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Despite the vast amount of research on the issue of intercultural dialogue, little is 
known about its role in the foreign cultural policy of so-called Muslim and 
Western countries. This study investigates the role of different discourses of 
intercultural dialogue in the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany from 
1998 to 2013. By focusing on discourses of “European-Islamic cultural dialogue” 
of Germany and “interfaith dialogue” and “dialogue among civilizations of Iran”, 
the study investigates the structure of the foreign cultural policy of both countries. 
It applies the methodology of grounded theory and consequently analyzes 
published texts, including annual reports, legal statements and budget bills, as 
well as the views of some 81 interviewees who have been involved in the 
implementation of intercultural dialogue activities. The relevant activities of the 
cultural section of the German embassy in Iran, the Deutscher Akademischer 
Austauschdienst, the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, and the Goethe Institute, 
as well as relevant activities of Iran’s Rayzani in Germany (the branch office of 
the Organization of Islamic Culture and Relations) and the International Center 
for Dialogue among Civilizations are explored in detail.  
Intercultural dialogue has played a supplemental role in the foreign cultural policy 
of Germany and Iran towards each other, but in different ways. It created an 
opportunity for German actors to continue implementing cultural activities with 
Iranian partners, even in difficult times. It likewise created a chance for Iranian 
actors to assist in Germany’s cultural projects. Intercultural dialogue played a 
supplemental role in the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany in different 
ways because of the differences between the structure of the foreign cultural 
policy of Iran and Germany, the organizational efficiency of their respective 
cultural actors, and their political considerations. This finding illustrates that 
although the cultural relationship between Iran and Germany has been affected by 
political tensions, it has been influenced by apolitical factors (organizational 
efficiency and the integrated or dual structure of their foreign cultural policy) too. 
Five main characteristics of intercultural dialogue are as follows: firstly, German 
actors have played a more active role in implementing intercultural dialogue than 
Iranian actors; secondly, Iranian actors have not been as active as German actors 
but have mostly accompanied German actors; thirdly, besides classic activities 
like seminars and round tables, there have been new forms of intercultural 
Abstract 
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dialogue activities such as exchange of interns; fourthly, there has been a high 
number of intercultural dialogue activities in the academic field; fifthly, the 
activities were adversely affected by the presidential change in Iran from Khatami 
to Ahmadinejad. 
 
Key Words  
intercultural dialogue, foreign cultural policy, Iran, Germany, Muslim world, 
Western world 
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In August 2015, when cultural relations between Iran and Germany were revived 
after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known also as the Iran nuclear deal, 
news broke of the cancelation of a performance by the Berlin Staatskapelle 
orchestra in Iran. The conductor, Daniel Barenboim, would not be allowed to 
perform in the country. Barenboim had been invited, among other cultural actors, 
academics and artists, to accompany Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the German 
foreign minister at that time, on his visit to Tehran. However, because of his 
Israeli nationality, Barenboim was treated differently from other members of the 
entourage. The performance was initially postponed by Iran, but later Hossein 
Noushabadi, the speaker of the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance, stated 
that the objection was not to a performance by the Berlin orchestra in Iran, but to 
the head of the orchestra: 
 
“He has multiple nationalities and one of them is Israeli. Iran does not recognize the 
Zionist regime and will not work together with artists of this regime” (Husband 2015).  
 
Not only were the Iranian authorities intent on canceling the performance, the 
Israeli cultural minister Miri Regev also tried to prevent the German state from 
allowing Daniel Barenboim to perform in Iran. It was reported in the news that 
she had posted on Facebook that she would send a letter to the German 
chancellor, Angela Merkel, requesting her to block the concert: 
“In my letter I shall stress that Daniel Barenboim’s appearance in Iran harms Israel’s 
efforts to prevent the nuclear agreement and gives encouragement to de-legitimization 
of Israel” (Daily News 2015).  
 
Because Barenboim had shown solidarity with the Palestinian population and 
founded a youth orchestra, the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra, of Israeli, Egyptian, 
Iranian, Jordanian, Lebanese and Palestinian musicians, he was accused by Regev 
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of “using culture as a platform for his anti-Israel political views” (Daily News 
2015). Reactions of Iranian and Israeli authorities to the performance by 
Barenboim in Iran suggest that the cancelation of the cultural program was 
entirely political and the result of the political antagonism between Iran and Israel 
and had little to do with the cultural relationship between Iran and Germany. 
Clearly, to understand the cultural relationship between Iran and Germany, it is 
not enough to concentrate on culture; it is also important to study its political 
dimension.  
The Iranian authorities’ cancelation of the performance illustrates that the foreign 
cultural policy of Iran and of Germany have deep differences. First there is a 
question as to the Iranian foreign cultural policy towards Germany: Were the 
relevant Iranian authorities aware of the multiple nationalities of Daniel 
Barenboim and his supportive attitude towards Palestinians? If so, then perhaps 
allowing the performance to take place could have been construed as Iran, 
together with Germany, siding with the Palestinians. Cancelation of the 
performance thus indicates that Iranian foreign cultural policy is affected by 
political issues and conservative rather than progressive in its decisions in critical 
situations. If not, it shows that Iranian foreign cultural policy towards Germany is 
not sufficiently informed. Furthermore, the fact that the orchestra is led by a 
person who has multiple nationalities shows that German foreign cultural policy, 
specifically at the time of Steinmeier, supported making music accessible to 
people beyond national, religious or ethnic boundaries, as the Berlin Staatskapelle 
orchestra also mentioned in a statement (Iran Daily 28.08.2015). Iran’s 
cancelation of this performance shows that either this aspect of German foreign 
cultural policy is not recognized by Iranian foreign cultural policy makers, or that 
its own foreign cultural policy is so mixed with politics that a straightforward 
decision cannot be made. Cancelation of the music performance thus suggests that 
Iranian foreign cultural policy towards Germany is not clear.  
The German authorities were apparently under political pressure to cancel the 
performance, too. The fact that it was not they but the Iranian authorities who 
canceled it suggests that the German authorities in charge of foreign cultural 
policy resisted being influenced by pressures from Israel; at least in this very 
specific case, they did not stop the performance in order to keep the Israeli 
government happy. In this case, German foreign cultural policy was differentiated 
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from other elements of German foreign policy, such as its diplomatic and 
economic policies, and the decision made separately. Moreover, organization of 
this big celebratory cultural performance with input from the German 
government, at a time when the international political atmosphere towards Iran 
had just changed positively, indicates that German foreign cultural policy had 
continued its cultural connections with Iran from earlier times. If the cultural 
performance was to take place, it was unlikely to be initiated from Stunde Null 
[zero] and solely because of the open atmosphere after the Iran nuclear deal; it 
was likely to be initiated because of a distinct foreign cultural policy on 
Germany’s part towards Iran. 
One year after cancelation of the music performance, another cultural event, this 
time scheduled to take place in Berlin, was canceled in December 2016. This was 
a planned exhibition of Western modern art collected more than three decades 
earlier by Farah Diba, the wife of Iran’s then king Mohammad Reza Shah. 
Following Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s visit to Iran in 2015, the idea of holding this 
exhibition was suggested jointly by senior officials of the Tehran Museum of 
Contemporary Art and the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation. However, it did 
not take place, because the Iranian authorities failed to provide an export permit, a 
necessary piece of paperwork to transfer the paintings to Berlin on schedule (The 
Local 27.12.2016, Zeit Online 27.12.2016). It seems that the resignation of Ali 
Janati, the minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance, and growing political 
sensitivities regarding showing an art collection of the pre-revolutionary rulers of 
Iran, played a role in delaying the export permit. Consequently, the Prussian 
Cultural Heritage Foundation canceled the contract for the exhibition because of 
the failure to meet the agreed opening date and the impossibility of planning for 
an uncertain event.  
Two points are relevant in considering these cancelations: Firstly, it seems that a 
mixture of political and institutional or organizational problems influence the 
foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany towards each other and consequently 
hinder cultural relations between them. Secondly, it is significant that, despite 
these problems, something exists between Iran and Germany that prevents them 
from giving up on their cultural relationship. Events such as music performances 
and art exhibitions are not the only cultural exchanges between Iran and Germany. 
There are other cultural programs, such as German language courses (like those 
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held by the Goethe Institute), academic exchanges (like scholarship opportunities 
offered by the DAAD for Iranian students) and interfaith discussions (like 
seminars which have been held by Rayzani1), which, far from the mainstream 
media’s spotlight and therefore the critical attention of opponents, have continued 
for several years. Parts of those cultural programs have been implemented during 
the last two decades in the framework of “intercultural dialogue”. This indicates 
that Iran and Germany have showed a specific interest in intercultural dialogue 
through different discourses. Studying cultural activities between Iran and 
Germany in the framework of intercultural dialogue is significant because they 
have survived during the last two decades despite political tensions and 
institutional inefficiencies.  
 
Intercultural dialogue is a general and abstract concept that has attracted attention 
at international level in different contexts. The first is its role as an instrument of 
the Middle East peace process, especially in the conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians. The second is the post-9/11 era, including the Afghan and Iraqi wars 
and occupations. Intercultural dialogue in this context was introduced as a tool of 
the war on terror. The third context is the Western-Muslim relationship with a 
domestic or regional aspect, for instance in regard to the integration of Muslim 
immigrants in European/Western society. Germany is a good example, as it has 
received labor immigrants from Turkey and the Middle East since the 1950s; 
another is the attention the Iranian government has paid to intercultural dialogue 
since the late 20th century, as a way of bringing itself out of international isolation 
and re-constructing its relationship with the West. Both these examples are 
explored in subchapter 1.1. However, the point of reviewing these three contexts 
is to show that intercultural dialogue has played a role beyond international 
relations. The hypothesis is that it has also done so in the countries’ foreign 
cultural policy. This is an aspect of their intercultural dialogue that has been 
neglected in recent literature. In analyzing what role it has played in Iranian and 
German foreign cultural policy towards each other, this study explores its specific 
discourses in the respective countries, the cultural actors that implemented them, 
and their aims in doing so.  
                                                          
1 Rāyzani is the branch office of the Iranian Organization of Islamic Culture and Communication in Germany. 
It is the official cultural representative of the Iranian government in Germany, but it has some differences 
from the “cultural attaché”.This point will be explained in detail in 6.1.1.  




1.1 Discourses Relating to Intercultural Dialogue in Germany and 
Iran 
The term “intercultural dialogue” has often been used by international 
organizations such as the UN and EU to mean a process of open and respectful 
exchange between different individuals and groups. However, this definition is 
very abstract and general. It is no surprise that it has not been perceived and 
articulated in a common and coherent way in Iranian and German society, as it 
has emerged through different discourses, historical backgrounds and government 
initiatives in both countries. The cultural actors and institutions implementing it 
have therefore had different aims and procedures. The difference between 
discourses of intercultural dialogue in Iran and Germany makes investigating its 
role in their respective foreign cultural policy towards each other all the more 
fascinating. 
Intercultural dialogue is articulated in Iran through discourses of “interfaith 
dialogue” and “dialogue among civilizations”, while in Germany it is found in 
discourses of the German Islam Conference (although this discourse has a 
domestic function and aims at Muslim immigrants in Germany, not Muslims all 
over the world) and “European-Islamic cultural dialogue” (also known as 
“intercultural dialogue” or “dialogue of cultures”). Discourses of intercultural 
dialogue in both societies have attracted attention beyond the political rhetoric of 
their politicians. Within these discourses, some Iranian and German cultural actors 
and institutions run projects intended for both German and Iranian participants. 
Surprisingly, it was found during this study that the German and Iranian 
organizers of those initiatives were rarely informed of their respective 
counterparts. They operated like single-tasking cultural actors, concentrating on 
each other’s public (Iranian and German participants), but with little relevant 
information (or concern) about the organizers of cultural activities in the other 
country within the intercultural dialogue discourse.  
On the German side, however, an integrated approach to implementing cultural 
activities for the Iranian and German public has been observed (these points will 
be discussed in detail in chapters 5 and 6). German cultural actors have shown 
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more interest in the Iranian public than in Iranian cultural partners (any actor who 
has an interest in cooperating in intercultural dialogue). It was remarkable to talk 
to a former director of a German institute, for example: When asked why specific 
attention was not given to Iran in his institute’s cultural activities, he replied that 
Iran had never involved itself in intercultural dialogue (Maaß, personal 
communication, 2015).  
Meanwhile, the Iranian side was not sufficiently informed about German actors in 
intercultural dialogue. Some Iranian cultural institutions have got to know some 
German cultural institutions, and several Iranian participants, including 
academics, pupils, artists and theologians, have participated in intercultural 
dialogue activities organized by German actors. But still, on the Iranian side there 
has been very little knowledge of German institutions that specifically 
implemented intercultural dialogue with Muslim countries. A former member of 
staff of an Iranian cultural institute was asked why it had never cooperated with a 
German cultural institute that specifically implemented activities under 
intercultural dialogue. He responded, very confidently, that there had been no 
intercultural dialogue institution in the world, including Germany, before the idea 
of “dialogue among civilizations” was introduced by the Iranian president 
Mohammad Khatami in 1998. 
In the course of developing this study and scrutinizing publications of Iranian and 
German foreign affairs ministries and cultural institutes, media records and books, 
as well as interviewing officers of relevant organizations, diplomats and experts 
on both sides, quite the opposite of what the German and Iranian actors expressed 
initially emerged: Not only has intercultural dialogue, within different discourses, 
attracted the attention of the Iranian and German states rhetorically, both states 
have also initiated official procedures and action plans, commissioned certain 
institutions and at different times given state and parastatal institutes, civil society, 
and volunteer groups opportunities to implement intercultural dialogue with other 
countries. It is significant that implementing these procedures was a step towards 
practically achieving a dialogue between Muslim and Western countries in both 
countries. Muslim countries were the target groups of the European-Islamic 
cultural dialogue on the German side, so it seems logical that Iran is also among 
them. Meanwhile, Western countries were target groups for interfaith dialogue 
and dialogue among civilizations on the Iranian side, so there are enough reasons 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
20  
to imagine that Germany, as a Western country, is also a target group for 
intercultural dialogue discourses on the Iranian side.  
The following account reflects the interest of the Iranian and German 
governments in developing intercultural dialogue between their countries. In 
September 1998, the fifth Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, went onto the 
stage of the 53rd General Assembly of the UN to present his speech (Khatami 
1388 [2009]: 15). Iran before that time had been automatically associated in the 
international realm with radical behaviors such as the American Embassy hostage 
crisis in Iran in 1979, which happened after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and 
the Mykonos assassination, which, according to a German court verdict, was 
organized by some Iranian politicians in 1992 (Küntzel 2009: 187-190, 
Mousavian 2008: 114-120). However, what Iran’s representative put to the UN 
this time had nothing to do with those typical images; the speech communicated a 
friendly and peace-seeking image of Iran, with a simple and general, but 
promising, message: a call for dialogue among civilizations. It attracted 
considerable attention from member states of the UN, including countries such as 
Israel and the USA, traditionally classed as hostile towards Iran in the 
international realm. The proposal to name 2001 the year of “dialogue among 
civilizations” was approved unanimously by all members (Hafeznia 2006: 21). 
Among the countries encouraging Iran’s approach to intercultural dialogue, 
Germany is significant. It not only celebrated the International Year of Dialogue 
among Civilizations -with the assistance of its ministries and civil society it 
implemented 90 projects, more than the contribution of any other country member 
of the UN (Picco 2001)-, it also strengthened its relationship with Iran after the 
cold relations following the Mykonos assassinations. Soon enough, after 
Khatami’s speech, Hermes Kreditversicherungs AG [German credit insurance 
company] increased the investment ceiling in Iran.2 In 2000, the presidents of the 
two countries, Johannes Rau and Mohammad Khatami, met and shook hands in 
Weimar in front of TV and radio journalists, cultural and political activists, while 
some opponents of the event protested. The presidents inaugurated a memorial on 
                                                          
2 Hermes insurance, according to Mousavian, has increased its investment ceiling in Iran in different periods 
and in different ways since 1992. For instance, there is a record of it agreeing to cover a total of 9.3 billion 
Deutsche Mark in 1992 (Mousavian 2008: 51) and an individual project in Iran worth 1 billion Dollars 
following the Paris nuclear agreement in 2004 (Mousavian 2012: 12). It is also important to mention that not 
only this German agency but also some British and Italian agencies, following the presidency of Mohammad 
Khatami in 1997, started to restore coverage for risks in Iran after a two- to four-year hiatus between 1994 
and 1996 (Kielmas 1998).  
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Beethovenplatz in the city of Weimar consisting of two simple stone seats and 
called the Goethe-Hafiz Memorial, symbolic of intercultural dialogue between 
two national poets of Germany and Iran, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and 
Mohammad Hafiz Shirazi (Einboden 2014: 2).  
Despite Iran’s efforts, the support of international organizations such as the UN 
and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the active role of some 
Western countries such as Germany to form the skeletal framework of dialogue on 
the level of international relations, some analyses show that it failed to mobilize 
countries around the world to contribute to peace (these analyses will be reviewed 
in chapter 3). Iran “was not in Western eyes the most credible candidate to lead a 
global movement promoting cultural tolerance” (Puchala et al. 2015: 131), so the 
effort failed from the diplomatic point of view. At the same time, Iran did not 
represent the entire Islamic world in the context of dialogue between Western and 
Muslim civilizations (Tazmini 2009: 82). Even if Iran is considered to represent 
Shia Islam, it failed to represent the majority of the Islamic world, who are 
followers of Sunni Islam. 
If intercultural dialogue in the framework of dialogue among civilizations is not 
considered to be significantly successful on an international level, it is important 
to understand why and how it has attracted the attention of the Iranian and 
German state. It is also crucial to identify which Iranian and German institutions 
and individuals have played a role as actors of intercultural dialogue.  
Attention to the issue of intercultural dialogue in Germany has its roots in the 
post-World War II era. Germany has since tried to mediate an image for itself 
internationally that has the least familiarity with the idealistic and nationalist 
views of the former Nazi regime. Germany strove to express itself as a 
Kulturnation [cultural nation] and make itself known as a country of education, 
technology and art.3 More efforts were made in the 1970s, at the time of Willy 
Brandt, when the idea of “culture as a two way street” was introduced to German 
foreign policy (Paschalidis 2014: 464). This idea was strengthened by speeches of 
German politicians such as Roman Herzog and Johannes Rau, former German 
presidents, and structural changes which led to more opportunities for 
                                                          
3 As will be discussed in 2.1, attempts to mediate Germany as a cultural nation have emerged since the 19th 
century and sometimes been interrupted for political reasons. In the post-WW II era, this approach aimed to 
show that race played a lesser role in being German, and democratic values and culture, such as art and 
music, had more to do with the image of this nation. 
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Mittlerorganisationen4 and civil society. There will be an opportunity to return to 
this point in chapter 2. Hence Khatami’s idea of dialogue among civilizations was 
encouraged by the German politicians, not because it was an entirely new idea, as 
some officials in Iran seem to believe, but because it fitted the approach that 
German foreign cultural policy had taken since (at least) the 1970s. Meanwhile, 
events such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the establishment of the Alliance of 
Civilizations in the UN in 2005, and the Arab Spring in 2011 amplified the 
attention of the German state to intercultural dialogue with Muslim countries. 
The interest of Iran in intercultural dialogue has a more complex context. In the 
era after the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian state attempted to create an image for 
itself that distanced it considerably from the pro-Western policies of its former 
government under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. It strove to present Iranian 
culture as an idealistic Islamic and revolutionary culture. It claimed to unify 
Muslim countries of the world and act against imperialism, although realizing 
those ideological aims was interrupted for at least two reasons: Firstly, the Iran-
Iraq war (1980-1988) affected Iranian foreign cultural policy, especially towards 
its neighbor countries, so its focus in cases like Central Asian countries was on 
cultural rather than religious and revolutionary aims (Johnston 2007, Wastnidge 
2014). Secondly, Iran was unable to pursue an integrated foreign cultural policy 
because its decision-making system was governed by a religiously and a 
democratically legitimated sector of the Iranian state, which often disagreed over 
foreign policy issues. Specifically, in the post-Iran-Iraq war era, what the 
religiously legitimized sector of the Iranian state endeavored to mediate as Iran’s 
culture abroad was not necessarily the same as that of the democratically 
legitimized sector. More details of this background will be discussed in chapter 2.  
With Iranian foreign cultural policy not strongly oriented on its idealistic aims and 
its decision makers not always in agreement on the details, two discourses have 
emerged, interfaith dialogue and dialogue among civilizations. Interfaith dialogue 
is a discourse encouraged by the religious sector of the Iranian state, although its 
roots are originally in the initiatives of some Iranian religious intellectuals that 
started to open up communication between Iran and the world in the early post-
                                                          
4 A Mittlerorganisation is an organization whose financial source is the state but which is directed by non-
state actors (Maaß 2005 and 2015). It is also called a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization 
(QUANGO) or semi-public administrative body. This type of organization will be discussed more in 2.4.1 
and 6.2.   
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Revolution era. Two of those intellectuals today are dissident theologians 
(Hidalgo et al. 2016: 324), and one lives in exile (Soroush 2009: x). Dialogue 
among civilizations, meanwhile, emerged in 1997 as a main manifestation of 
President Khatami, a reformist politician, among other things as a way of 
establishing a promising relationship with the West (Tazmini 2009). But it did not 
reflect the view of the entire Iranian state. The religiously legitimated sector, for 
different reasons which will be discussed in chapter 5, was either against it or not 
very enthusiastic about it. Khatami’s successor introduced other discourses in the 
fields of nuclear power, foreign threats and political repression (Warnaar 2013), 
which had nothing to do with intercultural dialogue but were more sympathetic to 
the foreign policy objectives of the religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian 
state. Contrary to the views of German participants in the study, the existence of 
the two discourses suggests that an Iranian version of intercultural dialogue does 
exist. The presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), his radical anti-
Israeli rhetoric, negotiations between the West and Iran over the issue of nuclear 
power, and finally, in 2013, the presidency of Hassan Rouhani, a centrist and 
reformist politician, redirected the Iranian state’s attention towards the issue of 
intercultural dialogue with Western countries.    
Iranian and German interest in intercultural dialogue raises the question of how 
and why it fitted into the different foreign cultural policies of these countries. It 
seems that cultural activities which were implemented as intercultural dialogue 
had specific characteristics that enabled them to survive and continue, with no or 
only rare interruption, for nearly two decades. These characteristics seemed to 
match the expectations of the democratically and the religiously legitimized 
sectors of the Iranian state. They also seemed to match the expectations of the 
German state. 
To understand these characteristics, it is essential to analyze how intercultural 
dialogue has been investigated academically, in which fields it has been 
implemented, and with which type of participants (for instance experts and key 
political figures, or pupils and students). The type of intercultural dialogue 
activities implemented in the context of foreign cultural policy is key in reviewing 
the literature. Questions of intercultural dialogue and interests of political and 
cultural actors or governments are central to most of the research and 
investigations. But what is important in this study is how and why intercultural 
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dialogue has attracted the attention of Iran and Germany, and what its role is in 
the context of their foreign cultural policy towards each other. The next 
subchapter considers the main question of the research in closer detail. 
 
 
1.2 The Research Question in Detail 
This study attempts to answer the following research question:   
What role has intercultural dialogue played with regard to the foreign 
cultural policy of Iran and Germany towards each other, and why?  
The next step in defining the research question is to explain each concept in its 
formulation. These concepts are explained in 1.2.1. 
 
1.2.1 Key Definitions  
It is possible to understand the role of intercultural dialogue in the foreign cultural 
policy of Iran and Germany if key concepts such as “intercultural dialogue” are 
clearly defined. Here, six key terms will be explained.  
 
1.2.1.1 Intercultural Dialogue in Academic Debates  
Before defining intercultural dialogue in this research, it is important to briefly 
look at how it is reflected in academic debates. Terms such as “dialogue”, 
“culture”, “interculturality” and “multiculturalism” have a long tradition in 
academic discussions in disciplines such as philosophy, social science and cultural 
studies, while intercultural dialogue has attracted attention only in limited studies, 
mostly conducted by international organizations such as the EU and the UN. 
Perhaps the UN members’ acceptance of naming 2001 the year of dialogue among 
civilizations was symbolic of a culmination of global attention to the issue of 
intercultural dialogue at the beginning of the 21st century. In 2005 the UN 
established the Alliance of Civilizations, and in 2008 the EU declared the 
European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. It is clear that there has been a 
worldwide effort to revive intercultural dialogue and keep it alive in the 
international realm. But it should not be forgotten that the initial flame of attention 
to the issue of dialogue among civilizations was ignited years earlier. In a policy 
report published by the UN University, references to intercultural dialogue and 
related terms by Director Generals of UNESCO emerged after the 1980s, peaked 
in 2001 and fluctuated up to 2015 (Bloom 2013: 4). Another report of the UN 
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Source: Valeria Bello (2013: 4) 
 
University also illustrated that the number of UN documents containing the terms 
“racism”, “interfaith”, “security” and “interreligious” in combination with the 
expression “intercultural dialogue” increased between 2000 and 2012. “Racism” 
was a key argument associated with the term “intercultural dialogue” in the first 
half of the last decade (2000-2004); nevertheless, its importance gradually 
decreased, and “security” became an issue closely connected with the concept of 
intercultural dialogue (Bello 2013: 4). In figure 1, Bello visualizes how use of the 
concept of security in association with intercultural dialogue reached its peak in 
UN documents in 2008 and 2012: 
 
Figure 1. Number of UNESCO documents containing four core phrases associated with 








Besides a high number of references to the issue of intercultural dialogue in 
official documents and by the Director Generals of UNESCO, the efforts of 
academics such as Hans Köchler, an Austrian philosophy professor who in 1972 
suggested that UNESCO should hold a conference on dialogue between different 
cultures (Köchler 2012: 2), have been considerable. The theory of the “clash of 
civilizations” of Samuel Huntington, which challenges Islamic civilization as a 
threat to Western civilization (Huntington 1996: 28), should not be neglected as 
one of the factors to attract the attention of the UN members to cultural dialogue 
as a possible solution and accept 2001 being named the year of dialogue among 
civilizations, as mentioned above. The issue of intercultural dialogue was also 
taken more seriously by some governments after the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
(Puchala et al. 2015: 131).  
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The huge amount of attention to the issue of intercultural dialogue at international 
level raises some questions. If intercultural dialogue is such a prominent topic in 
the international realm, why is it mostly visible in studies by international 
organizations? Does it attract any attention from independent academics? Is there 
any study providing evidence that intercultural dialogue can realistically 
contribute to problems such as racism and security? Or is intercultural dialogue 
still expressed as a hope and a strategy? Why should members of the UN believe 
in the function of intercultural dialogue in the first place? They not only support it 
rhetorically; some of them, like Germany and Iran, also take it seriously in foreign 
cultural policy. What are the actual aims that states pursue in supporting 
intercultural dialogue on a national level?  
Studies that consider intercultural dialogue can be divided into two categories. 
The first considers it theoretically and conceptually. “Dialogue” is argued to be a 
Greek notion referring to a process of communication between two sides, 
although it has been emphasized that it is not limited to practical action and is also 
a metaphorical and abstract approach that reflects interaction between thoughts 
and philosophies (Linell 2009: 2-3). Some studies also emphasize the distinction 
between it and other forms of communication, such as encouragement (Swidler 
2007: 6-7) and negotiation (Abu-Nimer et al. 2007: 8, Romano 2013). In the field 
of hermeneutics, Hans-Georg Gadamer argued that there is no absolute 
knowledge. Understanding a text is actually a process in which both the text and 
the interpreter, the two sides of communication, find themselves in a particular 
“horizon” or historical context. It is called the “fusion of horizons”, which 
indicates that people exist neither in a closed nor unique horizon (Gadamer 1980, 
Gadamer 1997). This point is relevant in dialogue between people from different 
cultures, because it reminds us that each side comes to a dialogue with his or her 
own self-interpreted story.  
The second category of studies considers intercultural dialogue as a practical way 
of achieving specific aims in social life that have to do with solving problems. 
Such studies discuss topics including applying intercultural dialogue to contribute 
to peace (Carpenter 2011), coexistence of people from different faiths (Ayoub 
2004, Güzelmansur 2009, Kaulig 2004), conflict resolution in multiethnic 
societies (Seidova 2011), promoting integration of immigrants, especially in the 
European context (Foote 2005, Pinheiro 2008, Wilk-Woś 2010), strengthening 
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regional and global security (Atwan 2010, Bourquin 2003), development of the 
education system (Yaron 1993) and civil society (Anderson 2010, ITAD/COWI 
2012, Kaur-Stubbs 2010), and women’s rights (Jaggar 2005). It is important to 
remember that most of these studies are done or commissioned by international 
organizations, such as the UN and UNESCO, and by multinational organizations, 
such as the EU. In most of these studies, the concept and characteristics of 
intercultural dialogue are not defined; it is therefore hard to decide whether 
intercultural dialogue has achieved the specific aims, or failed.  
Some studies belong to both categories. They consider dialogue between specific 
groups like Muslim and Western countries, but discuss them in a general way. For 
instance, Naika Foroutan in her study talks about cultural dialogue as a 
contribution to resolving cultural conflicts between Muslim and Western 
countries. But Foroutan’s discussions, rather than being connected to a specific 
case study, argue in an abstract way. For instance, it is not clear exactly which 
Muslim or Western country she means, or whether she means Muslims in Western 
countries (Foroutan 2004).  
The first shortcoming of these two categories of studies is that they do not include 
the empirical and theoretical dimensions of intercultural dialogue in their analysis. 
The studies on intercultural dialogue fail theoretically and conceptually to connect 
it to political realities and case studies; meanwhile, studies that consider 
intercultural dialogue in a practical sense mostly do not analyze it in the country-
specific, political and conceptual contexts. Secondly, it seems that the first 
category of studies refers to homogenous societies and metaphorical contexts 
(thoughts, knowledge), whereas the second sometimes addresses multicultural 
groups inside one society and sometimes different cultural groups in different 
societies. Thirdly, the practical aims of intercultural dialogue have hardly been 
examined or investigated at country/state level. The question why states should 
rationally have an interest in intercultural dialogue has only been considered 
vaguely in the context of peace and conflict studies, and the role of intercultural 
dialogue in the foreign cultural policy of different countries has been neglected in 
studies to date. This study attempts to fill that gap. 
Some studies consider the activities of “Arab-European dialogue”, “critical 
dialogue” and “constructive dialogue” in the policies of various countries. 
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However, these activities were implemented to achieve political and economic 
aims in the foreign policy of European and Muslim countries. Arab-European 
dialogue, as a study by Bat Ye’or argues, was intended to reach agreement over 
the price of oil and some political issues, such as the peace process in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Yeʼor 2002). Critical and constructive dialogue, as 
Seyyed Hossein Mousavian and Matthias Struwe discuss in their studies, was 
implemented between EU countries and Iran and aimed at specific political and 
human rights issues (Mousavian 2008, Struwe 1998). Therefore there is a degree 
of convergence between the gap that this study seeks to fill and the study by 
Struwe and Mousavian, because both analyze activities which are articulated as 
“dialogue” and supported by states. This study, however, will analyze dialogue 
activities that are supported by states under their foreign cultural policy, not in the 
framework of their economic and political foreign policy.  
It is also relevant to consider academic debates which have taken place in the field 
of the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany and the relationship between 
them. Several studies analyze the foreign cultural policy of Germany 
(Andrei/Rittberger 2005, Hoffmann 2005, Maaß 2005b, Schreiner 2011), and a 
few consider Iran’s foreign cultural policy (Johnston 2007, von Maltzahn 2015), 
although none considers intercultural dialogue as a specific instrument of foreign 
cultural policy. In some studies, too, cultural activities such as academic 
exchanges between Iran and Germany (Kochwasser 1961, Martin 1959) have 
been reviewed and analyzed in the historical relationship between the two 
countries. However, no study has considered cultural activities implemented as 
intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany in a historical context. 
To fill these gaps, the study analyzes the role that activities under intercultural 
dialogue plays in the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany towards each 
other. The next subchapter will explain in detail what the research question and 
subquestions of this study are, and which methodology best fits the research 
question.   
 
1.2.1.2 Defining “intercultural dialogue” in this Research 
This study does not treat intercultural dialogue as a general and abstract concept 
to be implemented between different groups of people, divided by their religion 
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and ethnicity. It considers it instead to refer to cultural activities which have been 
implemented or supported by the Iranian and German state for both Iranian and 
German participants. The notion of “dialogue” in intercultural dialogue describes 
communication between the Iranian and German sides, and the notion of 
“cultural” places it in the cultural rather than military, commercial and economic 
fields. All theoretical views of culture and dialogue are respected in this study, but 
it does not intend to examine those theories in the field study. Dialogue and 
culture have their local discourses in Iranian and German society, which were 
specifically reflected on in 1.1. Those discourses simply lead the researcher to 
where to look for intercultural dialogue activities in an Iranian and German field 
study. 
It is important to explain which Iranian and German actors and institutes have 
been active in implementing cultural activities as intercultural dialogue. The case 
study thus includes Iranian institutions and individuals that have been assisted by 
the Iranian state to implement cultural activities within the framework of interfaith 
dialogue and dialogue among civilizations with Western countries generally and 
with Germany specifically. It similarly includes German institutions and 
individuals that have been assisted by the German state to implement cultural 
activities under the discourse of European-Islamic cultural dialogue with Muslim 
countries generally and with Iran specifically. 
Cultural products that reflect the influence of Iranian and German culture on each 
other, such as translations of German books in Farsi and vice versa, are not 
included in the case study, unless they are produced as part of the intercultural 
dialogue activities of the actors mentioned in this study.  
In this study, intercultural dialogue is defined as specific cultural activities, 
including seminars, conferences, academic and educational exchanges, cultural 
exhibitions, co-written books, and internship programs implemented by Iranian or 
German actors for Iranian and German participants. Cultural activities organized 
by Iranian and German actors exclusively for Iranian participants or exclusively 
for German participants, or for Iranian participants and non-German participants, 
or German participants and non-Iranian participants, therefore cannot be counted 
as “intercultural dialogue” in this study.  
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This study does not set out to examine whether the content of cultural activities 
corresponds to the characteristics of dialogue in the view of scholars. It does not 
intend to define intercultural dialogue in the context of Iranian and German 
foreign cultural polices; it intends to analyze the projects that have been called 
intercultural dialogue by Iranian and German actors and to understand what role 
they played in the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany towards each other.  
 
The role of intercultural dialogue is analyzed in this study precisely and 
specifically with regard to the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany; it 
considers the role of cultural activities that are implemented under the discourse 
of intercultural dialogue in the context of foreign cultural policy, not their role in 
the foreign policy or domestic cultural policy of the two countries.  
 
1.2.1.3 Defining “Foreign Cultural Policy” in this Research  
A distinction is made between “foreign cultural policy” and “cultural policy”: 
cultural policy refers to policies that a government makes regarding art and 
culture on a domestic level, even though in the era of globalization it is difficult to 
imagine that a state or a cultural actor can limit the effects of cultural activities to 
inside its national borders. Foreign cultural policy refers to the policies a 
government makes to represent itself culturally abroad. Normally, the state actors 
in charge of cultural policy inside a country are different from those in charge of 
its foreign cultural policy. This is true for Iran and Germany, though there is some 
overlap in both cases. In Germany, the federal government, and the foreign 
ministry specifically, is in charge of foreign cultural policy. For instance, it 
defines goals and reports annually on activities. According to one of the annual 
reports, foreign cultural policy “is an indispensable component of German foreign 
policy” (Auswärtiges Amt 2004: 4). In Iran, meanwhile, foreign cultural policy is 
decided by a sometimes unfavorable mixture of both the ministry of Islamic 
culture and guidance and the Organization of Islamic Culture and Relations. It is 
executed under the supervision of the Iranian ambassadors, who are appointed by 
the Iranian foreign ministry.  
The difference between “foreign cultural policy” and “foreign policy” should be 
noted, too. A country’s foreign policy consists of strategies and activities 
undertaken by the state (usually head of the government, ministry of foreign 
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affairs) to realize its national interests and to achieve specific goals in 
international relations. Cultural relations is one of the components that, together 
with others such as economic, commercial, energy, technological, educational and 
diplomatic relations, help a government to achieve its foreign policy objectives. 
“Foreign cultural policy” in this study specifically addresses that part of the 
decision-making system that is responsible for the cultural relations of Iran with 
Germany and vice versa in the context of their foreign policies. It addresses 
neither the entire foreign policy of Germany and Iran nor other components 
thereof, such as economic and commercial relations. 
As will be explained in chapter 3 at length, there are different expressions of 
cultural policy between countries, such as cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy 
and foreign cultural policy. This study focuses on “foreign cultural policy” 
because it is intended to create an image, culturally, for a country abroad, not to 
convince the public in other countries of a specific issue that is important to one 
country, which is the intention of cultural and public diplomacy. One of the 
scholars to specifically analyze foreign cultural policy is Düwell, who 
convincingly differentiates between Kulturelle Ausstrahlung/cultural 
broadcasting and Kulturpropaganda/cultural propaganda (Düwell 2005). Some 
theoretical views on foreign cultural policy, like that of Kurt Düwell, are taken 
into account in this study, but because the study is based on grounded theory 
(which will be explained in 1.3.3), no theoretical view of foreign cultural policy 
will be tested here.  
The term “foreign cultural policy” in this research refers to basic principles, 
mechanisms and activities that guide the Iranian and German governments on the 
implementation of cultural activities in other countries generally and in the 
respective other country (or for an Iranian and German public) specifically. 
 
1.2.1.4 Defining “playing a role” in this Research  
To understand what role intercultural dialogue has played in the foreign cultural 
policy of Iran and Germany towards each other, it is necessary to understand the 
aims and goals of each country’s foreign cultural policy generally and towards the 
other country specifically. If intercultural dialogue has (or has not, or has only 
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partly) been able to achieve certain aims of Iranian foreign cultural policy towards 
Germany and vice versa, this study analyzes what its role was, and why.  
To a large degree, “playing a role” refers to the the study’s findings on the aims of 
Iranian and German foreign cultural policy. Did intercultural dialogue assist 
foreign cultural policy in achieving the countries’ respective aims? Did it hinder 
them? Did intercultural dialogue become a very advanced tool in the hands of the 
foreign cultural policy actors for achieving their aims? Or was it just an empty 
phrase and nothing practical was achieved by it? If so, why and how is that the 
case? At the same time, it is important in this study to know what the 
characteristics of intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany are, because 
then the role of intercultural dialogue can be discussed more effectively.  
The role of intercultural dialogue can potentially be significant to achieving 
general or specific foreign cultural policy aims of both Iran and Germany. 
Similarly, it might hinder achievement of those aims. That is why it is essential to 
investigate what the role of intercultural dialogue in foreign cultural policy 
actually is.  
 
1.2.2.5 Defining “why” in this Research 
The study includes a critical perspective on the following subjects: (1) Iranian and 
German foreign cultural policy, its aims and main institutions; (2) actors that 
implement intercultural dialogue in both countries; (3) characteristics such as 
fields, participants and forms of intercultural dialogue; (4) meaningful discussion 
to place intercultural dialogue in the context of Iranian and German foreign 
cultural policy.  
 
Therefore, the study aims not just to understand what role intercultural dialogue 
played, but also the causes, reasons and consequences – the “why” – of such a 
role, with the help of these four critical perspectives.  
 
 
1.2.3 Period of Analysis 
This study covers the years between 1998 and 2013. The starting point and the 
end have been selected according to the cultural and political situation of Iran, not 
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Germany. In any dialogue, both sides should have an interest in participation. The 
German government has long paid attention to the issue of cultural dialogue as 
one of the main principles of its foreign policy. For instance, Roman Herzog, 
German president between 1994 and 1999, and Johannes Rau, who held office 
between 1999 and 2004, paid significant attention to the issue of cultural dialogue 
in Germany’s international relations. Both have published books (Herzog 1999, 
Rau 2002) and given speeches (Herzog 1995, Herzog 1997) on this issue. 
Furthermore, as will be discussed in chapter 2, Auswärtiges Amt [German foreign 
ministry] has explicitly devoted attention to the issue of dialogue since 2000, for 
instance through Konzept 2000 [concept 2000] and the establishment of an office 
of dialogue among cultures in the cultural department of German foreign ministry 
in 2002. Up to the last update of this research in 2016, this particular office still 
had a budget to fund state, para-state and civil society actors to implement cultural 
activities towards other countries. That being said, some studies conclude that 
German foreign policy changed between 2007 and 2013 from a predominantly 
normative orientation to a more utilitarian approach – they specifically refer to the 
foreign policies of the governments of Chancellors Helmut Kohl, Gerhard 
Schröder and Angela Merkel (Daehnhardt 2008). These changed objectives in 
German foreign policy do not mean that Germany discarded cultural dialogue 
with other countries between 1998 and 2013.  
By comparison, discourses of intercultural dialogue on the Iranian side have had 
ups and downs. Before Khatami proposed the idea of dialogue among civilizations 
to the UN in 1998, the country was known for its radical and revolutionary 
policies; 1998 is therefore a clear (re)starting point for dialogue-based foreign 
cultural policy in Iran. Implementation of and cooperation in intercultural 
dialogue from 2005 to 2013, under President Ahmadinejad, faced some 
difficulties. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2.4. Again, following 
the victory in 2013 of a reformist presidential candidate, Hassan Rouhani, there 
have been indications that Iran intends to resume the intercultural dialogue 
approach in its foreign relations. Khatami himself in an article in The Guardian 
warns the West not to turn its back on the opportunity of diplomatic relations with 
Iran. He says: “President Rouhani's platform of prudence and hope is a practical 
translation of the idea of dialogue among nations into the realm of politics” 
(Khatami 2013).  
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The timeframe between 1998 and 2013 was selected because it includes the rule 
of both an outspoken reformist president, Mohammad Khatami, and a committed 
conservative, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. As such, it can illustrate how intercultural 
dialogue played a role in Iran’s foreign cultural policy towards Germany in 
changing circumstances. German foreign cultural policy towards Iran during this 
period (and before and after) remained relatively stable, so the choice of 
timeframe for the analysis of German policy is less relevant. The research 
question points to the role of intercultural dialogue in the foreign cultural policy 
of Iran and Germany. So studying the content of intercultural dialogue in this 
period, 1998-2013, fits methodologically because the policy of one side of the 
dialogue fluctuated considerably while the other did not.  
 
1.3 Methodological Framework  
Most of the theories reviewed for this study are in fields such as philosophy and 
hermeneutics. Because no theoretical guideline was available to identify the role 
of intercultural dialogue in the two countries’ foreign cultural policy, this study 
has applied “grounded theory” as the methodological framework. The central 
point of grounded theory is that the researcher does not enter the field study to test 
a specific theory, but to analyze different texts (including reports, interviews and 
observations) from the field study and construct arguments accordingly. The texts 
are coded in different stages: initial, focused, axial and theoretical. These codes 
create the final discussions to answer the main question of the study. Grounded 
theory applied in this study follows leading scholars (Glaser/Strauss 2009, 
Strauss/Corbin 1990, Thornberg/Charmaz 2014), specifically those with 
constructivist approaches (Charmaz 2009, Charmaz 2014). Chapter 4 presents 
details on the use of grounded theory in this study.  
 
1.4 The Position of the Researcher within the Research 
This subchapter will explain what the position of the researcher in this study has 
been.  
Being born, growing up, studying journalism and cultural studies in Iran, working 
as a journalist and being active in different NGOs gave the researcher a valuable 
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opportunity to understand social, cultural and political conditions of Iranian 
society and governmental and non-governmental organizations. This native 
observation informed the selection of the discourse of intercultural dialogue, 
relevant cultural organizations and interview partners in Iran. The opportunity to 
do a PhD in Germany, getting to know the German cultural Mittlerorganisationen 
like the DAAD, and participating in its cultural exchanges, including 
Hochschuldialog mit der islamischen Welt [university dialogue with the Islamic 
world], meanwhile enabled the researcher to identify the possible discourse of 
intercultural dialogue, case study organizations and interview partners in 
Germany.  
Both of the above points may challenge the researcher’s objectivity. Bias in some 
regards is undeniable, but the researcher applied the method of grounded theory 
and used encounters in both German and Iranian case studies to become 
increasingly tied to the subject matter and ask questions comparatively; for 
instance, if Iranian interviewees have safety concerns about participating in this 
study, why is that the case? What about German interviewees? Do they also have 
security concerns? If so, why? If not, why not? 
Sometimes, feedback from interviewees on both sides suggested that they did not 
find the researcher sympathetic to their own activities. For instance, in an informal 
chat at the end of an interview with a director of division 609 of the cultural 
department of the German foreign affairs ministry, the researcher was asked about 
any surprising observations she had made. She mentioned a kind of German 
exceptionalism in the behavior of German participants in her primary observation. 
The comment angered the interviewee, who wanted to know whether this was a 
finding of the study, and if so, on what evidence.5 Another example is from an 
interview with an advisor of Mohammad Khatami about working procedures in 
the NGO for Dialogue among Civilizations. One of the questions was about his 
view of corruption in the financial affairs of this NGO, as a right-wing Iranian 
newspaper had written an article about it (Anbarluee 15.10.2015). This 
interviewee was so annoyed by the question that he wanted to stop the interview. 
                                                          
5 Some observations of pride in German values and the German education system among the German 
interviewees leads to the hypothesis of “German exceptionalism”, like that proposed by Seymour Martin 
Lipset with “American exceptionalism”. This study could not test the hypothesis because its aim was not to 
explore unarticulated beliefs of the participants. It is a fascinating topic for investigation in future studies and 
will be discussed in 8.4.  
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He finally advised the researcher to focus on political activities of the religiously 
legitimated sector of the Iranian state against the dialogue among civilizations, 
and not on the NGO’s financial affairs. Such feedback is perceived as evidence of 
the researcher’s objectivity, or at least critical approach, to the subject of the 
study. It suggests that the researcher, as an Iranian, was not distracted by promises 
of dialogue among civilizations in the Iranian field study. Nor was she, as an 
Iranian student who left Iran for political reasons and to study in Germany, much 




1.5 Structure of Chapters  
This study is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the relevance 
and significance of the research topic. It has also provided a brief overview of 
discourses of intercultural dialogue in Iranian and German society. Part of this 
chapter was devoted to discussing intercultural dialogue in international and 
academic debate as well as details of the research question. 
Chapter 2 will present an overview of the historical and political relationship 
between Iran and Germany. Although it is not a study on the history of the two 
countries, it considers academic views on the construction of the Iranian and 
German nation-states and the multi-dimensional historical relationship between 
them. This chapter also considers organized cultural and social activities between 
Iran and Germany in history and provides a short overview of changes in their 
political structure and the influences these changes had on the respective state’s 
approach to culture in its foreign relations. In particular, changes in the German 
political structure after World War II and in the Iranian political structure after the 
Islamic Revolution are discussed. 
Chapter 3 reviews the research and publications on the issue of intercultural 
dialogue. It reflects theoretical and conceptual approaches to components of the 
notion of intercultural dialogue: dialogue, culture, interculturality. It also presents 
a review of studies that have focused on different religious, civilizational and 
political dimensions of intercultural dialogue. Following these reviews, some gaps 
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and deficits in the relevant research will be discussed. The academic debate in the 
realm of intercultural dialogue reflects theoretical consideration of the general 
concept of dialogue. At the same time, academic debates also reflect practical 
outcomes of intercultural dialogue in real life, especially in the context of 
religious and civilizational dialogue and in fields such as education and civil 
society. However, combining these two approaches has been neglected so far. 
Another research gap exists in exploring how intercultural dialogue is articulated 
and interpreted in a given society and what its discourses are. It is then significant 
to analyze its main characteristics and whether it is practically able to achieve the 
aims of its implementers, and the reasons for success or failure. Based on these 
gaps, the research question will be developed at the end of chapter 3.  
Chapter 4 focuses specifically on the research methodology. Grounded theory is 
used for two reasons. Firstly, there is no theory that could efficiently guide this 
study in analyzing the role of intercultural dialogue in German and Iranian foreign 
cultural policy. Grounded theory is chosen to help construct a new theoretical 
discussion from the results of the field study. Secondly, intercultural dialogue that 
has been expressed in different discourses and in two different countries requires a 
method of analysis that can deal with highly dissimilar data, political and cultural 
contexts. Chapter 4 gives an overview of grounded theory and explains how the 
comparative study on the different levels of actors, aims and activities will be 
conducted. It also presents the methods used to collect data for this study, 
including text collection, interviews and observation. It describes data analysis 
including initial, focused, axial, and theoretical coding, and explains the 
intermediate phase of memo writing, which played an important role in the 
qualitative method of this study. Finally, some coding and analysis techniques 
used in this study will be described at the end of chapter 4.  
Chapter 5 concentrates on foreign cultural policy in Iran and Germany. A 
summary of German foreign cultural policy and its institutions is followed by 
discussion of the discourse of “European-Islamic cultural dialogue” within it. 
Iranian foreign cultural policy and its institutions are then discussed. The 
discourses of “interfaith dialogue” and “dialogue among civilizations” are 
analyzed thereafter. Chapter 5 thus presents an analysis of the aims of both 
countries’ foreign cultural policy and their intercultural dialogue discourses.  
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Chapter 6 focuses on the Iranian and German institutions and individuals that are 
actors of intercultural dialogue. Two, Rayzani and the International Center for 
Dialogue among Civilizations (ICDAC), will be discussed as the main actors on 
the Iranian side. Four, the Cultural Section of the German embassy in Iran, the 
DAAD, ifa, and the Goethe Institute, their historical background, aims, structure 
and practices will be investigated in this chapter. Other German and Iranian 
institutes and individuals that play a role in intercultural dialogue to a lesser 
degree will also be discussed. The main characteristics of activities implemented 
for Iranian and German participants under intercultural dialogue by the actors 
studied are presented at the end of the chapter. 
Chapter 7 presents the results of chapter 6. It applies the analysis of the study to 
answer the research question, to clarify what role intercultural dialogue with its 
specific characteristics has played in the foreign cultural policy of Iran and 
Germany. Chapter 7 thereafter argues that intercultural dialogue played a 
supplemental role in both Iranian and German foreign cultural policy towards 
each other from 1998 to 2013. Because the structure of their foreign cultural 
policy and the organizational efficiency of their cultural actors are dissimilar, their 
supplemental role helped them to reach their foreign cultural policy aims in 
different ways. Germany, given its integrated foreign cultural policy and high 
organizational efficiency, played an active role in achieving the aims of its foreign 
cultural policy towards Iran. Iran, meanwhile, because of its weaknesses in both 
respects, could not achieve its aims regarding Germany and has mostly played a 
supporting rather than initiating role, participating in intercultural dialogue with 
Germany but not driving it. Furthermore, the domestic and international policies 
of both Iran and Germany influenced their intercultural dialogue activities towards 
each other in different ways, too. 
Chapter 8 provides further analysis of the key findings, considers the contribution 
of this research in relation to the results of other studies, outlines perspectives for 
intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany in the future, and finally 
recommends topics for future research.     
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The topic of this study is the role of intercultural dialogue in the foreign cultural 
policy of Iran and Germany. But why Iran and Germany? Why not Iran and 
another Western country like France or the USA? Why not Germany and another 
Muslim country like Morocco or Saudi Arabia? This chapter attempts to present 
an outline of the political and historical relationship between Iran and Germany. 
The reason for discussing this issue is that the cultural activities implemented 
under the specific discourses of intercultural dialogue between 1998 and 2013 did 
not appear suddenly and without background. Iranian and German people 
perceive their own nations differently depending on their history and political 
changes. They have had access to different sources for understanding each other’s 
nations. They have had a historical relationship based on many different 
motivations, and they have managed to implement some cultural, social, 
economic and political activities with each other, with or without official 
contracts. The notion of “dialogue” appeared in the foreign cultural policy of both 
Germany and Iran, even though their foreign cultural policy was oriented towards 
“culture” in different ways after World War II and the Islamic Revolution 
respectively. These issues will be discussed in chapter 2. 
This chapter consists of five subchapters. It begins with a reflection on different 
characteristics of the Iranian and German nations. The focus of this study is not on 
the experience of participants in Iranian and German intercultural dialogue, but it 
is relevant to understand the main factors that shaped the German and Iranian 
nations. Subchapter 2.1 considers these factors. Subchapter 2.2 specifically 
reflects on how diverse and multiple the initiatives were to create the history and 
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relationship between Iran and Germany. Based on this discussion, subchapter 2.3 
goes on to reflect on the cultural and social activities that Iranian and German 
partners managed to implement through the will or support of the Iranian and 
German governments. Subchapter 2.4 considers the term “culture” as a concept 
for both Iranian and German foreign policy. It tries to portray how and through 
which historical environment the approach of the German state, mainly after the 
Second World War, and that of the Iranian state, mainly after the Islamic 
Revolution of Iran, have been shaped. The last subchapter summarizes the main 
arguments of chapter 2 in six points.  
The rationale behind reflecting on and discussing these historical contexts is 
firstly to highlight the differences and similarities between the two nations. 
Secondly, it is to highlight the existence of a paradigm of a relationship 
underpinned not only by people of both nations but also by the German and 
Iranian states. They have had an interest in contact with other cultures generally 
and with each other specifically. This paradigm is important to understand the 
study as a whole.  
 
 
2.1 Different Characteristics of the Iranian and German Nations 
This subchapter does not aim to go into theories of nationality, identity, nation-
building or state-building. It attempts to give an overview of diverse and multi-
dimensional characteristics of the German and Iranian nations. Germany is a 
country in Europe, Iran in Asia. Iran is generally known as a Muslim country, 
Germany a Western one. This incompatible definition, by religion and by 
geography, also gives a superficial understanding of people who live in these 
countries. The history of both Germany and Iran shows that their people, besides 
being European/Western or Muslim, have been part of a wider region and 
identified themselves according to diverse characteristics, such as poet, musician, 
philosopher, open-minded, conservative and secular, rather than Western. To 
understand the intercultural dialogue context of Germany and Iran, it would make 
sense to disregard the general labels of “Muslim” and “Western” and quest further 
into the characteristics of their nations. Even when Iran and Germany did not have 
their current political borders, they already had a relationship with each other. In 
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previous times, Germany was identified as part of das Heilige Römische Reich 
deutscher Nation [Holy Roman Empire] or das Alte Reich – from the late 15th to 
early 19th century (Stollberg-Rilinger 2014) – and Abendland [Occident]; Iran 
meanwhile has been mentioned historically as part of Persia – since the 
emergence of the Achaemenid federative state in the sixth century BC until the 
Sassanid period between the third and seventh century (Mojtahed Zadeh 2007: 
24) –, the Orient and Morgenland [Orient].  
 
Figure 2. A visual overview of the location of Iran and Germany  
 
 
Different social and political factors such as war, revolution and changes of 
political system, as well as religion and cultural heritage have influenced the way 
people of these regions, today Germany and Iran, have perceived their nations.  
German-speaking people in Europe have been known for almost a thousand years. 
They were identified through numerous Germanic tribes such as Saxons, Franks, 
Bavarians, Swabians, Silesians, and Thuringians rather than a single state, as 
David P. Conradt discusses. Different political changes in the territory of the 
German-speaking people constructed their political entity. Until 1871, the 
territory was divided into some small kingdoms and two major powers, Prussia 
and Austria. The efforts of Otto von Bismarck, the first imperial chancellor, to 
make what was then identified as the German Empire into a classical European 
power were considerable. Some scholars believe that without him on “top of 
Prussian politics”, the unification of Germany would not have developed “in quite 
the same way as it did” (Berghahn 1987: viii). However, as the next political 
Source: Google Maps (2013) 
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changes during the 19th century illustrate, the German “state” or “political system” 
could not play a stable role in shaping the German nation, simply because most of 
the German political systems were not long-lived.6 But exceptionally, in 1949, 
following the sovereignty of two separate states of East and West Germany (1949-
1990), a progressive approach was taken to establishing a stable German political 
state: in 1990, East Germany integrated its political system into the political 
system of West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany. Conradt uses this 
point to argue that Germany has been governed successfully under a stable 
political system for six decades: 
“During the past decades, the Federal Republic has developed into a strong, 
dynamic democracy. Unlike the Weimar Republic, the Federal Republic has, 
since its earliest days, been identified with economic prosperity and foreign and 
domestic policy successes. There is also considerable evidence that a consensus 
on democratic values and norms has developed during this period. The vast 
majority of the population supports this system and believes in its fundamental 
norms: individual freedom, the rule of law, civil liberties, free political 
competition, and representative intuitions” (Conradt 2011: 197).  
Hence it is likely that the contemporary political system has a significant 
influence on the German people’s perception of themselves as a nation.  
Social and political changes are not the only factors to shape the German nation. It 
is also shaped by different characteristics of the “culture” of German-speaking 
people. The Napoleonic Wars, which started from 1803, are believed to be one of 
the main reasons for bringing to the fore the cultural characteristic of the German 
nation. As Johann Gottlieb Fichte stated, after the collapse of the Holly Roman 
Empire in 1806, the German nation no longer identified itself with its state. 
Thereafter, concepts of culture vs. civilization7 and culture-nation vs. state-nation 
attracted more attention among the German people (Becker 2011: 29, Brenner et 
al. 2003: 108). As a result, the German nation attempted to characterize itself 
according to the culture it had in common with its Western neighbors, such as 
literature, philosophy, art and music, rather than what it inherited from its own 
empire, civilization, nobles and aristocrats. Establishment of two cultural 
institutes, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 6, has a strong connection 
                                                          
6 The German Empire (1871-1918), the unstable democratic republic of Weimar (1919-1933), a totalitarian 
dictatorship of the Nazi regime (1933-1945), a military occupation (1945-1949). 
7 Culture, generally speaking, refers to the way of life of a people, their arts, language, belief and lifestyle, 
while civilization refers to cultural embodiment, or what Kant believes to be a technical type of culture. Both 
concepts are defined in more detail in 3.1.2. 
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with this historical context. The Insitut für Ausßlandsbeziehungen (ifa) [Institute 
for Foreign Relations], for instance, was founded initially from an organization of 
the Museum und Institut zur Kunde des Auslanddeutschtums und zur Förderung 
deutscher Interessen im Ausland [Museum and institute on German foreign trade 
and promoting German interests abroad], established in 1917 under the patronage 
of King Wilhelm II of Württemberg (Metzinger 2013, Metzinger 2007). The 
Goethe Institute also dates back to 1923, when the Deutsche Akademie (DA) was 
founded to develop and institutionalize the German language at domestic and 
foreign level (Michels 2005: 102).  
Besides cultural aspects such as art and the German language, religion also had a 
role in bringing together the German nation, but not in a strong and integrated 
way like in either Israel, as Lily Weissbrod argues (1983), or Iran, as will be 
discussed later. Most Germans are born into the Roman Catholic and Evangelical 
Protestant, or Lutheran, churches. As Conradt explains, historically some rulers 
and governors in German-speaking areas would identify themselves as protectors 
of the faith in their territories to make the churches dependent on them. Lutheran 
and Catholic churches to this day are largely financed by a church tax, a surcharge 
of about 8 percent on individual income tax, collected by the German state. The 
relationship between church and state in Germany must be understood in this 
complex context. It is also important to mention that different political changes or 
financial circumstances have changed part of the German population’s views on 
identifying themselves with religion. For instance, a very pragmatic way of 
escaping the church tax is to formally leave the church, which is how most of the 
population in the west of Germany left the church. The policies of East Germany 
between 1949 and 1990 also resulted in a decline in the position of religion in the 
everyday life of its population. As Conradt shows, in 1991 only 21% of East 
Germans believed in God. This number compares with 61% of West Germans 
expressing a significant belief in God (Conradt 2011: 202-203).  
German-speaking people also identify themselves as a nation that organizes 
communities and institutions to construct relationships in social, economic and 
political fields. The Gesellenunterstützungsvereine [benefit societies] of the 18th 
century, which arbitrated between journeymen and masters in the late feudalism 
period, are one example. Benefit societies were not just an egalitarian-discursive 
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practice but also a way of enforcing specific interests and political ideas or of 
encouraging solidarity among journeyman towards masters. The establishment in 
1863 of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein [General German Workers’ 
Association], which is the founding father of a main political party of present-day 
Germany, to support the rights of workers is also considerable (Borchard/Heyn 
2015, Eder 1985: 155-160). Added to these are the continued activity of ifa since 
1917 and the Goethe Institute since 1923, as discussed above.  
Economic, social and political factors play a role in the way German-speaking 
people see themselves as a nation. A more specific factor is the constitution of the 
Weimar Republic (1918-1933), which focused on “Western civilization” (Becker 
2011: 95-97). In the Nazi era (1933-1945), a strategic vision of the German 
race/Aryan race was taken as a state vision; consequently, anything outside of this 
race was judged inferior and enemy. After Nazism and in the post-World War II 
era, the German nation made a return to its cosmopolitan “culture-nation” 
approach. Because the new German state wanted to distance itself culturally from 
the Nazi regime in particular, it encouraged identification of the German nation 
with cultural aspects such as its literature and music and with modern features 
such as its education system and technology.  
The historical and political trends through which the people of Iran identify 
themselves as a nation are different from those of Germany. Perception of the 
Iranian nation has been formed, to a large degree, from its history before and after 
conversion to Islam in the seventh century. Following the conversion to Islam, 
Iran was one of the exceptional nations that did not integrate all elements of Arab 
culture of its Arab governors. Egypt, for instance, was also occupied by Arab 
militia and converted to Islam and adopted the Arabic language (Bassiouney 
2014: 9-11). Iran adopted the Arabic alphabet but did not change its language 
from Persian/Farsi to Arabic. That is how characteristics of being Persian -
keeping the Farsi language, for instance- and being Islamic -believing in the 
Islamic rather than Zoroastrian religion- developed together. By identifying 
themselves according to these characteristics of the Iranian nation, Iranian 
scholars positioned themselves successfully in the Islamic world, especially 
during the seventh and 12th century. In the post-Islamic era, many texts, including 
religious, literary and scientific books in Pahlavi, one of the ancient languages of 
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Iran, were translated into Arabic, which at that time became the international 
language of the world, and some books were translated from Arabic and Greek to 
Farsi (Bahri 2011). Books and articles by scientists and authors who were born in 
the territory of Iran, such as Mohammad b. Musā al Khwārasmi (ninth century), 
Mohammad Zakariyā al-Rāzi (10th century), Abu al-Wafā al-Buzjāni (10th 
century), ibn Abdullāh ibn Sīnā/Avicenna (11th century), Abu al-Rayhān al-Biruni 
(11th century), Nāsir al Din al Tusi (14th century), were written almost exclusively 
in Arabic, with few if any in Persian (Saliba 1998: 126).  
The pre- and post-Islamic dimensions of the history of Iran in forming the nation 
have been emphasized by different political systems to achieve their specific 
interests. In the 18th century, for instance, Shia Islam was declared as the “state 
religion” in Iran by the Safavid dynasty (Syed et al. 2011: 210) in order to form a 
specific nationality and provoke an attack on Iran’s Sunni neighbors. The Iranian 
nation was identified in that period as a Shia nation. In the early 20th century, 
however, Reza Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty made a clear return to identifying the 
Iranian nation with its pre-Islamic heritage, for instance by selecting in 1926 the 
motto “God, King, Nation” (Abrahamian 2008: 66). Following the Islamic 
Revolution of Iran in the late 20th century, the Iranian government has had a 
strong tendency to identify Iran as a Muslim (more specifically a Shia) nation 
rather than by its Persian heritage. The complex of identifying the Iranian nation 
based on its pre- and/or post-Islamic history appeared as a specific type of 
nationalism, which Reza Zia-Ebrahimi calls “dislocative nationalism”. In his 
view, this specific type of nationalism is dislocative, because the Iranian nation, 
generally speaking, dislodged itself from its empirical reality as a majorityMuslim 
society located in the East and positioned itself in the European context, on 
account of its Aryan origins, along with Europeans (Zia-Ebrahimi 2016: 5). The 
dislocative nationalism emerged as a modern ideology in the Qajar period, 
between the 1860s and 1890s, and then became integrated in the official ideology 
of the Pahlavi state between 1925 and 1979 (43).  
Social activities within the framework of long-standing organizations were not the 
strongest point of the Iranian nation. As Abrahamian argues, Iranian society up to 
the 18th century had “few government institutions worthy of the name” 
(Abrahamian 2008: 9). The lack of durable organizations in Iranian society has 
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similarly been analyzed by Homa Katouzian as Sakhteman-e Kolangi phenomena, 
which can be translated as “the short-term society” (Katouzian 2004: 1, Katouzian 
2013: 20). In his view, Iran, unlike European countries, historically has an 
“absence of an established and inviolable legal framework which would guarantee 
long term continuity”. Studying different periods of Iranian history, Katouzian 
illustrates that most legislation, social class, reformist plans and even laws were 
short-lived, because the will of somebody at the top of the pyramid of power 
would always change the norms and rules.  
The characteristics of the German nation and the Iranian nation show that both are 
shaped by their specific historical heritage and have been influenced by their 
political systems. These characteristics are similar in both nations, but there are 
differences too. For instance, religion is not the strongest influence on the 
characteristics of the German nation, whereas Islam, whether identifying or not 
identifying with it, plays an important role in shaping Iran. The Iranian nation has 
also been constructed in a more centralized way than the German nation. 
Comparing these characteristics is relevant to highlight that the intercultural 
dialogue between Iran as a Muslim country and Germany as a Western country is 
not merely a matter of the religious and geo-political identity of the Iranian and 
German participants.  
The following subchapter will give an overall view of the historical relationship 
between these two nations.  
 
 
2.2 Multi-dimensional Historical Relationship between Iran and 
Germany 
It is not difficult to imagine that the relationship between Iran and Germany was 
initially not as easy as it is today. Today, with the help of media, publications and 
advanced transportation systems, people in both countries can get to know each 
other and travel to different cities in Iran and Germany. In the past, the two 
nations had to have good reason, motivation and interest to cross borders and long 
distances to encounter each other’s culture and society. A brief review of those 
reasons is presented in this subchapter.  
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Travel has been one of the initial sources of learning about other cultures. As 
Friedrich Kochwasser argues, people from Germany and Iran have been in 
commercial contact with each other since the early Middle Ages, but that did not 
have any great meaning nor introduce the two nations to each other. In olden days, 
Iran and Germany did not have the political borders they have today, but more 
abstract and approximate boundaries, and the political rulers had less sovereignty 
over their people. It is therefore quite possible that a trader of Kurdish ethnicity 
from the west of present-day Iran had dealings with a trader belonging to the 
Franks from the west of present-day Germany; they probably learned from each 
other about their jobs, the weather or specific goods they could offer rather than 
showing any curiosity about each other’s nationality. Kochwasser also explains 
that goods from Persia were not entering Central Europe directly: the German 
traders would either take a route through Italy or Russia (Kochwasser 1961: 27), 
so there was even less possibility that the German and Iranian traders would learn 
about their respective countries.  
A region called Persia was first introduced to the German nation by Johann 
Schiltberger, a German soldier who traveled to the Hungarian frontier in the late 
14th century to fight against the Ottoman Empire and is mentioned as the “first 
German witness” of the culture and customs of Persia (Gabriel 1952: 45 and 46). 
The travels of Engelbert Kaempfer, a German physician and researcher who lived 
in the late 17th and early 18th century, are also significant. According to his 
travelogue, his journey to different places of the world, including what is today 
Iran, and cities such as Rasht, Qazvin, Qum, Kashan and Isfahan, influenced his 
inquiry and developed his understanding of “natural science” and “oriental 
medicine” (Klocke-Daffa et al. 2003).  
Travel consequently led to Iranians and Germans becoming familiar with the 
German and Persian languages respectively. Learning these languages opened 
new doors to German and Iranian literature and philosophy. The translation of 
books is an indication that the historical relationship between the Iranian and 
German nations had entered a new phase. Iranians were interested in learning 
about philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. Although Iranian scholars 
translated books from Greek to Persian even before the conversion to Islam (Bahri 
2011), as remarked in 2.1, in the post-Islamic era there was a tendency among 
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Iranian scholars to position themselves in the Islamic world. Translation was one 
of the characteristics of that period. In a travelogue from the second half of the 
19th century, one European traveler writes that he was astonished to meet people 
in Iran who discussed the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (Parsinejad 2003: 
26). Another door translation opened to Iranians and Germans was in literature. 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, a German poet who lived in the late 18th and early 
19th century, became acquainted with the poems of Shams-ud-Din Muḥammad 
Ḥāfeẓ-e Shirāzi after he started to learn Persian, Turkish and Arabic (Özcan 2014: 
13). Hafez was an Iranian poet who lived in Iran in the 14th century, and his 
poems are well-known for a special spiritual approach to love and God. Goethe 
studied the poems of Hafez and created a collection of poems mostly inspired by 
him named West-östlicher Divan [Western-Eastern Divan]. The West-östlicher 
Divan has been mentioned on several occasions during the last decades by 
German and Iranian thinkers and literary experts as an example of intercultural 
dialogue. 
Moving towards modernity and reforming the traditional system of Iran was the 
next source of motivation for a German-Iranian relationship. Travel by Nāser ad-
Din Shah, the head of the Qajar dynasty from 1848 to 1896, to the West, and 
especially Germany, is notable in this context. According to his travelogue, he 
traveled to Europe on three occasions, in 1873, 1878 and 1882 (Kochwasser 1961: 
84), and visited different cities of present-day Germany such as Essen, Berlin, 
Baden-Baden, Frankfurt, Cologne and Aachen (Naser-od-Din Shah 1874). His 
support for development of the educational system of Iran according to European 
experience was significant in the 19th century. The school of Dar al Fonun8 
[polytechnic college] was established in his time, 1851, which can be counted as 
one of the practical indications of the influence of modernity in Iranian society 
(Bahman 2004, Ringer 2004). The demand for European textbooks and scientific 
manuals, mainly translated from French or German, increased after the 
establishment of Dar al-Fonun. At this time, translation and the efforts of 
educated Iranians returning from Europe created a movement and provoked great 
                                                          
8 Dar al Fonun was the first Iranian modern school to train young Iranians for a military career, medicine and 
engineering. Teaching according to the European science system, the presence of European teachers and use 
of French, Arabic and German as well as Persian languages were the main characteristics of Dar al Fonun, 
which differentiated it from the old training system of Iran. The traditional “Madresah” system concentrated 
mostly on philosophy and “purely religious knowledge” and was run mostly by ulama [clergymen] (Ringer, 
2004, p. 42). 
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political and ideological transformations in Iran. Publishing books and 
newspapers about the Western political system and values led the modernization 
process, a process that resulted in constitutional revolution in Iran between 1905 
and 1907.  
Political and economic interests were another motivation in the historical 
relationship between Iran and Germany. The first phase of the relationship in the 
economic field, at governmental level, started at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Iran was also a target country for a “new kind of colonialism” on the part of 
Germany and was seen as one of the “few markets” (Martin 1959: 9) that was not 
completely occupied by the big world powers Britain and Russia. At the same 
time, the Iranian authorities in the Reza Shah era had a tendency to balance the 
influence of the mentioned world powers through partnership with Germany 
(Asgharzadeh 2007, Martin 1959). In this context Germany supported the 
establishment of economic infrastructure in Iran, including railroading, banking 
and shipping (Kochwasser 1961, Martin 1959).  
As Kochwasser explains, the establishment of a shipping line between Iran and 
Germany in the 1920s led to the export and import of goods. Slowly, an Iranian 
colony was created in Germany, especially in Hamburg, where most of the Iranian 
companies established branch offices (Kochwasser 1961: 254-255). No non-oil 
Iranian product has been as much in demand on the international, and especially 
German, market as carpets. It is reported that in the late 20th century, Germany 
imported three times more carpets from Iran than any other country (Kochwasser 
1961: 300). As a result, an Iranian colony of traders, students and academics 
emerged in Germany. It is also reported that in 1960 between 1,500 and 2,000 
Iranians were living in Hamburg (Kochwasser 1961: 254). Other economic 
examples of the German-Iranian relationship include the opening of an air route 
between Tehran and Frankfurt operated by Iran Air in 1958 and “Deutsche 
Lufthansa” in 1956 (Kochwasser 1961: 240); various development projects with 
the help of German experts, for instance the Lar River and modern cotton factory 
projects in 1957 (Kochwasser 1961: 239); developing the telephone network 
under a contract between the Iran and German post offices and projects by 
Siemens and Standard Elektonik in 1955 (Kochwasser 1961: 242); training 
Chapter 2: Context of Intercultural Dialogue between Iran and Germany 
51  
programs for Iranian young farmers under the management of an Iranian9 who had 
studied and taught agriculture in Germany (Kochwasser 1961: 243); and finally, 
founding a university, now Guilan University, according to the German system 
near to the Caspian See in the north of Iran in 1961 (Kochwasser 1961: 254). 
Because of the presence of German experts, physicians, engineers, technicians, 
teachers and scholars, a German colony started emerge in Iran from the late 19th 
century. It is reported that in 1960 more than 2,500 Germans were living in Iran 
(Kochwasser 1961: 249-250). Following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, many 
Iranians left Iran and migrated to the USA and European countries, especially 
Germany, mostly for political reasons (Yazdani 2015: 110-114).  
Army training courses conducted by the German army in Iran at the time of World 
War I can be counted as another source of the German-Iranian relationship 
(Küntzel 2009: 28). There is also evidence that some German troops and 
commanders assisted a minority opposition group, Jangalis, in the north of Iran in 
1918 (Atabaki 2006: 150 and 151).   
The next phase of the economic and political relationship appeared in nuclear 
energy in the late 20th century, when Germany confirmed that it would assist with 
the installation of nuclear technology in Iran. This was undertaken by the German 
company Kraftwerk Union AG after signing a contract with Iran in 1976 (Samore 
2013: 11). Its role stopped after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, along with that of 
most international companies in the same field. Following the Islamic Revolution 
of Iran, Germany played a more stable role in the economic relationship with Iran 
than other Western countries. It did not have increasing economic exchange with 
Iran, but it remained the biggest European exporter to Iran. Instead of economic 
sanctions against Iran, especially those intended to limit the nuclear program, 
some German commercial companies were able to bypass them by registering 
their names in the United Arab Emirates as international companies and thus 
continue to trade with Iranian companies (Küntzel 2012: 108 and 126).  
Some studies discuss how the tendency of the heads of the Iranian and German 
governments to play a regionally and internationally superior role at specific times 
has been a motivation for the relationship between the two countries. Mattias 
Küntzel argues that Wilhelm II sent his agents to Iran to attract Shia soldiers to 
                                                          
9 The name of this graduate student was Nasserali Motazedi.  
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fight against Britain (Küntzel 2009: 28). After Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime seized 
power, Iranian ulama, in their speeches in the mosques of small towns and 
villages of Iran, called Adolf Hitler the “twelfth Shia Imam” (p.52). Küntzel 
relates these historical facts to the current history of the relationship between Iran 
and Germany, saying that Germany is Iran’s strongest European partner 
economically and Iranian politicians welcome German diplomats, given the 
common Aryan race and cooperation in the Second World War (p.17). Relating 
these facts to each other, Küntzel concludes that the historically stable friendship 
between Iran and Germany has two possible meanings: Germany wants to use it 
either as a security network for its actual policies towards Iranian rulers or as an 
instrument of pressure that can be used to change Iran’s politics (Küntzel 2009). 
In another book Küntzel analyzes that Germany’s economic cooperation with Iran 
could push forward Iran’s nuclear program (Küntzel 2012).  
The motivations above suggest that the relationship between Iran and Germany 
has not necessarily been directed according to a specific long-term plan and 
strategy. Some motivations, such as travel, created room for the next to appear; 
some appeared simultaneously with the rest. Reviewing these motivations also 
illustrates that facts like the creation of German and Iranian colonies in Iran and 
Germany respectively cannot be explained solely by economics but have a 
combination of reasons, such as cultural and political factors. The historical 
relationship has developed very diversely and cannot be limited to a specific 
motivation. Hence analysis of the relationship as an aimful and strategic means 
for Germany to control Iran is unimproved theory rather than fact-based 
argument.  
The next subchapter considers some organized cultural and social activities 
between Iran and Germany.  
 
 
2.3 Cultural and Social Activities between Iran and Germany 
Cultural and social activities are activities relating to art, literature, translation, 
music and education, as well as those in the field of humanitarian affairs. These 
activities, organized by Iranian and German actors and supported by both 
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governments, are considered in this subchapter. The aim here is to look more 
closely at the context of intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany, which 
was also implemented with the support of Iranian and German governments.  
The first official cultural contract to play a central, but not determinative, role in 
the relationship between Iran and Germany is called the “friendship contract”, in 
German Freundschaftsvertrag and in Farsi Ahdnāme-ye mavadat or 
Tafahomnāme-ye farhangi. The first friendship contract between the Qajar 
dynasty of Iran and a delegate from Prussian Germany was signed in Paris in June 
1857 (Kochwasser 1961: 53). During Naser-din Shah’s visit to Berlin in 1873, 
another agreement was signed by the authorities of both countries. The next 
friendship contract, which contained terminology relating to “guaranteeing 
cooperation in cultural relationship”, was concluded in 1929 under the Weimar 
Republic in Germany and the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran. That agreement was re-
confirmed after World War II in 1954 (Entezam et al. 1955), two years after the 
renewed start of diplomatic relations between Iran -under the Pahlavi dynasty- 
and the Federal Republic of Germany, which at that time was known as West 
Germany.10 Without canceling the cultural contract of 1954, the cultural 
relationship between Iran and Germany decreased after the Islamic Revolution of 
Iran in 1979. Because of the anti-Western rhetoric of Ayatollah Khomeini, leader 
of the new Iranian state in the 1980s, some German politicians took a critical 
stance against Iran (Alkazaz/Steinbach 1988: 16). Some, however, like the 
German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, had a flexible position 
regarding Iran. In such a context, Genscher’s attempt to reinstate the cultural 
agreement with Iran is significant. He visited Iran in 1988 and a German-Iranian 
cultural agreement was signed. Nevertheless, “the agreement was declared invalid 
as a consequence of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie”, to which the German 
Parliament reacted harshly (Struwe 1998: 15).11 Although the political atmosphere 
                                                          
10 West Germany in this study is considered as the beginning of the current political system of Germany, 
which is the Federal Republic of Germany. After unification, the German Democratic Republic, or East 
Germany, accepted the constitution and the federal political system. Therefore, the cultural relationship 
between Iran and East Germany, which was not strong, is not reflected here.  
11 Salman Rushdie, a British-Indian author who wrote a book on Prophet Mohammad. The book was 
criticized extensively by Muslim people all over the world. The first country to ban its publication under 
pressure from “angry Muslims” was India. During the next months, from October 1988 to June 1989, other 
Muslim countries such as Bangladesh, Sudan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Thailand, Tanzania, 
Indonesia, Singapore and Venezuela also banned the book. Meanwhile, however, there were two important 
reactions that turned the response to Rushdie’s book into a clash between Muslims and the West. In 
November 1988 the book was awarded the literary Whitbread Prize (Netton, 2012, p. 20). The second 
reaction was from Iran. Although no version of the book entered the Iranian book market during 1988 and 
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afterwards was not always against Iran, up to 2013- the end of the period of this 
study- no updated version of the cultural agreement was concluded between Iran 
and Germany. Nevertheless, cultural activities have been organized through other 
kinds of treaties, which will be discussed later.  
Besides concluding friendship and cultural agreements, establishing Iranian and 
German consulates and embassies played an important role in stabilizing cultural 
and social activities between the two countries. Both made attempts to strengthen 
their diplomatic relationship during the 19th century. The first Iranian embassy 
was established in Berlin in 1885, the year in which Germany also appointed its 
first ambassador to Tehran (Martin 1959: 30). In 1897 a German consulate opened 
in Busher and in 1919 in Tabriz (Mousavian 2008: 12-13). Both consulates are 
currently closed. In the Pahlavi era Iran also established consulates in the cities of 
Hamburg, Munich and Frankfurt. All three consulates are still open in Germany.  
Some cultural and social activities were implemented with the support of the 
Iranian and German states in fields such as education and pedagogy. In 1907 Iran 
and Germany concluded an agreement to train students in vocational and technical 
education, which led to the establishment of the Honarestan Sanaty school in 
Tehran. According to Khosrow Lotfipur, two thirds of instructors of this school 
were from Germany. World Wars I and II interrupted German cooperation in the 
vocational training system of Iran, but these breaks were temporary. German 
experts and specialists were employed by the Iranian government at various times 
in different cities including Tehran, Shiraz and Tabriz. In 1950 Germany donated 
4 million Mark for new equipment in vocational technical education in Tehran 
and Tabriz. Also in 1962 and 1971, based on agreements between the Iranian and 
German governments, some students and experts were exchanged in vocational 
training (Lotfipour 1977: 11-14).  
Meanwhile, some German cultural institutions began to organize activities, 
including academic exchanges and German language courses, with the support of 
the German state. The enthusiasm among young Iranian students to learn German 
was high, particularly after World War II. One of the reasons for this enthusiasm 
                                                                                                                                                               
1989, Ayatollah Khomeini pronounced a fatwa on Rushdie in February 1989. He sentenced Rushdie to death 
for writing a text which is against Islam, the Prophet of Islam, and the Quran. After issuing the fatwa, it 
became the symbol of Muslim reactions to Rushdie and consequently a symbol of the violation of freedom of 
speech in the view of Western countries.  
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was that Iranian students who had studied in Germany before World War II began 
to return. By the 1960s, of 10,000 Iranian students abroad, nearly 4,000 were in 
Germany and just 560 in France and Austria, 300 in Switzerland, and 215 in 
England. Only the number of Iranian students in America was higher than the 
number in Germany (Kochwasser 1961: 255). A great number of Iranian students 
received financial support from academic institutions such as the Deutscher 
Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) to study in Germany. More details on this 
topic will be given in chapter 6.22. To meet the great demand for learning German 
in Iran, the Goethe Institute of Germany opened a branch office in 1958 in Iran 
and held language courses. It also opened a library and organized cultural 
activities such as film shows, literature meetings, theater and music festivals in 
Iran. The Goethe Institute was one of the most successful German cultural 
institutions in Iran at that time. It is reported that more than ten thousand Iranian 
visitors attended its cultural events in Tehran in 1974 (Chehabi 2001). The 
popularity of the Goethe Institute can probably explain why it suffered under the 
Iranian politicians’ reaction to Rudis Tagesshow,12 a German TV show which 
made fun of Ayatollah Khoemini in 1987. Following the Rudis crisis, Iranian and 
German diplomatic missions were suspended for a few months, the Goethe 
Institute and Deutsches Archäologisches Institut (another German cultural 
institute which had been established in Iran since 1956) were closed (IZH 2013).  
Iran also started to undertake some cultural activities in Germany with a few 
institutes and organizations. Among them, a mosque which later became an 
academic center, the Islamic Center of Hamburg, in 1960, is worth mentioning. 
Along with the economic boom from the exchange of goods through shipping 
lines between Hamburg and Iranian ports, Iranian colonies started to appear in 
Hamburg. Some of the Iranian inhabitants, mostly businessmen and carpet shop 
owners, decided to establish an Iranian Islamic mosque (Kochwasser 1961: 254). 
Later they requested a clergyman from the Qum Seminary in Iran to lead the 
mosque in Hamburg. As the official website of the Islamic Center of Hamburg 
explains, this request was confirmed by Ayatollah Boroujerdi, a newly appointed 
                                                          
12 Rudis Tagesshow was a comedy program which made fun of politicians, German and international. In 1987 
a broadcast containing 14 seconds of a comedy about Ayatollah Khomeini, the then leader of Iran, led to a 
political crisis between Iran and Germany. The German Ambassador was summoned by the Iranian 
authorities in Tehran, Iranian students demonstrated in front of the German embassy in Tehran, and some 
clergymen called the comedy a “Zionist Conspiracy” (Kasa 17.06.2010). The Iranian authorities requested an 
official apology from Germany, which was rejected by German politicians (ARD 1987). 
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head of Qum seminary, who was interested in developing the international 
communication of the seminary (IZH 2013). The Islamic Center to this day is one 
of Iran’s main religious centers in Germany. More information about this center 
will be given in 6.1.3.  
Seminars and meetings were also held on the issue of human rights and supported 
by the Iranian and German states in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At that time, 
Iran generally did not have a positive relationship with European countries. 
Events such as the fatwa of Ayatollah Khomeini against Salman Rushdie and 
Iran’s involvement in the Iraq War (1981-1988) put Iran in an isolated position 
internationally. In this situation, Genscher, the German foreign minister at the 
time, was the first Western authority to travel to Iran, in 1984 and then in 1987. 
He blamed the Iraqi government for attacking Iran, which is believed to be “a 
major step in promoting Iran’s acceptance of UN-resolution 598 that brought an 
end to the Gulf-War” (Struwe 1998: 15). Through the efforts of Genscher, some 
meetings were organized by the Goethe Institute13 and the DAAD in Iran (Küntzel 
2009: 171). Consequently, in 1988, the German side was able to convince the 
Iranian side to participate in a colloquium in Hamburg on human rights and 
possibilities to “enhance cultural and academic contracts”. It is reported that up to 
1991, with the help of the Deutsches Orient-Institut Hamburg [German Orient 
Institute], three meetings on human rights were held between Iran and Germany 
(Küntzel 2009: 171). 
Following these human rights meetings, the European Union (EU), with Germany 
playing an active role, organized a round of meetings with Iran including dialogue 
on their topic, “critical dialogue”. The dialogue sessions were organized from 
1992 to 1997 on human rights, although politically they provided an opportunity 
for the EU and Iran to discuss international issues after Iran’s long isolation. At 
that time the US was criticizing Iran for supporting what was claimed to be 
“terrorism”, “quest for weapons of mass destruction”, and “opposition to the 
Peace Process” and encouraged options such as economic sanctions against Iran. 
The EU had the same concerns, but because Iran’s domestic human rights issues 
                                                          
13 The Goethe Institute organized these meetings in the last months of its official activity in Iran, before the 
Rudis crisis. Involvement of the Goethe Institute in implementing initial meetings on human rights and 
religion was also mentioned by an Iranian participant in the field study (Soroush, personal communication, 
2012), and it is also believed to be the starting point of interfaith dialogue meetings of Iran in the post-
Revolution era. 
Chapter 2: Context of Intercultural Dialogue between Iran and Germany 
57  
were also important to it, and in that period human rights issues were a priority for 
the EU (Struwe 1998: 10-13), it preferred to try the option of negotiation with 
Iran. The aims of the EU in critical dialogue with Iran were as follows:  
“Given Iran’s importance in the region, the European Council reaffirms its belief 
that a dialogue should be maintained with the Iranian Government. This should 
be a critical dialogue which reflects concern about Iranian behaviour and calls 
for improvement in a number of areas, particularly human rights, the death 
sentence pronounced by a Fatwa of Ayatollah Khomeini against the author 
Salman Rushdie, which is contrary to international law, and terrorism. 
Improvement in these areas will be important in determining the extent to which 
closer relations and confidence can be developed” (Eropean Union 1992). 
 
It is of particular importance that the critical dialogue clearly aimed to change the 
Iranian government’s “behaviour” in domestic and foreign affairs. The critical 
dialogue was applied in three main ways: confidential démarches, public 
declarations, and regular meetings of the EU Troika with Iranian officials (Struwe 
1998: 20). The critical dialogue according to Struwe led to some changes in 
Iranian behavior; nevertheless, some of the tangible results were difficult to 
identify, because the outcomes of the meetings were not always open to the 
public. Some of the results appeared years after the critical dialogue. For instance, 
the fatwa against Rushdie was resolved during Khatami’s presidency. In 1998 the 
Iranian foreign minister had talks in a margin of the UN General Assembly with 
the British foreign secretary in which “they agreed an exchange of statements 
according to which the Iranian government declared they would not take any 
action to threaten the life of the author of the Satanic Verses nor anyone 
associated with his work, and would not encourage or assist anybody to do so” 
(Axworthy 2012: 106). The critical dialogue was suspended in 1997, following a 
German court verdict against Iran. According to this verdict, some Iranian 
authorities were recognized as being responsible for an assassination in the 
Mykonos Restaurant in Berlin in 1992. The assassination was organized against a 
number of Kurdish leaders who were opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(Siegmund 2001).  
The next meetings to be held were called “constructive dialogue”, also known as 
comprehensive or human rights dialogue. The constructive dialogue was again 
suggested by the EU, with an active role played by Germany, during the 
presidency of Mohammad Khatami in Iran. The main issues here were human 
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rights and the judicial system, which were discussed in four meetings. Delegates 
from the Iranian presidential office and the EU Presidency, non-governmental 
organizations, academics, journalists and some members of Amnesty International 
attended these meetings between 2002 and 2004. Main topics such as 
discrimination, torture, the roles of judges in the trial process, the interdependence 
of the autonomous judiciary system and fair trial on each other, freedom of 
expression, and administration of the courts were discussed amongst the delegates 
in Tehran and Brussels (Kjærum 2007: 13-15). During the constructive dialogue 
meetings, the Iranian government made some moves towards improving the 
human rights situation. For instance, Iran officially recommended courts to use 
alternative punishment to “stoning” (Kjærum, 2007, pp. 16-17). Besides 
Germany, other European countries such as Denmark and Finland also 
participated actively in these human rights dialogues. But even this progress could 
not prevent the termination of the constructive dialogue in 2004. In that year, 
following the victory of the conservative over the reformist parties in the Iranian 
parliamentary election, the EU issued a statement claiming that, despite some 
efforts during the human rights meetings, widespread breaches of human rights 
continued in Iran. The Iranian authorities consequently lost their desire to 
continue the dialogues (Mousavian 2008: 216). Germany continued the meetings 
until early 2005. This point will be discussed more in chapter 6.1.3.  
The last type of cultural activities are those organized by cities in Iran and 
Germany. Isfahan and Freiburg were the first, and Shiraz and Weimar the second 
Iranian and German partner cities to conclude “twin cities agreements” (signed by 
the mayors of the cities) in 2000 and 2009 respectively. In the agreement between 
Isfahan and Freiburg, both actors agreed to strive for cooperation in fields such as 
renewable energies, safety and firefighting services, and tourism. The agreement 
even led to activities in more fields, such as student and academic exchanges 
between the two cities. In late 2005, at the beginning of the presidency of 
Ahmadinejad in Iran and in a period in which Iran rejected continuing 
“constructive human rights dialogues” with the EU, a delegation of jurists from 
Freiburg attended seven days of meetings in Isfahan and Tehran in the framework 
of “dialogue about human rights” (Kommission für Menschenrechte 2005, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 01.11.2006). The agreement between Shiraz and Weimar 
was mostly initiated to commemorate two Iranian and German poets, Hafiz and 
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Goethe. As mentioned in 2.1, Weimar and Shiraz are the birth cities of these two 
poets. Cultural programs were therefore organized to commemorate the friendship 
of Hafiz and Goethe in the two cities, especially after conclusion of the twin cities 
agreement. A memorial to Hafiz and Goethe was inaugurated in Weimar jointly 
by Mohammad Khatami and Johannes Rau, the then presidents of Iran and 
Germany, in 2000. 
The cities’ friendships have faced some negative feedback. According to Küntzel, 
that of Freiburg and Isfahan was criticized by the media and some Iranian 
opposition groups based in Germany for two reasons; firstly, because cultural 
cooperation with Isfahan indirectly indicated that the German authorities tolerate 
Iran’s nuclear activities, since Isfahan is located near a nuclear site; and secondly, 
because cultural cooperation with Isfahan illustrated the German authorities’ 
agreement with Ahmadinejad’s policies, since Ahmadinejad, who expressed 
radical views against Israel, was a close friend of the mayor of Isfahan when the 
contract was concluded (Küntzel 2012: 9). The friendship of Weimar and Shiraz 
was under criticism, as Küntzel mentions, because in 2010 an Iranian delegation 
from Shiraz to Weimar declined a visit to Buchenwald concentration camp, a 
Holocaust memorial.14 Their rejection of visiting Buchenwald was perceived as a 
denial of the Holocaust (Küntzel 2012: 60).  
To sum up the discussions of this subchapter, it is useful to look at the content of 
table 1, which illustrates the relationship between Iran and Germany in the context 
of political changes over the years. 






structure change  
Main points of the 




Different states and 




Safavid, Afsharid and 
beginning of Qajar 
-Travel for military, trade, 
research and curiosity reasons 
-Developing relations through 
information of travelers 
-Translation as a source of 
getting to know German and 
Iranian culture 
1800 Late Middle Ages 1794–1925: Qajar -Dedication of West-östlicher 
                                                          
14 Buchenwald concentration camp was used between 1937-1944/1945 by the Nazis to hold war prisoners and 
European civilians, including mentally and physically ill people, homosexuals, criminals and Jewish citizens, 
who were forced to work and were systematically murdered (Stein/Gedenkstätte Buchwald 2004).  
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As table 1 shows, a variety of cultural activities were organized between Iran and 
Germany from the early 20th century. Some activities were in educational fields; 
others, such as “critical” and “constructive” dialogue, were organized with an 
active role played by the German and Iranian states. These cultural and social 
activities were influenced by the economic, political, foreign and cultural 
relationship between the two countries. Although concluding contracts, 
agreements and memorandums of understanding played an important role in 
initiating the relationship between Iran and Germany, some cultural and social 
activities were implemented between them without any formal contract or 
agreement. The policy and logic behind both the Iranian and German state support 
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of cultural activities in the international realm is crucial. The next subchapter 
considers this issue.  
 
 
2.4 Considering “Culture” in the Foreign Policy of Germany and 
Iran  
So far, the type of cultural and social activities implemented between Iran and 
Germany has been considered. This subchapter attempts to argue how 
implementing cultural activities on a foreign level has been decided politically by 
Iran and Germany. The approach to culture in the foreign cultural policy of 
Germany changed considerably after WWII. Following the bitter experience of 
the Nazi regime, the country attempted to mediate an image culturally of 
Germany worldwide that was fundamentally different from its past image. The 
approach to culture in Iranian foreign cultural policy was also constructed in a 
new way after the Islamic Revolution. The Iranian government tried to mediate an 
image of Iran culturally which carried the ideology of the Islamic Revolution and 
Shia Islam together. Two sections of this subchapter present these two 
approaches.  
 
2.4.1 Considering Culture in German Foreign Policy in the post-WWII Era 
There are various studies which consider the role of culture in the foreign policy 
of Germany, its aims and instruments. There is an abundance of literature on 
German foreign cultural policy in different periods (Andrei/Rittberger 2005, 
Düwell 2005) and its various instruments, such as the German language (Amman 
2005), art exhibitions and music festivals (Amman 2005, Denscheilmann 2013), 
university and school projects (Gauf 2005, Schütte 2005), and diverse media 
(Harnischfeger 2005, Rossbach 2005). Some studies discuss Germany’s national 
actors (Maaß 2005a, Pogarelskaja 2005, Singer 2005) and international 
cooperators (Merkle/Büttner 2005, Schöfthaler 2005).  
The foreign cultural policy of Germany changed significantly in the post-WWII 
era, although the tendency to differentiate and focus on “culture” as one of the 
components of German foreign policy goes back to earlier times.  
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As Kurt Düwell argues, German-speaking territories during the German empire 
undertook various cultural and academic activities abroad. But since the empire 
was not a central political system, these activities could not be decided according 
to a specific policy. The first indication of a specific policy regarding foreign 
cultural activities appeared in 1920, when the Weimar Republic, after the 
experience of WWI, established a cultural department in the foreign affairs 
ministry. The issue of Kulturpropaganda [cultural propaganda] was dealt with in 
this department, initially with some skepticism (Düwell 2005: 71). In 1933, after 
the Nazis seized power in Germany, the person in charge of the cultural 
department was called Reichsminister für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda 
[Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda]. At this time the German 
state systematically “abused” foreign cultural policy to create a cultural image of 
Germany abroad, and especially to legitimize “German expansion” and “political 
world order” (Düwell 2005: 59). The Nazi leaders implemented cultural policies 
which tied in with “racial and geographical agendas” to identify the nation as the 
“pinnacle” of “European heritage” and “civilization” (McGuigan 2004: 37). 
Cultural policies during the Nazi era were implemented through cultural tools 
such as theater (Drewniak 1995), film (Welch 1995), visual art (Petropoulos 
1995) and literature (Barbian 1995). With these instruments an attempt was made 
to inform audiences, whether inside or outside Germany, that “the everyday 
reality of cultural life under Hitler not only was quite diverse and remarkably 
liberal in some areas, but also often at odds with the values promoted by the 
National Socialist ideology” (Cuomo 1995: 2). It was with the help of such a 
propagative and successful cultural policy that the Nazi authorities managed to 
systematically kill specific groups of people in Germany and some neighboring 
countries. At the end of the war, a huge number of people were recorded as 
victims of the Nazi regime. It is difficult to give a total number, but some studies 
suggest that between 12 and 14 million people, amongst them about six million 
Jews, lost their life under the Nazis (Pohl 2011: 35-41).  
The approach to German foreign cultural policy was reviewed after WWII. The 
new German state (as clarified in 2.3, West Germany is considered as the 
beginning of the current political system of Germany in this study) tried to 
establish a foreign cultural policy to represent an image of Germany abroad that 
did not call to mind messages of racism and nationalism. The German state also at 
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this stage became very sensitive to the issue of the Holocaust, the killing of Jews 
by the Nazi regime. So the reconstructed foreign cultural policy attempted to use 
tools which represented a “realistic, open, and forward-looking” image of a “new 
German democracy” (Maaß 2005b: 23). The image of Germany in the post-WWII 
era was also mediated through other German components of its foreign policy, 
such as its rejection of militarist and expansionist policies, membership of the 
European Union, reconciliation policies regarding France, Israel, Poland, the 
Czech Republic -in the view of some scholars the most successful in the world 
(Feldman 2014)- and its flourishing economy. In the post-war era, three 
guidelines informed the relationship of the German state with the world. They 
were “never again”, which refers to learning from the experience of the Holocaust 
and relationship with Israel; “never alone”, which implies membership of 
Germany in NATO; and “politics before force” (Maull 2014: 409-410), which 
describes the priority of negotiation over military action. In chapter 2.2 it was 
mentioned that an Iranian delegation had been criticized by some German media 
and other groups for declining a visit to a Holocaust memorial. This reaction 
indicates that the German state is expected to respect the “never again” guideline. 
The consonance between German and EU policies regarding Iran since 2003 can 
also be understood in the context of “never alone”. The “policy before force” 
guideline can be explained as one of the reasons why Germany more or less 
upholds a relationship with Iran, despite all pressures from Israel and the USA, 
why it initiated “human rights meetings” in 1984 with Iran, and why Germany 
was involved in the “critical dialogue” and “constructive dialogue” as an active 
EU member. After unification of West and East Germany in 1990, the German 
federal government did not change this approach to foreign cultural policy 
dramatically. Cultural policy on a domestic level is the responsibility of the 
Länder [states] and on a foreign and international level of the German federal 
government, specifically the foreign affairs ministry. This issue will be discussed 
in more detail in 5.1.  
During the last two decades, German foreign policy has undergone some changes, 
although not towards stopping the development of cultural instruments in the 
context of German foreign relations. Patricia Daehnhardt argues that Germany’s 
foreign policy before 1997 appeared to make Germany a normative power among 
other international actors, especially the European countries. Nevertheless, this 
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trend changed significantly between 1997 and 2007. During this period, foreign 
policy was a way to represent Germany as a utilitarian power. Analyzing four 
cases, “Germany's new security policy”; “the Europeanization of Germany’s 
European policy regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy”; “bilateral 
relationships with France and the United States”; and “Germany's quest for 
permanent membership of the UN Security Council”, she argues that, from 1997 
to 2007, administrations under four chancellors constructed foreign cultural policy 
to make Germany a utilitarian power (Daehnhardt 2008).  
The changes in German foreign policy did not change the structure of Germany’s 
foreign cultural policy for two reasons: Firstly, because they had little to do with 
Germany’s cultural policies abroad; and secondly, because Germany in the post-
WWII era reconstructed its cultural instruments in a systematic and stable way. 
From 1945 to 1949, because West Germany was under the occupation of the US, 
England and France, its main cultural institutions were closed. In 1949, after the 
first post-war election in West Germany, Konrad Adenauer’s government could 
start to reopen those institutions. They are called “Mittlerorganisationen”, quasi 
NGOs or quangos in English. They are old organizations which have a mixed 
model (Maaß 2005a). They received a budget or part of their budget from the 
German government to implement cultural activities with other countries, but they 
are not a subordinate of German embassies like in France, as Maaß argues. In the 
Nazi era, independency for Mittlerorganisationen was almost impossible, because 
social and cultural activities were limited under the dictatorship and radical 
behavior of the German state at that time. Under the current federal republic, they 
are independent. It can therefore be said that the independence of 
Mittlerorganisationen also depends on the democratic statute of the German state. 
Ifa, the DAAD, the Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation and the Goethe Institute 
are examples of Mittlerorganisationen. In chapter 6 more details about them will 
be presented.  
German politicians played a positive role in foreign cultural policy by building 
contacts with other countries. Among the German presidents, for instance, Roman 
Herzog played a significant role between 1994 and 1999. He stressed the 
importance of dialogue with other cultures. His successor Johannes Rau also 
shared a positive view of promoting dialogue between Germany and other 
cultures, with Muslim countries and also the Jewish community, between 1999 
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and 2005. Rau inaugurated the Hafiz-Goethe memorial in Weimar alongside his 
Iranian counterpart Mohammad Khatami in 2000, as mentioned in chapter 1 and 
2.3. Both presidents, Herzog (Herzog 1995, Herzog 1997, Herzog 1999) and Rau 
(Rau 2002) wrote books and occasionally presented speeches on the issue of 
intercultural dialogue. The role of some German foreign ministers has been 
significant as well. The 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, the Willy Brandt era, is 
called the “watershed of German foreign cultural policy” (Paschalidis 2014: 464). 
Brandt as foreign minister and then as German chancellor tried to conceptualize 
culture in the foreign relations of Germany as a “two-way street” and described 
foreign cultural policy as the “third pillar” of German foreign policy alongside 
economic and diplomatic relations. Also when he was German chancellor, an 
important statement on German foreign cultural policy was written. Genscher, as 
mentioned in 2.2, had an important role to play in building the cultural 
relationship with Iran by initiating activities such as holding human rights 
meetings between 1984 and 1988. Some researchers have also mentioned that 
Klaus Kinkel made a connection between foreign cultural policy and the foreign 
economic policies of Germany between 1992 and 1998 (Maaß 2005b: 24). The 
importance of foreign cultural policy was greater for Frank-Walter Steinmeier, 
who became German president in 2017, than for his predecessor Guido 
Westerwelle, according to Rolf Mützenich (2011: 124).  
 
2.4.2 Considering Culture in Iranian Foreign Policy in the Post-Islamic 
Revolution Era 
Little has been written about the foreign cultural policy of Iran in investigations 
and studies. Various books and research have been published on the history, 
foreign policy, cultural diplomacy and soft power of Iran, but so far there are few 
studies on foreign cultural policy. There are various reasons why investigation in 
this field has been neglected; two of them are significant. Firstly, the quest to 
understand the military, nuclear, regional and international policy of Iran in the 
last decades has been greater than that to understand how the country represents 
itself culturally worldwide. Secondly, the main focus of the Iranian state at 
different times (from Pahlavi to the Islamic Republic era) was on modernization 
and westernization of Iranian society. Pahlavi concentrated on modernizing and 
westernizing society at all costs, while the Islamic Republic tended to oppose 
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them and sought to replace them with Islamic values. This approach did not leave 
room to concentrate on a cultural policy to represent the country internationally. A 
few studies consider Iran’s foreign cultural institutions, like the organization of 
Islamic Culture and Relations (Modaresi 28.06.2009, Naghibzadeh 1999, 
Naghibzadeh 2009). Some studies consider Iranian foreign cultural policy toward 
its neighbors, such as Syria (von Maltzahn 2015) and Central Asian countries 
(Johnston 2007), after 1979.  
Studying some investigations of the history of Iran suggests that the Iranian state 
showed a clear interest in cultural policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when Reza Shah 
pushed for a policy to modernize Iranian society. Although various agents in Iran, 
such as intellectuals and Iranian educated students who returned from Europe at 
that time, supported the process of modernizing society, the role of Western 
agents, institutions and experts was considerable (Devos/Werner 2013). Reza 
Shah started major projects to modernize university education and physical 
education (Catanzaro 2013, Chehabi 2013) and Iranian music (Aghamohseni 
2013). He also began to initiate some propagative cultural activities which had a 
domestic, but in the long term also foreign, effect. For instance, by holding the 
millennium celebration of the birthday of the Iranian poet Ferdowsi in 1934, “the 
myth of the Shahnameh had largely been side-lined from the official rhetoric of 
the state”. That was one of the instruments to propagate the kingdom of Reza 
Shah (Ansari 2012: 176). The second cultural attempt of Reza Shah that also had 
a foreign cultural aspect was in the field of archeology and museums. In 1927 
Reza Shah abolished the French archeological monopolized license, granted in the 
Qajar era, but let Western archeologists cooperate in this field in other ways, such 
as managing some museum offices. Nader Nasiri Mogghadam’s analysis is that 
the Pahlavi modernization program in this specific case connected Iranian cultural 
policy for the first time with Iranian diplomacy. He argues that reports on the 
archeological findings presented by Western experts for Reza Shah and some of 
the Iranian authorities firstly reconstructed the idea of the Iranian pre-Islamic 
cultural heritage as the root of the Iranian nation, and secondly promoted the idea 
among Iranian political elites that archeology is so crucially important to national 
identity, which should not be the monopoly of a specific foreign country (Nasiri-
Moghaddam 2013: 138). Identifying a nation and its head with pre-Islamic 
heritage has been discussed in 2.1 as dislocative nationality (Zia-Ebrahimi 2016), 
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an attempt to connect the identity of the Iranian nation to a European nation. Also 
as Ansari suggests, propagating Iranian culture based on its pre-Islamic heritage 
was effectively re-defined by the Western archeologists; consequently re-
exporting it to the West (Ansari 2012: 178).  
At the time of Mohammad Reza Shah the cultural activities based on ancient 
Persian culture and art were used to propagate and legitimate his monarchy. 
During the 1970s, along with strengthening the position of Iran in OPEC and 
gaining high revenue from the purchase of oil, Mohammad Reza Shah sought to 
project an image of himself to Iran and the world by presenting himself as part of 
a continental chain of Iranian monarchy dating back to the Achaemenid Empire 
and inviting politicians and diplomats from around the world to a celebration of 
2,500 years of the monarchy in Persepolis (Axworthy 2013: 76-77, Tabibi 2014: 
95). In addition, some cultural initiatives were organized under the supervision of 
his wife, Farah Diba. As Baharak Tabibi in her PhD dissertation argues, more 
national museums, such as the Tehran Carpet Museum, Abguineh Museum of 
Glass and Ceramics, Reza Abbassi Museum, Negarestan Museum and Tehran 
Museum of Contemporary Arts, were founded by Farah Diba and consequently 
can be counted as attempts “to propagate Iran’s high artistic culture” in the 
country and abroad (Tabibi 2014: 9-10). A decade earlier, in the early 1960s, she 
began to support the establishment of a cultural institute, Kānun Parvaresh Fekri 
Kudākn va nojavānān, the Institute for the Intellectual Development of Children 
and Young Adults, known as Kanun, which initially established a network of 
permanent and traveling libraries across Iran to promote culture and literacy 
(Daryaee 2016: 1). In the view of Hamid Dabashi, Kanun became a focal point of 
a major movement in Iranian cinema, giving opportunities to young film makers, 
poets and authors (Dabashi 2001: 44). Chapter 6.2.5 will discuss Kanun’s 
cooperation with German partners in intercultural dialogue. A center for the 
“Dialogue among Civilizations” in 1977, which was founded by Iranian National 
Television, the Iranian university of Farabi and the Institute of Cultural Research, 
was the next cultural initiative to be supported by Farah Diba. The center set out 
“to resume once again cultural links [of Iran] with great Asian civilizations which 
were interrupted because of the Western domination in the World”, as Daryoush 
Shayegan mentions (Shayegan 2014: 11-12). The center managed, among other 
things, to translate nearly 70 texts into Farsi and organize a seminar with the 
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assistance of the UNESCO “Big Plan” program in 1977 (Naraghi 1377 [1999]: 
23). The seminar was held to consider the possibility of dialogue among different 
cultures (Mirsepassi 2010: 34). 
Following the Islamic Revolution of Iran, political change influenced the Iranian 
state’s cultural approach in its foreign policy. The dominant revolutionary 
discourse of the new Iranian state and especially its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, 
included “neither East, nor West” and “exporting Islamic Republic of Iran to the 
world”. At the same time, ahead of making any clear cultural policy in the context 
of Iranian foreign policy, Iran’s image in the world was built by revolutionary 
actions such as the American Embassy hostage crisis in 1979 and terror among 
opponents of the Islamic Revolution in some European countries by members of 
“radical revolutionary groups and guards”, which had power in the early years 
after the Revolution (Sinkaya 2015: 104-110). The Revolution also changed the 
political structure of Iran and consequently influenced the policy-making process 
regarding cultural activities abroad: The Islamic Republic of Iran is a mixture of 
democratically legitimated and religiously legitimated sectors. On one hand, an 
elected president, who represents the Iranian state by means of the presidency and 
foreign ministry, has authority over the cultural activities of Iran abroad. On the 
other, the president’s ultimate authority is limited by the head of the religiously 
legitimated sector, who has control over all sections and means of the Iranian 
state. According to the Iranian Constitution, which was re-written after the death 
of Ayatollah Khomeini, the current leader has significant power over key cultural, 
security, judiciary and military institutions, including the Islamic Culture and 
Relations Organization (ICRO), which is in charge of Iran’s foreign cultural 
activities. Therefore, the complex nature of the power structure must be 
considered as a factor to understand the foreign cultural policy of Iran generally 
and characteristics of the intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany 
specifically. It should also be noted that international reactions to Iran worked as 
an obstacle to establishing a foreign cultural policy in the post-Revolution era. 
The Iran-Iraq War (1980- 1988), for instance, was one of the reasons the Iranian 
state was interrupted in achieving its institutional potential to construct a policy 
regarding its cultural activities abroad.  
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After 1994 the Iranian state managed to concentrate and coordinate its foreign 
cultural activities under the authority of a single organization, ICRO. Before that, 
a variety of organizations (around 17) initiated cultural activities abroad. 
Meanwhile, some organizations were founded to make cultural policies in the 
mixed domestic and foreign area. Šorā-ye Āli-ye Enqelāb-e Farhangi [the 
Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution] was an organization founded to regulate 
cultural activities and re-establish cultural institutions such as universities in Iran. 
The next important organization was Sāzemān-e Tabliqāt-e Eslāmi [the Islamic 
Propagation Organization], which was established by Ayatollah Khomeini in the 
early 1980s. The Department of International Affairs of the Ministry of Islamic 
Culture and Guidance,15 which was under the control of the president, played a 
role too. Institutions such as Taqrib and Ah al-Bayt assemblies, as well as Hekmat 
Academy -which was active in regard to philosophy and sociology studies- were 
the next actors to play a role. Most of the organizations and institutions 
mentioned, in fact, had religious terminology in their title or a religious 
background. This suggests that the foreign policy approach in the post-
Revolutionary era was religious. Among the organizations mentioned, the Islamic 
Propagation Organization was the founding father of ICRO. According to Farid 
Moddaresi, the main audience of the Islamic Propagation Organization was tode-
ye Motasharein [traditional religious mass], including youth and elders, 
clergymen and ordinary people, proponents of religious practices in mosques, and 
fans of music and film. There have been huge cultural and training departments 
and agencies in the hands of the Islamic Propagation Organization, including 
news agencies, universities, publications, newspapers, Maddāh 16 and film 
production institutes (Modaresi 28.06.2009). It not only addressed an Iranian 
audience but also extended its activities to some other Muslim countries. After the 
end of the Iran-Iraq War and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the next leader Ali 
Khamenei changed the structure of the Islamic Propagation Organization. He 
                                                          
15 Following the Islamic Revolution, the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education was in charge of 
university and cultural affairs, but afterwards it divided into two separate ministries: the Ministry of Higher 
Education and the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance.  
16 Maddah can be roughly translated as “religious singer”. According to Flaskerud (2013: 26), Maddah is a 
phenomenon which flourished in the post-Iranian Revolution era. With the content of its lyrics about Shia 
myths such as Karbala and Imam Hossain, Maddah encouraged Iranian solders to participate in the Iran-Iraq 
war (1980-1988). The role of Maddah also became significant after the war to stabilize the position of the 
religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state through the songs.   
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delegated Shora-ye ‘Āli [higher council] to manage the organization.17 In 1994 a 
branch of the organization was separated to deal specifically with the propagation 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran abroad. This organization is called the Islamic 
Culture and Relations Organization (ICRO). According to its constitution, which 
was authorized by the leader, all Iranian state means, including budget and 
decision-making authority regarding “foreign cultural propagation”, were 
transferred to ICRO (Rasmi newspaper 05.02.1996). More details of the structure 
of ICRO are presented in 5.2.2. 
Some studies discuss the role of ICRO in the cultural policy of Iran abroad. Von 
Maltzahn argues that establishing a specific institute in Iran “dealing with cultural 
policy” indicates that Iran, like Germany and Britain, cares about the power of 
culture in foreign relations. But unlike the cultural institutions in Germany and 
Britain, ICRO is not responsible for the country’s foreign policy. It has a mixed 
structure, which connects it to the ministry of Islamic culture and guidance but 
also makes it responsible to the leader. Despite its mixed structure, it follows 
some guidelines. Von Maltzahn’s analysis is that, although ICRO theoretically 
aims at all countries of the world, the focus has been more on countries with a 
majority of Muslim communities and neighboring countries such as Syria (von 
Maltzahn 2015: 68). In addition, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, ICRO 
included cultural (not religious) activities in its communication with countries of 
Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. In the 1990s Iran had learned some 
lessons from the early post-Revolution and post-war era. According to William 
Johnston, the non-religious nature of the cultural policy of the Soviet Union and 
its traditional influence on the Central Asian countries was the reason that Iran did 
not attempt to propagate Islam in those countries (Johnston 2007). Using 
historical cultural weight, such as Nowruz18 regarding countries such as 
Turkmenistan, and increasing cultural activities in Persian-speaking countries 
such as Tajikistan and Afghanistan, Iran extended, as Edward Wastnidge states, a 
pragmatic policy in its cultural activities in Central Asia (Wastnidge 2014).    
                                                          
17 These religious and cultural figures are as follows: Ahmad Janati, Mohammad Mohammadi Iraqi, 
Mohammad Ali Zam, Gholam Ali Afrouz, Ahmad Pornejati and Gholamali Haadad Adel. These persons 
played a key role over the next three decades in different cultural and foreign cultural positions of Iran.  
18 Nowruz is the Persian New Year, which is celebrated worldwide by the people of Iran as well as some 
other ethno-linguistic groups in Tajikestan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey etc. Nowruz is celebrated at the 
beginning of spring. 
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The presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1989-1997, brought some 
changes to the foreign policy of Iran, with a tendency to follow pragmatism and 
pursue national interests (Darvishi/Fardi Tazeh 2008, Özyurt 2011, Souri 2005) 
becoming apparent. In his presidency Iran started to become involved in human 
rights meetings with Germany and “critical dialogue” with the EU, as mentioned 
in 2.3. From 1998 Mohammad Khatami had a more “open foreign policy” and 
promised to open up the world to Iran via its policies of “détente” and “dialogue 
among civilizations”. He tried to strengthen “civil society” and the “rule of law” 
at domestic level. Through these reformist plans he formed a new image of Iran 
internationally. The idea of “dialogue among civilizations” was used by the 
foreign ministry to extend more relationships towards Western and Arab 
countries. This approach will be discussed in 6.1.3. Despite all the reformist plans 
and open foreign policy, Khatami faced some obstacles to fulfilling his foreign 
cultural approach. The “terror of writers”,19 newspaper bans, journalist arrests and 
student unrest in 1999, the 18 Tir crisis, are remarkable points to argue that 
Khatami as a president, in the mixed power structure, had limited authority to 
change the foreign cultural policy of Iran in a liberal way. At the same time, 
American President George W. Bush calling Iran an “axis of Evil” in 2001, 
increasing pressure from the EU regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the country’s 
human rights situation, and more economic sanctions against Iran can be counted 
as extra difficulties at the time of Khatami. These international pressures 
strengthened the opposition of hardliners in Iran against the liberal foreign policy 
of Khatami towards the West and his cultural policy, that is, the dialogue among 
civilizations.   
From 2005 to 2013 Iran was introduced to the world through the revolutionary 
rhetoric of Khatami’s successor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. His radical comments 
about Israel are just an example of “how not to improve a country’s image”, as 
Edward Wastnidge argues (2015: 372). According to Wastnidge, during 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency the idea of “soft power” in the foreign policy of Iran 
entered into Iranian political discourse. Soft power in this context matched the 
discourse that hardliners, and especially the leader, had a tendency to use, for 
                                                          
19 “Terror of writers”, which also is known as “Serial Murders”, refers to murders and disappearances of 
Iranian dissidents, intellectuals, liberal authors, and some members of the Writers Association of Iran. It 
happened between 1988 and 1998. There is evidence to indicate that the Iranian government and especially 
Vezārat-e Etela’āt [the ministry of intelligence] was responsible for organizing some of those murders (Ebadi 
2007/ Mokhtari 2016/ Tazmini 2009).  
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instance planning against “cultural penetration”. Ideas like “engineering of 
culture” and “soft war” appeared in this period. The second round of 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency had different aspects. In 2009 Iran faced a mass protest 
movement, criticizing the result of the presidential election and Ahmadinejad’s 
return to presidential office. The movement, known as the Green movement, could 
not sustain itself, but it was able to mobilize the sympathy of Western countries 
like Germany with Iranian people as regards their desire for democracy. At the 
same time, as Mokhtari says in his analysis, it proved that the Iranian state “is 
neither Islamic nor Republic” anymore and that there is a gap between the Iranian 
nation and state (Mokhtari 2016). The election of Hassan Rouhani in 2013 on the 
recommendation of “the president of reformation” Khatami and “the president of 
pragmatism” Hashemi20 suggests that, in spite of all disappointments, the majority 
of Iranian people have not lost their hope in reform. They support, among other 
things, the creation of a “friendly” and “realistic image” of Iran abroad.   
 
 
2.5 Summary of Points in Chapter Two 
At the beginning of his article on the foreign cultural policy of Germany, Gregory 
Paschalidis reports the result of a public opinion poll: between 2008 and 2013, 
people all over the world found Germany to be the most positive of all countries 
with the exception of Japan, which attracted the most positive feedback in 2012. 
Using this point, Paschalidis suggests that Germany, in just two generations since 
the end of WWII, has succeeded in transforming its poor international image into 
that of a universally appreciated “moral authority” (Paschalidis 2014: 257). A 
study conducted by the World Economic Forum states that in 2008 in the Middle 
East, “Iranians are most likely to say the interaction between the West and the 
Muslim world is important” (the World Economic Forum 2008: 15). According to 
this survey, about 70% of Iranians expressed themselves positively about this 
interaction (2008: 15) and believed that a “greater interaction between Muslim 
and Western worlds is a benefit rather than a threat” (2008: 25). No study or poll 
shows the view of Iranians specifically towards Germany. The popularity of the 
                                                          
20 In colloquial language in Iran, Hashemi is known as Sardār-e Sāzandegi [commander of construction], 
which indirectly applies to his pragmatic approach after the Iran-Iraq war. Khatami is known as Raees-e 
Dulat-e Eslahāt [head of administration of reformism]. 
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Goethe Institute amongst young Iranians (although the Goethe Institute does not 
exist officially in Iran, there is a German language institute which is indirectly run 
by it), and that of the DAAD amongst Iranian academics, suggests that there is a 
good chance for Germany to be popular in Iran. Meanwhile, especially after the 
Islamic Revolution, Iran did not have a steadily positive image in the world. A 
Pew Global survey shows that in 2006 the majority of European countries, 
including Germany, and the majority of Muslim countries, including Jordan and 
Egypt, expressed little or no confidence in Ahmadinejad. It is also stated that, in 
2003, 51% of German people perceived Iran as a danger for the region and the 
world, with regard to Iran giving weapons to terrorists instead of using them for 
defense (Pew-Global-Attitudes-Project 2006: 17-19). Another survey by the Pew 
Global center shows that the second top concern of 57% of Germans interviewed 
in 2013 was Iran’s nuclear program (Pew Research Center 2013: 3). Factors such 
as the powerful German economy in global trade, Iran’s unfortunate economy, 
Iranian radical political rhetoric in the early Revolution era and Ahmadinejad’s 
era, are important to form the image of Iran worldwide. But this comparison 
illustrates that Germany successfully managed its post-WWII difficulties and 
represented its image positively abroad. Iran did not have such success in its post-
Revolution era.  
The issues of the international popularity of Germany and the worldwide 
unpleasant image of Iran can be connected to the historical context of intercultural 
dialogue, which were discussed in this chapter. Both nations, as mentioned in 2.1, 
were formed in different ways: the German nation has tended to identify itself 
with its diverse culture, while the Iranian nation has tended to shift back and forth, 
identifying itself with its pre-Islamic or post-Islamic characteristics. Overall, they 
have managed to have a long history of common cultural activities, as mentioned 
in 2.3. The economic and political policies of Germany and Iran played an 
important role in forming the direction of this relationship and these cultural 
activities. As reviewed in 2.4, Germany’s foreign cultural policy was constructed 
within its foreign policy in a more distinct way in the post-WWII era. Iranian 
cultural policy has been mixed up with its Islamic propagation and domestic 
cultural policy in the post-Revolution era, with just a short period in which it was 
based on the liberal policies of Khatami.  
The main points reviewed in chapter 2 are as follows:  
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(1) Continuing cultural relations even without contracts: To organize 
cultural activities, as mentioned in 2.3, the Iranian and German institutions 
concluded cultural agreements. The cultural activities continued even 
when it was not possible for political reasons to continue or re-conclude 
such agreements. It seems that the presence of educational and pedagogic 
contracts, memorandums of understanding and twin cities agreements 
were able to fill the empty place of state agreements.  
 
(2) Shaping cultural relations through cooperation and negotiation: 
Germany, with the presence of its cultural institutions in Iran, represented 
and strengthened its cultural cooperative role. Moving closer to 
contemporary times, Germany’s role in the relationship with Iran was 
shaped by its position in the EU, so a new dimension of negotiation 
emerged. The “critical dialogue” is a good example here. It took place 
because of Iran’s role in the region/Middle East and its foreign and 
domestic policy. It was designed to “change” Iran’s behavior. Historically 
it began in a period in which Iran had recently survived the Iran-Iraq war, 
so Iran had a strong interest in normalizing its relations with the West 
through this dialogue. As a result Germany used the opportunity of its 
cultural cooperation to open space for negotiation with Iran from an 
EU/Western point of view. Some suggest that Germany had economic 
interests in this negotiation. Some also argue that Germany had learned 
from its WWII experience and consequently preferred the negotiation 
option. 
 
(3) Strong role of German and weak role of Iranian cultural institutions: 
Besides having diplomatic missions such as embassies or consulates in 
Germany, Iran represents itself through limited institutions like the Islamic 
Center of Hamburg. Germany, meanwhile, has had cultural institutions in 
different fields in Iran, such as language and art, academic exchange and 
archeology.     
 
(4) Shaping the cultural approach to foreign policy in Germany and Iran 
after changes in political system: Culture seems to be an important issue 
for Iran and Germany. After the Islamic Revolution, Iran has administered 
its foreign cultural policy through two sectors of the Iranian state 
(religiously and democratically legitimated sectors). After WWII, in 
Germany the federal government has structured its foreign cultural policy 
through an integrated political system, mainly the foreign ministry. 
 
(5) Defining some cultural activities between Iran and Germany as 
“dialogue”: Some of the cultural and social activities implemented 
between Germany and Iran since 1992 contain a notion of dialogue, like 
“critical dialogue”. 
Chapter 2: Context of Intercultural Dialogue between Iran and Germany 
75  
 
(6) Being Muslim and Western has not exclusively shaped cultural 
relations: The common cultural activities were not limited to those of a 
religious nature (from the Iranian side) and Western or European nature 
(from the German side). German language courses, support for academic 
exchanges, cultural activities and city friendships are not formed 
predominantly by these two characteristics.  
 
These six points illustrate that, despite differences and similarities between the 
Iranian and German nations, institutions, states and cultural approaches, there is a 
paradigm which reflects the common interests of the German and Iranian nations 
and governments in their contact with one another. This paradigm exists in spite 
of political and economic tensions sometimes being an obstacle to cultural 
relations. The paradigm is important for understanding how and why specific 
cultural activities have been implemented under the discourse of intercultural 
dialogue between Iran and Germany, which in turn is important for understanding 
this research as a whole.  
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This chapter reviews various studies on the issue of intercultural dialogue. As an 
academic discipline, intercultural dialogue is a relatively new and complex area. 
The complexity of intercultural dialogue research has been used as a basis to 
develop the structure of this chapter. Studies which concern definitions and 
different views of dialogue, culture and intercultural dialogue are reviewed in 3.1.; 
those which consider intercultural dialogue as the objective of study in different 
fields of civilization, religion, education, conflict resolution and peace are 
reviewed in 3.2. Some studies also discuss cultural activities and exchanges in the 
international realm, cultural diplomacy and foreign cultural policy, which are also 
considered in 3.2. Subchapter 3.3 presents gaps and confusion in the reviewed 
academic debates. Finally, in 3.4, the question of the present study is posed, this 
time in relation to filling a specific gap in the academic debates.  
 
 
3.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Approaches to Dialogue, Culture 
and Intercultural Dialogue 
Intercultural dialogue consists of three components: “inter-”, “culture” and 
“dialogue”. This combination has been mentioned in various studies, articles and 
statements, but in most, if not all, it refers to cultural relations, negotiation, 
debate, discussion, relationship, cultural exchange and similar. Intercultural 
dialogue thus either has some similarities to those concepts or it is a faddish term 
that authors and experts have a tendency to use. This subchapter explores what 
“intercultural dialogue” actually means.  
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3.1.1 Understanding Dialogue in the Context of Intercultural Dialogue  
The term “dialogue” has its root in the Greek word diologos. As Per Linell 
explains, it is derived from the Greek verb dialegesthai, which means “to conduct 
conversation”. Since the word legein means “to speak” and “to assemble”, 
dialogue should be considered as a “process” and “practice” rather than something 
abstract. Dialogue also means conversation or verbal interaction between two or 
more participants. The word dialogos is sometimes defined as two-sided 
communication according to a false etymology, namely because “dia” is related to 
dya/ duas, meaning two. In Linell’s view, however, this confusion has been 
strongly reinforced by the contrast between dialogue and “monologue”, which 
refers to one-sided communication. It is therefore possible to understand why a 
definition of dialogue as two-sided communication is tolerated in academic 
debates. But a more accurate definition is “speech” between a number of 
participants, as well as “discourse, talk, thought, reason, knowledge and theory” 
(Linell 2009: 2-3). Some scholars argue that dialogue is a result of a process 
which involves “listening with empathy, searching for common ground, exploring 
new ideas and perspectives, and bringing unexamined assumptions into the open” 
(London 2008). Dialogue is also defined as a “conversation aimed at mutual 
confrontation and understanding of views, and as cooperation in the search for 
true protection of general human values and work for justice” (Doron 2002).  
Some scholars argue that because dialogue is a type of communication, it should 
be differentiated from other types of communication. Leonard Swidler believes 
that some individuals “who are quite convinced that they have all the truth on a 
subject” use the terminology of dialogue because they feel that, in today’s climate, 
communicating in a framework of dialogue is less aggressive (Swidler 2007: 7). 
To define dialogue it is not even enough to refer to it as two-way communication, 
because fighting, negotiating and debating, for example, fit the same category but 
are not dialogue. There are some borders between those types of communication 
and dialogue, as Swidler argues. He clarifies two extremes of the two-way 
communication spectrum to illustrate these borders. At one extreme, two sides of 
communication hold the same views on a particular subject; this type of 
communication is called “encouragement” or “reinforcement”. At the other 
extreme, there is communication between two sides; one of them, or both, 
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presumes to have all the truth concerning a subject, meanwhile assuming that the 
other side needs to be informed of that subject. Neither of these types of 
communication fits the meaning of dialogue. In a dialogue, no side has a 
monopoly on the truth of a subject, and both need to seek further. Dialogue may 
turn out to be a reinforcement in some instances, but if it does, it is the result of 
“more or less extensive dialogue” that allows two sides to learn from each other 
and arrive at an agreement (Swidler 2007: 6-7). Swidler’s argument defines 
dialogue as a communication between two (or more) sides; it aims to express the 
ideas and thinking of the participants on an equal level and does not aim to reach 
to an agreement at the end; if agreement is achieved, however, it shows that 
dialogue has provided a possibility for that to happen. This definition suggests 
that dialogue aims at an understanding of an issue rather than focusing on 
convincing one or both sides of it. This is exactly the difference between dialogue 
and negotiation, as scholars such as Cynthia Romano discuss. She argues that 
negotiation uses dialogue to resolve differences; nevertheless, the goal of 
negotiation is to gain “advantage” rather than “understanding” (Romano 2013). 
Also, because negotiation is a discussion in which the participants try to strike a 
deal or reach an agreement of some kind, or in other words is the art of “give and 
take”, it does not fit the meaning of dialogue, as Doron argues (Doron 2002). In a 
study by Abu-Nimer, Khoury and Welty regarding Jewish-Palestinian dialogue, 
dialogue is differentiated from “debate” as follows:  
Table 2. Difference between dialogue and debate  
Dialogue: 
To inquire and to learn  
To unfold shared meaning  
To integrate multiple perspectives  
To uncover and examine assumptions 
Debate: 
To tell, sell, persuade  
To gain agreement on one meaning  
To evaluate and select the best  
To justify/defend assumptions 
 
 
Dialogue also has a root in philosophy. The Greek philosopher Socrates 
approached dialogue as a method of teaching and studying. Using dialogue as an 
instrument, Socrates learned with his students rather than teaching them. He asked 
“interesting questions” that inspired his students to find their own answers. 
Through this method, he was practicing “a spirit of equality” and transforming 
“understanding” (Winchell 2006: 30). There are also debates on “dialogical 
Source: Abu-Nimer et al. (2007, p. 8) 
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logic”, which points to a specific research tradition. Here, dialogical logic is 
conceived as “the systematic study of dialogues in which two parties exchange 
arguments over a central claim”, as Laurent Keiff argues (2011). Another relevant 
discussion of dialogue in the field of philosophy is “philosophy of dialogue”, 
which is expressed by Martin Buber. In his book, I and Thou (1937), Buber 
argues that human existence is based on relationships, it results from exchanges of 
thoughts between “man” and “man”. This discussion of Buber is referred to in 
fields such as qualitative research, for instance phenomenology (Fife 2015), and 
educational techniques. The latter field will be discussed in more detail in 3.2.3.   
Dialogue has been referred to in philosophy as an approach to seeking truth from 
more than one viewpoint. This approach to dialogue in Hans George Gadamer’s 
view is a “fusion of horizons”, which rejects the two alternatives of “objectivism” 
and “absolute knowledge”. It means that no horizon of thinking on a subject is 
completely irrelevant and no single horizon alone is completely relevant. 
Consequently, because participants in a dialogue have different backgrounds, 
histories and cultures, their points of view regarding a subject cannot be removed 
entirely. Dialogue thus creates a possibility for understanding different 
dimensions of an issue according to the views of people who have different 
thought horizons (Gadamer 1980, Gadamer 1997). As a result, Gadamer states 
that symmetry of interaction in dialogue produces knowledge (Linell 1998: 11). In 
Gadamer’s view, knowledge is constructed through the fusion of thoughts of two 
or more parties who share their views; and nobody can claim to own the absolute 
knowledge. Although Gadamer is criticized for being too “relativistic” (Grondin 
2015) and having a “strong focus on the agent’s own self-understanding” (Kögler 
1999), still his idea of “fusion of horizons” is referred to as one of the main bases 
of validity of dialogue as a rational approach to constructing knowledge.  
Dialogue has also been discussed in the context of the relationship between 
American citizens and the American state in the late 19th century. Jeffrey C. 
Goldfarb is among the scholars who analyze Tocqueville’s study on the 
consequences of democratic practices in America in 1920. In Tocqueville’s view, 
there has been a vital relationship between democracy as a political system and 
democracy as a social order with a distinctive culture. Goldfarb argues that 
Tocqueville’s analysis has some gaps and is rather a starting point. In Goldfarb’s 
opinion, democratic culture provides an opportunity to extend the relationship 
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between the state, that is to say the “culture of power”, and people, that is to say 
the “power of culture”, to change the relationship from monologue to dialogue: 
“[I]n the tension between the culture of power and the power of culture, there is a 
zone for dialogue in democracy, and […] intellectuals are key dialogic agents” 
(Goldfarb 2012: 150).  
The above review suggests that there are two approaches to understanding 
dialogue. Firstly, there is a practical concept which puts both parties (participants, 
individuals, groups) face to face to communicate and discuss an issue and provide 
an opportunity to talk and listen. Secondly, there is a metaphorical approach: It is 
no longer limited to face-to-face communication and can be any kind of reciprocal 
interaction, exchange of thinking, influence of one thought on another thought, 
constructing knowledge and similar.  
 
3.1.2 Understanding Culture in the Context of Intercultural Dialogue 
There is no single, straightforward explanation of “culture”. Different disciplines, 
such as anthropology, psychology and sociology, have different approaches to 
culture. Tony Bennett and John Frow in an introduction to the Sage Handbook of 
Cultural Studies briefly compared the amount of space and scope allocated to the 
word “culture” in two different publications in 1968 and 2001. In 1968, there was 
a single entry on culture and some limited connected issues such as cultural 
relativism and culturology. In the 2001 publication, there were 34 entries on 
anthropological and critical approaches to culture, such as “cultural economy” and 
“cultural industry” (Bennett/Frow 2008: 1-2). The increase in academic debates 
on the issue of culture in the last three to four decades illustrates that not only is 
its importance in international relations rising, but attention to it has also grown 
considerably in specific fields. This subchapter therefore attempts to review 
academic debates on culture in the context of intercultural dialogue. 
As mentioned earlier (2.1), there was a tendency from the early 19th century to 
identify the German nation as a Kulturnation (rather than emphasizing its 
civilization) through its language, art and music. The Iranian nation has identified 
itself with its pre-Islamic (civilization of Persia) and Islamic cultures in different 
periods. That being the case, which dimension of the human heritage of a nation is 
culture, and how does it differ from “civilization”?  
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Culture in David Emil Durkheim’s view has its roots in the “collective conscious” 
(Durkheim 2014) and in the view of T. S. Eliot it must be understood “in relation 
with religion” (Kohzadi/Azizmohammadi 2011: 2823). According to Clifford 
Geertz, religion and ideology have been considered as cultural systems (Geertz 
1973). Culture is also defined as “learned behaviors” in a society (Pedersen 2001: 
21). Emanuel Kant differentiates between culture and civilization by referring to 
types of “culture of skills” and “culture of training/discipline”. In Kant’s view, as 
Arsenij Gulyga explains, the first type is necessary for humanity to achieve goals, 
but the second type would rule things. Culture thus refers more to the “culture of 
training”, the absolute morality; what refers more to the “technical” dimension of 
culture, in Kant’s view, is “civilization” (Gulyga 2012: 164-165). In the 
terminology of Edward Burnett Tylor, however, there is no difference between 
culture and civilization, both referring to elements perceived by a human being as 
a member of a society: “[C]ulture or civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic 
sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, 
custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of 
society” (Tylor 1871: 1). Tylor also gives two semantic and value dimensions to 
the explanation of culture according to development theory:  
“Stages of culture, industrial, intellectual, political, moral – Development of 
culture in great measure corresponds with transition from savage through barbaric 
to civilized life - Progression-theory – Degeneration-theory – Development-
theory includes both, the one as primary, the other as secondary- Historical and 
traditional evidence not available as to low stages of culture […]” (Tylor 1871: 
23).  
 
Hence Tylor valuates different cultures, articulates them in a spectrum from 
civilized behavior to barbarism, and gives them semantic dimension, defines them 
in a spectrum from low to high civilization. Eric Gabel and Richard Handler 
criticize Tylor for categorizing civilization based on “degree” rather than “type” 
(Gabel/Handler 2008: 28). As George W. Stocking argues, civilization in Tylor’s 
terminology is the highest stage of progressive human development which began 
in savagery and would end on the highest or at least a standard level of the 
“European civilization” (Stocking 1963: 784). Franz Boas also criticizes Tylor in 
his discussion that human society is marked by a plurality of different cultures or 
nations, and there is no specific concept of culture. As Robert C. Ulin explains, 
Boas believed that there is no inherent relation between race and language and 
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culture; hence there are no inferior races, languages or cultures (Ulin 1984: 3). 
Simulating culture and civilization in Tylor’s definition of culture is also 
challenged by Matthew Arnold. In his view, civilization is outward and 
mechanical, while culture is above all an “inward condition of the mind and 
spirit” (Stocking 1963: 792). That is why it should be understood as a flexible and 
changeable dimension of human life rather than a concrete entity.  
The discussion above can be used as a guideline to the views of thinkers and 
scholars who discuss the relationship between human societies, including Muslim 
and Western countries. For instance, Fred Halliday discusses that long-standing 
tension between Muslim and Western countries has more to do with the political 
conflict than religion. Halliday divides the stages of this conflict into different 
periods. The first was the rise of Islam in the late seventh century, when Arab 
armies went into Sicily and then into France. The second was the medieval wars 
of the Crusaders. The third period began in the late eighteenth century, when 
European states subjugated the Muslim world to their political and economic 
domination, and the fourth took place after the Second World War and especially 
in the early 1970s (Halliday 1995: 71). Although Halliday’s argument highlighted 
the political context as the source of the conflict, most of the knowledge produced 
about this historical tension illustrates negative points of Islam. Some scholars 
tended to combine “Islam” with words such as “threat”, such as John .L Esposito 
in The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (1999), “rage” such as Bernard Lewis in 
The roots of Muslim rage (1990), and “civilizational conflict” such as Bassam 
Tibi in Euro-Islam: die Lösung eines Zivilisationskonfliktes [Euro-Islam: the 
solution of a civilizational conflict] (2009). Scholars such as Andrea Leug argue 
that the media have played a significant role in highlighting the issue of conflict 
between Muslim and Western countries:  
“Since the [Persian] Gulf War, the media have discovered the market value of 
this theme and have been addressing it in television programmes, magazines and 
books. Meanwhile, the diverse trends and complex social, ethnic or cultural 
realities in Islamic countries are hardly granted any attention” (Lueg 1995: 7).  
 
The other scholar to use the terminology of “civilization” to explain tensions 
between Muslim and Western countries is Samuel Huntington. In his book The 
clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, Huntington placed 
civilizations after the Cold War era in eight categories: Western, Latin American, 
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African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist and Japanese (Huntington 
1996: 32). Without defining civilization clearly, Huntington even draws the 
borders of the civilizations on a map (see figure 4) to show that the roots of future 
conflicts lie in the differences between civilizations, specifically Western and 
Islamic civilizations (Huntington 1996: 209), and no longer in the differences 
between economic or social classes (Huntington 1996: 25).   
Figure 3. The World of Civilizations: Post-1990 
 
Source: Samuel Huntington (2011: 26-27) 
 
One of the main problems of the map is that it simplifies the borders of 
civilizations, assuming civilization to be a concrete and not changeable 
phenomenon. The map shows several overlaps. Muslim people living in Western 
countries and followers of the Sinic religion living in India are simply ignored on 
the map, as is the fact that people who live in Sinic or Muslim countries may not 
identify strongly with their religion. The dislocative nationality of Iranian people 
(Zia-Ebrahimi 2016), as discussed in 2.1, can challenge the map in this regard. 
The sharp edge of the theory positioned the Western civilization as rational and 
civilized. It presents Islamic civilization as a trouble maker. It simply ignores the 
fact that Muslim and Western people share some similarities and Westerners 
could have strong dissimilarities between each other. The so-called Arab Spring, 
which started in 2010 in Tunisia and extended to Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria 
and resulted in uprisings in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, is a clear indication that the 
conflict has emerged inside Islamic civilization, and not against the West. The 
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demonstrators in these countries demanded, among other things, a democratic 
system, which Huntington has referred to as one of the favorite values of the 
West. Brexit [British exit], which refers to the referendum in 2016 whereby 
British citizens voted to leave the European Union, is another indication of the 
conflict inside the territory which Huntington identified as Western civilization. 
As a result, it seems that the reasoning of Huntington on future conflicts is a 
political manifestation against so-called Islamic civilization rather than an 
unbiased analysis in political science. Coming from a professor at Harvard 
university and director of security planning for the National Security Council in 
the Carter Administration(Shaw 2007: 254), Huntington’s idea has not remained a 
political prediction but been used as a strategy for US policies regarding Muslim 
countries.  
The rationality of the clash of civilizations as described by Huntington has been 
challenged by scholars. It has been criticized by Edward Said for building a 
conceptual framework of “us-vs-them” and defining “our civilization”, that is, 
Western, as “the accepted one” and “others’ civilization” as “different and 
strange” (Said 2005: 71). Fatemeh Mernissi also criticizes the clash of 
civilizations for ignoring factors such as economic interests that Islam and the 
West have in common. She reminds readers that Western relations with Saudi 
Arabia are an indication of interdependence and interpermeation between Islamic 
and Western countries (Mernissi 2003: 63). Roy Mottahedeh argues that 
Huntington has a wrong understanding of the clash of different civilizations in the 
past. He challenges the historical facts Huntington used to prove his theory, for 
instance that crusaders were to rescue “indigenous Christians of Holy Land” from 
the tyranny of the Muslim inhabitants. Mottahedeh is skeptical about this fact: 
“indigenous Christians of the Holy Land found Crusader Christians presence(‘s) a 
burden since the Crusaders could be extremely intolerant of the indigenous 
Christian groups present there” (Mottahedeh 2005: 133). John Trumpbour also 
suggests that the theory is written for the benefit of the US policies, not based on 
historical facts. The theory was released when communism had just collapsed, so 
there was a desire in US foreign policy to identify the next enemy. Trumpbour 
also reminds readers of the US policy towards Palestine and Israel, and relates it 
to that part of the conceptualization of Western civilization. In his view, the 
political relation between the USA and Israel is the reason to discuss the “Judeo-
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Christian” roots of the Western civilization (Trumpbour 2005: 98). Amartya Sen 
criticizes Huntington’s limitation and categorization of civilizations with 
overlapping categories. In his view, the identity of people who have been involved 
in conflicts is too diverse and complicated to be categorized as one specific 
civilization or culture. In his book Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, 
Sen argues that civilization and religion are not the only factors to shape the 
nature of violence and conflict between people from different cultures. People 
who are identified by a specific civilization or religion are influenced at the same 
time by other factors, such as economics, class or education. He therefore warns 
that categorizing people based on their religion or their civilization will increase 
the possibility of violence between them (Sen 2007). Navid Kermani’s argument 
is similarly relevant in this regard. He discusses that being Arab or Jew has not 
always been perceived as religious identity. He clarifies this point with the 
example of the “we” in Arab philosophy and poetry, which often does not mean 
“we Muslims” or “we Jews”, but rather “we philosophers” (Kermani 2005: 42). 
He emphasizes that, over the course of the modern age, Jewish philosophy, 
mysticism and literature developed in the Arab context. The identity of people in 
the Arab world is by no means shaped exclusively by Islam, but also by Jewish 
and Christian traditions. Negating or choosing to ignore historic realities 
aggravates the tensions in the Middle East (Kermani 2005: 43).  
Categorizing people according to their civilization and culture is a sensitive issue 
in understanding intercultural dialogue; firstly, because it can lead to value 
judgments such as barbaric or civilized or low or high cultures; secondly, because 
it can ignore diverse characteristics of their identity. Here too it is important to 
distinguish between “inter-cultural” and “intra-cultural”. The difference depends 
on the perspective of the researcher who studies a certain subject and compares it 
with other subjects inside or outside a community and group. Intra-cultural applies 
to communication/relations between people who are from the “same” culture or 
have a culturally “similar” background, for example communication between 
Iranians or communication between Germans. Inter-cultural meanwhile refers to 
communication between two sides (two persons, groups, partners) from different 
cultures, for example between Iranians and Germans. This categorization may not 
be entirely clear-cut or accurate, however. Communication between an Iranian 
and a German may count as inter-cultural, but cultural similarities, such as their 
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interest in the poems of Hafiz and Goethe or scholarships from the DAAD, make 
their communication intra-cultural. This situation can be confusing.  
L.E. Sarbough introduces a useful discriminator to differentiate inter-cultural from 
intra-cultural communication. He suggests considering the heterogeneity and 
homogeneity of the participants of communication. In Sarbough’s view, there are 
no two persons who are different in every characteristic, and no two persons who 
are alike in every characteristic. So by establishing a continuum with a pure 
homogeneous pair at one end and a pure heterogeneous pair at the other end, it is 
possible to recognize whether there are more similarities or dissimilarities 
between two persons. If they have more dissimilarities than similarities, studying 
their communication as inter-cultural is valid. If they share more similarities, they 
should be studied based on intra-cultural communication (Sarbaugh 1993: 7-8).  
To sum up the academic debates reviewed in this subchapter, it is important to 
recognize how a nation presents itself culturally and is perceived by others and 
that culture is a combination of different dimensions and aspects. Understanding a 
nation based on its so-called culture (Islamic in the case of Iran and Western in 
the case of Germany) neglects some dimensions of the everyday life of that 
nation. In defining the communication between two nations, similarities and 
differences in the characteristics of participants in communication must be 
identified. Intercultural dialogue in this sense refers to dialogue between 
dissimilar participants. 
 
3.1.3 Overview of Definitions of Intercultural Dialogue  
Studies which consider intercultural dialogue have been conducted in different 
disciplines and rarely define it as a specific concept. For instance, some analyze it 
in a European cultural and political context (Anderson 2010, Atwan 2010, 
Bekemans 2012, Bourquin 2003, Cliche 2004, De Petrini 2010, Wilk-Woś 2010, 
Wimmer 2007), and some in the context of education and globalization (Zajda 
2009). Most refer to the necessity of intercultural dialogue to reflect the diversity 
of cultures and see it as making a positive contribution to problems of social life. 
They nevertheless assume that intercultural dialogue is an already understood 
concept and does not need to be defined.  
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Intercultural dialogue has been defined in some dissertations and studies 
according to the definition given by international organizations. For instance, 
Chee Meng Wong, in his dissertation Intangible Cultural Heritage of Dance as 
Medium for Intercultural Dialogue: Culture Assimilator Reinterpreted, picks up 
on the definition of intercultural dialogue of the European Union and European 
Council. He shortens this definition to “a means to social cohesion” and “an ideal 
of liberalism and value pluralism” (Meng Wong 2013: 117-135). In another study 
on the subject of art and dialogue, definitions of the European Council and 
UNESCO are used (Cliche/Wiesand 2009: 7-15).  
The fact that the definitions of intercultural dialogue used by international 
organizations such as UNESCO and the European Union are reflected in relevant 
studies cannot be a coincidence. One reason may be rooted in the history of 
involvement of these organizations in intercultural issues. From the beginning of 
the 20th century there has been a great tendency for international organizations to 
take practical action to prevent conflicts and provide peace and security. As 
Simon Bromley argues, after World War II the European countries, which had 
experienced two world wars in less than a generation, showed a great tendency in 
European integration policies to pursue their own interests through cooperation 
with one another. Organizations such as the UN and European organizations were 
established in such a context. In 1949, ten European states signed the statute of the 
Council of Europe, and in 1951 the Treaty of Paris was signed, which was the 
original step towards founding the European Union (EU). The EU was established 
to pursue not only economic cooperation in energy sectors but also common 
foreign and security policies and to cooperate on justice and human rights issues 
(Bromley 2001: 31-35). This context explains why the EU has coordinated 
“critical” and “constructive” dialogue with Iran on human rights issues as 
mentioned in 2.3. Establishment of the UN goes back to after World War I and the 
foundation of the League of Nations. As Rumki Basu explains, it aimed to prevent 
a repetition of the disaster of war. During World War II, “the idea that a new 
major organization would be needed to maintain peace and security in the post-
war world” became popular among the allied powers. As a result, the UN was 
established in 1941 and developed its suborganizations in specific missions (Basu 
2004: 12-25). This point also explains why Mohammad Khatami’s idea of 
“Dialogue among Civilizations” attracted attention in the UN in 1998, and 2001 
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was consequently named after it. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is one of the suborganizations of the UN that 
has shown more interest in intercultural dialogue. UNESCO was created in 1945. 
It has two main priorities, Africa and gender equality, although it has a number of 
overarching objectives such as “fostering cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue 
and a culture of peace”(UNESCO 2010: 4). A study by Hadi Khaniki on speeches 
of five director-generals of UNESCO in the last three decades of the 20th century 
suggests that there has been a significant change from one-sided and monological 
phrases in the speeches, plans and statements of the five UNESCO directors to 
two-sided phrases (Khaniki 2008). Moreover, as already mentioned in 1.2.1.1, 
references to intercultural dialogue and related phrases by director-generals of 
UNESCO were found to have emerged since the 1980s, peaked in 2001 and 
fluctuated up to 2015 (Bloom 2013: 4). The number of UN documents containing 
terms of racism, interfaith, security and interreligious concepts in combination 
with the expression “intercultural dialogue” increased between 2000 and 2012 
(Bello 2013: 4).  
The increased attention of international organizations to the issue of intercultural 
dialogue can explain why most studies adopt their definition of intercultural 
dialogue. According to the UNESCO definition , intercultural dialogue refers to 
“equitable exchange and dialogue among civilizations, cultures and peoples, 
based on mutual understanding and respect and the equal dignity of all cultures” 
(UNESCO 2014). As well as managing cultural diversity, reviewing international 
strategies related to peace and development is mentioned by UNESCO as a 
necessity to promote intercultural dialogue in a study titled Investing in Cultural 
Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue (UNESCO 2009).  
The European Council also published a book on intercultural dialogue called the 
White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue in 2008, the year the European Union 
called European Intercultural Dialogue Year. Intercultural dialogue in this book 
is defined as follows: 
“[A] process that comprises an open and respectful exchange of views between 
individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic 
backgrounds and heritage, on the basis of mutual understanding and respect. It 
requires the freedom and ability to express oneself, as well as the willingness and 
capacity to listen to the views of others” (Council of Europe 2008: 17).  
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Based on this definition, intercultural dialogue contributes to “political, social, 
cultural and economic integration and the cohesion of culturally diverse 
societies”. It expresses “equality, human dignity and a sense of a common 
purpose”, sets out to “develop a deeper understanding of diverse world views and 
practices, to increase co-operation and participation -or the freedom to make 
choices-, to allow personal growth and transformation, and to promote tolerance 
and respect for the other” (Council of Europe 2008: 17). According to another 
definition of the Council of Europe, intercultural dialogue “can also be a tool for 
the prevention and resolution of conflicts by enhancing the respect for human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law” (Council of Europe 2003). In Sharing 
Diversity, a study launched by the European Commission in 2008, intercultural 
dialogue was referred to as the “heart of cultural programs” planned for 
implementation up to 2013. As Sharing Diversity states, intercultural dialogue is 
also a tool for cooperation with intergovernmental organizations such as the 
Council of Europe, the OECD and UNESCO, as well as NGOs (2008: XIII).  
These definitions consider conditions such as equality of opportunity and 
guaranteed safety of the participants. Discouraging extremism, bringing people 
together, managing cultural diversity, developing deeper understanding of diverse 
views, increasing cooperation and participation, promoting tolerance and respect 
and freedom are among the mentioned aims of intercultural dialogue. Different 
ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic backgrounds and heritages are referred to in 
the definitions to emphasize the diversity of participants in intercultural dialogue.  
These definitions have some deficiencies. Firstly, they do not consider the 
characteristics of dialogue as a form of communication. As was mentioned in 
3.1.1, dialogue can be understood in two senses, first practical and second 
metaphorical. It is not clear in these definitions which intercultural dialogue 
belongs to. Secondly, the range of participants of intercultural dialogue is so wide 
(individuals, peoples, groups and organizations) that it is difficult to determine 
whether intercultural dialogue is at individual, organizational or inter-
governmental level, or in inter-cultural or intra-cultural communication.  
Some scholars criticize the EU for using intercultural dialogue in “integration” 
and “immigration” policies when it is not clear whether this, as a method, will 
work. Some also criticize the EU for using it as a “flagship” against “terror”, 
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“radicalization” and “integration” when “little is known about the origin of the 
term, its real meaning and its objectives” (Silvestri 2007: 1).  
The theoretical and conceptual approaches reviewed in this section share a 
common challenge in relation to intercultural dialogue. Is dialogue in the context 
of intercultural dialogue an abstract issue, or is it a form of social communication? 
Does culture refer to the tradition, language and art of different people, or is it an 
issue that depends on the social or economic level of a nation? It is worth noting 
that the boundaries between inter-cultural and intra-cultural communication are 
narrow.  
The challenges to understanding intercultural dialogue are not just a matter of the 
academic debates. It is also connected to the subject of this study by political and 
social struggles. It is therefore important to consider the political and social 
circumstances in which intercultural dialogue has been implemented and which 
organizations with which political approaches and aims have defined intercultural 
dialogue.  
Subchapter 3.1 contains reviews of academic debates on dialogue and culture. 
This knowledge helps to analyze the intercultural dialogue activities between Iran 
and Germany. It is important to understand which other factors inform them 
besides those mentioned in the academic debates (ethnic diversity of participants 
of intercultural dialogue or peace objectives).  
 
 
3.2 Discussing Intercultural Dialogue in Different Academic 
Debates 
Intercultural dialogue has been explored in several disciplines. Categorizing 
intercultural dialogue based on these disciplines was difficult because, for 
instance, some studies considered its role in the educational arena and at the same 
time in immigration programs of European countries. The studies reviewed here 
are therefore not one-dimensional but multi-dimensional.  
This subchapter comprises seven sections. 3.2.1 considers the religious aspect of 
intercultural dialogue in some studies, while 3.2.2. looks at its civilizational 
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aspect. Section 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 respectively present intercultural dialogue through 
a dialectical approach and as a reflection of diversity. An overview of studies in 
the fields of education, civil society and media is presented in 3.2.5. Studies 
which consider peace, approaches to conflict resolution and immigration policies 
in the context of intercultural dialogue are reviewed under the political dimension 
in 3.2.6, and those which reflect foreign cultural policy and its instruments in 
3.2.7. 
 
3.2.1 Religious Dimension of Intercultural Dialogue 
In recent decades, the concept of intercultural dialogue has been linked strongly to 
the fields of religion and faith studies through the terminology of “dialogue 
among religions”, “interreligious dialogue”, “interfaith dialogue”, and similar. 
There are some differences between these terms, but because studies with a focus 
on dialogue matter here, the differences are neglected. They are reviewed together 
in this subchapter.   
Dialogue among religions can be categorized by different types based on goals 
and participants. Some studies distinguish four types: “dialogue of life”, “Dialog 
des Handelns” [dialogue of actions], “dialogue of theologian exchanges”, and 
“dialogue of religious experiences” (Güzelmansur 2009: 539-541, Kaulig 2004: 
78). The first type, dialogue of life, is a dialogue among people of a specific 
religion who live in a neighborhood with people of another religion and have open 
interaction with each other. They face joy, suffering and human problems 
together. Hence they try to overcome life issues through dialogue. The second 
type, dialogue of actions, is between Christians and non-Christians. Through 
dialogue they try to achieve development and progress in the society in which 
they work and live together. Dialogue of theologian exchanges, the third type, is 
among experts who want to deepen their understanding of each other’s religious 
heritage. In this case dialogue is a tool to learn about each other’s religion. The 
fourth type, dialogue of religious experience, refers to a dialogue in which people 
from a specific religious tradition share their experiences about their spirituality; 
they explain, for instance, to people of other religions how they think of and 
believe in God.  
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The other typology of dialogue among religions, which has much in common with 
that above, is developed by Mahmoud Ayoub (Ayoub 2004: 316-318). His first 
type is “dialogue of life”, which is more or less like that explained above. He 
defines the second type as “dialogue of beliefs”, which concerns theological 
doctrines and philosophical ideas. It tends to be restricted to dialogue between 
academics and mostly covers technical and abstract issues. “Dialogue of 
witnessing to one’s faith” is the third type, which often refers to an invitation to 
talk about religious subjects through dawah21 and missionary work. The fourth 
type is “dialogue of faith”, which refers to dialogue among Muslims and 
Christians, according to Ayoub. Dialogue of faith considers a deeper and more 
personal level of dialogue between religious people who share their personal faith 
with each other. The ultimate purpose of the dialogue of faith, Ayoub states, is to 
create “a fellowship of faith among the followers of Islam and Christianity” 
(Ayoub 2004: 318).  
There is another typology of dialogue among religions based on definitions of 
religion: “sharing religious experiences” and “relationship between man and 
man”. Khalil Ghanbari in his study argues that two phases, modernism and 
constructivism, shape the approach of the Parliament of the World’s Religions 
towards interfaith dialogue. As Ghanbari states, this parliament is one of the 
international platforms of interfaith dialogue, in which the Eastern religions such 
as Buddhism and Hinduism play a central role. In the parliament, members who 
have Eastern religions are engaged in a joint effort with members of the Western 
religions to show that the world’s religions have a common aspect. The 
parliament’s approach to interreligious dialogue is influenced by two phases of 
thinking. The first is characterized by an emphasis on religious experience. In this 
phase, Western theologians attempted to define religion on a basis that could not 
be explained rationally: revelations resulted from the divine agency, not from 
rational processes. This approach was useful to them because, if they are 
challenged on theology, they can claim that there is no relationship between 
theoretical reason and religion. Therefore, any rational critique of one aspect of 
religion does not harm the religion as a whole, because religion is beyond reason. 
In the second phase, universal morality characterizes interfaith dialogue. Here, 
                                                          
21 Dawah in Islam is similar to missionary work in Christianity and means preaching to invite and convert 
people to a specific religion.    
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religionists who disagree with the advent of constructivism argue that the 
religious experience should not be regarded as a shared aspect of religion, because 
it is historical and diverse. In this context they talk about the possibility of 
interfaith dialogue in which religion should be perceived as being concerned with 
the morality relationship between “man and man” and “man and nature”, and not 
“man and truth” (Ghanbari 2011: 49). As Ghanbari argues, interfaith dialogue 
suffered under these two phases and definitions because it is reduced to mythical 
experiences in the first phase and to morality in the second.  
As reviewed above, dialogue of religions is not implemented solely for 
theological and moral reasons. Social issues also play a role in motivating the 
participants. As Timo Güzelmansur argues, Christians (Catholic church) and 
Muslims are motivated to participate in dialogue of religions by a need for a 
peaceful and friendly relationship and cohabitation in a plural society 
(Güzelmansur 2009: 539). Some studies argue that certain conditions must be 
considered in organizing dialogue of religions. Catherine Cornille in different 
parts of her study argues that “understanding and empathy”, “belief in dynamic 
nature of truth”, “belief in the common ground or goal of all religions”, and 
“recognition of the other religion as a source of truth” are the main conditions to 
make dialogue work (Cornille 2007). In Johannes Kandel’s view dialogue can be 
conducted successfully if both sides have honesty, credibility, openness, readiness to take 
risks, firmness in their own convictions, reciprocity, willingness to listen and self-
critique, and the inclination to cooperate to answer practical questions (Kandel 2005: 
223).22  
There are also other scholars, like Seyyed Houssein Nasr, who believe that 
dialogue among religions should only take place between trained participants. 
Jane I. Smith argues in her study that:  
“Nasr is uninterested in dialogue for the sake of mere conversation, and insists 
that in order for dialogue to have any chance of success the participants must be 
well trained in their own faith as well as familiar with the other. Himself a man of 
genuine theological and philosophical curiosity, he wants to engage with others 
who are serious about the pursuit of truth. That truth is not, […], encapsulated in 
the ethical teaching of Islam, but is to be discovered by pursuing an epistemology 
in which a single reality, most basically the oneness of God, might be seen in 
several different ways, or from different perspectives” (Smith 2007: 137).  
 
                                                          
22 The original text is in German. It is translated to English by the researcher. 
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Some studies also argue that specific preconditions must be met for dialogue of 
religions. In a PhD dissertation by Nega Chewaka Tucho, it is mentioned that 
many efforts in dialogue of religions have failed because religious partners have 
not engaged in “self-criticism”:  
“In the past many efforts at dialogue have failed because this prerequisite has not 
been fulfilled. Groups of well meaning Jews, Christians, Muslims, Hindus, and 
Buddhists have held polite and gracious gatherings and have returned home 
without having significantly entered into each other’s thought forms. Although 
such meetings have produced a pious respect for others as fine religious persons, 
they have not generated the deep self-criticism and spiritual renewal that future 
dialogue must achieve” (Tucho 2012: 184).  
 
Tucho also argues that dialogue among religions cannot lead to the discovery of 
“transcendent realities”, namely God, but only to the experience of reality:  
“Our finite limitations and our simultaneous need for commitment to a particular 
experience of transcendent reality, our particular experience, though limited, will 
function in an absolute sense as the validating for our own personal religious 
experience” (Tucho 2012: 182).  
 
This “personal religious experience” is reminiscent of the approach that the 
Parliament of the World’s Religions took to define religion in the first phase of its 
work, as mentioned above. Using dialogue among religions as a way to enjoy 
some common values has been mentioned by Abduljavad Falaturi, who defined 
dialogue among religions based on “love”, or what he calls rahmah. According to 
a part of the Torah, the holy book of Judaism, people should love their neighbor. 
Falaturi interpreted it to mean a more worldwide view, to love the enemy too, 
because all humans are the children of the Father, according to Christian theology 
(Falaturi 1996). 
Some scholars criticized dialogue of religions for being a tool in the hands of one 
side to influence the beliefs of the other. Johannes Kandel and Henning 
Wrongemann, for instance, have argued in their studies that dialogue among 
religions becomes an opportunity for Muslims to express their ritual self-
proclamation or dawah (Kandel 2005, Wrogemann 2006). Some scholars, such as 
Karla Suomala, have also said that dialogue among religions has been used as 
post-colonial missionary work by Christians (Suomala 2012: 362-363). 
Mohammad Ayoub too argued that, in spite of the insistence of Christian and 
Islamic clergymen on tolerance and respect, in most interfaith dialogues these 
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promises were not fulfilled: “Muslims have generally condemned Christians as 
polytheists […] Christians have likewise often condemned Islam as a religion 
inspired by the devil and Muslims as barbaric people without any moral or 
spiritual values” (Ayoub 2004: 315). Ayoub believes that the problem is not in the 
nature of faith:  
“The problem lies in our inability to accept each other’s faiths on their own terms. 
Muslims have acknowledged an Islamized Christianity and Christians have often 
Christianized Islam. Thus, with all good intentions, both communities have 
sought to negate, or at least neutralize the individuality and integrity of the faith 
of the other in order to find room for it in their own tradition and worldview” 
(Ayoub 2004: 318).  
 
Moreover, scholars such as Michael Dusche discuss that interfaith dialogue is not 
an opportunity for Muslims and Christians to share their faith but an opportunity 
for them to express their view of non-believers. He continues that:  
“It would be a misunderstanding to conclude from these attempts at interfaith 
dialogue that Christians and Muslims should have accepted each other as equals. 
While turning a friendly face to each other, each side turns around to its own 
followers and makes it very clear that it is their own respective faith exclusively 
that warrants salvation” (Dusche 2006: 945). 
  
Some studies have analyzed aspects of Christian-Jewish interfaith dialogue that 
has roots in the post-WW II era. Katharina von Kellenbach argues that, although 
interfaith dialogue is dominated by men, in Christian-Jewish interfaith dialogue 
the first efforts to create channels of communication and networks of support for 
Jewish people across religious communities were led by women. She states that 
because these women had a lack of theological prestige and institutional power, 
they failed to mobilize religious leaders against the genocide. They nevertheless 
played an important role in saving people of other faiths through their professional 
(for instance as colleagues and neighbors) and personal (for instance through 
intermarriage) relationships. Here von Kellenbach argues that interfaith dialogue 
“is more than an academic experience in instruction. It is fundamentally a moral 
and political endeavor that demands solidarity with those who endure defamation 
and harassment” (von Kellenbach 2013: 71).  
The influence of intellectual theologians on society as a result of extending the 
issue of interfaith dialogue has also been debated in the academic realm. Sasan 
Tavassoli in his dissertation Christian Encounters with Iran: Engaging Muslim 
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Thinkers after the Revolution scrutinizes views and approaches of three Iranian 
liberal religious intellectuals, Abdolkarim Soroush, Mojtahed Shabestari and 
Mostafa Malekian, and their positive role in bringing the so-called Islam world 
(Shia) and Christian world (Protestant) together (Tavassoli 2010). As mentioned 
in chapter 2.3, in the post-Iranian-Revolution era, a group of intellectuals from 
Hekmat Academy of Iran began interfaith dialogue with Western countries. 
Soroush and Shabestari were pioneers in coordinating interfaith dialogues in Iran. 
This point will be analyzed more in 5.2.3. Although Tavassoli wrote 
optimistically of the effect of the Iranian intellectuals on creating an era of open-
mindedness for interfaith dialogue in Iranian society, some scholars analyze it 
differently. Omid Safi is among those who believe that, although Iranian 
progressive Muslim thinkers have a positive impact intellectually, even the efforts 
of somebody like Abdolkarim Soroush, called the “Iranian Luther”, cannot shake 
the foundation of Islam, as some Western media reporters think, nor can their 
attempts toward “Islamic reformation” change the whole of society. In Safi’s 
view, society cannot wait for the religious reformation and then consider 
economic and social factors (Safi 2003: 16). Safi’s point can also be understood as 
a pathology of interfaith dialogue: a society needs dialogue in all fields, not solely 
on religions. Karla Suomala also argues that interfaith dialogue is an attempt to 
remind people, specifically those who have a complex religious identity, that their 
identity is multidimensional and that “religion” is just one of those dimensions. 
She believes that bringing these people together in interfaith dialogue is difficult 
but will be fruitful in the end because it gives them an opportunity to learn that 
their own religion does not have superiority over other religions (Suomala 2012: 
367).  
To summarize, types, approaches, conditions and worries regarding dialogue 
among religions have been the main points of the studies reviewed in this section. 
Interreligious dialogue does not refer only to a dialogue among theologians on 
issues such as faith; it also refers to dialogue between people from different faiths 
who want to understand each other on practical life issues. Not only is knowledge 
on a specific religion important for an ideal participant to enter interreligious 
dialogue, some of the studies reviewed also state that the participant should be 
honest, open and self-critical in dialogue. Some have reflected concerns of 
theologians about misusing the opportunity of interfaith dialogue for dawah or 
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missionary work. The gender issue has been highlighted in some studies, with the 
argument that interfaith dialogue is mostly an arena dominated by men. Some 
studies have emphasized that interfaith dialogue must be understood in the 
participants’ political and social context. And some researchers have criticized the 
role of intellectuals in interfaith dialogue to develop an open and progressive 
society. Finally, the issue of the identity of participants in interfaith dialogue has 
also been raised. Religion is just one of many dimensions of an identity, and a 
society needs dialogue in all fields, not just the religious one. 
 
3.2.2 Civilizational Dimension of Intercultural Dialogue 
Intercultural dialogue has been discussed in some studies as “dialogue among 
civilizations”. This dialogue should be understood firstly as a strategy and 
suggestion to confirm that civilizations are equal in value and degree (as a 
counter-response to the Tylorian view of culture/civilization); and secondly as a 
response to confirm that conflict in human societies does not result from the 
difference between civilizations (negating Huntington’s clash of civilizations 
theory). Section 3.2.2 deals with the views of four philosophers who focused 
mainly on the civilizational dimension of intercultural dialogue. Their views are 
discussed in chronological order. 
The first philosopher is Hans Köchler, an Austrian philosopher and the first 
academic to use the phrase “dialogue among civilizations” in the international 
realm. In 1972, in the Cold War era, he sent a letter to UNESCO suggesting an 
international conference on “the dialogue between different civilizations” 
(Köchler 2012: 3). His idea was later picked up on by his own organization, the 
International Progress Organization. In close cooperation with the philosophy 
division of UNESCO, it organized different conferences between Muslim and 
Western countries on multicultural issues such as citizenship and globalization 
(Köchler 2012: 4-10). In Köchler’s view, there are some principles and 
requirements that are indispensable for genuine dialogue among civilizations. The 
first is “equality of civilizational/cultural lifeworlds”, which excludes any form of 
patronizing or supremacist attitudes favorizing one civilization over another. The 
second requirement is “awareness of the dialectics of cultural self-comprehension 
and self-realization”. Based on this principle, individuals from a civilization 
should look at it from an outside perspective to be able to perceive it. It is 
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reaching this level of understanding, in Köchler’s view, that helps to construct 
dialogue among civilizations. The third principle is “acknowledgment of meta-
norms as foundation of dialogue”, which is rooted in the first principle. 
Respecting civilizational equality is the precondition for interaction through 
certain “meta-norms”, such as “tolerance”, in dialogue among civilizations. The 
fourth principle, as Köchler explains, is the “ability to transcend the hermeneutical 
circle of civilizational self-affirmation”, similar to the second principle. 
“Civilizational self-affirmation” articulates the historical (and external) 
relationships of a civilization toward other civilizations (Köchler 2014: 3-5). To 
connect this theoretical discussion to the possibility of dialogue between real 
civilizations, Köchler reminds readers that achieving values common to all 
civilizations, such as “tolerance” and “mutual respect”, is not enough to make 
dialogue between them possible. In this regard Köchler suggests that “an analogy 
of civilizations can be drawn between (a) the normative equality of civilizations 
on the socio-cultural level and (b) the concept of the sovereign equality of states 
on the political level” (Köchler 2002: 2). His practical suggestion is to foster 
opportunities for dialogue between civilizations via global sporting events like the 
Olympics, because the nations of the world are treated equally at those events 
(Köchler 2002: 14).  
The second philosopher to be considered here is Johan Galtung, better known for 
his analysis of political violence and peace. In 1978 he said in a symposium23 that 
the concept of peace in the contemporary world must be understood in a richer, 
more diverse context. Peace should not be understood just as a “lack of war” and 
confrontation between major powers, but also as a lack of violence in spheres in 
which people from Hebrew, Christian, Islam, Greek, Roman and other traditions 
confront each other (Galtung 1978). In this presentation, Galtung refers in a 
general way to civilizations as being an important issue for the peace-building 
process. In 1981 he deepened this discussion in an article and talks on “an obvious 
need for dialogue among civilizations” in constructing a richer peace concept 
(Galtung 1981: 183).  
The third philosopher to conceptualize dialogue among civilizations is Daryush 
Shayegan, who established the Center of Dialogue Among Civilizations in 1977 in 
                                                          
23 The symposium that Johan Galtung participated in was called “Science and Peace”, 16th World Congress of 
Philosophy in Germany. 
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Iran. He organized a conference on the same topic with the support of UNESCO 
in the same year. Shayegan, without concentrating on a definition of civilization, 
expresses his idea on the decline of fertility of Asian civilization centering on 
Iran, India, China and Japan (Shayegan 1388 [2009]: 183-223, Shayegan 2014).24 
In this regard Asian civilizations missed “all dramatic breakthroughs of modern 
times”. In the case of Iran, Shayegan states that a great synthesis of Islamic 
thought in Iran took place in the 17th century at the time of Safavid and through 
the achievements of Mulla Sadra.25 Thereafter, Iranian philosophy did not go 
beyond commentaries on Mulla Sadra’s philosophy. In the case of India also, he 
explains that nothing was created in Indian civilization from the 17th century 
beyond commentaries on the Scholastic period of Indian philosophy. China also 
presented some signs of exhaustion in its approach to science and knowledge from 
the beginning of 17th century (Shayegan 2014: 13-14). The decline of Asian 
civilizations, in Shayegan’s view, brought their mutual cross-fertilization to an 
end and they stopped renewing themselves. Based on this historical review, 
Shayegan concludes that the decline is rooted firstly in the confrontation of East 
and West, that is, of Eastern civilizations and Modernity. Taking the approach of 
Michael Foucault to “order” and “power”, Shayegan suggests that Eastern 
civilizations become inactive in this confrontation because the order and design of 
knowledge in the Western tradition of thinking and the modern era are completely 
different from their own (Shayegan 2014: 15-16). It is rooted secondly in the 
Tavahom-e Moza’af or Do ganeh [double illusion] of Asian civilizations: on the 
one hand, Asian civilizations are not aware of the value of their own knowledge 
and thoughts, and on the other, they do not understand Western civilization 
completely. In his view, this double illusion is the main reason for the decline. He 
therefore suggests dialogue between civilizations as a solution (Shayegan 1388 
[2009]: 49, Shayegan 1999: 35). Shayegan emphasizes the special role of Iran in 
dialogue among civilizations due to its special place in the Islamic world and its 
border with the Western world: “[P]laced between the two worlds, Iran has played 
the role of privileged intermediary, an inevitable bridge between continents” 
                                                          
24 Some of the texts which are reviewed in this research, like this text, are originally available in Farsi. 
According to APA referencing, the citation for this kind of text should provide an English translation of the 
title in square brackets after the foreign-language title, without italics. Besides the title, the date of the text is 
important. The Iranian calendar (Jalali calendar) is different from the English or German calendar (Gregorian 
calendar). Therefore, each Farsi text which is available with an Iranian date is kept in the citation. Its German 
date is calculated and appears in this research after the original date, for example: 1388 [2009]. 
25 Mulla Sadra was an Iranian Shia Islamic philosopher and theologian who lived in the late 16th and early 
17th century. 
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(Shayegan 2014: 11). As a review of the speeches of different philosophers at the 
UNESCO conference in 1977 shows, Shayegan’s analysis had both opponents and 
supporters. For instance, Roger Garaudy shared a similar view to Shayegan and 
identifies the West in his speech with discourses such as “Faustian model of 
Western culture”, “Hegelian model of History” and “cultural imperialism”. In 
Garaudy’s view, problems of contemporary life, which are mostly rooted in the 
“long-term and exclusive domination of the West”, must be solved through 
dialogue among civilizations (Garaudy 1379 [2000]: 87). In contrast, Henry 
Corbin did not agree with putting all the responsibility for the problems on the 
shoulders of the West. In his view, civilization is an abstract term. As a result, it is 
wrong to suggest that civilizations can enter into dialogue as “universals”: “It is 
only the messengers, speaking in the name of their civilizations, who can be the 
real partners in a dialogue” (Corbin 1379 [2000]: 26). In this sense Corbin 
discusses that dialogue should be considered a “real” dialogue, for instance 
between mediators of different civilizations. He argues that Western interest in the 
East (for instance in archeological explorations at ancient sites in the East) should 
not be understood as an obstacle to dialogue. Real dialogue, in his view, raises the 
question of “shared responsibilities” because it is an exchange between “persons”: 
“A dialogue takes place between «you» and «me». «You» and «I» both need to 
have assumed a like responsibility, each for his or her own personal fate” (Corbin 
1977, Corbin 1379 [2000]: 26-27).  
A fourth philosopher in the context of dialogue among civilizations is the former 
Iranian president Mohammad Khatami. As already mentioned in 1.1, Khatami 
requested all UN members at its General Assembly in 1998 to call 2001 the year 
of dialogue among civilizations. This idea was a promise of Khatami’s 
presidential campaign in 1996. When Khatami became president in 1997, 
Mohammad Javad Faridzadeh, who had taken his PhD in Philosophy in Germany, 
helped him to promote the idea practically by managing the International Center 
for Dialogue among Civilizations and intellectually by writing his speeches. It can 
therefore be said that dialogue among civilizations had both a political and a 
philosophical dimension. There are many publications on the issue of dialogue 
among civilizations under Khatami and relevant topics in Farsi. A study by 
Mohammad Gharagozlu shows that 597 articles, commentaries, translations, 
speeches and interviews were printed on dialogue among civilizations from 1997 
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to 2002 (1382 [2003]: 86), while that of Hasan Namni puts the number of 
published books, articles and translations on the same issue between 1998 and 
2004 at 271 (1383 [2004]).  
Khatami’s view of dialogue among civilizations produced a large number of 
meetings, conferences and texts on the issue of intercultural dialogue at national 
and international level. Because Khatami’s view is one of the discourses of 
intercultural dialogue that will be studied in this research (more specifically in 
5.2.4), some views for and against it are reviewed here.  
Among the opponents of Khatami’s dialogue among civilizations, Ayatollah 
Mesbah Yazdi, one of the top clergymen of Iran, is significant. He criticizes its 
vague definition and suggests that it can have four different meanings. Firstly, 
dialogue among civilizations can refer to the influence of cultures on each other. 
He believes this is irrelevant, because if one culture already influences another, it 
makes no sense to construct a dialogue between them. Secondly, it can mean an 
approach to peace by connecting two sides of a dialogue that disagree over an 
issue. In this definition, as Mesbah Yazdi argues, two sides waive a part of their 
demands and requests to come to an agreement. Thirdly, it can mean a way to 
express the domination of American culture via dialogue over other cultures. In 
the fourth definition, dialogue among civilizations is an instrument to be 
implemented among experts in the quest for truth. Giving these four definitions, 
Mesbah concludes that it is precisely the lack of clear definition of dialogue 
among civilizations that makes entering into it risky. It is also necessary to ask 
“who” the actor of dialogue is. In his view, if the actor of dialogue is not 
sufficiently informed about Islam, he/she may fail to answer questions about 
Islam in the dialogue. That means that the enemy could defeat us (probably he 
means whole Muslims or Iranians) in the dialogue (Mesbah Yazdi 1379 [2000]).26 
Inside Iranian society, dialogue among civilizations has also been criticized by 
other political analysts. Houssain Daheshyar argues that participating in dialogue 
among civilizations means accepting the basis of the Western approach towards 
civilizations, and consequently such a dialogue cannot bring victory for the 
Iranian side (Daheshyar 1377 [1998]). Some scholars argue that Khatami’s 
dialogue among civilizations helped to change the image of Iran in the 
                                                          
26 The Text is in Farsi. It is translated into English by the researcher. 
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international realm. Khatami’s frequent visits to European countries as the first 
president after the Islamic Revolution confirms this claim (Gheissari 2009: 334). 
Some scholars also discuss that, although dialogue among civilizations could 
make an image for Iran outside the country, it had no opportunity to become a 
subject of discussion in the think-tanks and universities of Iran. Hence it failed 
and was “forgotten” in a short time (Gharagozlu 1382 [2003]).  
Some scholars from Iran have discussed Khatami’s dialogue among civilizations 
as an instrument of Iranian foreign policy. Clément Therme argues that dialogue 
among civilizations was a change in rhetoric rather than a change in the substance 
of Iranian foreign policy. In his view it failed because it was challenged by the 
“confrontational foreign-policy discourse of the highest authorities of the Islamic 
state, notably the office of the Supreme Leader” (Therme 2013: 223). Ghoncheh 
Tazmini gives a number of reasons for the failure of dialogue among civilizations 
in Iranian foreign and domestic policy. Firstly, because Iranian foreign policy was 
divided over key policy issues such as the relationship with the USA, Arab-Israeli 
conflict, support of Hizbollah and nuclear power, reaching agreement through 
dialogue faced many limitations. Secondly, dialogue among civilizations was not 
supported domestically by the main political actors who played an important role 
in representing Iran politically. Thirdly, it was not perfectly formed as a principle 
because of serious limitations such as having vague objectives and not being 
discussed and criticized in the arena of ideas and philosophy. Therefore, despite 
preparing an opportunity for NGOs, government and artists to enter into dialogue, 
it remained on the level of rhetoric. Fourthly, ambiguity and the imprecise nature 
of the civilizational issue hindered its definition. Moreover, it was expressed 
imprecisely; it was a political theory but articulated as a philosophical one. And it 
was ambitious, claiming to connect political Islam to the West, while the 
challenge for Iran as a Shia Islam actor was to represent the entire Islamic world 
(civilization), the majority of which is occupied by Sunni Islam (Tazmini 2009: 
81-97). Finally, Tazmini remarks that Khatami’s dialogue among civilizations 
was a “political tactic of survival instinct to use foreign policy gains to move up 
the ladder in the balance of power within the regime” (Tazmini 2009: 96).  
To sum up the significant points in the approaches of Küchler, Galtung, Shayegan 
and Khatami towards dialogue among civilizations, these philosophers firstly 
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considered conditions and aims of dialogue among civilizations but failed to focus 
on defining civilization clearly. Secondly, they failed to distinguish between 
civilization and culture. This can create an amount of confusion as to whether they 
deliberately take civilization and culture to be one concept or whether they 
disregard differences between them. Thirdly, there is no focus on defining 
dialogue itself. Fourthly, most of these approaches have shown a noteworthy 
connection to philosophy. The question is therefore why they do not use the 
phrase “dialogue among philosophies” instead of “dialogue among civilizations”. 
Finally, Khatami’s view of dialogue among civilizations had an exceptional 
chance to be heard in everyday life compared with other views when it was 
presented to the world from the high political position of the General Assembly of 
the UN. The reactions to Khatami’s view suggest, however, that the civilizational 
dimension of intercultural dialogue, if discussed on a practical level, is understood 
mostly as a policy rather than a philosophy or a form of communication and has 
less to do with culture.  
 
3.2.3 Intercultural Dialogue and Dialectical Approach in Philosophy and 
Literature  
There is a type of intercultural dialogue that is not implemented by an 
organization or institution. It is a form of dialectic. It highlights “the processual, 
relational and contradictory nature of intercultural dialogue” (Martin et al. 1998: 
5). It allows a person to consider different kinds of intercultural knowledge on a 
specific topic. Some research illustrates how, through a dialectic approach, 
different philosophies, literature and arts have influenced each other. 
The impact of Greek philosophy on Islamic philosophy is one example. As Majid 
Fakhry discusses, the reception of Greek philosophy in the Islamic world was 
mixed. Initially, Islamic philosophers were suspicious of it, but by the middle of 
the eighth century philosophers such as al-Kindi and al-Rāzi were able to develop 
Islamic philosophy through their dialectic approach to Greek philosophy. They 
even influenced realist Islamic theologians known as the Mu'tazilites,27 and 
improved their methods of Islamic theology (Fakhry 2013: 324). Fakhry also 
argues that, in the ninth century, al-Fārābi had a significant role in developing 
                                                          
27 Mu'tazilites are those philosophers who followed the Mu’tazilia school from the eight to the tenth centuries, 
mostly in Basra and Baghdad in Iraq. They denied the status of the Quran as being created by God with the 
argument that if that were the case, then logically God must have preceded his own speech. 
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Aristotelian logic and Plato’s cosmology in Islamic philosophy through his 
dialectic approach (Fakhry 1994). Discussing world views of Islamic and 
Buddhist civilizations, and emphasizing the emergence of rich mythical traditions 
such as Sufi philosophy and the poetry of central Asia, Majid Tehranian and 
Diasaku Ikeda discuss how these traditions borrowed some basic elements from 
each other’s value systems through a dialectical approach (Tehranian/Ikeda 2013).    
In poems and literature, the impact of the poems of the 14th century Iranian poet 
Hafiz on Goethe, the German poet of the late 18th and early 19th century, is 
significant in terms of dialectical approach, as mentioned in 2.1. Maḥmūd Falakī 
suggests in his PhD dissertation that Goethe played a key role in reflecting the 
spirit of an Eastern culture to his people: “He wanted to regenerate the foreign, 
oriental culture and society, and developed his poetry to a new level. He did not 
only see his role as a poet but also as trader. However, he directed an ideal trade, 
he wanted to be Western mediator of a spiritual and cultural exchange”28 (Falakī 
2013: 2). Goethe’s understanding of and reflection on issues of love and tolerance 
in Hafiz’s poems, as Falakī argues, is dialogue and cultural exchange. Stephen 
Fennell also points out that, in cultural terms, what Goethe did in his West-
Eastern Divan was to present Germany, long before its unification, “as a great 
civilization on an imaginary par with Persia” (2005: 244). Fennell argues that, 
through an interpenetrative encounter with Islam, Goethe highlights on 
Germany’s behalf an openness of German culture to other religions. Goethe 
projects a more cosmopolitan cultural outlook from Germany to its audience.  
With regard to dialectical approach in the studies reviewed in this section, 
intercultural dialogue in some cases functions beyond the will and demands of 
actors of different cultures. Culture is not concrete. It is flexible, changeable and 
open. The philosophy and literature of a nation have the potential to develop by 
confronting the philosophy and literature of other nations. This would not happen 
just by the will of a specific person or organization. Change and development also 
depend on the dialectical approach.  
 
                                                          
28 The dissertation was written in German, so the text extract above has been translated into English by the 
researcher.  
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3.2.4 Intercultural Dialogue in Art. A Reflection on Cultural Diversity  
There are also some studies which consider the issue of intercultural dialogue in 
the field of art. In one study, Danielle Cliche and Andreas Wiesand open up a 
discussion to argue for intercultural dialogue as a new priority for art and cultural 
policymakers around the world. They conduct a survey to assess the views of 
individuals, including state/public agencies, cultural policymakers and NGOs, 
from 51 countries in Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia, Pacific Islands, 
Africa and Latin America, on intercultural dialogue in the context of art. The 
results of the study show that “respect for human rights” is a main prerequisite for 
intercultural dialogue (Cliche/Wiesand 2009: 13). They also clearly show that 
intercultural dialogue is dependent on the recognition and promotion of “cultural 
diversity” in the arts. According to the study, the three main goals of governments 
and public art agencies in promoting intercultural dialogue through art projects are 
firstly, to encourage “activities that bring the public into contact with other 
cultures, their traditions or contemporary expressions which they would not 
otherwise have access to”; secondly, to balance “cultural exchanges with other 
countries and cultures around the world”; and thirdly, to direct “artistic projects 
that mix different cultural traditions and result in new or hybrid forms of cultural 
expression” (Cliche/Wiesand 2009: 30).  
Some studies have also underscored common elements of different cultures in 
specific cultural heritages as a strategy for conflict resolution in multicultural 
societies. Chee Meng Wong analyzes in his PhD dissertation the role of dance in 
Singapore as a cultural heritage which has been enriched through dialogue of 
different subcultures in this country. Referring to theories such as social cohesion, 
liberalism, democracy and pluralism, Meng Wong attempts to conceptualize the 
interpretation of “Indian dance heritage” as a transcultural and multicultural 
model of intercultural dialogue to overcome racism problems in Singapore (Meng 
Wong 2013).  
Music has also been discussed by some researchers as a context for intercultural 
dialogue. In a book edited by Felicity Laurence and Oliver Urbain, intermusicality 
in countries such as America, Tunisia and Turkey is explored as a sign of 
solidarity and dialogue. Tunisian music, for example, like jazz is “not only of a 
multitude of influences from African music, Barber music, Turkish music and 
Andalusian music, but also of the influence from music originating beyond the 
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country” (Laurence/Urbain 1999: 62). This openness in a country’s music firstly 
strengthens the argument that intercultural dialogue exists between people of one 
culture with people of other cultures through music; in this respect, 
intermusicality recalls the discussion on the dialectical approach in 3.2.3. 
Secondly, it suggests that music itself is a context to promote diversity and 
solidarity.  
An important point in reviewing the studies in this section is that music and art are 
not only a context in which to understand multicultural societies but by their 
nature themselves are diverse and multifaceted. They consist of different elements 
of other music and arts. This diversity of music and art makes them a suitable 
channel for and form of intercultural dialogue.  
 
3.2.5 Intercultural Dialogue in Academic Debates on Education, Civil Society 
and Media  
There are some studies which discuss intercultural dialogue in the context of 
education and empowering civil society, youth and women. It is important to 
mention that some of these studies regard education as a tool to promote 
intercultural dialogue in social life, while others consider intercultural dialogue a 
tool to promote scientific abilities and knowledge of people.  
Some scholars analyze the issue of religious education in schools in multicultural 
societies in a theoretical framework, based on the education theory of Martin 
Buber. His theory of the philosophy of dialogue was discussed in 3.1.1. In the 
field of education Buber is referred to for his discussion of pupils and teachers. He 
says that children must be taught in such a way that they explore their “two 
autonomous instincts”: the originator and the communion instinct. The originator 
instinct helps them to learn about themselves and the world, while the communion 
instinct makes them conscious of mutuality and sharing. Both are, as Kalman 
Yaron explains, key elements of education in Buber’s view. The originator 
instinct is on the “I-it” level, meaning that a human being within a monological 
domain regards “others” as a thing among things and perceives them as Erfahrung 
[experience]; in contrast, the communion instinct is on the “I-thou” level, on 
which a human being perceives others in a dialogic domain, in a Beziehung 
[relationship] between two human beings (Yaron 1993: 136). In Buber’s view, the 
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communication instinct in the educational relationship is not easy to achieve, for 
instance because dialogue needs sovereign individuals. In reality, this contrasts 
with educational reality, in which pupils are dependent on their teacher (Yaron 
1993: 137). The theoretical discussion of Buber has been used in studies which 
discuss linguistic, ethnic, national and cultural differences in Germany’s 
educational programs (Bogyó-Löffler 2011, Knauth 1996, Rohe et al. 2014).   
The issue of an open school system in which all pupils, regardless of their origin 
and beliefs, can have the same educational chances is also discussed by Peter 
Graf. In his view, in a society like Germany, which has more than 700,000 
Muslim pupils29 in state schools,30 there should firstly be a goal-oriented school 
program which considers the needs of different pupils, including Muslims and 
Christians; it should not be a provisional but a long-term school program; 
secondly, religious education should be seen as more than religious guidance for 
pupils, and schools should connect it to the demands of real life; thirdly, schools 
should reflect that the spirituality of all religions is justification of commitment; 
and finally, interreligious dialogue should be included as a common social task in 
schools. This suggests that interreligious dialogue between the Muslim minority 
and Christian majority of pupils in German schools should be considered in the 
framework of human rights and the Grundgesetz [German constitution], and not 
just as a theological task (Graf 2014: 45).   
The issue of religious plurality and its role in primary education has also been 
analyzed by Carl Sterkens. He argues that in some pedagogic models, pupils are 
encouraged to participate in interreligious dialogue. The question that should be 
asked more often is therefore how adequate those models are for coping with 
religious plurality, especially in the case of Western countries faced with a 
multicultural and multireligious population. According to Sterknes, the 
“interreligious model” cannot be applied in the framework of today’s pedagogy 
He believes that, under the liberal criteria of “neutrality” and “individuality” in a 
school, it is not a feasible method for pupils at primary schools. However there are 
better chances for pupils at a later stage with that model (Sterkens 2001: 204). 
                                                          
29 Since the publication date of the article goes back to 2014, this statistic should be understood according to 
this year. 
30 State school here means schools which are free. These schools are mostly provided by the Länder [states] 
of Germany, and the federal government plays a minor role in organizing them.  
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Abdoljavad Falaturi is a familiar name in the context of interreligious dialogue in 
German schools because of his analysis as a theologian (his views were 
considered in 3.1.2) and his efforts to determine a guideline for the issue of Islam 
in school materials (Falaturi 1986, Schultze/Falaturi 1988). Scholars such as 
Simon Hecker and Christoph Bochinger adopted key concepts developed by 
Falaturi regarding interreligious dialogue in their study on religious lessons in 
German schools. Falaturi developed six points which are necessary for successful 
interreligious dialogue. They are reflected in Bochinger’s research as follows:  
(1) Überwindung des Absolutheitsanspruches [overcoming absoluteness], 
which means that partners of dialogue should avoid pretending to know 
everything about the absolute truth;  
 
(2) Selbstkritische Haltung und Unvollkommenheit [self-criticism and 
imperfection], which means that partners should take a critical look at 
themselves and accept criticism from others;  
 
(3) Gleichberechtigung und Respekt [equal rights and respect], which means 
that no partner should have priority or privilege in communication over 
another;  
 
(4) Bereitschaft, vom anderen zu lernen [willingness to learn from the other 
side], which means that partners should tolerate the characteristics of other 
religions, making it possible to understand the position of another partner 
in his/her truth;  
 
(5) Gemeinsame Verantwortung für alle Menschen auf der Welt [common 
responsibility for all people of the world], which means that the dialogue 
itself should be considered as an instrument to achieve peace;  
 
(6) Schaffung einer neuen Theologie auf beiden Seiten [building a new 
theology on both sides], which means that both partners of interreligious 
dialogue should make a rule based on a new theology to have 
“understanding for self-understanding of both sides” (Bochinger 2010: 
104-105).  
 
Bochinger reflects the same understanding of the view of Falaturi, although he 
focuses on two obstacles to interfaith dialogue, which are mentioned by Falaturi 
as follows: Firstly, Scheindialog [dialogue on paper31], which means that 
                                                          
31Scheindialog can also be translated as “sham dialogue” or “apparent dialogue”. What can be understood 
from the explanation above, however, is that it refers to a specific type of official and formal dialogue.  
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sometimes dialogue is not real and is used as an “excuse” or “legitimizing tool” 
for both sides to declare that they have officially engaged in dialogue. Secondly, 
Spannungsfelder [areas of tension], which means that sometimes dialogue takes 
place in a situation in which both partners use concepts or contexts that are not 
clear and therefore misunderstand each other (Hecker 2008: 28).  
Werner Haußmann in his PhD dissertation compares school programs in Germany 
and England, two societies facing large-scale immigration. Haußmann compares 
the curricula of Indian Muslims in England and Turkish Muslims in Germany in 
his case study. He argues that, despite the differences between German and British 
society, both had weaknesses regarding appropriate “religious education 
concepts” and proper “implementation” regarding religious education. “Dialogue-
oriented education” is a perspective that Haußmann suggests to both societies for 
their future school work (Haußmann 1993).  
Some studies also consider conditions of interfaith dialogue at the level of 
university syllabuses and programs. In Matthias Vött’s view, it is necessary for 
students of different religions and from diverse cultures to experience a 
“constructive dialogue” by living together and learning from each other. He also 
states that, as dialogue partners, students need some basic personal and social 
skills to make the dialogue situation possible. He develops a profile of 
“interreligious dialogue competence” and presents a tutorial on how such skills 
can be acquired (Vött 2002). Some scholars also argue that intercultural dialogue 
in a higher education context should follow these objectives: “to share visions of 
the world”; “to understand those who see things differently”; “to identify cultural 
similarities and differences”; “to combat violence”; “to help manage cultural 
diversity in a democratic manner”; “to bridge the divide between those who 
perceive diversity as a threat and those who view it as an enrichment”; and “to 
share best practices” (Poglia et al. 2007: 18). Intercultural dialogue has also been 
studied by Stephanie Houghton as a model for foreign language learning. Through 
this model, teachers attempt to include intercultural competence in their 
pedagogical aims “to better organize their teaching activities, considering syllabus 
and materials development, classroom practice and teacher and learner identities” 
(Houghton 2012: 72). She analyzes some English language teaching in Japan and 
examines conflicting theoretical perspectives on “value judgment”. Houghton 
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discovers that at the heart of the issue of teaching a foreign language lies 
“management of prejudice”, which is conducted through intercultural dialogue 
(Houghton 2012). The results of a survey conducted in all the EU-member 
countries in 2007 also show that many people believe developing foreign 
language courses in schools and increasing exchanges, such as dialogue among 
religions, for students and teachers could help Europeans to know each other 
better (Wilk-Woś 2010: 82).  
Some scholars additionally argue that there is a considerable paradox to 
conducting intercultural dialogue in the field of human rights. Tomas Nawrath in 
his study analyzes the philosophical aspect of this contradiction. Firstly, although 
discussing human rights would lighten differences between cultures, the 
differences cannot be ended by dialogue. Secondly, sometimes the problem does 
not come from the subject of discussion but from intercultural realities. On this 
point Nawrath presents as an example a situation in which a culture with a more 
or less universal approach is in a process of dialogue with another culture that is 
isolated. Nawrath argues that some intercultural realities cannot be changed 
through dialogue. Thirdly, it is difficult to build a transparent and unique solution 
to the problem of intercultural realities. It is hard to imagine a theory that could 
apply to all cultures, as there are no mandatory requirements as to what cultures 
should be.. Fourthly, often propaedeutic elements are needed for intercultural 
dialogue to solve the problem of intercultural reality, a factor that has been largely 
neglected. Implementing intercultural dialogue on human rights issues that are 
directly under state authority can be challenging, because the participants come 
from different political systems. It is therefore important that partners from non-
democratic countries are allowed to participate in these dialogues. Nawrath 
concludes that human rights are about cultural realities, not cultural dialogue 
(Nawrath 2010).  
There are some studies which discuss how, since human rights values are a vague 
concept, they should be defined through intercultural and interfaith dialogue 
between different societies. In a study conducted by Cornelia Roux, this issue is 
argued in the case of South Africa. Although the constitution and the bill of rights 
from 1996 expect South African citizens to respect human rights values, there has 
been no clear guidance to clarify exactly what these values are. In 2001 the 
Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy was published by the South 
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African state and defines human rights values as democracy, social justice and 
equity, among others. But, as Roux argues, these definitions were general and 
abstract and could not help society, especially the education system, to apply 
them. One indication of the failure to apply these values was that violence in 
schools was reported as “alarming” in 2004. Thus the Department of Education of 
South Africa decided to run a project to enlist the help of teachers to define 
human rights values according to the specific cultural characteristics of South 
Africa on the one hand, and to promote a culture of human rights on the other, 
through intercultural dialogue with pupils in schools between 2005 and 2007 
(Roux 2006: 79-80).  
Some studies suggest that training programs for South African women would 
strengthen their abilities for peacebuilding. Lisa Schrich conducted a project in 
South Africa to analyze the gender issue in the field of conflict and violence and 
explores the skills of women for peacebuilding through dialogue, negotiation and 
mediation (Schirch 2010). Some studies similarly argue that conducting 
intercultural dialogue on the issue of human rights in different societies demands 
special consideration. Alison M. Jaggar argues that dialogues should not be 
regarded as opportunities to save poor women in poor countries by proselytizing 
supposedly Western values. She likewise states that feminist scholars should 
avoid assumptions on intercultural dialogue with women elsewhere when there is 
no comprehensive understanding of those women’s situation (Jaggar 2005: 56). 
Jaggar argues that the agenda of intercultural dialogue of poor women in poor 
countries must be reconsidered because the basic global structure and “the justice 
of those Western governments” directly and indirectly affect poor women’s lives. 
In her view, when there is no “fair trade” system, talking about fair social 
relationships inside poor countries is irrelevant (Jaggar 2005: 71). Another 
scholar, Zain Kassam, scrutinizes preconditions for building interreligious 
dialogue between Muslim Afghan women. Kassam argues that there are three 
myths about Muslim women which must be considered before implementing any 
intercultural dialogue. They are: “we are at war to eradicate terrorists and liberate 
Muslim women”, “capitalism is a good thing, and will improve life for them”, and 
“Islam is a misogynist religion and without secularism, Muslim women will not 
be able to improve their condition” (Kassam 2013: 127). He believes that the 
Western countries cannot engage in constructing dialogue among religions to 
Chapter 3: Review of Literature and Posing the Research Question 
112  
improve the situation of women in Afghanistan when they still uphold one or 
more of those myths. 
Intercultural dialogue has been discussed also in relation to civil society. Since the 
governments of developed countries work more closely with their parliaments, 
local authorities and civil society to prepare and implement national development 
policies and plans, some studies examine a possibility to develop this mechanism 
in non-developed countries by improving dialogue activities inside their civil 
societies. “Dialogue policy” skills among the Civil Society Organizations (CSO) 
of Bangladesh, Mozambique and Uganda were discussed in research conducted 
by the foreign ministry of Denmark with cooperation of partners in Austria and 
Sweden. The research has also been regarded as a learning process to help the 
Austrian, Danish and Swedish partners understand the best way to support CSOs 
of other countries specifically through “policy dialogue”. In this context, policy 
dialogue has been defined as “open and inclusive dialogue on development 
policies” (ITAD/COWI 2012: 9) 
The issue of intercultural dialogue has also been discussed in the field of the 
internet or cyberspace. Xiaomeng Lang in his PhD dissertation argues that the 
internet is a unique opportunity which, despite all the censorship laws in countries 
such as China, can produce two kinds of Netzliteratur [net literature]. In the first, 
text can be produced by amateur writers. In the second, several media, such as 
voice, video, music and film, can be used to promote simple traditional texts. In 
Xiaomeng’s view, both types of net literature are characterized by a new ability to 
engage in dialogue between writer and reader through the internet and with equal 
opportunity for all users (Lang 2008). In another PhD dissertation, Luisa Conti 
considers a special character of cyberspace that creates not only a solid foundation 
for the concept of intercultural dialogue but also a basic integrated knowledge 
pool, which can be accessed as part of a dialogic interaction for users (Conti 
2012). Interaction between users from different countries in cyberspace is also 
considered by researchers who analyze the educational potential of the internet. 
Abbes Sebihi, for instance, in his PhD dissertation studies interactions of Arab-
German students on the website of Farabis.net. Sebihi evaluates different sections 
of the website as a form of e-community using the method of critical incidents. 
Although the argument of the study is expressed in an unorganized way, it is an 
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academic attempt to show that an e-community also plays a role in improving 
German-Arab academic dialogue (Sebihi 2007).  
 
3.2.6 Political Dimension of Intercultural Dialogue 
Some studies reflect on the political dimension of intercultural dialogue and seek 
to find out how intercultural dialogue in different fields (including religion and 
education) can resolve conflicts and construct peace.  
Some scholars discuss how interfaith dialogue has been a “basis for peace and 
understanding” because foundational common principles, such as love of God, are 
embedded in the sacred texts of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Therefore, 
dialogue between followers of these religions can be a relevant action to construct 
peace (Migliore 2008: 313). Christiane Timmerman and Barbara Segman are 
among scholars who discuss that understanding the viewpoints of different 
religions regarding dialogue can itself build successful dialogue among followers 
of different faiths towards peace. Taking this approach, Timmerman and Segman 
edited a book which includes the perspective of Christianity (Platti 2007), Judaism 
(Solomon 2007), and Islam (Ramadan 2007) towards interfaith dialogue. 
Meanwhile, some studies discuss interreligious dialogue as a solution to regional 
conflicts. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Amal I. Khoury and Emily Welty describe 
interfaith dialogue as “a powerful method of conflict resolution and peacemaking” 
(Abu-Nimer et al. 2007: 7). Since the Middle East is home to three Abrahamic 
traditions and holds the complicated and painful history of the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, these scholars suggest that dialogue between Jewish, Christian, and 
Muslim communities presents a great opportunity to construct peace among them. 
They study interfaith dialogue from the perspectives of different parts of the 
region such as Israel-Palestine, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. These scholars 
assume that a “comprehensive peace based solely on secular values, actors, and 
frameworks will not be sustainable; peace must involve the religious believers and 
resonate with their faith” (2007: 10). They also differentiate dialogue from debate, 
as mentioned in 3.1.1. They believe that dialogue should encourage both sides to 
understand each other’s views but not necessarily set out to convince them. In 
some multi-ethnic societies where religion influences people’s everyday life, 
some researchers argue that dialogue among religions manages to construct 
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tolerance and understanding. Research conducted by Goulchokhra N. Seidova on 
relations between the Shia and Christian communities of Daghestan, and 
specifically the city of Derbent, is significant. Derbent is a town which was 
constructed after the conversion of the people of Daghestan region to Islam. It 
used to be a place where many people from different faiths lived together. Seidova 
explains that there have been numerous cases of authentic religious tolerance in 
the history of Derbent. For instance in 1806, based on a request of a Christian 
community, one of the Shia mosques in the town was reconstructed as a church, 
named after St. George the Victor. In 1852 the mosque was returned to Muslims 
after a new church was built in its stead. Seidova refers to the name of the 
mosque, which is still Kilisya mosque [Church-Mosque] (2011: 169). Another 
study on dialogue between the followers of two major belief and practice systems 
in Ghana, witchcraft and trokosi,32 shows that specific beliefs and practices which 
have a harmful aspect for social life can be corrected and mediated through the 
process of dialogue (Wiafe 2010).  
In some studies dialogue in the context of civilizations has been discussed as an 
instrument to achieve peace. Dieter Senghaas, for instance, refers to the potential 
of common values of civilizations, such as Chinese philosophy, Islam and 
Buddhism to regulate conflicts. He believes that intercultural dialogue based on 
those common values can make a successful contribution to solving conflicts 
(Senghaas 2005). Some studies conceptualize dialogue among civilizations as a 
new discourse in international political theory that has been used not only by 
Mohammad Khatami but also Václav Havel, a dissident philosopher and president 
of the Czech Republic between 1989 and 1992 (Petito 2007). The idea is also put 
forward as a “new approach to international relations” (Hafeznia 2006: 351), and 
Marc Lynch suggests in his study that it is an opportunity for the international 
public sphere (Lynch 2000).  
Some studies reflect on the potential of the program of the Alliance among 
Civilizations (AoC), which was established in 2005 by the UN.33 They argue that 
                                                          
32 According to Oduro Wiafe and Eric Kwabena, trokosi is a practice whereby a family sends a girl-child to 
the traditional shrine to serve there for a period of time as reparation for an offence committed by a member 
of her family. 
33 After the idea of dialogue among civilizations, the UN initiated the Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) in 
2005. This project has been led jointly by the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the 
President of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. It aims to act against extremism by encouraging 
international, intercultural and interreligious dialogue and cooperation. 
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the AoC created some scope for dialogic interaction on an international level 
(Köse 2009: 77). Other studies are skeptical about it, however, with Ali Balci, for 
instance, criticizing the AoC for following the same false line as Huntington’s 
clash of civilizations, and for constituting a dichotomy in the international realm 
which he calls “the clash/ alliance dichotomy” (Balci 2009: 105). The AoC is also 
criticized for giving an opportunity to Turkey, as one of the main actors of the 
project, to pursue its own foreign policy (Balcı/Miş 2008).   
Dialogue programs implemented by international organizations to reach peace are 
criticized in some studies. It was mentioned in 3.1.3 that organizations such as the 
UN and EU became active after World War II, launching cultural activities to 
achieve peace. In a study conducted to explore the relevance and effectiveness of 
UNESCO’s priority initiatives on intercultural dialogue, Julie Carpenter remarks 
that:  
“Intercultural dialogue […] consists of values such as freedom, equality, 
solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility. As such it is 
intrinsically political by nature. The cultural section of the UN continually faces 
and addresses political challenges in developing and implementing programs of 
intercultural dialogue activities” (Carpenter 2011: 10).  
 
Facing the challenges has not been easy for the UN. It has had some political 
difficulties continuing the dialogue activities of “Plan Arabia” after 9/11. Plan 
Arabia is a program that intends to increase knowledge of Arab culture around the 
world and encourage greater mutual understanding between Arab culture and 
other cultures by promoting dialogue and exchange. Its focus is on the traditional 
arts and cultural heritage of Arab countries and began in 1993 (Carpenter 2011). 
In addition, UNESCO renamed some of its old programs, which were originally 
intended to connect the different poles from South to North and East to West, 
“intercultural dialogue programs” (Băsescu et al. 2008), which seems to be a 
political way of gaining distance from the old South-North rhetoric while in 
reality pursuing the same programs.  
Some scholars study the use of intercultural dialogue by European organizations 
as an instrument to maintain their immigration and integration agendas. Zofia 
Wilk-Woś argues that the reason the EU Commission puts so much effort into 
developing intercultural dialogue programs is that “culture can unite people as 
well as divide them. Cultural differences can cause conflicts in workplaces, 
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schools, local communities and at a country level. And why is the dialogue 
needed? Because Europe’s cultural face is changing very fast” (Wilk-Woś 2010: 
79). She argues that Europe is becoming home to more and more immigrants from 
different nationalities, religions and cultures. These immigrants make up about 
8.9% of the total population. Therefore, “fears that the influx of migrants will 
disrupt the social system and dilute national identities are more and more 
frequent” (Wilk-Woś 2010: 80).  
Issues related to immigration are indicators of intercultural dialogue in some 
studies. In a study conducted with the support of the Council of Europe, the 
general indicators of intercultural dialogue are defined as “national minority 
groups”, “immigration groups”, “language groups” and “information and 
legislation addressing hate, culture and religious motivated crimes” (Foote 2005: 
14). These indicators seem to highlight the role of intercultural dialogue in 
monitoring the social problems resulting from immigration, as well as building an 
information system for “cultural policy” in Europe, as Danielle Cliche discusses 
(2005).  
There have also been scholars, such as Joel Anderson and Sukhvinder Kaur-
Stubbs, who discuss intercultural dialogue as an instrument to promote free, full 
and equal participation of civil society and European institutions and create an 
“intercultural Europe” (Anderson 2010, Kaur-Stubbs 2010). Some studies also 
analyze the cultural programs of different European countries in the European 
Year of Intercultural Dialogue in 2008. Lamers, for instance, analyzes the EU 
policies relating to intercultural dialogue in the context of integration of minority 
youth in Dutch education. His case study was based on the cultural programs of 
the Netherlands in 2008, including “Commune Slotervaart” to organize 
interreligious meetings and “Mondrian education group” to plan activities to 
practice the Dutch language and develop active citizenship. These programs were 
implemented to enable Europeans or people who live in Europe to firstly deal 
“with a more open and more complex environment” and secondly raise their 
awareness of “the importance of developing the active European citizenship open 
to the world, respectful of the cultural diversity and based on common values” 
(Lamers 2008: 37). Teresa Pinheiro argues in a study that intercultural dialogue 
had a key role to play in developing Portuguese society, and the European Year of 
Intercultural Dialogue was therefore celebrated in the Portuguese Emigration 
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Museum in Fafe (Pinheiro 2008: 63). Since intercultural dialogue in the EU’s 
definition has been expected to achieve “sharing values” and “doing together”, as 
mentioned in 3.1.3, some studies argue that by implementing it, a multi-
governance and common human rights system can be constructed in Europe 
(Bekemans 2012). Increasing migration and the redrawing of national boundaries 
also prompted Patricia Wiater to argue that human rights in European countries 
can be protected in the context of the European Court of Human Rights by 
applying intercultural dialogue between immigrants and the host population. In 
her view, the chances and risks of the cultural diversity of European countries 
must be considered more carefully. A mechanism should be found to avoid 
cultural relativism. Wiater argues that there are four conditions for intercultural 
dialogue in the context of the European Court of Human Rights: 1) democracy; 2) 
rule of law; 3) equal dignity; and 4) equal enjoyment of rights, which includes 
general principles like mutual respect, ethnic equality and gender equality (Wiater 
2010: 27-49). Kotzur also argues that conducting “intercultural human rights 
dialogue” among European countries is a “universalization process” that enables 
them to establish a common law language in Europe (Kotzur 2010: 111). 
Economic aims have also been mentioned as the purpose of planning dialogue 
activities between different cultures. The economy has been discussed as a key 
factor in relation to the issue of immigration inside European countries. The 
economic success of Europe has become highly dependent on migration, as some 
scholars have pointed out. It is therefore not enough to simply improve the 
language skills of immigrants within the framework of intercultural dialogue 
projects (Wimmer 2007: 9). Intercultural dialogue should also consider issues 
such as promoting school education, job training and higher education for 
immigrants. 
Some studies used terminology of intercultural dialogue to support a human rights 
charter and the notion of Euro-Mediterranean citizenship in the corresponding 
region through network activities of transnational civil societies such as the Anna 
Lindh Foundation (De Petrini 2010: 167). Security and stability seem to be 
another motivation for European and Mediterranean countries to engage in 
intercultural dialogue, as Sally Khalifa Isaac Atwan believes. She states that the 
EU needs to take the role of dialogue into account, firstly because Europe 
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searches “for a zone of political and economic influence” in the Mediterranean, 
and secondly because Europe has to manage the “upsurge of Islamic extremism” 
(2010: 3). Some studies also consider the issue of changing “security perceptions” 
in the Mediterranean and connect it to cultural and civilizational dialogue with 
European countries (Ferdiou 2003). Some scholars have also argued that 
“violence prevention” in Europe can be reached through intercultural dialogue. 
Jean-Fred Bourguin states that to prevent violence against groups such as women, 
children and immigrants on the one hand, and to guarantee individual security in 
European countries on the other, key concepts such as “democracy”, “citizenship” 
and “individual and collective responsibility” must be promoted in the framework 
of intercultural dialogue (Bourquin 2003: 33-40).   
Hans Erik Näss refers to the vague conceptualization of intercultural dialogue in 
projects of European organizations. In his view, they follow the wrong lines. The 
use of intercultural dialogue in general policies of European organizations lacks 
precision. For instance, it is said that “sharing diversity” would develop through 
intercultural dialogue, but “diversity” is not distinguished from “difference”. Näss 
also applies Fukuyama’s critique to the “old multicultural model” of social 
programming in the Netherlands and Britain. In his view, the model was not a 
great success, because it aimed at specific groups such as artists and professionals 
and neglected society as a whole. Näss reviews some of the EU’s intercultural 
dialogue projects and shows that a significant portion of them have focused on 
specific groups like artists (Näss 2010).  
Some studies also argue that dialogue even in the economic and political context 
has contributed to cultural issues and could help to achieve peace. European-Arab 
Dialogue or “Eurabia” between European and Arab countries, which started in 
1973 after the oil embargo, is an example. It was aimed at both political and 
economic issues, but in the view of scholars such as Bat Ye’or, it also had 
significant cultural outcomes. It was an action taken by both sides under pressure 
from the issue of Palestine, which was significant for the Arab world, and the 
price of oil, which was significant for the Western world. Aside from the 
economic and political interests, Ye’or argues that European-Arab dialogue was a 
platform for both sides to represent their own civilizations and discuss their 
“cultural polices”, such as immigration and integration, and take a step forward on 
practical programs, such as cultural exchanges including academic cooperation 
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and art exhibitions (Yeʼor 2002). Hans-Dietrich Genscher, then foreign minister 
of Germany, in one of the sessions of this dialogue in Hamburg in 1982, put clear 
emphasis on Europe’s debt to Islamic civilization and the importance of the 
dialogue in cementing Euro-Arab solidarity, as Ye’or mentions (2002: 26). In the 
context of political dialogues, Omid Nouripour’s critique of “critical dialogue” is 
significant. Critical dialogue was conducted between Iran and the EU between 
1992 and 1997, as mentioned in 2.3. In Nouripour’s view, the critical dialogue 
was weak not because of the nature of conducting dialogue but because of the 
nature of German-Iran policy. Nouripour argues that German politicians were 
never really critical in their dialogue with Iran, therefore to expect a “real” critical 
dialogue would be irrelevant. In his view besides some good opportunities created 
by the critical dialogue to promote the relationship between Iran and Germany in 
the time of Khatami such as the expansion of trade with the prospect of the WTO, 
the cooperation in areas such as energy, transport, environment, drug control, 
migration, culture and human rights dialogues (2011: 11), the status of dialogue 
was unclear. In his view, five elements of German policy regarding Iran 
influenced critical dialogue and made it unclear and dysfunctional: the first and 
second are human rights concerns and the nuclear power question from the Iranian 
side, the third are sanctions that have a negative influence on Iranian people’s 
lives, and the fourth are security and energy questions that are generally important 
for Germany (2011: 15-17). 
Another issue is “dialogue with Islam”. The terminology of dialogue with Islam 
suggests a religious or interreligious dialogue, but it focuses on conducting 
dialogue with people who are Muslims or residents of Muslim countries. The 
second partner of dialogue is not identified in this terminology, which implies that 
the main issue of dialogue is “Islam” or “Muslims”. Highlighting Islam in this 
terminology calls to mind the content of 3.1.2 on the long-standing tensions 
between the West and Muslim countries.  
The first roots of dialogue with Islam, as Michael Dusche argues, go back to “the 
ecumenical activities and time that Catholic Church expressed its high esteem for 
Muslims, Second Vatican Council”, between 1962 and 1965 (Dusche 2006: 945).  
Meanwhile, the roots of dialogue with Islam in Germany are also significant. 
Discussions regarding dialogue of religions, especially Islam, began as Germany 
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encountered waves of immigrants from Muslim countries after the 1950s. 
Important initiatives of this dialogue were initially launched by churches. As 
Martin Affolderbach argues, the initiatives began after 1973 because of the 
“regulation of family reunification” in Germany. Another significant year in this 
history is 1975, when the “Week of foreign citizens” (which is currently called 
“Intercultural Week”) was launched by churches in Germany (Affolderbach 2015: 
33).  
Dialogue with Islam received more attention in the post-9/11 era, when it was 
suggested as a solution for European countries to combat “terrorism”. Sarah 
Silvestri criticizes the EU’s approach for being unclear and confused about 
dialogue with Islam, arguing that the “state of play” was sometimes towards 
countries with a predominantly Muslim population, sometimes towards Islamist 
political actors and sometimes towards Muslim immigrants inside Europe 
(Silvestri 2007: 2). Even if dialogue with Islam in the post-9/11 era takes place 
directly with Islamist actors, scholars such as Thomas Tartsch doubt that terrorism 
is an instrument that can prevent terrorism. Referring to specific parts of the 
Quran,34 Tartsch argues that there is no common value to construct peace between 
Muslims and the rest of the world. For instance, two elements form the structure 
of the power of Ummah [community] in Islamic theology; they are jihad 
(protection), and the extension of Islamic territory. In Tartsch’s view, both of 
these elements go against human rights values and freedom of speech in Europe 
(Tartsch 2008: 11). Some studies also argue that to prevent terrorism through 
dialogue with Muslim countries, the Western actors must seriously listen to 
Muslim views and criticism of the West. In this context, The West and the Islamic 
world – A Muslim Position, a study reflecting the views of Muslim intellectuals 
from different countries on the relationship between Muslims and the West, is 
significant (Bakr et al. 2004). This study has been supported by ifa and will be 
discussed further in 6.2.3.  
The Deutsche Islamkonferenz [German Islam Conference] is another milestone in 
dialogue with Islam. In 2006, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior 
launched the German Islam Conference as an instrument to promote the 
integration of Muslim immigrants in Germany. The German Islam Conference in 
                                                          
34 Quran or Qur’an is the holy book of Muslims. 
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Germany is described by Sarah Dornhof as a chance to change power in the social 
and political structure of German society. She believes that expanding the scope 
of interreligious dialogue by emphasizing the views of the Muslim community in 
Germany has reformulated and rearticulated “political rationalities”: “[T]he 
relationship might be complementary, parallel or contradictory, but in any case 
productive and proliferative, shaping a topology of power” (Dornhof 2012: 384). 
Some scholars have regarded the German Islam Conference as an opportunity to 
mediate fundamentalist Islamic views. Khadija Katja Wöhler-Khalfallah argues 
that inviting Islamic communities such as Der europäische Fatwa-Rat [European 
Fatwa council], an Arabic Muslim brotherhood, and Milli Görüs Bewegung e.V. 
[Milli Görüs organization] (2009: 204), which is led by Turkish immigrants 
(Wöhler-Khalfallah 2009: 245), to the German Islam Conference does not meet 
Germany’s aims of integrating Muslim immigrants, because these organizations 
represent fundamentalist Islam. The German Islam Conference thus gives some 
fundamentalists a chance to represent the Muslim community of Germany without 
the legitimacy to do so (2009: 17).  
Some scholars also share concerns about combining terms such as 
fundamentalism and Islamism with dialogue with Islam. Such combinations imply 
a perception of Islam as an ideology, which Kai Hafez warns against, as it can 
lead to fundamentalists being generalized as the entire Muslim population. He 
states that for most Muslims, who are not fundamentalists, Islam is still religion 
and culture. Therefore to perceive their Islam as an anti-Western ideology is 
wrong and can work as an obstacle to dialogue (1997: 17).  
Dialogue with Islam has been discussed as a way to regulate what Naika Foroutan 
calls Zivilisationskonflikte [civilizational conflicts]. In her research on cultural 
dialogue between the Western and Muslim world, she argues that dialogue is a 
way to regulate civilizational conflicts. Civilizational conflict in her model has 
different Beweggründe [motivations], such as political power, geographic, 
economic, social and political incentives. The conflict in her model is divided into 
two inter-civilizational and intra-civilizational levels. On the inter-civilizational 
level are discourses concerning national and ethno-political issues, for example, 
while, in a comparatively smooth transition, there are ethnic and ethno-political 
discourses on the intra-level. The interaction between these two levels leads to 
conflict over values, world views, moral and universal world orders (Foroutan 
Chapter 3: Review of Literature and Posing the Research Question 
122  
2004: 25). Foroutan argues that because this type of conflict in the context of the 
Western and Muslim relationship concerns cultural issues, it can be “regulated”, 
progress to a stage of “transformation” and finally take a step towards 
“democratization” through cultural dialogue. Such dialogue is possible through 
the participation of different actors in the Staatenwelt [countries of the world], 
such as states or representatives of states, diplomats and participants of cultural 
and educational institutions (Foroutan 2004: 41). Foroutan’s study has three main 
limitations. Firstly, the model of civilizational conflict does not have a direct and 
clear definition of civilization. On the inter-civilizational level, one factor is 
described as “civilizational”, while the parallel factor on the intra-civilizational 
level is described as “inter-religious”. It is not clear whether civilization in her 
model is defined as religion or according to some other criteria. Secondly, conflict 
is not specified clearly in this model. It is motivated by political power and 
geostrategic, economic, social and political reasons. It seems that several conflicts 
can be attributed to these factors. They are not convincing enough as 
characteristics of civilizational conflict. Thirdly, because Foroutan’s study is not 
based on a specific case or society, the final recipe for resolving the conflict 
between the Muslim and Western world seems to be general, abstract and 
impractical. Fourthly, from what Foroutan concludes, it is apparent that 
“democratization” is a key to resolving the conflict, although in some cases even 
democratic states destroy new-born democracies in Muslim countries. The CIA, 
for instance, “toppled the democratic and popular government of Iranian Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mossadegh” in 1953 in order to protect its own economic 
interests and secure the sovereignty of Shah Mohammad Reza (Long 2008: 93). 
Therefore, it seems that to make a comprehensive model for solving conflicts, 
whether civilizational or otherwise, between Muslim and Western countries, 
democracy alone is not sufficient.  
Some scholars, however, express a more realistic view of the ability of 
intercultural dialogue to resolve conflicts. Norbert Ropers believes what dialogue 
can do to resolve problems and conflicts is limited. In his view, the problem is not 
rooted just in  
“[…] stereotypical perceptions, differences of opinion and varying cultural 
standards, but rather tangible conflicts of interest, structural factors and the 
struggle for power and influence. It would seem, then, that dialogues must be put 
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in the context of the overall dynamics of conflict and conflict transformation” 
(Ropers 2004: 2). 
 
Hence dialogue projects implemented by NGOs and institutions should not be 
over-estimated but considered as the grassroots of peacebuilding and combine 
with individual capacity-building, institution-building, networking and practical 
projects and pre-negotiation, as Ropers suggests.  
Hans Köchler also warns about instrumentalizing the term “intercultural dialogue” 
in a political sense. In his view, dialogue among civilizations has been used by 
some political leaders to propagate a peaceful vision of their multicultural 
societies and as a strategy to reshape the balance of power in favor of a “particular 
civilization, which is defined by themselves, and themselves alone” (Köchler 
2014: 267). Scholars such as Bernd M. Scherer also perceive “south-north” power 
relations as an important element in forming the structure of intercultural 
dialogue. Firstly, these relations are intended to help southern countries develop 
themselves, not the other way round. The idea of sending an Indian expert to 
Germany in a development cooperation rarely arises, although an exchange of 
priests may be possible (Scherer 1997: 51). Secondly, discourses of dialogue are 
already set, as partners in the south and the north are aware. For instance, it is 
very possible that intercultural dialogue concerns ecology, human rights and art, 
which are of great interest to the north, and not economic sanctions (Scherer 1997: 
52-54).  
The studies reviewed in this section reflect different forms of intercultural 
dialogue that attempted to deal with critical situations, resolve conflicts, and 
construct peace. Intercultural dialogue also has been referred to in the foreign or 
international policy of different countries, which is reviewed in the next section. 
 
3.2.7 Intercultural Dialogue in Academic Debates on Foreign Policy 
The foreign policy of a country consists of different policies aimed at reaching 
economic, diplomatic, industrial, technological, educational, military and cultural 
objectives. Studying cultural policy in the context of foreign policy has not been 
the main focus and interest of academics compared with other fields such as 
economic and diplomatic policies. Frode Liland argues that culture is not of major 
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interest to diplomatic historians for four main reasons: firstly, to include culture in 
the analysis of foreign policy a scholar should consider non-traditional actors. 
Depending on the problem posed, the actors can be diverse, from artists and 
musicians to journalists and religious groups. Investigating them requires a 
developed methodology. Secondly, the connection with non-traditional actors 
consequently means searching non-traditional sources such as cartoons, 
magazines, music and art, which a scholar working in the field of diplomacy or 
foreign policy is usually unfamiliar with. Thirdly, studying traditional sources 
may also cause problems if culture is included in the research. To perceive the 
cultural setting and study it in a specific foreign policy, a scholar requires a quite 
different approach to the text than in the mere reconstruction of day-to-day affairs 
(Liland 1993: 5-6). Fourthly, the treatment of culture very often requires an 
interdisciplinary approach, in which empirical monographs on anthropology, 
sociology, folklore studies, literary analysis and media studies will certainly be 
helpful if the scholar can step out of “well-trodden paths” (p. 7). 
Despite the limitations mentioned by Liland, some academic disciplines such as 
public diplomacy and foreign cultural policy have considered culture in the 
context of foreign policy. The notion of diplomacy was discussed by Harold 
Nicholson in 1939, who referred to the importance of three issues for states in 
their international relations: shifting from secret to open diplomacy; taking public 
opinion in foreign cultural affairs seriously; and caring about communication on a 
wide scale (Villanueva Rivas 2007: 46). However, the origin of the notion of 
public diplomacy, in the view of Nicholas Cull, goes back to 1965, when 
international actors sought “to accomplish the goals of their foreign policy by 
engaging with foreign publics”, and which “has gained international currency 
only since the end of the cold war” (2008: 31). Public diplomacy is associated 
with “soft power”, a term developed by Joseph Nye and used as an alternative to 
“hard power” in the international realm. In Nye’s view, the hard power of a 
country can be defined as its military and economic institutions and rests on 
inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”). In Nye’s analysis, however, there is 
a type of power that comes from the popularity of the values or culture of a 
country among others: 
 “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other 
countries- admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of 
prosperity and openness- want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set 
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the agenda and attract other in world politics, and not only to force them to 
change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft power-
getting others to want the outcomes that you want- co-opts people rather than 
coerces them” (Nye 2004: 5).  
 
A range of methods and techniques exists for countries to achieve their objectives. 
Cull suggests that, by employing methods such as listening, advocacy, cultural 
diplomacy, exchange and international broadcasting, states have improved their 
international relations historically. He remarks that the information age has 
opened up new virtual spheres, such as YouTube, and multiple functions, such as 
internet platforms, for public diplomacy. These new spheres can promote broad 
participation in dialogue and put issues forward for future discussion (2008: 52). 
Some scholars such as César Villanueva Rivas argue that cultural diplomacy is a 
main component of public diplomacy; hence studying it is relevant to 
understanding cultural approaches in foreign policy. Cultural diplomacy is “a 
long-term perspective” and considers how “people’s identities are constructed and 
represented in discursive terms”. Public diplomacy, however, is more oriented in 
the “short-term problem of representation at the level of communication and 
image-making of society” through the influence of the media, newspapers, 
academia and unions (2007: 47).  
Some studies have considered trends in how states administer diplomacy. Rebecca 
E. Johnson divides them into 1) fragmentation, 2) concentration and 3) diffusion 
(2011: 666). In the fragmentation model, diplomacy is administered at the 
governmental level and involves government departments that are traditionally 
concerned with purely domestic issues. It is expanded by a range of governmental 
agencies and a multiplicity of channels that are in contact with foreign ministries. 
As Johnson argues, a consequence of this trend is that it needs policy coordination 
at national level. This enables it to coordinate international negotiations, for 
instance, which consequently reflect various bureaucratic interests of different 
countries. The concentration model shows policy coordination at national and 
international level. It applies to diplomacy that is assisted by the fusion of 
domestic and international politics and has increasing involvement of heads of 
government in international policy. According to Johnson, “awareness of the 
potential costs of lack of bureaucratic and political coordination and politicization 
of international policy” on the one hand, and “a growing international role for 
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heads of government” (Johnson 2011: 667) on the other, has resulted in a 
centralization of diplomacy in institutions such as prime ministerial and 
presidential offices. The third model, of the diffusion trend, can be applied to 
democracy that is conducted by professional diplomats who are required to 
engage with a growing range of non-governmental stakeholders in complex policy 
networks.  
Scholars like Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault discuss tools of diplomacy, 
which they generally categorize into “monologue”, “dialogue” and 
“collaboration”. States use these tools according to a purpose that they follow in 
their foreign policy; they should “think about the best times and best places to use 
each, either by itself or in combination” (2008: 12).  
Cowan and Arsenault warn that monologue should not be perceived in opposition 
to dialogue but as a method that can sometimes work more effectively than 
dialogue. In their view, “when a nation wants the people of the world to 
understand where it stands”, they do not communicate this message by debate and 
dialogue, but in a governmental address or document. An example of this 
monologue is the American Declaration of Independence in 1776. The United 
States Information Agency (USIA)-sponsored Jazz tours with black artists in the 
1950s, and products such as Coca Cola and McDonald’s, books, movies, poetry 
and works of visual art can be assigned to the same category (2008: 13-16). 
Dialogue as a tool of public diplomacy, Cowan and Arsenault argue, has an 
advantage over monologue because it reaches the foreign public by actively 
making contact between its own and other cultures: “It begins with dialogue 
between individuals, whether they are representatives of governments or private 
citizens, meeting in a hotel conference room or an online chat room”. Examples of 
dialogue in this context are summer camps between teenagers of the “enemy” 
states India and Pakistan, and Israel and Palestine, academic or professional 
conferences, call-in talk shows, interactive web sites, cross-cultural sports and 
Deutsche Welle programs like Dialogue of Cultures, which features topical 
discussions by prominent thinkers from Germany and the Arab World (2008: 17-
18). One advantage of using dialogue as a method in public diplomacy is that it 
provides an “opportunity for people to express themselves and to be heard”, and 
this opportunity, Cowan and Arsenault argue, can be politically useful because 
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people “consider a political outcome as fair” if they engage in relevant discussion 
and debate about it (2008: 19).  
The next method is collaboration, which is considered a “more effective means of 
engaging foreign publics” between nations compared with monologue and 
dialogue. Collaboration is defined as forms of partnership that focus on solving 
shared problems or conflicts, advancing shared visions, or completing a physical 
project. These projects may be “short term with a clear endpoint” or “larger scale 
and long term such as side by side participation in natural disaster reconstruction 
efforts”, as mentioned by the authors (2008: 21). Sesame Street is one of the 
successful examples of collaboration, which Cowan and Arsenault believe 
developed a specific form of public diplomacy called “Muppet Diplomacy”. 
Sesame Street is an American TV program which deals with local issues and 
cultural norms of different countries and came to popularity because it is not 
monologic, and “local collaborators provide its local themes, characters, 
authenticity and relevance” (2008: 24).  
The increasing role of civil society in the process of public diplomacy is regarded 
by some scholars as a step towards dialogue-based public diplomacy. Shaun 
Riordan argues that Western countries should learn that they have lost their 
monopoly on international relations (Riordan 2004: 11) and should take a new 
approach to collaborating with non-governmental agents and set a dialogue-based 
public diplomacy strategy. However, in his view, dialogue-based public 
diplomacy needs to develop “a capacity for long-term policy thinking and geo-
political analysis”, and “Western foreign ministries are notably weak in both” 
(Riordan 2004: 13).   
“Science diplomacy” is another area in which reference is made to cultural 
approaches in foreign policy. As Daryl Copeland discusses, science and 
diplomacy have been understood in relation to each other since Britain’s Royal 
Society appointed its first foreign secretary in 1723. It took about three centuries 
for a diplomatic approach to science to be recognized as an academic discipline in 
the 1990s, when there was an increasing tendency to discuss global issues in the 
international realm (Copeland 2016: 631). Science diplomacy refers to addressing 
global issues such as climate change, resource scarcity and environmental crisis 
through academic activities implemented by governments and international 
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organizations. According to Copeland, by addressing global issues and challenges, 
science diplomacy uses neutral and non-ideological language to mitigate 
“international political differences when regular diplomatic channels are strained, 
blocked or non-existent” (2016: 629). The example Copeland uses to substantiate 
this claim is a case in which science diplomacy was employed when political 
tensions between New Zealand and USA were high. In 1985 the two countries 
stopped diplomatic relations because of a disagreement over nuclear-armed 
warships. The bilateral relations were not fully normalized until 2014. 
Nevertheless, throughout that time, “the US base in Christchurch which provided 
forward supply and logistical support for American scientific research activities in 
Antarctica, remained fully operational, and cooperation between US and New 
Zealand scientists continued without interruption” (2016: 629-630). Science 
diplomacy was also studied in the context of Germany’s foreign academic policy 
by Birte Fähnrich in 2013. Fähnrich investigates a specific project of “Research in 
Germany – Land of Ideas”, which was initiated by the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research between 2005 and 2013. She concluded that aims 
achieved by this project through academic cooperation with different countries 
were not limited to their original scientific objectives. Beyond those aims, 
cooperation enabled the German actors to inform themselves economically with 
regard to other countries’ opportunities, to represent symbolic political elements 
of Germany, to represent German education abroad, and to create an internal 
visibility of German actors abroad (Fähnrich 2013: 243-245).  
Foreign cultural policy is another area in which culture plays a role in foreign 
policy. Foreign cultural policy is hard to define because it can be mixed with 
foreign policy and cultural policy, as mentioned in 1.2.1. In Richard Martinus 
Emge’s view, it has the same function as cultural diplomacy and must 
consequently be perceived as a “vehicle of foreign policy” (Emge 1967: 15). Kurt 
Jürgen Maaß defines foreign cultural policy as an instrument of foreign policy that 
concerns promoting culture abroad, but also Kulturarbeit [cultural work] to 
support the aims of foreign policy (Maaß 2005b: 23). In a study comparing the 
foreign cultural policy of Britain, Germany and France, foreign cultural policy is 
defined as a country’s image of itself and how it presents itself abroad through its 
cultural values and traditions (Martens n.d.: 2).  
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Types of foreign cultural policy according to Kurt Düwell (2005: 62-63) are as 
follows: 
(1) Kulturelle Ausstrahlung [cultural broadcasting or diffusion]. Foreign 
cultural policy here is limited to a cultural element or tradition which is 
internally important for a country but symbolizes the country worldwide. 
For instance, the ideal of the “gentleman” illustrated the British Empire 
through its colonies. Kulturelle Ausstrahlung makes no attempt to impress 
a specific foreign public to reach a specific aim, but it can be helpful for 
the economic and power interests of nations, Düwell argues;  
 
(2) Kulturelle Selbstinterpretation [cultural self-interpretation]. This policy 
tends to represent some cultural elements of a nation to other nations. 
Cultural affairs are respected between two nations on a reciprocal level 
when countries have Kulturelle Selbstinterpretation. The example Düwell 
gives is of establishing the British Council in 1934 and cultural institutes 
of other countries being accepted in Britain in return;  
 
(3) Kulturelle Expansion [cultural expansion or spread]. This is a more 
advanced level than the two above because it enables a nation to plan its 
cultural advertising abroad, through short and long programs. The British 
Embassy conducting English language courses abroad is a type of 
Kulturelle Expansion activity, because English lessons are an opportunity 
to inform language learners about British culture and values;  
 
(4) Kulturpropaganda [cultural propaganda]. This is a type of foreign cultural 
policy which enables a nation to plan its cultural advertising abroad in 
order to extend its national power over other nations;  
 
(5) Kulturimperialismus [cultural imperialism]. This type of foreign cultural 
policy enables a nation to promote national or racist power expansion 
abroad via its aggressive cultural advertising programs directed towards 
other nations. The policy of the German Empire and Nazi regime were a 
mixture of cultural propaganda and imperialism, as Düwell argues. He 
points out that both notions, of propaganda and foreign cultural policy, 
reflect the meaning of “advertisement” in a similar way but to different 
degrees (Düwell 1981: 69). The actor of propaganda advertises a specific 
culture in a very obvious and direct way, while the actor of foreign 
cultural policy tries to determine the best possible policy to mediate its 
own culture in an invisible and indirect way.   
 
It is important to also consider how actors that implement foreign cultural 
activities (including intercultural dialogue) abroad are reflected in the academic 
debates. Very few studies and academic debates look at the actors of Iranian 
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foreign cultural policy. There are studies which directly or indirectly emphasize 
the role of Islamic organizations in Iran in this field, especially ICRO (Johnston 
2007, Tavassoli 2010, von Maltzahn 2015, Wastnidge 2014). ICRO works with 
the support of the Iranian state; nevertheless, it is more dependent on the religious 
sector of the Iranian state than on its democratic sector. This point will be 
discussed in more detail in the field study of this research in chapters five and six. 
The role of actors of German foreign cultural policy has been discussed by Maaß 
as a crucial one. Among the actions he mentions are agencies which have branch 
offices abroad, like the DAAD and Goethe Institute, individuals who coordinate 
conferences and workshops, information sources such as books, films and 
websites which give information about education and internships in a host country 
to other countries, schools and universities which prepare academic material for 
their counterparts abroad, and finally institutes and universities which assist their 
counterparts abroad with regard to language facilities (2005b: 28-30). The role of 
a specific type of organization, Mittlerorganisationen, as an actor of foreign 
cultural policy has been emphasized by Werner Link. He argues that foreign 
cultural relations are “a wide field”, which contains actors including independent 
individuals, artists, authors, members of foundations, private groups, 
organizations, churches and labor unions, as well as representatives from state 
organizations; however, the role of Mittlerorganisationen, like the Dante Alghieri 
community in Italy, Pro Helvetia in Switzerland, the British Council of Britain 
and the Goethe Institute of Germany (Link 1981: 262), is noteworthy. In Link’s 
view, it is important to guarantee a pluralistic and non-totalitarian order which 
does not let a state monopolize foreign cultural activities (1981: 262-263). A 
Mittlerorganisation is a type of organization which is directed by a combination 
of individual actors and some members of the state; it is managed independently 
but funded mainly with state support and the budget of provinces and regional 
offices (in Germany the Länder). According to Link, Germany compared with 
other Western democracies has a large and diverse number of 
Mittlerorganisationen (Link 1981: 267). Mittlerorganisationen, as Volkhard 
Laitenberger argues, became important for Germany in the context of academic 
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exchange in the 1920s.35 Since then, the German state has given increasing 
assistance to construct German foreign schools and establish institutions such as 
the DAAD and Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (Laitenberger 1981: 73-75). 
The dependency of Mittlerorganisationen on the German state is a complicated 
issue and cannot be judged generally. Link argues that the Goethe Institute is “so 
far legally independent”, and specific tasks and responsibilities were set out 
according to a contract between it and the German Democratic government in 
1976 (Link 1981: 271-272), which indicates how carefully officials of the Goethe 
Institute try to reduce the interference of the German state in their affairs. A 
review of the guidelines, statements and concepts of the foreign affairs ministry 
and German Parliament between 1970 and 2011 shows that “dialogue” was 
considered in a more stable and planned way. This shift, as Düwell argues, 
resulted from the attention of the German government to connecting “cultural 
relations” to “development strategies” in its foreign relations. His example for this 
claim is Ten theses on encounter and collaboration with so-called third world 
countries, which was released in 1982 by the new administration of Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl (Düwell 2005: 79), and Concept 2000, which aimed to strengthen 
dialogue with the Islamic world (Düwell 2005: 83). This will be discussed more in 
5.1.1.  
 
Four points can be drawn from reviewing the academic debates in 3.2.7. Firstly, 
studying culture in the context of foreign policy must analyze non-traditional 
actors such as artists and journalists, which is why there is little interest in it 
among academics in the foreign policy field. The second point is from the study 
of Cowan and Arsenault, who categorize cultural activities of countries abroad 
according to monologue, dialogue and collaboration. They suggest that countries 
use one of the specific types mentioned based on their needs. Thirdly, some 
studies consider the issue of culture in the foreign policy of countries in the fields 
of public, cultural and science diplomacy, and soft power. Some also discuss 
types of administration of diplomacy and connect the issue of diplomacy with 
governmental organizations and their national and international bureaucratic 
                                                          
35 The issue of cultural exchange in the field of education was important for Germany even before the 1920s, 
as Kurt Düwell explains with reference to Propagandaschulen [propaganda schools] of Germany abroad, 
which date back to 1914 (1981: 71). 
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capabilities. There are also studies which discuss differences between foreign 
cultural policy and diplomacy. The fourth point derives from studies which 
analyze foreign cultural policy as the third pillar of foreign policy beside 
economics and politics. A typology of foreign cultural policy by Düwell is 
reviewed in this section and ranges from cultural broadcasting to cultural 
imperialism.  
The next subchapter illustrates the confusions, gaps and limitations in the 
academic debates regarding intercultural dialogue and which can be dealt with in 
this study.  
 
 
3.3 Confusions, Gaps and Limitations in Academic Debates 
The content of the reviewed studies suggests with regard to the confusions, gaps 
and limitations of the academic debates that: 
 There is a tendency to replace one-way dominating communications with two-
way interactive communications;  
 
 There is an emphasis on providing an opportunity for “listening” and not just 
“talking” for both sides of communications;  
 
 There are theoretical approaches which consider dialogue as a step towards 
legitimizing human interactions and understanding different dimensions of 
truth;  
 
 There is an increasing opportunity for thinkers, theologians and philosophers 
to share their views on specific issues; 
 
 There is a trend of using dialogue as a technique for learning, teaching and 
cooperating; 
 
 There is a new approach towards relationships between groups which are 
politically unequal, for instance South and East, Western countries and 
Muslim countries. 
 
There is major confusion in the reviewed studies regarding the definition of 
intercultural dialogue. Most of them mention intercultural dialogue as a key and 
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vital instrument, approach and process as a contribution to conflict resolution and 
peace, among other things. However, they have not defined clearly what 
intercultural dialogue means in each field study. Leaving intercultural dialogue 
without a clear definition is confusing for two reasons: firstly because there are 
different points of view and theoretical approaches to “dialogue” and “culture”; a 
clear definition of intercultural dialogue could enable a reader to understand the 
position of an implementer or organizer of intercultural dialogue. Secondly, an 
ambiguous definition of intercultural dialogue can make assessing its 
achievements difficult. A solution to reduce this confusion is to study 
characteristics of intercultural dialogue in each discipline.  
Gaps have been identified in the reviewed studies:  
1) intercultural dialogue has been implemented over issues which are largely 
concerned with social problems such as conflict resolution and educational and 
theological issues. Every year, conferences and meetings are held on issues such 
as natural disasters, water resources and climate change. There seems to be a lack 
of studies on these issues from an intercultural dialogue point of view. 
2) if intercultural dialogue can be understood generally as communication 
between two participants who want to understand each other on a specific issue, 
then a logical possible result is the reduction of an original clash between them; 
almost no study has mentioned that this may create another clash. For instance, 
two neighbors may have a conflict over using a shared swimming pool. Neighbor 
A thinks that neighbor B does not let his daughter swim in the pool for religious 
reasons. However, the dialogue between them could convince neighbor A that 
neighbor B is not at all religious. At the same time, he learns that neighbor B is 
accusing him of standing at the corner of the swimming pool and ogling the 
women swimming there. The first problem is solved, but the second problem may 
even intensify the conflict between them. This illustrates the need to study the 
consequences or failures of intercultural dialogue.  
3) as the study of Tomas Nawrath showed (in 3.2.3), intercultural dialogue in 
some fields, such as human rights, is challenging because it concerns 
“intercultural realities”. If that is the case, then why do some governments and 
international organizations like the EU still set human rights as an issue for 
intercultural dialogue with other countries? No Study has focused this issue. 
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4) there are two series of studies dealing with the issue of intercultural dialogue. 
The first considers it theoretically and the second practically; very few studies 
combine the two and present a theoretical discussion in a field study or practical 
context. Such a gap sends out an additional message: There is no theoretical 
framework which can help a researcher to investigate a specific intercultural 
dialogue activity in a certain case study. 
5) the issue of foreign cultural policy, its instruments and actors has been analyzed 
in the context of countries, especially Germany, as reviewed in this chapter. 
However, there is no study which looks through the actors of intercultural 
dialogue on a country level and discusses how the political orientation of these 
actors towards their political system, and how their type of diplomacy or (foreign 
cultural policy institution), has shaped the characteristics of their intercultural 
dialogue. Furthermore, there is no study that focuses on the specific foreign 
cultural policy of two countries towards each other.  
6) no study has analyzed intercultural dialogue as a common instrument of foreign 
cultural policy of two specific countries towards each other. 
7) as Norbert Ropers (in 3.2.3) argues, intercultural dialogue should not be over-
estimated but perceived as the grassroots of peacebuilding. There is a major lack 
of analysis that deeply scrutinizes the realistic expectations of intercultural 
dialogue and not just dreams and unproven potential.  
8) there are several publications which reflect views, commentaries and critiques 
regarding discourses of intercultural dialogue in Farsi and German. However, 
sources (in Farsi and German) are hardly reflected in international academic 
debates.  
9) the issue of public diplomacy and foreign cultural policy in the case of Iran has 
seldom attracted attention from scholars comparing issues such as Iran’s nuclear 
power. There are few studies which consider the cultural policy or public 
diplomacy of Iran towards Central Asia (Johnston 2007, Wastnidge 2014) or 
Arabic countries (von Maltzahn 2015), and no study of Iranian foreign cultural 
policy regarding Western countries. This issue is discussed in few studies in Farsi.  
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3.4 Posing the Question of the Study according to Gaps in the 
Research 
The question of the present study can be posed to fill specific gaps and limitations 
in the literature, although it undoubtedly cannot deal with them all. To fill gaps in 
the study of intercultural dialogue on the country level and explore intercultural 
dialogue as a common instrument of foreign cultural policy of two countries, this 
study analyzes intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany. It considers the 
political orientation of their actors toward their political system and their type of 
foreign cultural policy institutions. The study deals furthermore with Farsi and 
German publications on the one hand, and considers the foreign cultural policy of 
Iran (an issue rarely addressed by academics) on the other. 
The principal aim of this research is to analyze the role of intercultural dialogue in 
the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany towards each other. To explore 
this issue, grounded theory has been applied as the main methodology of this 
research. The main and subquestions of this study have therefore been constructed 
gradually. However, not only the new data in the field study of Iran and Germany 
but also what has been learned from the academic debates, and their gaps and 
limitations, were very helpful in considering the main and subquestions.  
This investigation firstly includes an analysis of the aims and objectives of foreign 
cultural policy within the field study in Iran and Germany, as well as the 
institutions and actors involved in it. It is vital to answer the main question of 
what Iran and Germany expect to achieve through their foreign cultural policy. 
Furthermore, each institution and actor reflects the political structure and cultural 
priorities of the respective country. While studying institutions and actors is 
important to understand the distinction between each of them in their own 
country, it also makes the differences and similarities between Iranian and 
German institutions clear.    
This research is not a study on general discourse of intercultural dialogue, as has 
been observed in the reviewed studies, but investigates specific cases in Iran and 
Germany. The second question explores which Iranian actors have implemented 
activities under “interfaith dialogue” and “dialogue among civilizations”, and 
which German actors have implemented European-Islamic cultural dialogue 
activities. Investigation of their aims, activities and target groups were central to 
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this question. The study also looks deeper into the reasons for the institutions to 
choose these activities or target groups in the context of intercultural dialogue. 
The intercultural dialogue activities investigated in this study take place in 
different fields, for instance theater, music, academic exchange. The third 
subquestion of the study is therefore: Why have intercultural dialogue activities 
appeared at particular times and in specific fields and by specific actors? Unlike 
some of the research reviewed in this chapter, this study does not simply describe 
these activities but also explores the fascinating political dimensions and 
institutional demands that form them, and why. Therefore, the third subquestion 
of the study is on characteristics of the intercultural dialogue between Iran and 
Germany and analyzing the context and reasons behind them.  
Another key issue in this research is to relate analysis from the study to the main 
question. Every piece of new information and data collected for this study should 
aid understanding of the role of intercultural dialogue in the context of the foreign 
cultural policy of the two countries towards each other. The fourth subquestion 
thus focuses on understanding the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany and 
analysis of the characteristics of their intercultural dialogue and the relationship 
between them.  
Chapter 4 discusses in detail the methodology applied to the main research and 
the subquestion of this study.  






This chapter describes the methodology used in this research in five subchapters. 
It describes the journey from the original research plan through different stages of 
data gathering and analysis. 4.1 is an outline of the research perspective, showing 
why grounded theory has been selected as a methodological framework for this 
study to take limitations and challenges in the field study and turn them into an 
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opportunity for qualitative analysis. 4.2 presents the levels of comparative 
analysis (actors, aims and activities). Subchapter 4.3 describes data collection 
methods and the sampling strategy types used in this study. Different stages of 
data analysis will be presented in 4.4. It explains how the first phase of analysis, 
“initial coding”, is conducted and how initial codes are used to construct 
“focused”, “axial” and “theoretical codes”. An intermediate phase of “memo 
writing”, which has a key role in constructing the analysis in grounded theory 
research, is also explained in 4.4. This subchapter closes with a discussion on 
techniques used during data analysis in this research.  
 
4.1 Grounded Theory as a Methodological Approach 
Grounded theory was applied in this research because there was no theoretical 
framework to fit the problem of the study. There are different methodological 
frameworks. In a traditional or classical approach, a researcher can take a theory 
like Durkheim’s theory of suicide or anomie as “a guide theory” and analyze the 
rate of suicide in a specific society. By testing the collected data according to the 
guide theory, the researcher can confirm or reject it or pose a critical question to 
its validity. In this research exploring the problem of intercultural dialogue in the 
context of Iranian and German foreign cultural policy, no theory was found that 
could explain its dimensions and play the role of a guide theory. Thinkers and 
scholars such as Kant, Taylor and Boas, Sen and Halliday provided a context for 
understanding, firstly, where key gaps exist in relevant research on intercultural 
dialogue, and secondly, for identifying which points are of interest and which 
questions have to be asked to add a new dimension to the academic debate. At the 
heart of qualitative analysis in grounded theory is transferring the available data to 
“codes”. These codes suggest new hypotheses and questions. Analyzing them 
leads finally to a theoretical discussion. Coding in grounded theory should not be 
limited by a specific theory. The researcher should be as open as possible to 
consider different dimensions of the research objectives and ultimately construct 
his/her own theory. The final discussion of the research does not include the 
codes36 and new hypotheses but the outcomes and analysis resulting from the 
codes. Analysis of the codes in this research is presented in chapter seven.  
                                                          
36 More than 4,000 codes were created with the Maxqda software in this study. 
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Grounded theory was developed in the 1960s as a “popular choice of 
methodology for nurse researchers”, and at that time “more than 3,650 journal 
articles” were published based on this methodology (Mills et al. 2008: 2). Barney 
Glaser and Anselm Strauss have played an important role in defining it and 
provoking discussions regarding its approaches and structures since 1967 
(Thornberg/Charmaz 2014: 153). To a large extent, grounded theory has been 
developed as constructivist grounded theory by Strauss himself and researchers 
such as Juliet Corbin and Kathy Charmaz, as Mills, Bonner and Francis discuss 
(Mills et al. 2008: 2). As Charmaz suggests, Glaser and Strauss have contributed 
different critiques which challenge the validity of grounded theory. In several 
articles and new versions of their books, they propose grounded theory as a 
qualitative method which can generate theory based on the following seven rules 
(Charmaz 2014: 7-8): 
 Simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis, 
 Constructing analytic codes and categorizing from data, not from 
preconceived logically deduced hypothesis, 
 Using the constant comparison method, which involves making 
comparison during each stage of the analysis, 
 Advancing theory development during each step of data collection and 
analysis, 
 Memo-writing to elaborate categories, specially their properties, define 
relationships between categories, and identify gaps,  
 Sampling aimed towards theory construction -theoretical sampling-, not 
for population representativeness, 
 Conducting the literature review after developing an independent analysis.    
 
Grounded theory, unlike a traditional/classic methodological framework, is 
therefore developed at each stage in relation to other stages, evaluating the 
research question and subquestions during the research. The theoretical 
construction of the main discussion of the research is developed during the 
simultaneous data collection and data analysis process. Figure 5 illustrates 
differences between grounded theory and a traditional methodological framework: 
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Figure 4 Traditional methodological framework vs. grounded theory 
 
Source: made by the researcher (2015) 
 
Charmaz, Gibson and Hartman argue that because the researcher plays an 
important role in forming the research in grounded theory, the methodology is a 
constructive grounded theory (Charmaz 2014: 12-13, Gibson/Hartman 2013: 58). 
The researcher does not have a right to impose any idea or theory on the field 
study at the data gathering stage, but he/she enters the field study with his/her own 
story and assumptions. Moreover, issues that participants in the field study share 
with the researcher have a crucial role in forming the nature of the analysis. The 
researcher further observes several points in contact with text, participants and 
their verbal and non-verbal communication. All these factors can influence the 
formation of his/her final analysis.  
The international journal Grounded Theory Review shows that several researchers 
whose field is not limited to nursing and medicine have reflected their own 
solutions in the challenges of using this method (Jones 2009, Pergert 2009). 
Charmaz argues as follows that: 
“Diverse researchers can use basic grounded theory strategies such as coding, 
memo-writing, and sampling for theory development with comparative methods 
because these strategies are, in many ways, transportable across epistemological 
and ontological gulfs, although which assumptions researchers bring to these 
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strategies and how they use them presuppose epistemological and ontological 
stances. Constructive grounded theory adopts the inductive, comparative, 
emergent, and open-ended approach of Glaser and Strauss’s 1967 original 
statement” (Charmaz 2014: 12). 
 
In this research, grounded theory has been applied in different stages. The 
research question and subquestions have been evaluated during the years of the 
study in relation to data collection, sampling and data analysis in a field study of 
Iran and Germany. The collected data are analyzed mainly with the valuable 
assistance of Kathy Charmaz’s book, Constructing Grounded Theory (2009 and 
2014 versions). It contains examples from a variety of research work to help the 
reader understand and solve research challenges, and it has guided this research 
like a bible. Memo-writing was another key stage of the research. Some initial 
questions were expressed through memo-writing. It improves abstract thinking to 
write about categories and connects codes to categories in more advanced stages 
of the study. These stages will be explained in the next subchapters.  
 
 
4.2 Comparative Study on Different Levels 
Scholars such as Todd Landman believe that comparative study of countries is a 
specific type of study. It employs different methods to understand the effect of a 
variable such as economic development in the context of different countries. 
Landman argues four main reasons for comparing countries in political science: 1) 
contextual description about issues and cases which are unknown; 2) classification 
of issues to make understanding of complicated problems easier; 3) hypothesis-
testing; and 4) prediction (Landman 2003: 4-10). An example of a comparative 
study of countries is that of Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of the New World Order, which was reviewed in chapter 3. This study 
compares 120 countries using qualitative and quantitative methods. However, 
Landman believes that Huntington’s study had “weak predictive arguments” and 
became relevant and attracted attention after 9/11, but not because of its strong 
argument (Landman 2003: 10). A point which can be drawn from Landman’s 
study is that the conclusion of comparative research should be based on logic and 
rational sense; events relating to the same issue but occurring after it cannot 
construct a rationality or validity for it.  
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In grounded theory, the initial codes are compared with each other and used to 
develop the concentrated and axial codes. Grounded theory is thus based on 
comparing data and codes with each other. The result of scrutinizing and 
comparing codes of the collected data in this study illustrates that comparison of 
three specific issues would make sense to answer the main question of the study. 
They are: cultural actors, aims and intercultural dialogue activities. 
 
4.2.1 Comparing Actors 
Germany and Iran have different types of actors to undertake cultural activities 
directed at the public of the respective country. One factor by which to compare 
them is their location. Germany used to implement cultural activities in Iran along 
with work of different institutes and organizations which had a branch office in 
both Germany and Iran, such as the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst 
(DAAD), which is headquartered in Bonn and has its branch office, the 
Information Center, in Tehran. Some of these organizations, like ifa, had no 
branch office in Iran. It has its head office in Stuttgart and has worked together 
with the cultural section and press section of the German embassy in Iran to 
implement specific intercultural dialogue activities for Iranian applicants. Iran 
also has a limited number of institutions in Germany in this regard. For instance, 
the Islamic Center of Hamburg has been established in Germany since 1953 and 
concentrates on religious activities. There have been a few organizations which 
have a base just in Iran but implement some intercultural dialogue activities (or 
cooperate with other German organizations to do so). The International Center for 
Dialogue among Civilizations is one of those organizations. 
Besides the location factor, background, profession, funding and status of 
relationship to the Iranian and German states (whether they are state, para-state or 
privately based) play a role in comparing the actors with each other.  
 
4.2.2 Comparing Aims 
The cultural actors of every country logically pursue specific aims in their cultural 
activities abroad. Iran and Germany are no exception. Aims of cultural actors that 
are less dependent on the state seem to differ somewhat from the aims of 
governmental cultural actors. Cultural actors that are known for arts exchange 
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should have slightly different aims than cultural actors that concentrate on 
academic exchange. It is vital to analyze the relationship between firstly these 
types of aims, secondly the aims that Iranian and German governments pursue in 
their foreign cultural policy, thirdly different aims that discourses of intercultural 
dialogue in Iran and Germany are supposed to reach. Comparing aims in these 
three levels can help to understand the role or function of intercultural dialogue in 
the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany.  
 
4.2.3 Comparing Intercultural Dialogue Activities 
German and Iranian actors have organized a variety of projects and activities, 
including intercultural dialogue, in cultural fields. But what do these activities 
look like? They can take the classical or traditional form of inviting experts and 
professionals to participate in a seminar, or the more advanced form of a co-
written book by German and Iranian authors. Which cultural fields have the 
activities been implemented in? Some are academic, some interreligious dialogue. 





4.3 Data Collection 
Collecting data and conducting analysis in grounded theory are supposed to be 
done together, not successively. No specific method is recommended for 
collecting the data. The rule is that a method fits a specific subquestion. If the 
question is: What intercultural activities has a specific institute implemented? then 
the publications and reports of the institute can be relevant data. If the question is: 
Why is there no report on the cultural activities of a specific institute? talking to 
high-ranking members of the institute can be the relevant data. In this study, 
different methods such as document analysis, conversation, interviews and 
observation have been used.  
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Published texts were useful in the initial stage of the research but insufficient on 
their own, firstly because they were partly damaged or not completely available, 
and secondly because they could not answer all the questions of this study. For 
instance, analysis is needed on why regular annual reports are available on the 
foreign cultural policy of Germany but not on the foreign cultural policy of Iran. 
To answer questions like this, it was necessary to interview relevant individuals. 
Since not all individuals agreed to participate in interviews, some informal 
conversations were conducted with them. Besides documents, conversations and 
interviews, different situations, locations and confrontations of different 
interviewees with questions of the study are observed. This observation is 
carefully used as the third source of information for this study.  
To understand text, the study has benefited from Roland Barthes’s view on “text” 
(Barthes 1971), who believes it to be different from the material that carries the 
content of the data, which is called “work”, not text. Text refers to the language of 
a book discussing the subject of an investigation; the book itself is the work. Text 
does not stop at its literature; it goes further than words, signs and facts. Text is 
thus paradoxical because it can challenge the structure of the work and the view of 
the people who produced it. In Barthes’s view, text is also plural “because it has 
several meanings” (p. 238). The work has to be understood in the process of 
filiation because “the author is reputed as father and owner of his own text” (p. 
239). Text thus reflects realities more than the physical or imaginary reality that 
can be seen in the work. This approach to text defines a methodological approach 
to perceiving data in all its forms, including documents, interviews and 
observation, and differentiating their texts from work. For instance, not just the 
work of an interview has been analyzed, but also the way an interviewee neglects 
to answer a specific question or pauses in responding to a question.  
What kinds of data have been collected in this research? In Charmaz’s view, data 
generally is divided into two categories. All kinds of data that are shaped by 
participants in a field study via communication and questions of the researcher, 
including surveys, open questions, interviews, conversations, informal talks, 
emails and even verbal reactions to the researcher, are called elicited texts. The 
kinds of data which have already been published and are available to the 
researcher in the field study and which the researcher has no control over, 
including books, bills, published surveys and records, are called extant texts 
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(Charmaz 2014: 47-48). In this research, a mix of both extant and elicited texts 
has been used. Texts like bills, annual reports and parliament regulations which 
are collected for analysis in this study are in the category of extant text. 
Interviews, conversations and even observations with the direct involvement of 
the researcher are elicited texts in this study. 
Data in this study is collected according to theoretical sampling, which will be 
explained in the next subchapter.  
 
4.3.1 Sampling  
In principle, deciding about samples in quantitative and qualitative research 
follows the same rationality: The data should be collected systematically so as to 
represent the whole target society. For example, if a study measures the quality of 
the mathematics teaching in a city, sampling should cover schools which are 
located in different neighborhoods with south/north, rich/poor, and 
host/immigrant populations. Such sampling can still contain some errors, but it is 
rational to follow a strategy which covers all the levels of society. Rationality is 
respected similarly in both quantitative and qualitative research. There is, 
however, a very significant difference between qualitative and quantitative 
research: Quantitative research, as Martin Marshall states, deals with large 
amounts of data, while qualitative research understands the usefulness of studying 
small samples. Marshall suggests three approaches to selecting a sample for a 
qualitative study: convenience sample, judgment sample and theoretical sample. 
Based on factors such as time and availability of sources, a researcher can decide 
to choose one or a mixture thereof. Convenience sampling fits selection of the 
most accessible data, while in judgment sampling the researcher actively selects 
the most productive sample, according to her/his own knowledge on relevant 
theories, books and research, to answer the research question. In theoretical 
sampling, as also recommended in grounded theory, an interpretative theory will 
result from the emerging data (Marshall 1996: 523).  
Grounded theory suited to theoretical sampling. Theoretical sampling has been 
defined by Glaser and Strauss as a method which can be conducted based on the 
initial decisions of the researcher regarding data collection. Therefore, theoretical 
sampling is rooted in extant and elicited texts that are available in the field study: 
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“The initial decisions […] are based only on a general sociological perspective 
and on a general subject or problem” (Glaser/Strauss 2009: 45). The initial 
decisions in grounded theory research, as Charmaz explains, come from the data; 
it constructs tentative ideas about the data, and then examines these ideas via 
further empirical inquiry. It involves a particular form of reasoning called 
“abduction”, which is a mode of imaginative reasoning. When a researcher cannot 
account for a puzzling finding, he/she makes an inferential leap to consider all 
possible theoretical explanations for the observed data and then forms and tests 
hypotheses for each explanation (Charmaz 2014: 199-200).    
Charmaz explains theoretical sampling with a study of Jennifer Lois on the topic 
of homeschooling mothers (Charmaz 2014: 193-196). Knowing that 
homeschooling took up an inordinate amount of time for mothers in the United 
States, Lois investigates which strategies homeschooling mothers use to overcome 
emotional burnout and manage their housework, relationship with their husbands, 
and their duties as mother and teacher. The initial round of interviews suggests to 
Lois that something else was grounded in the field that deserves more attention 
academically: a concept of “time for the homeschooling mothers”. Therefore, the 
main codes were reviewed and a new round of interviews conducted to identify 
what “time” means for those mothers.  
The next example is from research by Tim Rapley. He uses purposive sampling. 
He writes an article about stages of a study on delay in diagnosis for children with 
juvenile idiopathic arthritis. Through access to four forms of data, Rapley was 
able to make sense of his data. He reviewed sources such as patients’ case notes 
on the same illness, a limited number of academic papers on delayed diagnosis, 
and he stayed in contact with relevant members of a hospital team (Rapley 2014: 
51-52). At this stage he collects information that assists him to understand the 
potential of variation in the phenomena of delayed diagnosis. Through initial 
interviews he became curious as to why the time to diagnosis in some cases is 
shorter than others. With this question he narrowed down his sample groups and 
specified his questions. He finally constructs his main discussion, arguing that 
“luck” and “knowledge” (of parents of ill children) could explain the phenomenon 
of delayed diagnosis (Rapley 2014: 58-59).  
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The common point of the two reviewed research studies is that the researchers 
developed richer and deeper questions from their initial round of data collection 
and used theoretical sampling. From the point of departure in the initial round of 
data collection, they developed a theory and accordingly set sampling strategies.  
This study also gradually narrowed the topic down to those cultural activities 
conducted under specific discourses in Iran and Germany. Different stages of the 
process of making sense of intercultural dialogue, the interviews and observation 
will be discussed in the next subchapters. 
 
4.3.2 Making Sense of Intercultural Dialogue in the Field Study 
To make sense of intercultural dialogue in Iran and Germany, the following two 
subquestions are initially asked in the field study: 
 
Subquestion one: What are the main aims and objectives of Iranian and 
German foreign cultural policy, and what are the main institutions and actors that 
play a role in it?  
Subquestion two: Which Iranian and German institutes, organizations, centers 
and individuals can be counted as actors of intercultural dialogue? What were 
their aims? Which activities did they implement? In which fields? For which 
target groups? Why? 
An attempt has been made to focus questions like these on the collected texts of 
Iran and Germany: 
 Which discourses refer to cultural dialogue with other countries, cultures, 
and nations, and receive support from the Iranian and German states? 
 
 Which sections or institutions of the Iranian and German states deal with 
foreign cultural policies generally and consider intercultural dialogue 
specifically? What are their background and aims?  
 
 Which actors are in charge of implementing foreign cultural activities 
abroad generally and are helping to implement intercultural dialogue 
activities specifically? What is their profession? What is the status of their 
relationship with the state? Why? 
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It is important to consider which type of data has been available to meet the 
demands of this study and what the elicited texts are. Three forms of data have 
been collected as follows: informal conversations, relevant publications, and 
contact with organizations. These forms are explained in the next sections. 
 
4.3.2.1 Informal Conversations 
Firstly to save the time and secondly to deal with the lack of exact information 
available to answer the initial questions of the study, some individuals who were 
informed about foreign cultural policy and cultural dialogue were contacted. The 
necessity of talking to those individuals in Iran was greater than in Germany, 
because in Germany the relevant information was often available via extant texts. 
The individuals were selected by convenience sampling, whereby the most 
accessible individuals who could be contacted are selected. In Iran it was possible 
to talk to some political figures and in Germany to some experts and members of 
staff who organized dialogue projects. Informal conversation with these 
individuals was chosen because it was the most effective way, in the early stage of 
the study, for the researcher to develop an understanding of intercultural dialogue 
in the context of both countries in open discussions and without specific 
questions. Informal conversation was also very helpful in uncovering new topics 
of interest which might initially have been overlooked by the researcher. 
Individuals would point out various dimensions of the topic of intercultural 
dialogue, which opened up many interesting points and questions. Moreover, the 
informal conversation played a key role in deciding on the next sampling in the 
study (theoretical sampling). Seven individuals were contacted at this stage. Data 
relating to these informal conversations appears in appendix 1. 
 
4.3.2.2 Relevant Publications  
Two pieces of advice were significant in the initial informal conversations. The 
Iranian participants suggested visiting the library of Farhangestān-e Honar 
[Academy of Art], Ketābkhāne-ye Melli-ye Iran [National library of Iran], and 
library of the foreign ministry. All these libraries are located in Tehran. The 
sources were useful; they had intranet and index e-systems which give access to 
the published Iranian press media, reports, books, journals and bulletins on the 
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topic of intercultural dialogue. The second piece of advice was to contact specific 
organizations, institutions and individuals and avoid some others which may 
perceive the topic or result of the study as a security threat for Iran’s cultural 
image internationally. Informal conversation in the German field study also 
resulted in advice to look for annual reports and publications of the foreign affairs 
ministry, specific institutions and organizations via their homepage. Other advice 
was to visit the library of ifa in Stuttgart, and Das Politische Archiv37 [political 
archive] in Berlin.  
More than 250 reports and statements of Iranian (about 100) and German 
institutions (about 150) were investigated in total. Access was gained to 50 
publications of the Iranian foreign ministry, including internal bulletins, inquiries 
and occasional reports, as well as 20 publications of the International Center of 
Dialogue among Civilizations (ICDAC), including its monthly inquiries and some 
of its annual reports. In addition, 20 publications of the Organization of Islamic 
Culture and Relations, including the inquiries of its Center for Interfaith Dialogue 
and two reports on annual forums of all its Rayzani branch offices, were 
reviewed. Similarly, 150 documents were reviewed in the case of Germany. 25 
publications of the German Auswärtiges Amt [foreign affairs ministry] were 
studied, including its annual reports on foreign cultural and educational policy, 
action plans, and statements on key concepts, as well as reports on relevant 
conferences. Meanwhile, it was possible to access publications of German 
institutes which received a budget for organized intercultural dialogue. 
Approximately 80 publications, including annual reports, action plans and 
bulletins of the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, Institut für 
Auslandsbeziehungen e.V., Goethe Institut, Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, 
and Pädagogischer Austauschdienst, as well as some reports on the activities of 
Deutsche Welle, were reviewed in this context.  
 
4.3.2.3 Contact with some Organizations/Members of Staff  
Beyond talking to some informed individuals and studying relevant published 
texts, institutions involved in implementing intercultural dialogue activities were 
                                                          
37 After obtaining information about this archive center, it became clear that data from the last 30 years are 
not available to the public and researchers. The time period of this study is 1998 to 2013, which is the last 20 
years in terms of research. This archive therefore did not fit data collection.  
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identified. Contacts with members of staff of some institutions like ifa and the 
DAAD as well as the Iranian Rayzani were therefore established. These 
institutions cooperated with the researcher and communication with them was a 
valuable source of information during the years of the research. Contact with the 
institutions was also used to conduct more informal conversations and interviews 
for the study and provided access to other extant texts.    
 
4.3.2.4 Initial Lessons from the Field Study  
The first lesson from studying the collected data was identifying the main 
discourses of intercultural dialogue in Iran and Germany. The discourse of 
“European-Islamic cultural dialogue” arose more than any other discourse in 
informal conversations of Germany. Some reference was naturally made to the 
“dialogue of cultures” of Roman Herzog (German president from 1994 to 1999) 
and “dialogue with Muslim world” of Johannes Rau (German president from 1999 
to 2004). But what has been done systematically by the German parliament and 
the German foreign ministry (according to informal conversations, relevant 
publications which were mentioned above, and contact with institutions) has 
related to “European-Islamic cultural dialogue”. This discourse was strengthened 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in America. More information on this issue will 
follow in 5.1.3.   
“Dialogue among civilizations” was the main discourse mentioned in initial 
informal conversations with the Iranian side. It was notable here that they 
emphasized the cosmopolitan approach of dialogue among civilizations on the one 
hand, and on the other saw it as a way to emphasize Islamic civilization. To focus 
more on the content of the conversations, it became clear that there was a 
discourse behind the dialogue among civilizations that these informed individuals 
referred to indirectly, and that discourse was “interfaith dialogue”, which had 
been ongoing since the 1980s. Studying the relevant available documents, it 
became clear that the Iranian state had regularly organized interfaith dialogue after 
the Islamic Revolution. Interfaith dialogue has clearly been a discourse of 
intercultural dialogue on the Iranian side, because not only the religious sector of 
the Iranian state but also the reformist sector was proud of what was identified as 
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“dialogue among civilizations”. In 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 both of these discourses will be 
discussed in detail. 
The second lesson was that information on cultural actors and intercultural 
dialogue were not available from the same sources in Iran and Germany. Access 
to relevant data in the case of Iran was problematic and time-consuming. The 
homepages and e-portals of Iranian institutes and organizations present 
incomplete information and are out of date. It was therefore necessary to visit the 
institutions and their libraries, but the libraries likewise had incomplete and 
damaged archives. Even the words “annual report” or “report on foreign cultural 
policy” were unfamiliar to the ear of the main staff of those libraries. Some 
relevant bulletins which were available in hard print were damaged; in some cases 
it became clear that all publications of libraries are not registered in their 
electronic indexes. Hence trusting to the available mechanism of those libraries 
was almost impossible. In contrast, access to data in Germany was relatively 
unproblematic, because the internet portals of organizations and institutions have 
a systematic arrangement to make it possible to present and download annual 
reports and relevant information. Their information is updated and available 
mostly in both German and English. Contact with the ifa library was a fruitful 
experience, because annual reports were completed for the years between 1998 
and 2013.  
The third lesson was to recognize the “alive” field study of Germany and “dead” 
or “mute” field study of Iran at the stage of making sense of the data. A relevant 
institution on the Iranian side closed in 2005. The list of interfaith dialogue 
meetings of ICRO shows that Germany is not a partner. On the German side, 
although the golden time of discourse of European-Islamic cultural dialogue was 
around 2005-2008, there have still been projects implemented under its title and 
with the assistance of its specific budget. 
The fourth lesson relates to the political perception of intercultural dialogue in 
Iran. It was a very common comment in the informal conversations with Iranians 
that dialogue with Germany or the West was difficult because intercultural 
dialogue was misused politically. On the German side also, dialogue with Iran 
(and not generally with the Muslim world) has been a political issue. Further 
analysis of this issue follows in 7.1.3.  
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These lessons firstly helped with deciding on the period of analysis in this study, 
which is between 1998 and 2013. Because this time period shows variation in the 
approach to intercultural dialogue in one of the case study countries, it seems to 
be a proper time period to specifically answer the question of this study. This 
point has been explained in 1.2.3. Secondly, they helped to focus on specific 
institutions which have a more important role in setting the foreign cultural policy 
of Iran and Germany. The Iranian foreign ministry and Organization of Islamic 
Culture and Relations are relevant on the Iranian side, while the German foreign 
affairs ministry is significant on the German side. Thirdly, they helped to focus on 
specific actors of intercultural dialogue in the Iranian and German context. 
Activities of other institutes and individuals which play a role in between are 
considered in a subchapter on “other German actors” and “other Iranian actors” in 
chapter 5. The names of the actors are shown in table 3:   
  
Table 3. Iranian and German actors of intercultural dialogue which are studied 
specifically in this research 
Iranian actors  German actors  
Rayzani  The cultural section of the German 
Embassy in Iran 
International Center of Dialogue among 
Civilizations 
Goethe Institute 




Fourthly, these lessons helped to decide on interviews conducted in the study, 
which are considered in the next subchapter. 
 
4.3.3 Interviews 
Based on information collected at the stage of “making sense of intercultural 
dialogue”, some parts of the body of the research are formed, and some 
subquestions are answered, but some new questions also emerge which need to be 
answered in interviews. Individuals who informally participated in conversations 
suggested some interviewees with the potential to answer different questions of 
the study. The relevant publications which were studied initially gave some 
additional ideas of others to approach with some obscure points surrounding the 
problem of the study. Moreover, as explained in the last subchapter, some 
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individuals were suggested to be interviewed in the first round through contacts 
with institutions and members of staff.  
The individuals who were interviewed in the first round are generally categorized 
in four groups, as follows: 
1. Politicians: Politicians who are informed on or have experience in 
decision-making in the relationship between Iran and Germany, foreign 
policy and foreign cultural policy of both countries are in this category. 
Figures who are familiar with the discourses of intercultural dialogue and 
diplomats who have held relevant posts were the next target individuals.  
 
2. High-ranking officials: People who occupy high-ranking positions in the 
cultural organizations are a valid source of information. They are 
simultaneously in contact with politicians and have to consider the 
political sensibilities of implementing intercultural dialogue activities with 
a specific country and also with teams and colleagues that have experience 
of cultural activities with different countries. They are aware of the goals 
their organization follows and the kind of activities it can organize. 
Therefore the heads, directors and chiefs of relevant institutions and 
organizations were the next group of interviewees of this study.  
 
3. Members of staff: The views and information of members of staff of the 
cultural and other organizations were also important. The rationality of 
interviewing these people was to be able to understand dimensions of 
intercultural dialogue activities from different points of view, not just 
those of high-ranking individuals but also of those who dealt with 
implementing the activities. Employees of relevant institutions which are 
involved, directly or indirectly, with intercultural dialogue projects, and 
some members of staff of organizations which have been involved in the 
foreign cultural policy of both countries were therefore interviewed.  
 
4. Informed individuals: There are people who have a connection with the 
topic of intercultural dialogue or foreign cultural policy of Iran and 
Germany through their expertise, contacts and former jobs. Therefore, 
individuals who are politically informed about discourses of intercultural 
dialogue, the relationship between Iran and Germany, and the foreign 
cultural policy of Iran and Germany, including experts, authors and 
journalists, were also interviewed in the first round of interviews.  
 
Because not all interviewees agreed to participate in face-to-face interviews, or it 
was not possible to visit them because of their time schedule, some of the 
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interviews were conducted as informal conversations, communication via email, 
telephone and skype. Some of the face-to-face interviews were in groups of two or 
three people, simply because the interviewees were colleagues and wanted to save 
time or answer the questions more confidently.  
How are the questions for the interviews formed? As Charmaz recommends, 
conducting an intensive interview needs an interview guide. It helps a researcher 
to observe more confidently and experience different potentials of the 
communication with the interviewee:  
“When you grapple with creating, revising, and fine-tuning your interview 
questions, you gain a better grasp of how and when to ask them in conversation. 
You will keep in mind how to form well-constructed questions although you 
might not follow your original questions or glance while conducting the 
interview” (Charmaz 2014: 63). 
The interview questions contain the main objectives of the two first subquestions 
of the study. A sample of questions in the first round of interviews is shown in 
appendix 4. Altogether, 49 interviews were conducted in the first round, among 
them 25 interviews with Iranian participants and 24 interviews with German 
participants. The data from these interviews, including the groups, name of 
participants, time and form of the interviews, are presented in appendix 2.  
Information from the first round of interviews contained some interesting points. 
Besides answering some subquestions, it also raised new questions. These new 
questions and interesting points were noted in memos and used to develop 
hypotheses and new questions. One of these questions was regarding the ICDAC. 
What exactly happened to it? Why was it closed down? Was it closed down, or 
did it merge into another organization? If so, why? Moreover, it was interesting to 
learn that, despite not many political tensions in the relationship between Iran and 
Germany during Khatami’s presidency, the number of intercultural dialogue 
activities did not increase considerably. To discover why that was the case, the 
interviews were continued in the second round with participants of the same 
groups as the first round but with more focused questions. Most of the 
interviewees in the second round were approached on the suggestion or with the 
help of the interviewees from the first round of interviews.  
There were also some interesting points relating to specific activities implemented 
by German actors. For instance, it was interesting to learn about academic 
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cooperation and job-internship opportunities which the DAAD and ifa, German 
cultural actors, made possible for Iranian and German participants. Both activities 
were funded under the discourse of “European-Islamic cultural dialogue”. These 
types of activities arose more than others. To discover why, another group was 
added to the four groups of interviewees in the second round of interviews:  
5. Participants of intercultural dialogue: Individuals who have participated 
in intercultural dialogue activities between Iran and Germany, including 
students, professors and researchers who participate in DAAD exchange 
programs and ifa’s cross-cultural “Praktika” program are the target 
individuals in this group. 
 
Guide questions in the second round are more focused on problems of and 
obstacles to intercultural dialogue, as well as on the interest of the participants in 
intercultural dialogue projects. A sample of these guide questions is presented in 
appendix 4. Thirty one interviewees participated in the second round of 
interviews. Appendix 3 reflects data relating to these interviews.  
A total number of 81 individuals participated in all interviews of the study. Some 
interviewees were contacted more than once with more questions, but the date of 
their interview (as appendix 2 and 3 show) is based on the first date of the 
interview, and their name is mentioned once in both appendices. Furthermore, 
some interviewees belonged to more than one category, for instance an informed 
individual was also a participant of the DAAD projects. To avoid mentioning an 
interviewee’s name twice, a single interview is presented in the list.  
Some problems also arose when conducting the interviews for this study: 
 The start point of the research was 1998. Some institutes were closed and 
some relevant intercultural dialogue projects had already ended at the time 
of conducting this research. Finding relevant participants was therefore 
difficult.  
 
 Interviewing some Iranian participants was difficult. Some of them had no 
interest in participating in the interview because of political 
considerations. This later became an analytical point to explain the 
political problem of intercultural dialogue.  
 
Chapter 4: Methodology 
155  
4.3.4 Observation  
Part of the main reasoning in grounded theory is to “let your research problem 
shape the methods you choose” (Charmaz 2014: 27). One of the examples 
Charmaz gives in her book is a study conducted by Wasserman and Clair in 2011 
on homeless people and social services for them. Data from this study is gathered 
based on in-depth interviews; nevertheless, both researchers took observation and 
participation in the data gathering into account. Observation was a type of data in 
their research that illustrates new dimensions of the research problem (Charmaz 
2014: 24-25). 
 
The issue of intercultural dialogue in the context of Iran and Germany could not 
be studied without being part of it. In most cases the researcher therefore had to 
participate actively and observe different situations personally. Observation was 
key to deciding on the next samples and data gathering, as the theoretical 
sampling of grounded theory advises. The data collected from documents and 
interviews was not enough to answer different questions of the study. In each 
stage it was important to take into account and observe carefully not only the 
content of the information but also the situation, and even the lack of information. 
Observation in both document and interview analysis of the study was used as a 
source of information. 
Document analysis was not a sufficient method. The absence of annual reports on 
Iranian foreign cultural policy and the lack of precise regulations or bills from the 
Iranian parliament regarding intercultural dialogue activities are significant, but 
they are only descriptive points. Some individuals were therefore approached to 
find out why this is the case. The interviews were able to clarify some dimensions 
of these points, but some interviewees dodged the issue. Observing their behavior 
and combining it with the results of the document and interview analysis suggest 
that Iranian foreign cultural policy itself is influenced negatively by the dual 
political system of Iranian government. The interviewees mostly reflected two 
different values. The first is creating an Islamic and revolutionary image for Iran, 
and the second is creating a peace-seeking and cosmopolitan cultural image for 
Iran. It seems that the struggle reflected in the interviewees who believe in two 
different values is one of the reasons that no clear regulation on foreign cultural 
policy had been concluded in Iran up to that time (end of 2016). This observation 
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suggests that there is not only a problem of achieving and concluding a clear 
regulation for foreign cultural policy but also a structural problem of forming the 
foreign cultural policy of Iran. This point will be discussed in 7.1.1. 
In the German field study, document analysis was similarly not a sufficient 
method, although it was helpful to a large degree. A high level of harmony and 
team work was observed in the field study of Germany. What was revealed in the 
interviews often confirms what was reflected in the reports, for instance. The 
interviewees from the German “politicians” and “high-ranking officials” groups, 
for instance, did not dodge questions on the foreign cultural policy of Germany. 
Finally, their behavior and the way they dealt with questions suggested that they 
believe in an integrated system of values in German foreign cultural policy. A 
general value was to create a good image for Germany in Iran and to consider the 
sensibilities of the relationship between the two countries. This point will be 
discussed in 7.1.1. 
The instruments used in this observation included field notes and memos, which 
were very important for making new questions and developing analytical points of 
the observation.  
The researcher also had some specific privileges which made the process of 
observation easier. Firstly, close contact with some cultural organizations, as 
mentioned in 4.3.2, helped her to build communication with members of their 
staff. Through these contacts it became easier to understand, for example, which 
issues an organization is open to answering questions about and which it tries to 
avoid, and why. Close contact also made it possible to understand which issues an 
organization has agreements or disagreements with other organizations over, and 
why. A connection with some close friends of Iran’s former president Mohammad 
Khatami is another privilege. Since Khatami’s “dialogue among civilizations” is a 
focused discourse of this study, the opportunity for open and deep communication 
with people who were involved in promoting this discourse made in-depth 
observations possible. The participation of the researcher in an academic 
exchange of the DAAD, under the discourse of “European-Islamic cultural 
dialogue”, from 2012 to 2015, was the third privilege for active observation in the 
field study. This participation enabled the researcher to closely observe the 
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communication, fields of discussion, problems and advantages of intercultural 
dialogue between Iranian and German participants.  
 
 
4.4 Data Analysis 
The first analytical stage of this study, as mentioned above, began during the 
collecting and sampling of data. The data are then transformed into codes. Coding 
is a way to synthesize hundreds of pages of interviews, field notes, documents and 
other texts to develop a theoretical discussion. It is a process of defining what the 
data are about. As Charmaz explains, coding means “naming segments of data 
with a label that simultaneously categorizes, summarizes and accounts for each 
part of data. Coding is the first step in moving beyond concrete statements in the 
data to making analytic interpretations” (Charmaz 2009: 111). Grounded theory 
coding can be divided into four phases, which are explained in the next sections.  
 
4.4.1 First Phase: Initial Coding 
Initial coding is the first step to transform the data to smaller segments. It breaks 
the concrete data into shorter words which can be categorized and analyzed later. 
It is basically a matter of asking some main questions of the data to name and sort 
them. Charmaz summarizes questions which Glaser and Strauss think are 
important to ask about the data at this stage as follows:  
 “What is this data a study of? 
 What do the data suggest? Pronounce? Leave unsaid? 
 From whose point of view? 
 What theoretical category does this specific datum indicate?” (Charmaz 
2014: 116). 
 
One of Charmaz’s tips to the researcher is to “remain open” to explore all 
theoretical possibilities of the data. There are concepts which can define the 
gathered data theoretically, such as Max Weber’s “reutilization”. But Charmaz 
advises that researchers, instead of limiting the data to one or two theoretical 
concepts, should be open to see different potentials of the text. The second tip 
Charmaz gives is to “stay close to the data”. Sometimes, based on the earlier 
concepts in the researcher’s mind, he/she would code a part of the text in a very 
abstract way. If the code cannot easily represent the text, it will be problematic to 
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categorize it or relate it to other codes at a later stage. The third tip is to “keep 
codes simple and precise”, as well as “constructing short codes”. To make a code 
simple and short, Glaser and Strauss suggest using gerund verbs: for instance 
bridging, saying, separating and so on. The fourth tip is “preserving action during 
coding”. It means that coding a specific part of the text should not neglect one 
element and only highlight another. The fifth tip is “comparing data with data”, 
which plays a very important role in grounded theory coding. It helps the 
researcher to be sure that the codes were formed in the best way and communicate 
with the original text as much as possible. “Moving quickly through data” is the 
final tip Charmaz gives, which means that working quickly on the data would 
spark a researcher’s thinking. Moving from data to data will enable the researcher 
to compare, articulate and revise the codes in a way which can represent their 
original text as much as possible (Charmaz 2014: 120-121).  
Some of these tips were useful for coding of this study; nevertheless, there were 
still some challenges. For instance, data collected in this study were in three 
languages. Most of the data were in Farsi and German, and partly in English 
(almost all interviews with German interviewees were conducted in English). The 
study is written in English; therefore the tip from the grounded theory researchers 
above, to use gerund verbs in coding, was relevant. But there was a problem with 
coding part of the data in Farsi, because in Farsi a gerund verb also functions as 
an infinitive. For instance, didan means both “seeing” and “to see”. The gerund 
likewise does not exist in German. The capitalized form of an infinitive verb 
functions as a gerund but is then a noun. Das Sehen means “seeing” as a noun, 
and sehen means “to see”. This problem has been dealt with by using both forms 
of infinitive and gerund verbs in coding. 
There were several times that a certain piece of data could be coded in more than 
one way; a piece of information which categorizes German foreign policy 
according to the three pillars of political, economic and cultural policies, for 
instance. The first way of coding can be “classifying German foreign policy”. The 
second way of coding can be “maintaining culture as a pillar of foreign policy”. 
This problem has been dealt with through two possible solutions. Firstly, by 
writing a code that maintains points of both codes. In the case above, a code like 
this could be imagined: “maintaining culture in classification of German foreign 
policy”. The second solution is to keep the first code in coding and write the 
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second code separately as a memo. Therefore, if such information repeated itself 
in the next data, the code and memo could be found easily. Finding them can help 
to make a relationship between previous and new data. There is also a third 
solution: writing both codes on one piece of information, although the experience 
of coding in this study has shown that double coding makes the process of 
analysis complicated. This solution is therefore not to be recommended.   
Word-by-word coding, line-by-line coding and incident-to-incident coding are 
methods that can be used for initial coding. Word-by-word coding attempts to 
code the text word for word and is suitable for research that works with large 
volumes of data such as Internet data. Line-by-line coding considers text sentence 
by sentence. It fits well with research that deals with fundamental empirical 
problems such as interviews, observation and documents. Incident-to-incident 
coding is a very close cousin of line-by-line coding, as Charmaz suggests.  
In this study, line-by-line coding was used in the initial stages, and in later stages 
incident-to-incident coding via gerund verbs. Maxqda software was used to record 
coding on initial, focused and axial levels. This software presents other 
possibilities, such as preserving memos on codes and free memos. It also makes it 
possible to compare codes with each other in the same text or in different texts, 
search specific codes among other codes and give examples of codes by clicking 
on codes. A total of 4,463 codes were created for this research with the help of 
Maxqda.  
 
4.4.2 Second Phase: Focused Coding 
Initial coding is followed by focused coding, which deals with establishing a 
relationship between codes and categorizing them. This is the second major phase 
in coding. According to Charmaz, focused coding means using “the most 
significant and/or frequent earlier codes to sift through large amounts of data. One 
goal is to determine the adequacy of those codes. Focused coding requires 
decisions about which initial codes make the most analytic sense to categorize 
your data incisively and completely” (Charmaz 2009: 59-60). 
Focused coding was conducted during and after the initial round of interviews. It 
is an important stage of this study, because it enables the researcher to focus on a 
few specific codes and to add new guide questions and an extra group of 
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participants for the second round of interviews. The collected data is full of 
important codes, but only some of them can be focused. Some of the codes could 
suggest different dimensions of a common issue, and some could represent a 
distinctive character in the case studies of Iran and Germany. These types of codes 
are chosen as the focused codes. The rest are disregarded or stored for later use. 
Some of the stored codes could later explain different dimensions of the final 
categories. Different functions of the Maxqda software make finding and 
changing codes, and categorizing and de-categorizing them extremely easy. Table 
4 shows how focused coding has been constructed from the initial coding, in an 
example of an interview with a German diplomat.  
Table 4. An example of initial and focused coding of the study 
Example of interview text Initial codes Focused codes 
Question: what have been the benefits of 
intercultural dialogue for Germany and Iran… 
Answer: stop, I am not in a position to give you 
ANY COMMENT about dialogue between 
Germany and Iran, 
what I can do, I can give a general outlook on 
dialogue between civilizations, but with Iran 
honestly, very very little, 
 if you want to know about bilateral relationship 
between Iran and Germany, this you should 
understand, this is not my profession. 
 I would prefer to call my colleagues to the 
political desk. They can answer these kind of 
questions.  
Question: well, ok, this is not that much 
surprising for me, because I know that Iran has 
not been so active in dialogue since 2005 and 
also you have this position since 2011, that 
means you probably don’t know what was 
going on in the period time before 2005. 
Interviewee: no see, it is not like, Iran is not 
among the countries that we approach. Iran is 
among the countries which we are focusing, 
because Iran is a Muslim country.  
Question: so lets start with this question: which 
Muslim countries you approach more than the 
other countries? 
Interviewee: I can talk just about the period 
time that I am in office, seriously. Since 2011. 
In these three years definitely Arab countries 
which we had seen political development. 
Which we call Arab Spring. These countries 
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Starting the work in 
time that Arab 
Spring is the main 
topic 
Chapter 4: Methodology 
161  
 
This focused coding is based on the researcher’s knowledge of the total initial 
codes of this study up to the time of this coding. A key point to understand the 
first focused code of table 4 is the special time of the interview. The interview was 
conducted a few months after conclusion of the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action” between Iran and Western countries regarding the nuclear technology of 
Iran in July 2015. It was a time that made many officials of the German foreign 
ministry reluctant to talk about any relationship with Iran. Many requests to 
interview high-ranking officials and members of staff of the foreign ministry for 
this study were rejected in that period. After the interview with this diplomat, a 
member of staff of a political department of the German foreign ministry was 
finally approached. He also emphasized in the interview that she would not talk 
about Iran, but about “European-Islamic cultural dialogue” generally. This code is 
therefore based on information from comparison of the data and observation by 
the researcher. A code which fits that piece of information is thus: “Excluding 
Iran from discussion”. The hypothesis in that stage of the research was that Iran is 
classed as a Muslim country and part of cultural dialogue. But German politicians 
who were interviewed in this study avoided talking about it at the specific time of 
the interview for political reasons. Nevertheless, because the code should reflect 
the information and not the hypothesis, articulating it with the word “politically” 
or similar is avoided. The code “excluding Iran from discussion” has also been 
used in the stage of focused coding for some other pieces of data in different 
interviews because it became clear that, in the same period of time, some 
interviewees refused to discuss Iran. Some of them even told the researcher that 
they did not want to talk about it before the result of the nuclear negotiation was 
clear.  
 
4.4.3 Third Phase: Axial Coding 
The data which has been broken down into smaller pieces in the initial coding is 
brought together again in the third phase of coding. This stage is called “axial 
coding”. Axial coding relates categories to subcategories, as Strauss and Corbin 
present it. The properties and dimensions of a category are specified in this stage. 
Questions such as “what, where, why, who, how, and with what consequences” 
have to be asked in this phase, based on the available codes. Strauss and Corbin 
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believe that linking the relationship between the categories in the axial coding 
should be conceptual rather than descriptive (Strauss/Corbin 1990: 107).  
Table 5 shows an example of initial and focused coding in this research and can 
be helpful to understand the axial coding used here. In axial coding, the codes of 
the study are scrutinized more critically: Why and how did Iran attract little 
attention from this specific diplomat? Does the code of “counting Iran out of 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue” suggest a political approach towards Iran in 
the foreign cultural policy of Germany? Or should it be taken as a feature of the 
diplomat being poorly informed about Iran? Or is he not allowed to talk about Iran 
for political reasons? Through these questions, the axial coding provides more 
facts and positions to strengthen a focused code and turn it into an analytic point. 
If there are not enough facts to strengthen a focused code, then it cannot be proved 
and should be deleted or articulated again. “excluding Iran from European-Islamic 
cultural dialogue”, for instance, has been changed to “not having priority on Iran 
in European-Islamic cultural dialogue”, because more facts and codes from the 
interviews have been scrutinized and compared with each other to reach this 
conclusion. The main axial codes of the study strengthen three main arguments 
which explain characteristics of the intercultural dialogue between Iran and 
Germany: different structural foreign cultural policy, different institutional 
efficiency, and political considerations of Iran and Germany.  
 
4.4.4 Fourth Phase: Theoretical Coding  
Theoretical coding is the final phase of coding in grounded theory. After selection 
of specific initial codes and gathering of more information to form focused codes, 
categories are constructed through axial coding; theoretical coding is a stage 
which relates different categories to theorize a specific analysis regarding the 
research problem. Charmaz uses the view of Glaser and explains which questions 
can be asked from the codes at this stage to relate them to each other as a 
hypothesis and then to integrate them in a theory. These questions are known as 
the “six Cs” and consider the data according to: Causes, Contexts, Contingencies, 
Consequences, Covariances, and Conditions (Charmaz 2014: 151). Theoretical 
coding depends on components of axial coding. It should conceptualize categories 
and relationships between them to answer the main question of a study.  
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In this research, the final axial codes have been discussed in a way to answer the 
research question. The main theoretical discussion therefore uses the three 
arguments, of different structural foreign cultural policy, different institutional 
efficiency, and political considerations of Iran and Germany, to analyze which 
role intercultural dialogue has played in the foreign cultural policy of Iran and 
Germany towards each other.  
 
4.4.5 Intermediate Phase: Memo Writing 
During collecting, coding and analyzing data, a researcher who is applying 
grounded theory may face new questions or come up with new ideas and thoughts 
regarding codes and observations. It is possible that by comparing codes and 
constructing categories, he/she encounters some contrasts. These points are 
recorded, analyzed and later can be used as part of the analytical subchapters of 
the study by writing “memos”. Writing down questions, points and ideas in an 
analytical and conceptual way is called “memo writing”. As Charmaz explains, 
memo writing charts, records and details a major analytical phase of the study. It 
is not necessary to write memos formally, they can be produced spontaneously, 
especially in initial stages of the research. In Charmaz’s view, memo writing can 
be divided into two kinds: early memos, which reflect what is going on in the 
data; and advanced memos, which contain the description and analytical points 
(Charmaz 2014: 169). In this study, memos were written frequently and flexibly, 
firstly because comparing details of the field study of Iran and Germany simply 
opened up many ideas and questions which had to be considered carefully; and 
secondly because the Maxqda software made memo writing possible in different 
ways, on each code, between sentences, and on each document individually. It 
also facilitates writing free memos. Here are two examples of memos from this 
study: 
Table 5. Two examples of memos in the research  
Early 
memo 
Turning interview to a political manifest regarding Germany 
The interviewee, Mr. K, an Iranian diplomat who direct the department of Europe and 
American in foreign affairs ministry, instead of answering questions and discussing 
based on facts, was answering what he thought would be a good thing to do. 
Sometimes also his talks were reactionary like criticizing the West in General and 
Germany in particular because of not supporting Iran’s nuclear energy. It was tried 
several times to attract his attention to answer questions and turn the interview to a 
political manifestation, thinking about cultural approaches of foreign affairs ministry, 
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but after listening to each question he was continuing his manifestation and giving his 
views politically about Germany: 
Interviewee: still I feel Germany is quite occupied country, because it is defeated! 
Question: still? 
Interviewee: yes, still. Just few months ago it was discovered that the USA is spying 
Merkel’s cellphone. Also British did the same in German Parliament. it never happen 
in France, or Italy. 
Advance 
memo 
Difference of Iranian and German diplomats 
Analysis of the collected data suggests that there has been little information about 
German cultural institute and its foreign cultural policy regarding Iran among Iranian 
diplomats and high organizational positions. Germany, though, has been mentioned as 
a ‘good’, ‘fiend’ ‘not-bad’ country, no specific comment about German actors, and 
activities in context of intercultural dialogue was mentioned by diplomats. Even 
talking to heads and former heads of Rayzani, and reading published interviews from 
them, it was illustrated that cultural abilities and activities of Germany towards Iranian 
public is underestimated. 
 
In contrast, German diplomats which happen to be interviewed in this research have 
had more information about cultural organizations of Iran, Iran’s political obstacle to 
coordinate cultural activities. Two of diplomats, for instance mentioned difference 
between Rayzani and Iranian embassy in their view. One of them expressed his hope 
in time of Khatami, because Khatami was a former director of Islamic Center of 
Hamburg formerly. One of the diplomats mentioned that according to his experience 
of service in Iran he can differentiate Iranian people’s religious character from other 





There are some techniques which are used to make more sense of codes and 
consider them in a more critical way. They are explained in the following two 
sections:    
 
 4.4.6.1 Flip-flop Technique 
Flip-flop technique is one of the comparative techniques developed by Strauss and 
Corbin. They discuss that a concept is turned “inside out” or “upside down” to 
obtain a different perspective on the event, object, or action/interaction. In other 
words, the research considers opposites or extremes to identify significant 
properties. Strauss and Corbin illustrate the flip-flop technique by reviewing 
research on the concept of teenage “access” to drugs. Since access to drugs has 
been characterized in their field study as “easy”, they tried to understand what 
would happen to teenagers if access to drugs were “difficult”. One of the 
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questions formed in that research turned out to be: “Would difficult access make a 
difference in amount or type of teen drug use?” (Strauss/Corbin 1990: 94-95). 
In the field study of Germany, it became clear that the names of actors, including 
institutes and private organizations, and their projects relating to intercultural 
dialogue appear in an annual report on foreign cultural policy published annually 
by the German federal government for the parliament. This evidence motivated 
the researcher to ask whether such reporting exists on the Iranian side. The answer 
was negative. To obtain information about Iranian actors and their projects on 
intercultural dialogue, as mentioned above, a huge amount of extant and elicited 
texts must be collected from different sources. No systematic reporting on Iranian 
foreign cultural policy is available. It indicates a weak institutional efficiency of 
Iranian institutions and organizations. This question has therefore been asked in 
axial coding using the flip-flop technique: “What role does intercultural dialogue 
play in foreign cultural policy if the institutional efficiency of the actors of that 
foreign cultural policy is under question?” 
 
4.4.6.2 “in vivo” Coding 
Coding is a difficult stage in grounded theory. Sometimes there is no word which 
can explain an event or action in the text better than the special terms used by 
participants in the field study. Coding specific parts of the data according to terms 
that participants have mentioned is called “in vivo” coding. Four kinds of in vivo 
codes prove useful, according to Charmaz: terms everybody knows that flag 
condensed but significant meanings; a participant’s innovative term that captures 
meanings or experience; insider shorthand terms reflecting a particular group’s 
perspective; and statements that crystallize participants’ actions or concerns 
(Charmaz 2014: 134).  
In this research, some data are also coded using the in vivo technique. For 
instance, “dialogue is a hostage of politics”. This phrase was used by one of the 
German interviewees to explain the negative influence of political issues on 
intercultural dialogue of Germany with Iran. This phrase could also explain the 
political perception of intercultural dialogue on the Iranian side, particularly 
regarding dialogue among civilizations, which for political reasons lost attention 
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4.5 Summary of Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 presents an overall image of the rationality behind the grounded theory 
methodology of this study and outlines how different sections of the study follow 
its rules. It explains comparative study on the different levels of actors, aims and 
activities, gives information regarding the data collection process, sampling 
strategies and groups of research participants (politicians, high-ranking 
individuals, members of staff, and program participants). Furthermore, it explains 
how the data is coded (initial, focused, axial and theoretical coding) to establish a 
thematic structure which shapes the analysis and finally the main discussion of the 
study.  
This qualitative research is not an easy process. Tips and guidelines from 
grounded theory researchers like Kathy Charmaz have helped the researcher to 
avoid confusion in different stages of data collection and analysis (which happen 
mostly simultaneously). However, writing the research also has its own 
challenges. The reader should not be confused or bored by a chronological report 
of what happened in the study. The text of research is more than a mere report.  
Writing this research started from three points: structural differences between 
Iranian and German foreign cultural policy; different organizational efficiencies; 
and political tensions. These are the three axial codes of this study, which 
originated from advanced memos written after coding. The three points were the 
starting point for writing the analysis. It was necessary to know what a reader 
needs to enjoy reading these points: a logical reason why the three points are 
important, what their relevance is to the main question of the study, what their 
background is, how they can be positioned in academic debates, and so on. The 
table of contents for the study was therefore re-written after the three points had 
been written down. The order for presenting the results of the study was then 
decided.  
The first chapter is intended to give an overview of the topic of the study. It was 
written at the end because the researcher then had complete knowledge of all 
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insights of the study. It became apparent during the study that historical points in 
the relationship between Iran and Germany are important. Some of the 
intercultural activities were in fields that historically attracted attention from both 
nations. The second chapter is therefore intended to give an overview of the 
history and background of the relationship between the two countries. This 
chapter was also written after writing the first draft of the main analysis of the 
study. Reading research and investigation on the topic of intercultural dialogue 
began at the beginning of this study, but review came after completion of the 
research. Grounded theory recommends writing the literature review after 
finalizing the analysis, because then the actual question and topic of the study can 
be positioned better among the academic debates. The third chapter therefore 
contains the review of literature. The methodology of the research is planned as 
the fourth chapter because it clearly shows how the research is conducted.  
Analytical points on the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany and on 
intercultural dialogue of Iran and Germany are explained and analyzed in chapter 
five. Chapter six is allocated to analysis of institutions, organizations and 
individuals that implemented cultural activities under intercultural dialogue. The 
characteristics of intercultural dialogue are discussed at the end of chapter six. 
Chapter seven illustrates the most important analytical points of the study, that is, 
the theoretical codes. Chapter seven illustrates analysis on characteristics of the 
intercultural dialogue, with the three points written at the beginning of the writing 
process central to this chapter. These analytical points are also used to explore the 
role of intercultural dialogue in foreign cultural policy. Chapter eight presents 
points to answer the main question of the study and reflect on what this study adds 
to academic debates on the topic of intercultural dialogue.  
Chapter five gives a detailed overview of the foreign cultural policy of Iran and 
Germany and the organizations in both states that decide on those policies. 
Certain discourses of intercultural dialogue which are selected as the case study 
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This chapter presents the first analytical points of the study. Intercultural dialogue 
in Iran and Germany are supported by specific state organizations and institutions 
of the respective countries. Some of these institutions are responsible for deciding 
on the foreign policy of Iran and Germany. Analysis of the data illustrated that 
there is a major difference between the Iranian and German organizations. The 
structure of the political state and the approaches of Iran and Germany after the 
Islamic Revolution and World War II respectively have had a determinative role 
in setting their cultural policies towards the world. This chapter presents answers 
to the first subquestion of the study. It explores the following questions in 
different forms: Which organizations in the Iranian and German state are 
responsible for deciding on foreign cultural policy? What are the similarities? 
What are the differences? Why? Which goals do they follow? Do they have a 
clear plan for their foreign cultural policy? Why? Answers to these questions 
could clarify new dimensions of Iranian foreign cultural policy and specific 
discourses of intercultural dialogue. 
Subchapters 5.1 and 5.2 deal with the foreign cultural policy and intercultural 
dialogue discourses of Iran and Germany respectively. 5.1.1 presents an overview 
of the political system of Iran. 5.1.2 shows the structure of Iranian foreign cultural 
policy according to the analysis of acts, regulations and statements of the Iranian 
parliament and Iranian constitution after the Islamic Revolution. Organizations 
which have a key role in forming the foreign cultural policy of Iran are discussed 
in 5.1.3. Details of “interfaith dialogue” and “dialogue among civilizations”, as 
Iranian intercultural dialogue discourses are provided in 5.1.4 and 5.1.5 
respectively.  
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Subchapter 5.2 firstly provides an overview of the political system of Germany in 
5.2.1, and 5.2.2 details the structure of German foreign cultural policy according 
to analysis of the main acts, regulations and statements of the German parliament 
and foreign ministry after World War II. Information on organizations which have 
a key role in setting or influencing the foreign cultural policy of Germany are 
presented in 5.2.3, while 5.2.4 deals with the discourse of “European-Islamic 
cultural dialogue” as an intercultural dialogue discourse.  
The last subchapter, 5.3, summarizes the discussions of subchapters 5.1 and 5.2.  
 
 
5.1 Iranian Foreign Cultural Policy, Acts, Organizations and 
Intercultural Dialogue Discourses 
Although there is very little about the intercultural dialogue activities of Iran in 
academic debates, Iran has been involved in different interfaith and intercultural 
dialogue activities for the two last decades. After the Iranian Revolution, political 
elites and religious organizations decided to create a different image for Iran 
internationally from that created by the Pahlavi dynasty. One of the aims of 
cultural activities at that time was to show how Iranian culture is against Western 
values. Over the last decades, Iranian cultural institutions have engaged in 
intercultural dialogue activities to reach their aims, yet these aims have not been 
pursued through a precise plan. This subchapter explains why. 
 
5.1.1 An Overview of the Political System of Iran 
After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the political system of Iran officially 
changed to an Islamic Republic. However, the term “Islamic” does not mean that 
it is an absolutely religious totalitarian government. Its legal system is based on 
Sharia law, but in many respects civil law applies. Similarly, the term “Republic” 
does not mean that it has a full democratic system. The Islamic Republic of Iran 
also does not resemble the system of the Islamic republics of Pakistan or 
Afghanistan, Mauritania or the Gambia.  
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The Islamic Republic of Iran is indeed a mixed system, in which authoritarian, 
religious, democratic and nationalist elements are mixed together, and sometimes 
cooperate and sometimes block each other. The president and the parliament are 
directly elected by the people, but these institutions to some degree and the 
judiciary to an extended degree are affected by the religious leader. Some specific 
institutions are also a mixture of democratic and loyal to the leader. These 
institutions are religiously legitimated. It can therefore be said that the Iranian 
state has two sectors: democratically legitimated and religiously legitimated. Their 
relationship is regulated in the constitution. In addition, there are power relations 
and influential networks which work beyond the constitution. It is therefore 
difficult to measure which sector has more power to make political decisions. 
These sectors are illustrated in the figure below: 
Figure 5. Structure of Iranian political system 
 
Source: made by the researcher (2016) 
 
The political system in Iran is centrally governed by three branches: the 
legislature, executive and judiciary. The branches have local offices, such as local 
courts, Farmāndāri [city government] and Ostāndāri [provincial government]. 
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The branch referred to in figure 6 as “mixture- loyal to the leader”, has both 
democratically and religiously legitimated elements. It extends its influence on a 
local level through local institutions such as the Friday Prayer Imam, who is 
appointed by the leader. Meanwhile, city government or provincial governments 
are appointed by the democratically legitimated sector of the Iranian state. In the 
Iranian political system, the issue of domestic culture is treated differently 
compared to Germany. The religious dimension of culture is managed mostly by 
the religiously legitimated sector. Policies regarding other aspects of culture, such 
as art, music and theater, are generally decided by the democratically legitimated 
sector. However, the work of this sector faces limitations because of the 
interference of the religiously legitimated sector and, beyond that, informal 
networks of the leader. The duality of the political system therefore often creates a 
distorted domestic cultural policy. The policy regarding foreign cultural activities 
faces more or less the same problem: Religiously and democratically legitimated 
sectors of the Iranian political system struggle over authority to decide on foreign 
cultural policy. This point is clarified in more detail in 5.1.3. The duality of the 
system is not the only problem, however, as the following section illustrates. 
 
5.1.2 Iranian Foreign Cultural Policy: Between Islamic Propagation and 
Iranian Foreign Policy  
The issue of culture is mentioned in a vague and abstract way in the Iranian 
constitution. As Ahmad Naghibzadeh discusses, article 152 of the constitution 
obligates the foreign policy of Iran to reject all forms of domination and to be in 
“mutual peaceful relationship with all non-belligerent States”. Article 153 stresses 
that “any form of agreement” which results in “foreign control” over the different 
resources of Iran, including cultural resources, is forbidden. According to 
Naghibzadeh, these articles of the constitution express “a protective foreign 
policy” in an “extremely abstract way”. In his view, these articles do not help the 
cultural and political actors to act in international affairs (Naghibzadeh 2009: 38-
39). 
Statements and legislation released by the Iranian state after the Revolution do not 
share a specific plan or action paper on foreign cultural policy, but discuss it in a 
general way and mixed with Islamic propagation and domestic cultural issues. 
The first statement was released in 1992 by the Cultural Council of Islamic 
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Republic of Iran. This statement is titled Osul-e syāsat-e Farhnagi-e Jomhuri-ye 
Eslāmi-ye Iran [the principles of the cultural policy of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran], in short Principle 1992. Principle 1992 is a five–page document and 
considers the issue of culture mostly on a domestic level, but it also remarks on 
culture on a foreign level in some points. The priority of Iran’s cultural relations, 
according to this statement, is “Muslim countries”. It emphasizes the role of 
cultural centers of Iran abroad and expects them to represent Iran actively in the 
cultural arena, such as religious places and Haj.38 It emphasizes that the ministries 
of “Islamic Culture and Guidance” and “Foreign Affairs”, “Higher Education”, 
“Health”, as well as the Iranian national TV and sports organizations, are 
responsible for implementing cultural policy abroad. The president is supposed to 
supervise their activities. The statement also requires all the mentioned 
organizations to report on their cultural activities abroad every six months (Šorā 
Ā'li Enqelāb Farhangi 1992).39  
The next document which considers foreign cultural policy is Barnāme-ye panj 
sāle-ye Tose’eh [five-year development plan]. The plan is proposed and set every 
five years by the president’s administration. It must be legislated by the Iranian 
parliament and finally approved by the leader. The plan is supposed to guide the 
state organizations in regard to economic, social and cultural affairs. The time of 
the first and second plan covered approximately the period of President 
Rafsanjani, in the post-Iran-Iraq war era. The main focus of the two plans, periods 
1989-1993 and 1995-1999, was the economy. As Gheissari and Nasr argue, 
Rafsanjani planned to construct some economic bases through trade, investment, 
privatization, industry infrastructure and creation of job opportunities in the two 
plans (Gheissari et al. 2009: 120-125). Both plans mention rules regarding foreign 
cultural policy. The 25th amendment of the first five-year plan commissioned the 
relevant cultural organizations (the same organizations that are mentioned in 
Principle 1992) to establish a “unified and coordinated system in cultural and 
propagation affairs and merging relevant and parallel centers in one” (Plan and 
Budget Organization 1368 [1989]: 11). The 46th amendment gives permission to 
some ministries to use the assistance of foreign experts, preferably from Muslim 
countries. In the second five-year plan, the necessity of cultural relations with 
                                                          
38 Haj is a religious practice that Muslims are supposed to do in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. 
39 The copy of the legislation that is available has no page number, but information regarding cultural 
activities abroad was reflected on the last page, in the section on “foreign relations” and “organizations”.  
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“friend Muslim countries” and “ECO countries”40 is mentioned (Plan and Budget 
Organization 1373 [1994]: 97). Amendment 56 underlines the necessity of 
planning against “cultural penetration”. It obligates ICRO, the Propagation 
Organization, the Imam Khomeini Publication Center, and Iranian TV to 
undertake such planning (Plan and Budget Organization 1373 [1994]: 50). 
Amendment 57 requires the state to be active in the world cultural and media 
sphere by promoting the Farsi language and literature. It calls for the promotion of 
dialogue between religious experts and thinkers, as well as the translation of the 
Quran into foreign languages at international level (Plan and Budget Organization 
1373 [1994]: 51). 
The third and fourth five-year plans refer to the periods 2000-2004 and 2004-
2008. These plans cover approximately the two presidential periods of Khatami as 
well as the early years of Ahmadinejad. Both have much in common with the 
economic plans of the first and second plans. As is mentioned in some studies, 
however, they made a compromise between the “political realities” and the 
“political and spiritual needs” of Iranian society (Daniel 2012: 243). The third 
plan has a remark on “cultural penetration”, but it requires the state to promote 
“cultural infrastructures”, such as cultural heritage organizations, cinema, theater 
and civil society. With regard to foreign cultural policy, it tasked the foreign 
ministry with building “foreign relations”, while specifically making ICRO the 
responsible state organization for “cultural and propagative policies” abroad, 
under the supervision of the leader (Plan and Budget Organization 1379 [1998]).41 
The fourth plan contains some remarks on culture and dialogue, but again the 
boundary between the domestic and foreign sphere is not clear. Article 108 
requires cooperation between state organizations to keep the “memory and policy 
of Ayatollah Khomeini” alive. In the fifth section of article 108, the plan requires 
ICRO and the foreign ministry to cooperate with the Imam Khomeini Publication 
Center to achieve these aims (Plan and Budget Organization 1383 [2004]-a: 187). 
Article 109 makes the state responsible for paying attention to protecting and 
recognizing the “Iranian historic identity” via instruments such as promotion of 
the Farsi language. Nevertheless, in no part of article 109 is any cultural institute 
commissioned to do so (Plan and Budget Organization 1383 [2004]-a: 189). In 
                                                          
40 Countries which are members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) are called ECO countries.  
41 The version of the program which is available for the researcher does not have a page number; the specific 
information which is mentioned above is located in Article 183 of the program.  
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article 110, the state is charged with extending the “culture of peace” and the idea 
of “dialogue among civilizations” on an international level, although none of its 
six sections lays out a plan or tasks any specific organization (Plan and Budget 
Organization 1383 [2004]-a: 189-190).  
The fourth plan to be prepared by Khatami’s administration was rejected by 
Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad also closed the organization which was in charge of 
writing the plan and instructed his own team to write a new plan covering 2010-
2015 (Amuzegar 2014: 12). The first chapter of this plan is on “Islamic-Iranian 
culture”. The terminology of cultural dialogue, as was included in the previous 
plan, does not appear in the fifth. According to the fifth plan, the state is supposed 
to promote the “Islamic-Iranian development model” and complete the “cultural 
engineering map” (Plan and Budget Organization 1389 [2010]: 23). Article 5 of 
the plan requests specific institutes and organizations to write a “Sanade Melli-ye 
tose’e-ye ravābet-e farhangi-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran” [national act of 
development of cultural relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran at international 
level], in short national act. The national act is expected to explain “pure 
Mohammad’s Islamic principles” and “religious and political thoughts” of Imam 
Khomeini and the current leader, Khamenei. It must find a way to introduce 
“Islamic-Iranian civilization” and culture to the world with the aid of “dialogue”. 
The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance, together with ICRO, and with the 
cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as Howze-ye Elmi-ye 
[Higher Council of Seminary of Qum] and Al-Mostafa Alamiye assembly are 
instructed to write the national act (Plan and Budget Organization 1389 [2010]: 
25). The plan stresses that the national act needs to be submitted to the council of 
ministers. It is significant to mention that the name of ICRO in this article is 
written inside a parenthesis. This type of mention suggests that it is not yet 
respected as the single authority in charge of foreign cultural policy in Iranian 
state legislation. This point will be discussed later. An unofficial version of the 
national act, in 2012, shows that it requires the Iranian cultural organizations to 
extend “cultural values” of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to introduce 
“achievements and successful models” of the country to the world, to globalize 
“the discourse of pure Mohammad’s Islam”, to promote “religious tourism” of 
Iran, especially for Shia population tourists, to give “scholarship to foreign 
students” and to establish “headquarters of Iranian universities abroad” (Šorā Āli 
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Enqelāb Farhangi 2012). Up to the end of 2013, the national act had not been 
finalized or submitted to the Iranian parliament.  
The next statement is Naqše–ye Mohandesi-ye Farhangi [the Map of Cultural 
Engineering], which was promoted by the Higher Council of Cultural Revolution. 
The idea of “cultural engineering” was initially suggested by the leader in public 
speeches between 2004 and 2010 (Šorā Āli Enqelāb Farhangi 2012: V). Up to the 
time of the analysis of this research being finalized (early 2017), the statement had 
still not been submitted to the Iranian parliament.  
There are two reasons for the delay in submitting both the national act and the 
map of cultural engineering: Firstly, the foreign cultural policy of Iran is not 
decided by a specific state actor. There is always a council or group of different 
actors who make the statements. Because these actors have different interests and 
priorities, reaching an agreement takes time. Secondly, because concluding a 
statement takes a long time practically, the statement is subject to different 
administrations. Work on the national act, for instance, began in 2010 at the time 
of President Ahmadinejad, but the act had not been submitted by the end of his 
presidency. A newly appointed team of President Rouhani criticized the content of 
the act for using unprofessional terms and not taking a practical approach to 
international issues (Abbasi, personal communication, 2016). Submission of the 
national act thus took even more time to be corrected according to the criticisms 
of the new president’s team.   
The appointment of different actors to decide details of acts and statements on 
foreign cultural policy is a key problem. It not only slows down the process of 
legislation of the acts but also prevents an integrated policy being created to 
promote Iran culturally abroad. Cultural actors that are dependent on the 
religiously legitimated sector usually have an interest in Islamic self-interpretation 
or propagation abroad, while those that are dependent on the democratically 
legitimated sector are interested in promoting foreign policy. They therefore 
support cultural activities as the instrument of foreign policy, whether of a 
religious or artistic nature. They pursue opportunistic foreign cultural policy, as a 
result of which, Iranian foreign cultural policy swings between Islamic 
propagation and foreign policy objectives.  
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The next section looks at the Iranian organizations that are in charge of foreign 
cultural policy. 
 
5.1.3 Iranian Guiding Political Organizations in the Realm of Foreign 
Cultural Policy  
Institutes and organizations which are involved in political decisions for Iran’s 
cultural activities abroad are listed in a study by Mohammadreza Dehshiri 
(Dehshiri 1393 [2014]: 208-210). To understand them in the context of the 
political system of Iran, they are presented in this section based on their 
dependency on the democratically or religiously legitimated sectors of the Iranian 
state. Table 6 illustrates them as follows: 
Table 6. Organizations which play a role in Iranian foreign cultural policy, categorized by 
their dependency on religiously or democratically legitimated sectors of the state 
Under authority of religiously legitimated 
sector 
 
Under authority of democratically 
legitimated sector 
1 Šorā-ye Āli-ye Enqelāb-e Farhangi 
[Supreme Council of Cultural 
Revolution]- its statute legislated by the 
leader 
1 Iranian Parliament- mandated by the 
constitution- its statute legislated by the 
constitution  
2 Šorā-ye Maslahat-e Nezām [Expediency 
Discernment Council]- mandated by the 
leader but legislated later by the 
constitution  
2 Iran Cultural Heritage, Handcrafts and 
Tourism Organization- its statute legislated 
by the Parliament  
3 Komite-ye Emdād-e Imam Khomeini 
[Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation]- 
mandated by the leader 
3 Office of Cultural Affairs of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs- its statute legislated by 
the Parliament  
4 Šora-ye Hamāhangi-ye Tabliqat-e Eslāmi 
[Coordinating Council of Islamic 
Propagation]- its statute legislated by the 
leader 
4 Šorā-ye Āli-ye Iranian-e Xarej az Kešvar 
[The Supreme Council of Iranians abroad]- 
its statute legislated by the Parliament  
5 Edāre-ye Tabliqat-e Eslami-ye Qum 
[Office of Islamic Propagation of Qum]- 
its statute legislated by the leader 
5 Center for International Scientific 
Cooperation/ CISC, in Ministry of Science, 
Research and Technology- its statute 
legislated by the Parliament  
6 Al Mustafa International University- 
mandated by the leader 
6 Organization of Sport- its statute legislated 
by the Parliament  
 
7 
Majma’e Omumi-ye Taqrib-e Mazāheb 
[The World Forum for Proximity of 
Islamic Schools of Thought]- its statute 
legislated by the leader 
7 Azad Islamic University- its statute 
legislated by the Parliament  
8 Sazmān-e Tabliqāt-e Eslami [Islamic 
Propagation Organization]- its statute 
legislated by the leader 
8 International University of Imam 
Khomeini- its statute legislated by the 
Parliament  
9 Majma’e Jahāni-ye Ahl-e Bayt [World 9 Cultural Institute of Economic Cooperation 
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Forum of Ahl-e Bayt]- its statute 
legislated by the leader 
Organization /ECO- its statute legislated 
by the Parliament 
10 Hozeh Honari [art department] of Islamic 
Propagation Organization- its statute 
legislated by the leader 
10 Helāl-e Ahmar [Red Crescent]- its statute 
legislated by the Parliament 
11 Islamic Culture and Relations 
Organization- its statute legislated by the 
leader 
11 Foundation of Iran Studies- its statute 
submitted by Council of Higher Education, 
which is under authority of the Parliament  
12 International Communication department 
of office of the leader- its head selected 
by the leader 
  
13 Āstān Quds Razavi [Imam Reza Shrine]- 
its director selected by the leader 
  
14 Frahangestān-e Olum [Academy of 
Science]- its statute legislated by Cultural 
Council, which is under the authority of 
the leader 
  
15 Farhangestān-e Honar [Academy of Art]- 
its statute legislated by Cultural Council 
which is under the authority of the leader 
  
16 Department of International Affairs of 
Iranian TV and Radio/IRIB- its statute 
legislated by the Parliament but its 
director selected by the leader 
  
17 Organization of Haj and Pilgrim- its 
director selected by the leader 
  
18 Sāzmān-e Oqāf [Organization of 
Endowment and Charity Affairs]- its 
statute legislated by the Parliament but its 
director selected by the leader 
  
Source: Dehshiri (1393 [2014]: 208-210), reshaped and developed by the researcher  
 
More than half of the organizations on the list are under the authority of the 
religiously legitimated sector. Two points regarding the list are worth considering. 
Firstly, the list does not reflect all state organizations which play a guiding 
political role in the foreign cultural policy of Iran. For instance, the foreign 
ministry and the Islamic culture and guidance ministry are simply ignored in the 
list, even though both ministers are members of the higher council of ICRO, an 
organization which receives a budget and authority to plan Iran’s cultural 
activities abroad. Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction to the study, two 
cultural events between Iran and Germany were canceled on the decision of the 
ministry of Islamic culture and guidance. Secondly, there is very little information 
or discussion on the detail of the role that these organizations play in foreign 
cultural policy. This study therefore uses information based on talking to relevant 
participants in the field study and some publications to present more detail. 
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It is uncertain what role organizations such as Āstān Quds Razavi [Imam Reza 
Shrine], which is under the authority of the religious sector, play in the foreign 
cultural policy of Iran. There is no annual report or clear information on the 
website of the Imam Reza Shrine that can give relevant information on its foreign 
cultural activities. It is possible that it plays a role in foreign cultural policy, 
because it allocates some financial sources to relevant organizations. In 2004, the 
total sum of the endowment of the Imam Reza Shrine, which has 17 million 
pilgrims and visitors per year, is reported to be an estimated $15 billion (Karami 
2016). 
Of the organizations categorized as being under the authority of the religiously 
legitimated sector the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, and of those under 
the democratically legitimated sector the Iranian parliament play a role in setting 
rules, policies and guidelines relating to foreign cultural policy. ICRO and the 
foreign ministry have executive and practical duties. According to Dehshiri, 
however, ICRO, besides its executive duties, is also in charge of decision making, 
setting rules, planning, supervising, leading and directing programs (Dehshiri 
1393 [2014]: 213).  
The foreign ministry is under the authority of the democratically legitimated 
sector. The minister is appointed by the president, after which his/her position 
should be affirmed by the Iranian parliament and the leader. The structure of the 
foreign ministry after the Revolution changed under different ministers. 
According to published texts, the issue of culture has not been considered 
significantly in those changes. Different continents and countries of the world 
were considered in different departments of the foreign ministry between 1998 
and 2013, although economic, judicial, research, training, publication and 
translation issues also attracted attention in the structure of the ministry between 
1997 and 2005 (Iranian foreign ministry 1384 [2005]: 186-187). In the period 
from 2010-2013, the department of economic affairs was eliminated (Aftab News 
25.04.2011). The issue of culture was mentioned in the structure of the foreign 
ministry in 2001 (Dehshiri 1393 [2014]: 209), when the office of cultural affairs 
was established. This office was in charge of coordinating affairs between the 
foreign affairs ministry and ICRO. According to information from the field study, 
the office had just a single key person (Akrami, personal communication, 2015; 
Masjedjamei, personal communication, 2013). It was closed in late 2005 
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(Khatibzadeh, personal communication, 2014). Although the issue of culture is 
not visible in the structure of the foreign affairs ministry, some participants of the 
study argue that participation in and implementation of conferences on philosophy 
and literature, attention to investigation and research, and finally, support for 
interfaith dialogue, critical dialogue and constructive dialogue all in all indicate 
the importance of the issue of culture to this ministry (Sajadpour, personal 
communication, 2013; Khatibzadeh, personal communication, 2014). 
Furthermore, the foreign ministry and, consequently, its diplomatic missions 
abroad are the highest state institutions which are recognized by the other political 
systems. Any practice of any Iranian cultural institute, organization or center 
abroad is thus under the authority of the foreign ministry. That is why the role of 
the foreign ministry in foreign cultural policy is undeniable.  
The Organization of Islamic Culture and Relations (ICRO) is the next important 
organization which sets the foreign cultural policy and practices in this field, with 
the assistance of its branch offices around the world and its various publications 
and religious and cultural centers. As already discussed in 2.4.2, the organization 
was established because, in the post-Iran-Iraq war era, politicians and religious 
figures felt the need for Iranian foreign cultural policy to be entrusted to a single 
state organization. The international office was therefore separated from the 
Islamic propagation organization to construct the new organization of Islamic 
culture and relations. Some institutes under the authority of the leader, as well as 
some institutions of Qum42 together with markaz-e gostaresh-e zabān va adabyāt-
e Farsi [the Council for the Dissemination of the Persian Language and 
Literature], merged into it to form a single body of the ICRO structure. ICRO has 
a shoua-ye ‘ali [higher council] which consists of 15 members, six of whom are 
appointed by the leader.43 The official positions of six other members of the 
higher council also suggest that they are under the authority of the religiously 
legitimated sector. These positions are: the head of the foreign affairs office of the 
leader, the head of Iranian national TV, the head of the Islamic Propagation 
Organization, the secretary general of Taqrib, the head of Ahlol Bayt institute, the 
head of Jama-tal Mostafa institute. There are just two members under the 
                                                          
42 Such as the Secretariat of the World AhI al-Bayt Assembly [dabirkhane-ye majma-e jahani-ye ahl-e beit], 
in short Ahl al-Bayt Assembly, the Secretariat of the World Forum for the Proximity of Islamic Schools of 
Thought/Taqrib [dabirkhane-ye majma-e jahni-ye taghrib-e mazaheb], in short Taqrib Assembly 
43 One of the members is a life-member: Dr. Haddad Adel. Adel was speaker of the parliament and his 
daughter is the wife of the leader. Five other members can be renewed by the leader. 
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authority of the democratically legitimated sectors: the Islamic guidance and 
culture minister and the foreign minister. The head of the higher council is the 
Islamic guidance and culture minister. This point can be linked to the analysis at 
the beginning of 5.2.1 that two sectors which govern the country sometimes block 
each other regarding political decision making. The function of a higher council 
that mostly consists of members who are dependent on the religiously legitimated 
sector and is directed by a member who is under the authority of the 
democratically legitimated sector is criticized by a former head of Rayzani, as 
described in 6.1.1. The ICRO higher council is supposed to decide on the general 
polices to determine long-term and short-term projects and to approve the annual 
budget of ICRO.  
The original mission of ICRO was to present the Islamic Revolution and ideas of 
Imam Khomeini abroad. According to the ICRO constitution, its aims and 
objectives are as follows: 
 Revival and dissemination of tenets of Islam and Islamic thought with a 
view to spreading the true message of Islam to the people of the world. 
 
 Creating awareness among the people of the world as regards the 
principles, the objectives, and the stance of the Islamic Republic of Iran as 
well as the role it plays in the international arena. 
 
 Expansion of cultural relations with various nations and communities in 
general, and Muslims and the oppressed in particular. 
 
 Strengthening and regulating the existing cultural relations between the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries of the world as well as global 
cultural organizations. 
 
 Appropriate presentation of Iranian culture and civilization as well as its 
cultural, geographical and historical characteristics. 
 
 Preparation of the necessary ground for unity among Muslims and the 
establishment of a unified front among world Muslims on the basis of the 
indisputable principles of Islam. 
 
 Scholarly debates and confrontations with anti-religious, anti-Islamic, and 
anti-Revolutionary cultures with a view to awakening the Muslims of the 
world regarding the divisive conspiracies of the enemies as well as 
protecting the rights of Muslims. 
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 Growth, development, and the improvement of the cultural, political, 
economic, and social conditions of Muslims (Rasmi newspaper 
05.02.1996, Tavassoli 2010: 89-90) 
 
These objectives show a clear focus on “Islam” and the “Muslims of the world”. 
The secondary focus in the objectives is on approaching “other countries” and 
promoting the “Farsi language” in the foreign cultural policy of Iran.  
ICRO has more than 1,000 employees (Safavi 2013). There has been no 
publication to clarify whether its structure has changed over time, and how. 
According to a participant in the field study, the organization started to expand 
from early 2000, since a large organization with more departments and offices can 
devote more budget from the parliament to itself (Abbasi, personal 
communication, 2016).  
According to the observation in the field study and information from the official 
website of ICRO, which is written in Farsi (ICRO n.d.), this organization has four 
Moā’venat [departments]: Cultural, Research and Education, International Affairs, 
and Financial Administrative. The cultural department is in charge of two 
publications centers. The first is the Alhoda International Publishing Group, which 
has published more than 1,200 books in 25 foreign languages. The second center 
is the Bonyad-e Andishe-ye Islami [Foundation of Islamic Thought]. It has 
published over 16 journals in English, Arabic, French, Russian, Spanish and Urdu. 
According to von Maltzahn, one of the few researchers who has worked on ICRO 
specifically, this organization published over 30 journals with the assistance of its 
cultural centers abroad (von Maltzahn 2015: 67). The research and education 
department includes suboffices such as the Farsi Language Center as well as the 
Center for Interfaith Dialogue. The latter office is in charge of holding 
interreligious dialogue meetings with foreign groups and delegations. This issue 
will be discussed in 5.2.3 in detail. The international affairs department deals with 
branch offices of ICRO abroad. Branch offices are called Rāyzani Farhangi, 
which in Farsi means “cultural consultation”. In this research they are simply 
called “Rayzani”. It is important to mention that Rayzani is different from the 
cultural attaché that is part of Iranian embassies abroad. There will be a chance to 
return to this point in 6.1.1. ICRO has Rayzani and other types of cultural centers 
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in 61 countries, including 16 European and North American countries, 18 African 
and Arabic countries and 16 Asian and Pacific countries. In some countries, such 
as Turkey, China, Pakistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan and India, ICRO has more than 
one cultural center. In Pakistan it has at least eight cultural centers.  
There is no official report or document on the total budget of ICRO. Part of the 
budget comes from the parliament. Review of the annual budget law of the Iranian 
parliament suggests that between 1998 and 2013, this organization assigned itself 
a budget of between 79,500,000,000 Rial and 1,115,700,000,000 Rial. As 
appendix 5 at the end of this dissertation shows, the approximate amount of 
budget in euros in this period is between 34,289,660.94 € and 70,339,046.39 €. 
Nevertheless, the parliament’s budget is not ICRO’s only financial source. 
Because the organization is under the authority of the religiously legitimated 
sector, some participants of the field study suggest that it enjoys a fruitful 
connection between the leader and organizations such as the Imam Reza Shrine, 
which was mentioned above, in its funding (Tabatabaei, personal communication, 
2013). 
From the discussion above it can be concluded that Iranian foreign cultural policy 
is set mostly under the authority of ICRO and the foreign ministry, which are 
respectively under the authority of religiously and democratically legitimated 
sectors of the Iranian state. However, some participants in the field study believe 
that the decisions of ICRO and the foreign ministry do not influence the foreign 
cultural policy of Iran dramatically, because “the Iranian system” itself is clear 
about its relationship with the West (Zahrani, personal communication, 2014). 
The term “Iranian system” in the field study refers to the ideal system which was 
in the minds of the founding fathers of the Islamic Revolution. By contrast, some 
participants argue that it does not matter which organization or institution is 
deciding on Iranian foreign cultural policy, because Iranian politicians historically 
have a pragmatic and rational approach regarding foreign issues. One diplomat 
mentioned that the resolution of the Salman Rushdi fatwa crisis44 and the 
diplomatic position of Iran regarding the Azerbaijan-Qarabag conflict45 prove that 
                                                          
44 This point is discussed in 2.3. 
45 An ethnic and territorial conflict which took place from the late 1980s to May 1994 between residents of 
the borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iran took a diplomatic position in this conflict in 1992 and attempted 
to make peace between both sides, although Iranian diplomats were more on the side of Armenia. Because 
Azerbaijan is a Muslim country, this position by Sajadipur is called a logical or pragmatic dicision rather than 
an ideological decision.    
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Iran is rational rather than ideological in its foreign policy decision making 
(Sajadipour, personal communication, 2013). 
These facts suggest that Iranian foreign cultural policy is fragmented rather than 
integrated. It has a dualist structure. But some Iranian diplomats who were 
interviewed in this study strongly reject this analysis. A former diplomat 
emphasized that the existence of different actors in Iranian foreign cultural policy 
indicates a “decentralization of power” in the political system of Iran: 
“This is one of the characteristics of Iranian system. Some people out of Iran 
think that Iranian system is a “one man show”. Like one is on top of pyramid and 
order; and all would obey. Although it is not at all like this […]. This is an 
indication of decentralization of power […] because of this reason understanding 
interactions is difficult. This is difficult for foreigner to understand. You should 
be inside Iranian society to understand” (Kharazi. Personal communication, 
2014). 
 
Kharazi uses the point of diversity of actors of Iranian foreign policy to justify the 
chaos in decision making. However, the existence of different actors in a foreign 
cultural policy by itself is not a problem. The question is whether the variety of 
actors can coordinate with each other or not. The foreign cultural policy of 
Germany also has different actors, but they work within an integrated political 
system. This point will be discussed in detail in 5.2. A main argument which has 
emerged during the qualitative analysis and comparing codes from the Iranian and 
German field study is that the problem of Iranian foreign cultural policy is not its 
variety of actors, but the lack of an integrated and unified structure. Its dual 
structure does not commit the actors to coordinate with each other. These points 
will be focused on more in chapter 7.  
 
5.1.4 Interfaith Dialogue in the Context of Iranian Foreign Cultural Policy  
The interfaith dialogue approach was initiated by the Hekmat Academy with the 
help of religious intellectuals such as Mojtahed Shabestari and Abdolkarim 
Soroush in the early 1980s. Not only have both of these intellectuals been highly 
influential thinkers in Shia Islamic theology, they were also highly trusted by the 
Iranian state in the early post-revolutionary era. They had a lasting connection 
with the religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state. They gradually moved 
away from government jobs, but they kept their connections with the theological 
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realm. Tavassoli in his study argues that in spite of the conservative atmosphere of 
the seminaries of Qum and some political difficulties of Iran, these intellectuals 
took a pluralistic approach towards religion. They had extensive knowledge of 
Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism, and their views positively influenced the 
academic theology of Iran (Tavassoli 2010: 149). At the time of this research, 
between 2012 and 2016, neither of them had an official and free platform for their 
activities. Shabestari has developed his ideas and studies via some private 
meetings and internet websites. He was invited in 2013 to Germany to participate 
in university interfaith dialogue, supported by the DAAD. This point will be 
discussed in 6.2.2 in detail. Soroush lives in exile and continues to write and work 
as a guest scholar in academic institutes in Germany and the USA.46 Soroush 
specifically explains that the reason for Iran’s tendency towards interfaith 
dialogue was that, rationally, it was a channel to communicate with Western 
countries in situations in which international relations between Iran and the rest of 
the world were difficult:  
“I was telling to people who were politicians or non-politicians at that time that if 
you even have a political aim still dialogue with the Western churches is the 
efficient way. Means that if you can come to an agreement with a Western church 
and its members see your honest and godly intentions, then you will find a 
common language with them. That is like finding a friend in castle of an enemy” 
(Soroush, personal communication, 2012).  
 
It was therefore with the efforts of Soroush, Shabestari and some other 
theologians that an initial meeting in the framework of interfaith dialogue was 
held with the assistance of the Goethe Institute in Tehran and Hekmat. Some 
German religious delegates,47 together with Abdoldjavad Falaturi, came to Iran to 
discuss issues such as religion and judicial context. The first official interreligious 
dialogue was held between Iranian delegates and religious delegates from the 
Greek Orthodox Church in 1982 in Athens. Interreligious dialogue continued with 
the efforts of Hekmat until 1990, when the ministry of Islamic culture and 
guidance, or more precisely its international department, took responsibility for it 
in 1990. Interreligious dialogue continued under the authority of the ministry up 
                                                          
46 This information is from an interview with Soroush and contact with him in 2013. In this year he was a 
guest scholar of the Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation Research in Duisburg. 
47 Since the interview with this participant was held in Farsi, the transcribed names of German delegates 
probably contain mistakes. The names Pandan Rat, as the head of the Goethe Institute of Tehran in the early 
years after the Revolution, Stefan Hans and Hans Kuns as the German participants of interreligious dialogue 
were mentioned in this interview.  
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to 1995, when it became the responsibility of the department of investigation and 
training of ICRO. Shortly after that, the Center for Interreligious Dialogue (CID) 
was established within ICRO. It specifically concentrated on holding 
interreligious dialogues (CID 2010: 1, CID 2011a). Reviewing the aims of the 
center for interfaith dialogue also shows that it tried to represent Iran as an Islamic 
actor with an interest in dialogue. The official website of ICRO presents eight 
aims of interfaith dialogue. They mostly relate to introducing Islamic thoughts, 
correcting stereotypes and wrong assumptions about Islam, and creating a forum 
for dialogue between religious scholars of the world (ICRO n.d.). On an Iranian 
news website, however, the aims are associated with eleven factors. The main 
focus of the aims in this source is on introducing Islam in three fields: Islamic 
thought and specifically Shia Islam in the world; religious traditions of Muslims; 
and Islamic sources and achievements of Islamic scholars (Bashgah Andishe n.d.). 
Nevertheless, what is reflected academically on the aims of interreligious dialogue 
is as follows: “creating a forum for mutual understanding between different 
religions, cooperating with thinkers and leaders of other religions around the 
world, doing research on the common views between religions; introducing the 
principles of Islamic thought, and removing misunderstanding” (Tavassoli 2010: 
90).  
As table 7 shows, interreligious dialogues were held between Iranian religious 
delegates and international partners from the Pontifical Council for Interreligious 
Dialogue, Vatican; Saint Gabriel Institute, Austria; the Secretariat of the 
Switzerland Episcopal Council; the World Council of Churches (WCC), Geneva, 
Switzerland; the Russian Orthodox Church; the Anglican Church/University of 
Birmingham, England; and the Armenian Orthodox Church of the Silisi of Beirut, 
Lebanon. The content of table 7 is from studies (Kamali Chirani 2013: 46, 
Tavassoli 2010: 89-93) and also the official website of the Center for Interfaith 
Dialogue (CID) of ICRO (CID 2010, CID 2014a).  
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Table 7. Interreligious round tables between Iranian delegates and religious institutes and churches 




Dialogue Date Place Theme 
Greek Orthodox 
Church  
First 1982 Athens Man, Faith and Environment 
Second 1984 Athens Faithful Man in the Changing World of 
Today 
Third 1987 Tehran This World and the Next World in Islam 
and Christianity 
Fourth 1998 Athens Family and Its Value in Islam and 
Christianity 







First 1995 Tehran Modernity from the Viewpoint of Muslim 
and Roman Catholic Scholars 
Second 1998 Rome Islam and Christianity Facing Pluralism 
Third 2001 Tehran Youth, identity and Religious Education 
Fourth 2003 Rome Pillars of Peace: Justice, Truth, Love and 
Freedom  
Fifth  2005 Tehran Morality from the viewpoint of Islam and 
Catholicism 
Sixth  2008 Rome Faith and Reason (Vatican 2008) 
Seventh  2010 Tehran Religion and Society (CID 2014b) 
Eighth  2012 Rome Justice in Islam and Christianity (CID 
2012) 
Ninth  2014 Tehran Constructive dialogue between Muslims 
and Christians for the good of society 
(ICRO 2014) 
Tenth  2016 Rome  Extremism and violence in the name of 







1995 Tehran Peace and Justice in Islam and Christianity 
First  1996 Tehran Justice in International Relations and 
between Religions from the Viewpoint of 
Muslim and Christian Scholars 
Second 1999 Vienna Fundamental Values, Rights and Duties in 
a Just System of Co-existence from the 
Viewpoint of Muslim and Christian 
Thinkers  
Third  2003 Tehran Peace, Justice, and their Menaces in 
Today's World 
Fourth  2008 Vienna  Hermeneutic (Bsteh/Mirdamadi 2011: 5) 
Fifth  2013 Tehran Religion, Ethics and Law  (Tasnim news 
04.10.2015) 
 
sixth 2015 Vienna Cooperation between Islam and 
Christianity to promote human values, 






First 2005 Zurich Interreligious Dialogue: Requirements and 
Challenges 







1995 Geneva Peace and Justice in Islam and Christianity 
First 1996 Tehran Religion and the Contemporary World 
Second 1999 Geneva The Role of Religion in the Future 
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Switzerland Third 2002 Tehran Religions and Globalization 
Fourth 2006 Geneva Morality & Politics 





2011 Geneva Transforming Communities, Christians 
and Muslims Building a Common Future 
(CID 2011c) 
Sixth  2012 Geneva Inter-religious Dialogue and Society: 
Ways, Means and Goals (Insights 2012, 
WCC 2012) 
Seventh  2014 Tehran Spirituality and Modernity (WCC 2014) 




First 1997 Moscow Religion and Peace 
Second 1999 Moscow Peace and Justice from the Viewpoint of 
Muslim and Orthodox Scholars 
Third 2000 Tehran The Role of Interreligious Dialogue in 
International Relations 
Fourth 2004 Tehran Islam and Globalization 
Fifth 2005 Moscow Religion and Globalization 
Sixth  2006 Tehran Impact of the Resurrection in Today’s 
Existence  
Seventh  2010 Moscow God and Man in Islam and 
Christianity/The Role of Religion in the 
Life of the Individual and Society (The 
Russian Orthodox Church 2010) 
Eighth 2012 Moscow Religion and Human Rights (Taghrib 
News 01.06.2012) 
Ninth 2014 Tehran Importance and Strengthening of 
Cooperation and Mutual Understanding 
between Islam and Orthodoxy (The 
Russian Orthodox Church 2014) 
Tenth  2016 Moscow Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation as 
Instruments for Achieving Lasting and Just 









Interpretation of the Scriptures 
Second 1997 Tehran Interpretation of the Scriptures on Social 
Justice and Poverty 
Third 2002 Tehran The Analysis of the Concept of Dialogue, 
Religion and Globalization, Religion, 
Civilization and Religious Diversity 
Fourth 2003 Birmingh
am 
Religion in Political Arena 
Fifth 2005 Tehran Religion, Violence and Peace 
Armenian 
Orthodox 
Church of the 
Silisi of Beirut, 
Lebanon  
First 2000 Tehran Peaceful Co-existence from the Viewpoint 
of Muslim and Armenian Scholars 
Second  2004 Beirut The Role of Religion in Society 
Third  2008 Tehran Family in Islam and Christianity  
Fourth 2011 Beirut Religion and Youth (CID 2011b) 
Source: Various sources, each is cited in the table by the researcher 
Interfaith meetings also took place with other religious institutes and churches of 
the world. For instance, according to Tavassoli, there was a meeting between the 
Iranian delegation and Giovanni Agnelli Foundation in 1999 in Turin, Italy, on the 
issue of “Religion, Society and State in Iran and Italy” (Tavassoli 2010: 91). A 
meeting was also held with the Jewish Community of the USA in 2008 in Tehran 
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focusing on the issue of “one God and the common religious beliefs of Islam and 
Judaism” (CID 2010: 6-7). Some interreligious dialogues were implemented by 
the CID in relation to Buddhism with the Buddhist University of Thailand 
between 2000 and 2008, and the Buddhist University of Sri Lanka in 2008 (CID 
2010: 7-8). The CID also implemented a few interfaith dialogues on a domestic 
level. For instance, in 2008 there was an interreligious dialogue between some 
Zoroastrians and some delegates selected by the CID. The dialogue concentrated 
on the issue of “Examining the General Religious Thought of Islam and 
Zoroastrianism” (CID 2010: 8).   
Reviewing the interfaith dialogue meetings reveals some notable points. Firstly, 
interfaith dialogue in the post-Revolution era gradually fell under the control of 
the religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state. Initially (approximately 
from 1982 to 1990), it was implemented by Hekamt Academy, which can be seen 
as a civil society actor. Interreligious dialogues were then taken over by the 
democratically legitimated sector of the Iranian state, the international office of 
the ministry of Islamic culture and guidance. Since 1994, they have been 
implemented by ICRO, an organization which is mostly under the authority of the 
religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state.  
Nevertheless, religious institutes and seminaries of Qum have had a dynamic of 
participating in interreligious dialogues with religious groups and churches of the 
world, even though they are mostly led by Iranian hardliners who have a close 
relationship with the religiously legitimated sector. Among them, Ayatollah 
Mesbah Yazdi is significant. His criticism of dialogue among civilizations was 
mentioned in 3.2.2. Unfortunately, he did not respond to a request for an interview 
in this study, but a study by Sasan Tavassoli contains some interesting 
information about him. He is introduced by Tavassoli as one of the “most well-
known radical, arch-conservative and high ranking Shia intellectual and cleric in 
Iran today”. According to Tavassoli, however, he has still often engaged in 
interfaith dialogues with groups from different churches of the world and shared a 
“reconciliatory approach towards Christianity” (Tavassoli 2010: 36-37).48 
                                                          
48Neither the research of Sasan Tavassoli nor the official website of Mesbah provided more specific 
information. Nevertheless, there are two relevant points that can confirm that Mesbah had an interest in 
engaging in interfaith dialogues. Firstly, according to his website in English, he had travels to countries of 
Spain and Latin America, Lebanon, Syria, India, Malaysia and Indonesia (website of Mesbah Yazdi n.d -a). 
Studying his Farsi official website illustrates more detail on his travel to Spain. He traveled to Madrid in 
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Furthermore, some NGOs, for instance the Institute for Interreligious Dialogue 
(IID), have to a limited degree been active in the realm of interfaith dialogue since 
the presidency of Khatami in Iran. Some of these actors will be discussed in 6.1.3. 
Generally, however, the role that these non-state and NGOs played in 
interreligious dialogue was not directed towards the objectives of Iranian foreign 
cultural policy towards Germany in an integrated way. 
The second point is the affirmative role that the democratically legitimated sector, 
especially the minister of Islamic culture and guidance, played to support civil 
society in promoting interfaith dialogue in the early post-Revolution years. 
Khatami was the minister at that time (between 1982 and 1992). According to a 
participant of the study, the responsibility for interfaith dialogue was given to 
Hekmat because of the trust and support of Khatami. At the end of his ministry, 
the responsibility for interfaith dialogue transferred from Hekmat to the 
international office of this ministry. At first there were few restrictions and 
interference from this office in the workings of Hekmat; but gradually the 
limitations grew to such an extent that some pioneer delegates became 
disillusioned and did not continue their cooperation in the interreligious 
dialogues::  
“It was a time that cultural ministry was in hand of Khatami, then Larijani, and 
then Mirsalim took the office… later people came who had to be 100 percent 
acknowledged by the intelligence service, 100 percent acknowledged by leader, 
and they follow 100 percent a Hizbollahi policy. Slowly the people in charge (of 
interfaith dialogue) were changed. We had a time Mr. Shabestari, who was 
indeed cosmopolitan and know foreign languages and had experience and 
knowledge about religion. He knew the world. But slowly other people came to 
field. One of them is Hasan Rahim pour Azghadi. He has a major tribune in TV 
of Iran. He…even does not have a school-graduation. But he is now the speaker 
for every subject including the religion. One of the professors who had 
participated in meeting with the Orthodox group, Ebrahim Dinani, told me 
that… Azghadi that day told many things, suddenly the director of the orthodox 
group banged on the table and stood up and told that if this guy continue just 
more five minutes like this, we all will leave the meeting. Such a nonsense he 
was telling. Hence, the dialogue among religions turned to be something else. To 
                                                                                                                                                               
August 1997 and was hosted by the Rayzani of ICRO there. During his trip he visited different mosques and 
held speeches for Muslims in Spain It is therefore not unlikely that he also engaged in interfaith dialogue with 
Christian groups during his visits. Secondly, according to information from the field study, he had visited the 
University of Birmingham or invited some professors from this university to Iran (Tavassoli, personal 
communication, 2015). Thirdly, the Iranian foreign ministry helped him to travel to some foreign countries to 
participate in interfaith dialogue (Sajadpour, personal communication, 2013). 
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something to teach Christians what real Christianity is” (Soroush, personal 
communication, 2012).  
 
The third point concerns the lack of concentration on a specific issue in the 
interfaith dialogues. It is obvious that the discourse of interfaith dialogue fits the 
image which the Iranian state intends to mediate for itself culturally abroad. But 
interfaith dialogue on which specific issue? A simple content analysis of the 
topics illustrated in table 7 shows that the issue of “peace” (12) and “justice” (9) 
as well as the role of religion in society, the future and the world (9) attracted 
more attention in the interreligious dialogues compared with issues such as 
“globalization” (4), “family” and “youth” (4), “right” and “law” (4), “faith” (3), 
“coexistence” of people from different religions (4), politics and international 
relations (3), “modernity” (3), and finally, theological discussions such as life in 
the next world (4). It therefore seems that being involved in dialogue itself was 
more important for the Iranian delegates than discussing a specific issue or 
solving a conflict or problem.  
The fourth point is the absence of Germany in the list of the planned interfaith 
dialogues held by the various Iranian actors, Hekmat Academy, ministry of 
culture and CID. Between 1998 and 2013, some German religious delegates and 
academic groups met with directors of ICRO and CID, but these meetings and 
contacts did not lead to implementation of interreligious dialogue between Iran 
and Germany in a planned way or as a series of round tables. This point was 
discussed in the field study with some Iranian participants. A former director of 
CID replied that the budget for implementing interreligious dialogue was limited, 
and there were so many requests from religious institutes and churches of the 
world that CID was only able to confirm just a few of them (Helmi, personal 
communication, 2013). Responding to this point, another former head of CID 
presented some reasons which did not fit the context. For instance, he talked 
frequently about dialogue with Almanhā [Germans]; however, he mixed the 
context of interreligious dialogue with Germany partly with the “Vatican II 
approach” in 1962 (which was discussed in 3.2.1), partly with “critical dialogue” 
between 1992 and 1996 (which was discussed in 2.3), and partly with 
interreligious dialogue with Austria:  
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“Dialogues with Germans in Iran has started since 1369 [1990]. The reason was 
that Mr. Khatami (the former president who was at that time minister of Islamic 
Culture and Guidance), has heard about Vatican II and tendency of the Catholic 
Church to direct inter-religious dialogue with the other world’s nations […]. 
Dialogue with Germans has started before the religious dialogues….yes, yes, Dr. 
Ra`bani, Dr. Soroush, Dr. Mohaghegh Damad, they had started the dialogue with 
Germans…but it was not really religious dialogue… Dr. Shabestari had started 
the dialogue with Germans, for he was many years over there and had very good 
relations with them […]. Our dialogue with Germans was not really religious 
[…] for instance Dr. Steinbach was with his institute active to implement those 
dialogues. He was inviting and consequently Iranians would go. But his 
discussions were on human rights, for instance one question from Dr. 
Mohaghegh Damad was whether there is freedom in courts of Iran […].We have 
a lot of dialogues, at least I have myself 20 books on this issue, for instance 
Hermeneutic, with Austria […]. Yes, it is not Germany but the language is 
German” (Mirdamadi, personal communication, 2013).  
 
Another participant and former Imam of the Islamic Center of Hamburg believed 
that the difficult political situation during the presidency of Ahmadinejad (2005-
2013) was a reason for the lack of a planned interfaith dialogue with Germany 
(Nourbakhsh, personal communication, 2016). Views which were shared by 
another former head of CID explained some dimensions of this point in a different 
way, however. In the view of a former director of CID, the following are key 
reasons for the lack of planned interreligious dialogue with Germany: 1) absence 
of a clear policy at a top organizational level; 2) lack of “expertise” among the 
personnel of ICRO and CID; 3) appointment of relatives, friends and persons with 
close personal or external expertise relationship; 4) employment of personnel and 
directors with a poor knowledge of foreign languages, especially in the section of 
Rayzani (Akrami, personal communication, 2015). He went on to say that, since 
some current partners of the interfaith dialogue like the Vatican and the WCC, had 
been in place for a long time, the members of staff of CID simply followed the old 
guidelines. In his view, because a German participant “randomly” did not have the 
opportunity to make good contacts with influential Iranian figures in international 
interreligious meetings, Iran and Germany did not match each other for the 
planned interfaith dialogue: 
“You can raise the same question of not having interfaith dialogue with Germany 
regarding to France, why did not we have dialogue with France? [...] for instance 
we had a lot of programs with St. Gabriel institute of Austria. Very frequently 
programs, the reason was that, as far as I know, Professor Beste, who was the 
head of St. Gabriel, who had serious and deep interest in these relationship, had a 
close relationship with Mr. Khatami. You should suppose that the idea of the 
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dialogue started over there. That means you can see ‘personal presence’ as a main 
reason in between. That actually part of the reason, there are other reasons too. 
But in any case I would say whether plan or coincidence, they visited each other, 
get close to each other and then it turn to be a process of interfaith dialogue 
meetings, and the process continued… if you look it from this point, it can be 
said that randomly there was not such a chance to connect with Germany. If you 
say why there was not such a random, then it returns to my first point, there was 
no system and organization [to take interfaith dialogue serious]” (Akrami, 
personal communication, 2015).  
 
The discourse of interfaith dialogue articulated itself later as part of “dialogue 
among civilizations” in the context of Iranian foreign cultural policy. This 
happened for a variety of reasons which will be explained partly in the next 
subchapter and partly in 6.1.2. 
 
5.1.5 Dialogue among Civilizations in the Context of Iranian Foreign 
Cultural Policy 
The idea of “dialogue among civilizations” presented by Mohammad Khatami to 
the 53rd general assembly of the UN in 1998 had some global consequences. 
Indications of its international significance are 2001 being named the year of 
dialogue among civilizations (Nejad Hosseinian 1999), the member states of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference issuing the Tehran declaration of dialogue 
among civilizations in 1999 (Nejad Hosseinian 1999), and the UN general 
assembly adopting the resolution of “global agenda for dialogue among 
civilizations” in 2001 (UN 2001). The idea also had some effects on domestic and 
foreign cultural policy in Iran. Reflections on and criticism of Khatami’s idea 
were discussed in 3.2.2. This subchapter presents how this idea was reflected in 
acts and legislation, its influence on the Iranian state’s policies and society, and 
the view experts and diplomats took of it.  
To consider the idea of dialogue among civilizations practically, Khatami helped 
to establish an international center to deal specifically with the issue from the 
financial resources of the presidency. More information about this center and its 
activities will be discussed in 6.1.2.  
Khatami used the discourse of dialogue in combination with issues such as 
promoting peace-building in the world and elevating the relationship between the 
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West and Muslim countries in his international and domestic speeches. However, 
he never clearly defined exactly the role of this idea in the context of Iranian 
foreign policy. For instance, in a speech to UNESCO he explained that dialogue 
among civilizations did not approach a Rome or Italian type of peace, which is 
based on the balance of power, but a peace based on rošd-e aqli [intellectual or 
rational development] of humanity (Khatami 1388 [2009]: 35). But his speech 
does not clarify the type of peace. Moreover, in some speeches Khatami 
emphasized that dialogue among civilizations was not about the language of 
diplomacy and the political realm (Khatami 1388 [2009]: 37), and intellectuals, 
writers and artists, not politicians, were the main actors (pp. 49-50, 121 and 130). 
At the same time, in some speeches he also underscored the role of dialogue and 
diplomacy together as a tool of foreign policy (p. 107). Even on the eve of the first 
speech of Hassan Rouhani in the UN, Khatami published an article and warned 
the West “this time” not to miss the opportunity for diplomacy with Iran that had 
been missed in his time and through the idea of dialogue among civilizations 
(Khatami 2013).   
In Khatami’s view, the reason for expressing the idea of dialogue among 
civilizations was the emergence of Islamophobia and Huntington’s theory on one 
hand, and reviving civil society and the rule of law inside Iranian society on the 
other. To resolve problems on an international and domestic level, he suggested 
changing the dominant paradigm: 
“So I suggested that this paradigm, paradigm of war and conflict, should change 
and be replaced by paradigm of hamdeli [sympathy]. I started to discuss that the 
human has an advantage over animals which is the ability to talk and using 
words. This is not just about word but it is about brain and rationality. The human 
can be appeared through his/her word. So consequently we suggest dialogue 
between humans. And this dialogue is different from debate and negotiation 
which aims at convincing a side of communication. It is dialogue in a sense to 
open worlds of people towards each other through words” (Khatami, personal 
communication, 2014).  
 
The idea produced some national and international events attended by Iranian 
actors. An Iranian journal reported numbers and topics of domestic and 
international conferences and seminars held under the discourse of “dialogue 
among civilizations”. According to this journal, from 1997 to 2000, three 
domestic conferences were held with participation by Iranian delegates, in 2000 
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six domestic and six international conferences, in 2001 around 19 domestic and 
36 international conferences, in 2002 three domestic and five international 
conferences, in 2003 three domestic and two international conferences, and in 
2004 two domestic and three international conferences These numbers indicate 
that the idea attracted most attention in 2001, but attention had gradually 
diminished by 2004 (Andishe Jurnal 1383 [2004]).  
A main weak point of dialogue among civilizations in the context of foreign 
cultural policy was its legal terms. It was not a discourse of the religiously 
legitimated sector, so it did not have the absolute support of the Iranian 
government. Also, it did not position itself institutionally in the body of the state 
rules and statements. It was reflected only vaguely and not in practical terms in a 
few statements. In the ninth chapter of the fourth development plan, article 110 
specifically considers the issue of dialogue among civilizations. The Iranian state, 
according to this article, is obligated to promote culture of peace, understanding, 
counter-violence and coexistence among different nations in international 
relationships and realize the dialogue among civilizations and cultures in a 
practical sense. The main plans to achieve this are as follows:  
a. planning to participate and be an active part of regional and international 
trends, as well as in foundations and assemblies relating to the issue of 
dialogue among civilizations, 
b. preparing necessary conditions for exchange of ideas of authors, scientists 
and artists and scientific, cultural and civil foundations, 
c. attempting to introduce Iranian culture, art and literary dimensions to the 
rest of the world, and preparing an opportunity for (Iranian) intellectuals 
and scientific and cultural centers and Iranian society to get to know about 
new cultural achievements in the world, 
d. concluding cultural contracts at regional, continental and international 
level and preparing conditions to implement these contracts in the plans of 
executive bodies,  
e. improving executive structures and supporting establishment of NGOs to 
practically realize dialogue among cultures and civilizations. This aim 
should be reached by decreasing the involvement of the state and 
increasing the role of the non-governmental section in the dialogue among 
civilizations activities, 
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f. affirming the executive power of this article based on the suggestion of the 
organization of management and planning and under the authority of the 
council of ministers up to the end of the first year of the development plan 
(Plan and Budget Organization 1383 [2004]-a).49 
The objectives of article 110 were achieved to a small degree. Two of the reasons 
are as follows: Firstly, the article was released at the end of Khatami’s presidency, 
which meant that two of the main state actors appointed to consider the idea 
executively changed within a few months. The next president, President 
Ahmadinejad, and his administration had no interest in continuing the policies of 
Khatami. Secondly, article 110 did not determine an executive enforcement for 
specific state or NGO actors to implement the idea, so the executive conditions for 
implementing the discourse were still too abstract and general. 
Dialogue among civilizations in the context of Iranian foreign cultural policy in 
the short-term was a cultural tool in the hands of Khatami’s administration to 
decrease international tensions involving Iran, though in the long-term it was 
unable to sustain itself and evolve. It was articulated partly as a continuation of 
interfaith dialogue, which means that the whole discussion of dialogue among 
civilizations began to give way to dialogue among religions, as the merger of the 
specific institute for dialogue among civilizations with ICRO will show in 6.1.2. 
Moreover, because Khatami continued to talk about Iran as a representative of 
Islamic civilization (Khatami 1388 [2009]: 47 and 104), it is rational to fit the 
discourse of dialogue among civilizations to dialogue among religions. That may 
be one reason why the discourse of “dialogue” was not entirely eliminated in the 
long term. 
Some participants of the study also argued that the Iranian nation historically had 
an interest in dialogue in philosophy (Mosleh, personal communication, 2013) and 
theology (Masjedjamei, personal communication, 2013; Mohaghegh Damad, 
personal communication, 2013). Therefore, regardless of the type of political 
system, the foreign cultural policy of Iran has a tendency to orient itself on 
dialogical communication. That is why dialogue among civilizations has grown 
up gradually over the years together with the discourse of interfaith dialogue. 
                                                          
49 The original text is in Farsi. What is reflected here has been translated into English by the researcher. 
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Even some participants of the study who belonged to the group of opponents of 
the idea of dialogue among civilizations articulated some radical practices of 
Ahmadinejad as dialogue: 
“In time of Ahmadinejad the dialogue was pursued even more frankly. […] in 
time of Ahmadinejad the first issue of dialogue was the Holocaust. The issue of 
Holocaust was a huge hit to them [West]. Though Ahmadinejad did not deny it, 
he just put it under the question [...] also the speech of Ahmadinejad at the 
Colombia University was a part of this dialogue. Thereat some Jews interrupted 
him with their noises but he did continue his speech. Also his letters to 
Americans are the next layers of dialogue in time of Ahmadinejad….see, 
dialogue in time of Ahmadinejad was much more than dialogue in time of 
Khatami. You look at his plan of travels to the USA. He met a lot of groups and 
media. He had dialogues with Iranians abroad. You compare these dialogues with 
time of Khatami. It is just incomparable. Khatami did not have that much 
dialogue” (Anbarluee, personal communication, 2013). 
 
Therefore it can be argued that dialogue among civilizations was opposed by 
Iran’s hardliners because of a problem they had with Khatami rather a problem 
with dialogue, particularly when Khatami appointed a specific institute to deal 
with it and tried to decrease the power of the state to control it. The opposition 
towards Khatami’s dialogue among civilizations from hardliners such as Mesbah 
nevertheless became sharper and clearer after the presidency of Khatami was 
over. 
Some participants from ICRO also argue that the discourse of dialogue among 
civilizations was not supported after Khatami, because of the emergence of 
bureaucratic problems (Abbasi, personal communication, 2014; Dehshiri, personal 
communication, 2013; Maleki, personal communication, 2015). This issue will be 
discussed in detail in 6.1.2. 
There are two points relating to the approach of the Iranian foreign affairs 
ministry and ICRO towards Germany. Firstly, Iranian diplomats are observed to 
have little access to and be poorly informed about Germany. The knowledge of 
diplomats who were interviewed or contacted by the researcher regarding the 
political structure and cultural activities between Iran and Germany, with the 
exception of Seyed Hossein Mousavian,50 was poor. Their answers to the 
                                                          
50 Mousavian served as Iranian ambassador in Germany between 1990 and 1997. He also worked as a 
member of the nuclear negotiation team between 2005 and 2007. In 2005 and 2010 he was accused of 
engaging in espionage in the Iranian nuclear team, but both times the accusation was rejected by the courts. 
At the time this research was conducted, Mousavian had no diplomatic position and worked as a visiting 
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questions of the study were not focused. They replied in some cases with a lack of 
evidence. Nearly all diplomats who were contacted in this study had never served 
continuously in diplomatic positions of Germany or other European countries.  
Secondly, it was not possible to contact a member of staff or directors of ICRO 
who are fully informed about Germany, its political structure or its strategy for 
foreign cultural policy towards it. Attempts to meet with relevant experts of the 
department of European studies of ICRO were also unsuccessful.51 
Although the relevant organizations in charge of Iranian foreign cultural policy 
had no in-depth knowledge of Germany, most of the Iranian diplomats and 
experts still share a positive view of the relationship between Iran and Germany 
(Kharazi, personal communication, 2014; Dehshiri, personal communication, 
2013; Sajadpour, personal communication, 2013; Maleki, personal 
communication, 2014; Zahrani, personal communication, 2014). There was one 
exception, a diplomat who believes that the reason for the weak cultural 
relationship between Iran and Germany is that the latter is “still occupied” 
(Karami, personal communication, 2014). Being occupied, in his words, refers to 
the occupation of Germany by America, France and England between 1945 and 
1949. He used this terminology to argue that Germany shaped its policy towards 
Iran under the influence of Western countries, which also explained why Germany 
did not have a steady cultural relationship with Iran.  
 
 
5.2 German Foreign Cultural Policy, Acts, Organizations and 
Intercultural Dialogue Discourses  
Before discussing details of intercultural dialogue activities implemented by 
Germany for Iranian and German participants from 1998 to 2013, it is necessary 
to understand how Germany has structured its foreign cultural policy, which acts 
have regulated such policy, and which organizations have been involved.  
                                                                                                                                                               
researcher at Princeton University. However, he participated in this study and attempted to connect the 
researcher with some Iranian diplomats.   
51 The head of section for Germany in the European studies department of ICRO had no pertinent information 
about Germany and the cultural relationship between Iran and Germany. However, he did use the opportunity 
of the contact to ask the researcher how he could study in Germany without physically being present there or 
learning German.  
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After World War II, German political elites and parties tried to create an image 
for Germany internationally that was different from the image created by the 
previous German political system. To do this, over the years they created 
regulations which obligate the German state to financially support cultural actors 
to create such an image but decrease its control over them, and introduced general 
cultural plans, cultural actors to implement those plans, and target countries to be 
partners to them.  
This subchapter presents an overview of the political system of Germany, the 
structure of German foreign cultural policy, organizations which play a guiding 
role in decisions on foreign cultural policy, and the discourse of “European-
Islamic cultural dialogue”.  
 
5.2.1 An Overview of the Political System of Germany 
Germany is a federal republic. Its political system is divided into three branches, 
the legislature, executive and judiciary. Two roles are defined at the top of the 
political system. One is the chancellor, who is head of the government with 
policy-making power. The chancellor is directly appointed by the German Federal 
Parliament and then proposed by the president. The second role belongs to the 
president, who is the head of state and represents the nation internationally. His or 
her position is not associated with policy making, unless in emergency situations. 
The president is appointed by a council composed to one half of members of the 
federal diet and to the other half of members of the Länder [states]52 diet. 
Therefore it can be argued that the system as a whole is democratically 
legitimated. Policy making on the cultural activities of Germany at domestic level 
is chiefly under the authority of the Länder and county level of the government, 
while policy making related to cultural activities at foreign level is under the 
authority of the federal government. This point will be discussed in detail. Figure 
7 illustrates this structure. 
Figure 6. Political structure of Germany in the context of its cultural and foreign cultural 
policy  
                                                          
52 Länder refers to the 16 states of Germany. In this study, “state” is frequently used to refer to the 
government and administration of Iran and Germany. Therefore Länder is used in the text to avoid confusing 
the reader.  




Source: made by the researcher 
The political system of Germany, which is democratically legitimated at both 
chancellor and president level, creates an integrated foreign cultural policy. It is 
integrated because institutions at Länder and federal level have an agreement to 
cooperate in foreign cultural activities, although the Auswärtiges Amt [foreign 
office] is foremost in decision making. To understand the role of different sections 
of the German political system in foreign cultural policy, it is important to look at 
how it is set out in the constitution.  
 
5.2.2 German Foreign Cultural Policy: A Distinct Element of German 
Foreign Policy  
The characteristics of German foreign cultural policy relating to the country’s 
constitution, relevant acts and regulations are discussed here. According to the 
constitution, the issue of culture in Germany is defined at three administrative 
levels: federal government, Länder, and county. Article 30 of the Grundgesetz 
[Basic Law] differentiates the division of tasks between the Länder and the 
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government as follows: “The exercise of governmental powers and the discharge 
of governmental fulfillment is the task of the Länder, except where otherwise 
provided for in this Basic Law”,53 though as Wilfred Van der Will and Rob Burns 
argue, the Länder in practice consider all matters of cultural policy under their 
own sovereignty rather than that of the federal government (Van der Will/Burns 
2014: 201). The establishment of the Staatsministerium für Kultur und Medien 
[Federal Ministry of Culture and Media] in 1998, for instance, faced some 
obstacles and led to the resignation of Michael Naumann, the first commissioner 
for this post, two years later. Naumann was appointed by Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder and intended to play a more active role in regard to cultural policy at 
federal governmental level but met with opposition from the Länder, all political 
parties, and some media. Such a reaction, in the view of Van der Will and Burns, 
is rooted in a legal issue and the post-German unification era. Firstly, individual 
Länder constitutions make it clear that sovereignty in the context of cultural 
policy comes from the region’s citizens rather than from above. Secondly, the 
attempt to balance federal and regional powers over cultural policy was already 
interrupted by the unification of West and East Germany in 1990, because five 
new Länder were added to Germany, which required special consideration of the 
cultural affairs issue, among others. Accordingly, the federal government and old 
Länder temporarily had a duty to support the financially weaker new Länder. This 
temporary nature was maintained until 2000, when a new act ordered that the 
same agreement would run until 2019. From this historic context Van der Will 
and Burns conclude that the expanded role of the federal government in cultural 
policy is more “enduring” than anticipated by the Länder (Van der Will/Burns 
2014: 201-202). However, the case of the establishment of the Ministry of Culture 
and Media seemed to cross a line with the Länder to such an extent that they 
could not tolerate it and took a stand against it. The ministry still exists today, but 
according to the researcher’s observation, it does not play a significant role in 
German cultural policy.   
Although Van der Will and Burns believe that the constitution is unambiguous 
about the division of tasks between Länder and federal government, it seems that 
the German constitution is still not strict and direct enough to differentiate borders 
                                                          
53 The original text: „Die Ausübung der staatlichen Befugnisse und die Erfüllung der staatlichen Aufgaben ist 
Sache der Länder, soweit dieses Grundgesetz keine andere Regelung trifft oder zuläßt“. 
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of cultural policy and foreign cultural policy. But looking at some statements and 
acts of the federal government shows that the issue of foreign cultural policy is 
more distinct in the context of foreign policy. Constructive cooperation between 
the foreign ministry and the ministers of culture of the Länder, in the framework 
of Kultusministerkonferenz [the Standing Conference of the Ministers of 
Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany] 
activities, is a considerable step towards specifying the scope of their tasks and 
responsibilities. For instance, in the Lindauer Absprache [Lindau Agreement], 
which was concluded on 14 November 1957 between the federal government and 
the state chancelleries of the Länder, their participation in international treaties 
and their different legal positions are discussed (Sekretariat der 
Kultusministerkonferenz 1998).  
Guidelines and statements which specifically consider the issue of foreign cultural 
policy are also important. In 1970, in the time of Willy Brandt, the first guideline 
was formulated by Ralf Dahrendorf, a parliamentary secretary of the foreign 
ministry; it is called Leitsätze für die auswärtige Kulturpolitik [guidelines for 
German foreign cultural policy], in short the 1970 Guideline (Auswärtiges Amt 
1970). The 1970 Guideline must be seen as a first step towards a systematic 
foreign cultural policy of Germany. In 14 pages it contains recommendations to 
simplify coordination between the German federal government and the Länder on 
cultural affairs abroad. Five years later, in 1975, an inquiry commission consisting 
of different members of the German parties, some academics and university 
professors, who were appointed by the German government, prepared a 140-page 
report on foreign cultural policy, which in Maaß’s view has counted as a “bible of 
foreign cultural policy” for many years (Maaß 2005b: 24). The report, which in 
short is called the 1975 Report, shared the same aims and principles as the 1970 
Guideline, including counting foreign cultural policy as a supporting pillar for 
foreign policy, expecting it to aim at a different and wide audience abroad, 
considering multi-relationships with the world, including East Germany, and 
offering exchange and cooperation with partner countries. But the 1975 Report 
was especially significant for its plans and solutions for cooperating with different 
Länder and organizations, developing cooperation in cultural, academic and 
technical fields, giving details to plan German language facilities abroad, and to 
work with Mittlerorganisationen, schools abroad, universities, and media, all in 
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the context of foreign cultural policy. The 1975 Report issued recommendations 
to take care of international students and interns who come to Germany and then 
return to their own countries, as well as containing a chapter on supporting the 
plans financially. In addition, it expected the German cultural actors to be open 
towards cultural activities abroad and legitimize Germany as a Kulturstaat 
[cultural state] (Bundestag 1975: 9). In 1977, the German federal government 
released a detailed 26-page statement as a response to the 1975 Report. It was 
called Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung zu dem Bericht der Enquete-
Kommission [statement of the federal government on the report of the inquiry 
commission], in short the 1977 Statement (Bundesregierung 1977). The 1977 
Statement also had a lot in common with previously mentioned documents, 
although it had a specific emphasis on foreign cultural policy. It considered 
foreign cultural policy as an equal part of foreign policy alongside diplomacy and 
economic policies. It assigns an important role to foreign cultural policy in 
creating European integration and détente, as well as in building Germany's 
reputation abroad. The plans of the 1977 Statement were similar to the 1975 
Report, although they were more precise and simplified.  
In the following years, other measurements were adopted by the German state to 
regulate foreign cultural policy. For instance, since 15 June 1994 the German 
federal parliament has asked the federal government to submit an annual report on 
foreign cultural policy (Auswärtiges Amt 2013a: 5). This report is prepared by the 
foreign affairs ministry and delivered annually to the parliament.  
In 2000, when Joschka Fischer was foreign minister, a new statement on foreign 
cultural policy titled 2000 Konzeption [2000 Concept] (Auswärtiges Amt 2000b), 
was released. It emphasized some aims and principles of the previous statements 
but formulated the aims and interests of foreign cultural policy in a clearer way. 
These aims will be explained later. The 2000 Concept has some differences in 
comparison with other foreign cultural policy statements. For instance, it 
contained a specific part to explain strategies for German foreign cultural policy. 
Issues such as budget and structure, cultural programs, foreign media policy, 
European cultural policy, promotion of German language, science and 
universities, foreign schools, education and youth exchange, sport, and finally 
cultural agreements are considered specifically as realms of action for achieving 
the objectives of German foreign cultural policy. It is significant that the 2000 
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Concept contains guidelines to fulfill the tasks. Mittlerorganisationen such as the 
Goethe Institute (which is mentioned several times), the DAAD, ifa and 
Alexander von Humboldt on one hand and of parastatal organizations such as 
PAD and the ZfA on the other are mentioned in the concept, to deal with specific 
tasks in the context of foreign cultural policy. The term “dialogue”, is mentioned 
thirteen times in the 2000 Concept. 
Just a year after issuing 2000 Concept, the 11 September terrorist attacks in the 
US put more emphasis on the terminology of dialogue in foreign cultural policy 
statements and guidelines. The attack opened a new episode in the US and 
European international relationship, as a coalition of the war on terrorism was 
formed and led to military attacks on Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. 
Germany joined the Northern Alliance, constituted to attack Afghanistan, in 
response to the terrorist attack of 9/11, although it refused to join the coalition to 
attack Iraq in 2003. From the time of the early reactions to 9/11, the German 
foreign ministry and German parliament started to initiate some cultural activities 
with Muslim countries as a form of non-military conflict resolution. Referring to 
strategies of 2000 Concept, the foreign ministry from 2002 initiated a special 
program of European-Islamic Cultural Dialogue and established a new office 
inside its department of culture and media with the same title. Meanwhile, the 
German parliament took the issue of preventing terrorism so seriously that it 
established a new 5.1-million-Euro budget to support intercultural dialogue 
programs with Muslim countries (Auswärtiges Amt 2003: 4-5). More details of 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue will be presented in 5.1.2. 
Extending cultural dialogue with Muslim countries was mentioned again in an 
action plan to deal with world conflicts called Zivile Krisenprävention, 
Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung [Civilian crisis prevention, conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding], in short Crisis action plan, in 2004. The plan 
suggested some strategic approaches to prevent crisis in the Middle Eastern and 
third world countries. In the realm of culture and education, cultural dialogue is 
mentioned as a relevant but challenging tool to alleviate crises which have a 
cultural dimension and to promote transformation to democracy (Bundesregierung 
2004: 48).  
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The issue of dialogue with Muslims was raised in Germany again in 2006. This 
time it had a domestic emphasis. The interior ministry decided to establish a 
conference to initiate dialogue between Muslim migrants and the German state, 
Deutsche Islam Konferenz [German Islam Conference]. Academic debates on this 
issue are reviewed in 3.2.4. Dialogue with Muslims in this context has also had a 
foreign cultural policy emphasis, because the international benefit of the 
integration of Muslim immigrants in German society in this period was a crucial 
issue for Germany. One year before the inauguration of the German Islam 
Conference, some European countries experienced a harsh reaction from some 
Muslims to a caricature of Prophet Mohammad.54 The German state, in addition to 
its foreign cultural policy towards Muslim countries, therefore also systematically 
paid specific attention to Islam as a domestic issue. More detail regarding the 
German Islam Conference will be presented in 6.2.5. 
In 2011, another concept of foreign cultural policy was released under Auswärtige 
Kultur- und Bildungspolitik in Zeiten der Globalisierung - Partner gewinnen, 
Werte vermitteln, Interessen vertreten [Cultural relations and education policy in 
the age of globalization – winning partners, mediating values, representing 
interests], in short Concept 2011. In Concept 2011, the term Bildung [education] 
is added to foreign cultural policy: foreign cultural and educational policy. Four 
aims are formulated for the policy: strengthening Europe, securing peace, 
maintaining old friendships, and finding new partnerships. In addition it was 
mentioned that the foreign cultural and educational policy could be used as 
cultural diplomacy more than ever through instruments including education, 
exchange, dialogue, and the partnership approach (Auswärtiges Amt 2011b).  
According to annual reports on German foreign cultural policy and statements and 
concepts such as the 2000 Concept, the aims of foreign cultural policy can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. Updating the concept of foreign cultural policy: The concept of foreign 
cultural policy must be formed in a fertile dialogue with the federal 
government (Auswärtiges Amt 1999: 4). Foreign cultural policy should be 
                                                          
54 In 2005, some of the world Muslim population reacted to a caricature published in the Danish press and 
then re-printed by other European countries like Germany. The reaction to the caricature led to some 
demonstrations in Muslim countries and a major boycott on products from Denmark and some European 
countries, including Germany. 
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a concept which fits the meaning of the work of all German actors 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2000a: 3).  
2. Considering federal, regional and local priorities: The culture of Germany 
must be mediated as part of European culture. To do that, the assistance of 
federal government, Länder and cities as well as private organizations 
must be taken into account (Auswärtiges Amt 2000a: 3, Auswärtiges Amt 
2000b: 1-2).  
3. Specifying tasks of federal and local levels: Federal and Länder 
organizations work together to reach the aims of foreign cultural policy, 
but their tasks and responsibility are distinguished based on the Lindauer 
Absprache (Auswärtiges Amt 2000b: 1-2). 
4. Using the potential and networks of Mittlerorganisationen: the assistance 
and networks of institutions such as the Goethe Institute (Auswärtiges Amt 
2000a: 3), as well as various actors including private and 
Mittlerorganisationen with different aims and priorities (Auswärtiges Amt 
2000b: 1-2) is necessary. 
5. Promoting cooperation between state and non-state sections: Cultural 
activities must be implemented by promoting coordination between the 
German state, especially the foreign ministry, and other institutes abroad 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2000a: 3). Cooperation in cultural work is also needed 
on both levels, at home and abroad (Auswärtiges Amt 2000b: 1-2). 
6. Considering the political aims of foreign policy: The 2000 Concept 
emphasizes that foreign cultural policy is an integral part of foreign policy 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2000b: 1-2). This aim has been emphasized since 2001 
with a focus on achieving political aims, such as peacekeeping, conflict 
prevention, and recognition of human rights, as well as making a 
contribution to new security challenges in the post-9/11 era (Auswärtiges 
Amt 2002: 4). Emphasis was also placed between 2008 and 2013 on 
supporting general aims of German foreign policy though cultural 
activities (Auswärtiges Amt 2009: 6, Auswärtiges Amt 2010: 9, 
Auswärtiges Amt 2011a: 12, Auswärtiges Amt 2012a: 10, Auswärtiges 
Amt 2013a: 7, Auswärtiges Amt 2014: 15).  
7. Promoting cultural dialogue: In the 2000 Concept there is a specific focus 
on cultural dialogue as part of cultural exchanges between people and 
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cultures (Auswärtiges Amt 2000b: 1-2). Reference to dialogue especially 
with so-called Islamic countries intensified in the 9/11 era (Auswärtiges 
Amt 2002: 4). Annual reports published between 2002 and 2008 mention, 
alongside the value of dialogue, that aims such as preventing worldwide 
conflict must be reached (Auswärtiges Amt 2003: 5-9, Auswärtiges Amt 
2004: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 2005: 5-8, Auswärtiges Amt 2006: 5, 
Auswärtiges Amt 2007: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 2008: 2).   
8. Promoting the perception of German culture: The image of Germany must 
be mediated internationally by implementing cultural and art activities 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2003: 5-9, Auswärtiges Amt 2004: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 
2005: 5-8, Auswärtiges Amt 2006: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 2007: 5, 
Auswärtiges Amt 2008: 2) and creating Sympathiewerbung [sympathy 
advertisement] for the image of Germany (Auswärtiges Amt 2009: 6, 
Auswärtiges Amt 2010: 9, Auswärtiges Amt 2011a: 12, Auswärtiges Amt 
2012a: 10, Auswärtiges Amt 2013a: 7, Auswärtiges Amt 2014: 15). 
9. Considering media and communication: Communication is considered a 
main tool to create a contemporary image for Germany (Auswärtiges Amt 
2003: 5-9, Auswärtiges Amt 2004: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 2005: 5-8, 
Auswärtiges Amt 2006: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 2007: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 
2008: 2) (Auswärtiges Amt 2009: 6, Auswärtiges Amt 2010: 9, 
Auswärtiges Amt 2011a: 12, Auswärtiges Amt 2012a: 10, Auswärtiges 
Amt 2013a: 7, Auswärtiges Amt 2014: 15). 
10. Paying attention to educational policy interests (Auswärtiges Amt 2003: 5-
9, Auswärtiges Amt 2004: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 2005: 5-8, Auswärtiges 
Amt 2006: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 2007: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 2008: 2). 
11. Promoting the European integration process (Auswärtiges Amt 2003: 5-9, 
Auswärtiges Amt 2004: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 2005: 5-8, Auswärtiges Amt 
2006: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 2007: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 2008: 2).  
12. Promoting the German language (Auswärtiges Amt 2009: 6, Auswärtiges 
Amt 2010: 9, Auswärtiges Amt 2011a: 12, Auswärtiges Amt 2012a: 10, 
Auswärtiges Amt 2013a: 7, Auswärtiges Amt 2014: 15) . 
13. Highlighting German values: According to the 2000 Concept, foreign 
cultural policy is not neutral but based on values such as democratization 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2000b: 1-2).  
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14. Highlighting the role of the foreign ministry in guiding policy actors: The 
2000 Concept states that specifically political guidelines and foreign 
cultural policy are formulated and coordinated by the foreign ministry 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2000b: 1-2) 
15. Underlining diverse dimensions of activities: Foreign cultural policy is not 
solely about cultural policies but also cooperation in economic, scientific, 
research, theology, education, and vocational training, among other things 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2000b: 1-2). 
 
Different annual reports have also mentioned specific strategies to reach the set 
objectives. They include establishing dialogue, informing target groups of people 
abroad through cultural and educational projects, forming networks among people 
and institutes, initiating and supporting open partnerships with cultural actors of 
other countries and encouraging relationships with private partners (Auswärtiges 
Amt 2003: 6-8, Auswärtiges Amt 2004: 6-8, Auswärtiges Amt 2005: 5, 
Auswärtiges Amt 2006: 5-6, Auswärtiges Amt 2007: 8-9, Auswärtiges Amt 2008: 
2-4, Auswärtiges Amt 2009: 8-9, Auswärtiges Amt 2010: 9-10, Auswärtiges Amt 
2011a: 12, Auswärtiges Amt 2012a: 10-11, Auswärtiges Amt 2013a: 8).  
The acts and statements regarding German foreign cultural policy have not 
considered Iran specifically as a partner or target country, although Iran is 
represented in them as part of general groups such as developing countries and 
Muslim countries.  
From the above details it can be concluded that firstly, German foreign cultural 
policy is built as a distinct element of the country’s foreign policy; secondly, its 
tasks and scope of activities are clarified separately from German domestic 
cultural policy; thirdly, it is mostly under the authority of the German foreign 
ministry; fourthly, not just dialogue and educational activity have attracted 
significant attention in foreign cultural policy recently. 
 
5.2.3 German Guiding Political Organizations in the Realm of Foreign 
Cultural Policy 
As was mentioned above, the German foreign ministry is key to decision making 
on foreign cultural policy. Figure 8 shows other organizations and their portion of 
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financial assistance in foreign cultural policy (Auswärtiges Amt 2009: 11). The 
figure is from a 2008 annual report, but the same organization played a role from 
1998 to 2013.  
Figure 7. Foreign cultural and education policy budget by sources in percent- source: 










Source: Auswärtiges Amt (2009: 11) 
As figure 8 shows, the budget for foreign cultural activities is supplied from the 
following sources: 
1. Foreign affairs ministry, referred to as AA, assigns most of the budget of 
the foreign cultural policy to itself; 
2. Federal Government for Culture and Media, BKM/ Beauftragten der 
Bundesregierung für Kultur und Medien, which is the second important 
organization; 
3. Federal Ministry of Education and Research, BMBF/Bundesministerium 
für Bildung und Forschung;  
4. Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, 
BMFSFJ/Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend; 
5. Federal Ministry of the Interior, BMI/Bundesministerium des Innern; 
6. Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
BMZ/Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und 
Entwicklung. 
The annual reports on the foreign cultural policy presented tables and charts to 
illustrate the budget that was spent each year by the individual political guiding 
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organizations. They simultaneously included information on the budget spent by 
organizations, institutes and actors that implement foreign cultural policy, and 
some details of cultural projects, their aims and results. The aim here is not to 
analyze the financial details of German foreign cultural policy but to show the 
transparency of information in the annual reports. Some parts of the annual report 
of 2013/2014 that reflect this transparency are given below:  
 
“The expenditures for the federal government's foreign cultural and educational 
policy amounted to a total of € 1.571 billion in 2013 and a total of € 1.591 billion 
in 2014. € 738.8 million of the budget of 2013 and € 761.9 million of the budget 
of 2014 was devoted to the federal foreign office” (Auswärtiges Amt 2014: 26).55 
 
“As you see in the next diagram, the foreign affairs ministry devoted its €738.8 
Million budget for these activities: €257.9 million for program work, € 213.7 
million for school funds, € 31.7 million for building fund in cultural section, € 
235.5 million for directing institutes” (Auswärtiges Amt 2014: 30).56 
 
“Overall the budget of foreign cultural policy in 2013 which is devoted to 
Mittlerorganizationen are as follows:  28,5 % for Goethe Institute, 28,9 % for 
school educational activities abroad, 23,2  for DAAD, 14,4 % for other costs, and 
5 % for foundation of Alexander von Humboldt (AvH)” (Auswärtiges Amt 2014: 
32).57 
 
As these show, details of financial sources in the annual report on German foreign 
cultural policy do not just clarify the total yearly budget but also give information 
on which German cultural actors receive how much of the budget. This type of 
transparency of information has not been found in studying the collected data 
from the Iranian field study.  
The German foreign ministry has 10 Abteilungen [departments]. As figure 9 
shows, the central department is responsible for personnel matters. There are two 
types of political departments which deal with different regions, continents and 
countries. A specific department considers the issue of disbarment. The E 
department focuses on European affairs, and UN considers UN affairs and global 
questions. Department 4 sets some policies regarding economic and sustainable 
development, while department 5 concentrates on rights and judicial affairs in the 
international realm. Department 6 considers culture and communication in foreign 
                                                          
55 The original text is in German. It is translated into English by the researcher. 
56 The original text is in German. It is translated into English by the researcher. 
57 The original text is in German. It is translated into English by the researcher. 
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affairs. Finally, department 7 is called the protocol department, which deals with 
issues such as travel and visiting programs.  
Figure 8. Departments of the German foreign ministry 
 
Source: made by the researcher from information of (Auswärtiges Amt 2012b, 
Auswärtiges Amt 2015) 
Foreign culutral policy is specifically set in department 6, “Culture and 
Communication”. Besides the head of the department, key experts, heads of 
different departments, ministers of state in the foreign ministry, personal advisors 
of the foreign minister and the foreign minister are involved in making decisions 
on foreign cultural policy (Kreft, personal communication, 2014).  
Department 6 has a head and three commissioners. One commissioner deals with 
the issue of culture and German as a foreign language. The second commissioner 
is in charge of foreign science policy. The third commissioner is in charge of 
communication of Germany and dialogue between cultures. The titles and number 
of commissioners changed slightly between 1998 and 2013 (and even afterwards). 
For instance, in 2015 there was a single commissioner in charge of two issues, 
“foreign science policy and communication of Germany” and “dialogue between 
cultures”.  
Each commissioner has a chance to work closely with different Referate 
[divisions], from 600 to 610, of department 6. The titles of the divisions and their 
cooperation with specific commissioners have changed slightly over time. Each 
division deals with specific issues: 
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 Division 600 is in charge of strategy and planning of foreign culture and 
education policy and program of Deutschlandbild im Ausland/DA 
[Germany’s image abroad].  
 Division 601 deals with cultural media activities in Europe, USA etc.  
 Division 602 deals with cultural and media activities in Asia, Africa etc.  
 Division 603 concentrates on cultural and media activities, as well as art, 
literature, film and UNESCO activities.  
 Division 604 considers projects of scientific institutes and universities, for 
instance work with the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut [German 
archeological institute].  
 Division 605 focuses on foreign schools and sport.  
 Division 606 deals with institutes such as Mittlerorganizationen, the 
Goethe Institute and ifa.  
 Division 607 is in charge of domestic public relations and citizen dialogue.  
 Division 608 is in charge of internet, website and audio communication 
abroad and media such as DW.  
 Division 609 deals with communication and media affairs with Middle 
Eastern countries and specifically dialogue with the Islamic World.  
 Division 610 deals with school partnership projects such as PASCH 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2012b, Auswärtiges Amt 2015). 58 
The discourse of European-Islamic cultural dialogue is the responsibility of 
department 6 and specifically the third commissioner, who is in charge of 
communication of Germany and dialogue between cultures. Division 609 is one of 
the divisions dealing with this discourse. More details follow in the next 
subchapter. 
 
5.2.4 European-Islamic Cultural Dialogue in the Context of German Foreign 
Cultural Policy 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue emerged after 9/11. Although it is articulated 
for the first time in the 2002 annual report, its foundation was laid in the 2000 
                                                          
58 Tasks and title of the divisions usually change yearly, though generally these ten divisions work on the 
same issues.  
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Concept, as mentioned in 5.1.1. According to information from the field study, the 
German government wanted to react after 9/11 for three reasons: 
“Because of 9/11, yes, it was. We wanted to aim at Muslim world, not 
religiously, but socially [...] There were quite half of them, or most of them 
(terrorist) were Saudis, first of all. Secondly they were all Sunnis. And then 
thirdly there was a group of them, studying in Hamburg harbor” (Mulack, 
personal communication, 2015).  
 
As stated in the annual report of 2002, the foreign ministry implemented the 
special program of European-Islamic cultural dialogue in cooperation with the 
Mittlerorganisationen and the federal government press and information office. 
The report specifically mentioned the budget for the dialogue in 2002, which was 
€ 5.1 million. According to information from the field study, the initial budget 
was supplied from “a new tax on cigarettes” (Maaß, personal communication, 
2015). It is also known as the “anti-Terror package” (Erbel, personal 
communication, 2015). Approximately the same amount of budget was allocated 
to European-Islamic cultural dialogue in the following years (Auswärtiges Amt 
2002: 34-35, Auswärtiges Amt 2003: 4-5). It existed as a special program up to 
the end of 2013, but German foreign cultural policy found new objectives after 
2011. Because of changes in some Arab countries during the so-called Arab 
Spring, programs such as “Transformation” have attracted more attention in 
German foreign cultural policy recently.  
The purpose of European-Islamic cultural dialogue mentioned in the 2002 annual 
report is: 
1. to improve mutual understanding between the Western and the Islamic 
world through specific projects, 
2. to contribute to our (German) values, 
3. to use scholarship programs, foreign schools and further education 
measures for Muslim teachers of the Islamic world countries,  
4. to intensify media cooperation (Auswärtiges Amt 2003: 5). 
 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue in its initial stages was planned to enable the 
cultural actors, through the financial resources, to take action. It expected them to 
carry out freshly developed dialogue projects, which complemented the regular 
programs, in cooperation with partners in Islamic societies. According to the 2002 
annual report, approximately two dozen Referenten/Referentinnen [male and 
Chapter 5: Intercultural Dialogue and Foreign Cultural Policy of Iran and Germany 
213  
female advisors] started to assist the foreign ministry through their analysis and 
promotion of dialogue with Islamic societies. According to information from the 
field study, these advisors were not initially expected to play a major advisory role 
on this issue. The idea of the foreign ministry was to employ some experts and 
officers who are familiar with the context of Muslim countries or Islam studies. 
Such advisors, who could develop their career in the cultural sections of the 
German embassies in Muslim countries and relevant offices of the foreign 
ministry, would have a chance to become the permanent employees of the 
German foreign ministry (Erbel, personal communication, 2015). 
The “Commissioner for the Dialogue of Cultures” was established in 2002 in the 
department of communication and culture to specifically deal with European-
Islamic cultural dialogue. Consequently, a working platform was set up for 
“dialogue with the Islamic world” (division 609). This division networked with 
other divisions (for instance with divisions 604 and 608), cultural institutes and 
private groups, as an initiator and catalyst to initiate cultural projects with Muslim 
countries. All the commissioners for dialogue of cultures up to the end of 2013 
were diplomats. The first commissioner was Dr. Gunter Mulack, appointed by 
Joschka Fischer in 2002. Mulack had experience of working as an ambassador or 
permanent representative in Muslim countries such as Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain 
and Syria before taking this position. He also worked for three years in the 
German Embassy of Iran and can speak and understand Farsi. He held this 
position up to 2005. In Mulack’s view, European-Islamic cultural dialogue was a 
tool to broaden the access of German society to Muslim society and decrease 
stereotypes about Muslims, as well as to create a more realistic understanding of 
Muslims, and vice versa (Mulack, personal communication, 2015).  
The second commissioner was Hans-Günter Gnodtke, who also had experience of 
diplomatic missions in Muslim countries such as Egypt and Sudan. He can speak 
and understand Arabic. He held his position up to 2007. In his view, European-
Islamic cultural dialogue was a tool of public diplomacy towards the Muslim 
world, and values such as democratization were therefore a measure for him to 
decide which Muslim countries could partner this project. Some Islamic parties 
and fundamental organizations were, in his view, outside of the partnership: 
“I think what I made clear […] I was working for a government agency and being 
an official agent, there is some limitation what I can do. This is different from 
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what a journalist can do, or an academic institute; and I had to make sure that we 
will not legitimize people who would be outsider, who would be propagating for 
Israel, who would be ventilating the old standard and the semitic prejudices of the 
European history. So that was limitation. Since many of the Islamic parties were 
criticizing structure of Israel, they were out of my scope of potential of dialogue 
partners” (Gnodtke, personal communication, 2016).  
 
The third commissioner was Dr. Heinrich Kreft, who held advisory and 
organizational positions inside the foreign ministry and had some diplomatic 
experience in Western countries such as the US. He was commissioner up to the 
middle of 2014.59 Kreft believed that all cultures and civilizations should be 
considered in intercultural dialogue, not just specifically Muslim countries. 
Therefore, in his view, the name of the commission at that time, dialogue with 
Islam, did not fit the aims of the foreign ministry. As a result, it was changed after 
the innovation of Alliance of Civilizations in the UN in 2005:  
“At the beginning, the name of the program for dialogue was “dialogue with 
Islam”, which I personally did not like. Because it seems that it takes analysis of 
Huntington. So the title changed to dialogue among civilizations, intercultural 
dialogue or interkultureller Dialog after the Spanish prime-minister, Zapatero, 
with the prime minister of Turkey Tayyip Erdoğan, call for “alliance of 
civilizations” in 2005. The term obviously was coming from the speech of 
former-president Khatami in the UN. So, when the alliance of civilizations was 
founded, we change the name of this office from the dialogue with Islam to 
dialogue with civilizations. In the year 2005… Erdoğan for two years was general 
secretary of the OIC, Organization of Islamic Conference, so he made sure that 
the Muslim countries joined the Alliance of Civilizations Institute. Also this 
organization is bringing other countries, for example China, US and Latin 
American countries” (Kreft, personal communication, 2014).  
 
The title of the commission thus changed from “dialogue with Islam” to “dialogue 
among civilizations or cultures”. This change emerged from interactive 
discussions among members of staff of the department of culture and 
communication and members of cultural sections of German embassies in Muslim 
countries, as two participants in the field study mentioned (Tutakhel, personal 
communication, 2015; Drexler, personal communication, 2015).  
The role of the federal parliament relating to European-Islamic cultural dialogue 
is also significant. It established the budget in 2001 to prevent future terrorist 
                                                          
59 The next commissioner was a woman, Beate Grzeski, who had a diplomatic mission in China.  
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attacks. The parliament had means of observing the details of this project, for 
instance by requesting annual reports on foreign cultural policy. A member of the 
German parliament who played a role in establishing the budget for the program, 
however, mentioned in interview that the foreign ministry was not brave enough 
to handle intercultural dialogue with countries which are politically sensitive, 
specifically Iran. The activities are therefore implemented at “a low level”. He 
describes intercultural dialogue as being held “hostage” to political tensions 
between Iran and Germany, and such a situation is not improved even through 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue: 
“There is a mood (on the German side), if there is a trouble with nuclear power of 
Iran, there should be more boycotts. And there are more sanctions. And there is a 
general mood to take intercultural dialogue as hostage of the sanction too […]. 
I would not say this is a formula for any conflict in the world, but with Iran I 
don’t see the necessity of interrupting any intercultural relations” (Nouripour, 
personal communication, 2014).  
 
But European-Islamic cultural dialogue has had strong points too. The work of the 
foreign ministry, state and parastatal organizations, Mittlerorganisationen and 
private groups in this regard was a successful model of cooperation. This 
cooperation was integrated and fruitful, not because it had a plan and inerrant 
mechanisms but because the foreign ministry from the beginning strived to 
operate dialogue with the assistance of available German actors. It encouraged 
networking between them. Chapter 6 shows how the German actors implemented 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue.  
There are two points relating to the approach of the German foreign ministry and 
diplomats with regard to Iran. Firstly, the general guideline that the diplomats 
follow is “keeping contact with Iran”. An attempt has been made to uphold a 
minimum of contact with Iranian society via whatever possible cooperation 
(Erbel, personal communication, 2015). The foreign ministry also supported 
educational and academic cooperation with Iran, because it seemed to be a less 
sensitive field (Kreft, personal communication, 2014) and because of the 
existence of the highly qualified and motivated academic actors of Iran (Mulack, 
personal communication, 2015). 
Secondly, diplomats who were interviewed in this study were mostly well 
informed about Muslim countries, the program of European-Islamic cultural 
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dialogue, and the political structure of Iran specifically. They were not all fully 
aware of the cultural activities between Iran and Germany in the last two decades, 
while most of them agreed that educational cooperation was the high point of 
cooperation between the two countries. It was also significant that, in the context 
of counting Iran as a Muslim country, persons with knowledge of Arabic (like 
Bernd Erbel, Gunter Mulack, Hans-Günterand Gnodtke) and Farsi (like Bernd 
Erbel and Gunter Mulack), held the position of diplomat.    
In summing up it is important to explain why this discourse has been a focus of 
the present study. The reason is that firstly, this discourse attracted the attention 
of the German organization responsible for German foreign cultural policy, the 
foreign ministry. Secondly, a regular budget was allocated to it, and the cultural 
activities under this discourse have been implemented for a long time (up to 
concluding the results of this research in 2016). Thirdly, the discourse claims to 
develop an opportunity for dialogue between Germany and participants from other 
countries (Muslim countries). It is therefore an intercultural dialogue.    
 
 
5.3 Summary of Chapter 5 
Chapter presented information and analysis on the foreign cultural policy of Iran 
and Germany and the main organizations associated with it. It has been discussed 
that in the post-1949 era the German democratically legitimated political system 
attempted to differentiate cultural policy on the domestic level from its foreign 
level. Statements and acts of the German federal government are analyzed in this 
chapter. These acts specified foreign cultural policy as a distinct component of 
German foreign policy. Analysis of the action plans and statements of the federal 
government also suggests that certain cultural actors have been expected to deal 
with specific issues which are culturally important for German foreign policy. 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue in this context can be seen as a catalyst to 
implement foreign cultural activities towards Muslim countries since 2002. This 
discourse was positioned from the beginning as one of the practical programs of 
the department of culture and communication of the foreign ministry. A specific 
commission was appointed to deal with it. Iran was not considered a specific 
target country of German foreign cultural policy, although talking to relevant 
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experts and diplomats has shown that there is a common agreement to attempt to 
maintain contact with Iran culturally, even when political tensions with the 
country are running high.  
There are three main factors forming Iran’s foreign cultural policy. Firstly, it is 
heavily influenced by the dual political system after the Revolution in 1979. The 
democratically and religiously legitimated sectors of the Iranian state have divided 
the task of setting foreign cultural policy between at least two sections, the foreign 
ministry and ICRO. Analysis of the statements and acts generally reflects this 
duality. Foreign cultural policy is a mixture of domestic cultural and Islamic 
propagation policy rather than being a distinct component of Iranian foreign 
policy. Secondly, the cultural organizations are not led by experts. For instance, 
some appointed directors of Rayzani are not able to communicate effectively in 
the language of the mission country or even in English. The other employees are 
not experts in cultural activities but may have expertise in religious studies or are 
trusted by organizations close to the religiously legitimated sector. In this context, 
interfaith dialogue could not be operated efficiently to promote cultural relations 
with Germany. Interfaith dialogue emerged in the early years after the Iranian 
Revolution, from 1982. It was gradually taken out of the hands of Iranian civil 
society by ICRO, where it continues to reside to this day.  
Thirdly, the democratically legitimated sector has not been fully aware of the 
significance of the role of cultural activity as a pillar of foreign policy. For 
instance, the opportunity of dialogue among civilizations during Khatami’s 
presidency was not used operationally by the foreign ministry or the embassy in 
Germany.  
These three factors created a fragmented foreign cultural policy. Interviews with 
relevant Iranian experts and diplomats have illustrated that they have little 
information and knowledge about the cultural relationship between Iran and 
Germany. The foreign cultural policy as a specific policy has been unfamiliar for 
them, as well. Nearly all participants of the study agreed that there is no political 
sensitivity concerning the cultural relationship with Germany. On the Iranian side 
there has therefore been a lack of clear and integrated policy, not a lack of 
interest. 
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The next chapter presents information on cultural actors that implemented cultural 
activities in the discourse of interfaith dialogue, dialogue among civilizations and 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue, and contains details of the activities. 
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This study now moves on to present data and analysis regarding Iranian and 
German institutes and organizations which play a role in implementing cultural 
activities within the framework of intercultural dialogue through the specific 
discourse of European-Islamic cultural dialogue (on the German side) and 
interfaith dialogue and dialogue among civilizations (on the Iranian side). Here, 
these institutes and organizations are called intercultural dialogue actors. They 
have received financial assistance from the German or Iranian states. The first 
subchapter, 6.1, considers two main Iranian actors, as well as the other institutes, 
organizations and private groups which play a role in intercultural dialogue. The 
next subchapter, 6.2, reflects on information about four main German actors of 
intercultural dialogue. Institutes and private groups which play a role in 
intercultural dialogue to a lesser degree will be discussed in this subchapter as 
well. Both subsections consider information on the history and organizational 
aims, organizational structure and budget, and the practices of the specific 
institutes, general cultural activities and specific activities in the framework of 
intercultural dialogue, and conclude with a summary. The third subchapter, 6.3, is 
a summary of chapter 6. It contains a key analysis regarding the characteristics of 
the intercultural dialogue activities which were implemented between Iran and 
Germany from 1998 to 2013.   
 
 
6.1 Iranian Implementing Actors 
There are some Iranian institutes and actors which play a role in implementing 
cultural and intercultural dialogue activities for an international public, including 
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Germans. Some of them are located in Germany, some in Iran. The Iranian 
embassy in Berlin and three Iranian consulates in Munich, Frankfurt and Hamburg 
have offices to deal with cultural affairs. There are also institutes which 
concentrate on religious Islamic activities, for instance the Islamic Center of 
Hamburg, Ahl al-Bayt Mosque in Cologne, Islamic Culture Center in Frankfurt, 
Abouzar Mosque in Aachen, and the Islamic and Cultural Center of Iranians in 
Berlin. Iranian TV and radio and the news agency IRNA also have a branch office 
in Berlin. Some cultural institutes are located in Iran. Because there is no report 
by the Iranian foreign ministry or Organization of Islamic Culture and Relations 
(ICRO) to reflect foreign cultural activities or names of cultural actors, some 
Iranian libraries were searched to gather the relevant data. As mentioned in 
chapter 4, media records such as newspapers, magazines and electronic indexes 
were studied. According to that search, more than 20 Iranian institutes have 
played a role in organizing cultural activities, specifically interfaith dialogue and 
dialogue among civilizations. Details are presented in Appendix 6, at the end of 
this research. The Iranian actors are as follows: 
1. ICRO 
2. Different Iranian cultural attachés which are subsections of ICRO  
3. The Academy of Art 
4. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance 
5. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
6. The Ministry of Cooperation 
7. The Ministry of Higher Education of Iran 
8. The Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS)  
9. The Organization of Cultural Documentation of Islamic Revolution of 
Iran 
10. The President’s Office 
11. The International Center of Dialogue among Civilizations (ICDAC) 
12. Center for Women’s Participation, President’s Office 
13. Different universities of Iran 
14. The National Commission of UNESCO 
15. The Organization of Tourism of Iran  
16. The Organization of Youth of Iran  
17. The Organization of Sport  
18. The Office for Public Relations and International Affairs of the Kish 
Free Zone Organization 
19. Municipalities of different cities of Iran, e.g. Tehran and Mashhad  
 
Chapter 6: Iranian and German Implementing Actors of Intercultural Dialogue 
221  
Studying the institutes in the list reveals that just three of them (1-3) are under the 
authority of the religiously legitimated sector, while numbers 4-17 are under the 
authority of the democratically legitimated sector. The religiously legitimated 
sector is thus either less interested in the implementation of the cultural activities, 
or the media paid less attention to activities of its relevant actors.  
Studying the extant texts and informal conversations showed that two Iranian 
organizations implemented intercultural dialogue activities more than others. The 
first is the branch office of ICRO, Rayzani, which is located in Germany. It is 
selected as a focus of this study because it has strong ties with the religiously 
legitimated sector. Hence investigating it provides interesting analysis on 
“interfaith dialogue” activities towards the German public and on the cultural 
activities which are authorized by the religious sector. Analysis on Rayzani is 
presented in 6.1.1. The second focus here is on the ICDAC. This actor is selected 
because it was supported by the Iranian presidency. Analyzing its activities can 
clarify what has been done by the democratically legitimated sector of the Iranian 
state towards the German public. Analysis on the ICDAC is presented in 6.1.2. 
Why are other organizations in the above list not the main focus of this study? 
Some of them are relevant, but they did not participate actively in this research. 
For instance, the cultural section of the Iranian embassy in Germany did not 
cooperate with the researcher despite being contacted several times.60 Some of the 
actors were not especially active, so it did not make sense to spend time and face 
difficulties to gather more data about their activities. But the data which has 
already been gathered about these organizations is used to briefly analyze their 
activities in 6.1.3 and 6.1.4. 
 
 
                                                          
60 The section has not presented any information on its activity on the official website of the Iranian embassy 
in Berlin. The researcher tried to contact the office several times but was only able to meet the person in 
charge of the office a single time. In that short meeting she could not record the talk and was requested to 
leave the office as soon as possible because of a demonstration of some Iranian opposition groups in front of 
the embassy. Given the lack of detailed information and contact with the office, the cultural section of the 
Iranian embassy was dropped from the list of focused intercultural dialogue actors.  
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6.1.1 Rayzani or Branch Office of the Organization of Islamic Culture and 
Relations in Germany 
To gather information about Rayzani, different sources of information were 
accessed and its website was checked. Because the website did not give updated 
and clear information about Rayzani, the head office of ICRO in Tehran and the 
Rayzani office in Berlin were visited at least twice for information. Their 
publications, such as weekly or monthly journals in Farsi, were the main sources 
of information. During these visits some individuals were also interviewed. The 
result of analysis of the data is presented here in three parts: Part 6.1.1.1 presents 
information on the history and organizational aims of Rayzani; information about 
the organizational structure of Rayzani follows in 6.1.1.2; and finally, practices 
and activities which Rayzani generally and specifically implemented regarding 
intercultural dialogue are presented in 6.1.1.3.  
 
6.1.1.1 History and Organizational Aims 
As discussed earlier in 2.4.2, the history of Iranian cultural affairs in Germany 
goes back to when the first Iranian embassy was established in Berlin in 1885 
(Martin 1959: 30). The cultural section of the embassy for a while, even before 
the Islamic Revolution and some years thereafter, used to be called Rayzani, 
which in Farsi means “cultural consultation”. During those years, Rayzani worked 
under the supervision of the Iranian cultural ministry and after the Revolution 
under the supervision of the ministry of Islamic culture and guidance. As 
discussed in 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, after the establishment of ICRO in 1994, Rayzani fell 
under its supervision. According to information from the field study even during 
the years Rayzani was working under the supervision of the ministry of Islamic 
culture and guidance, the Iranian embassy61 started to deal with some cultural 
affairs itself, without requesting help from Rayzani. This point illustrates a 
dualism in the cultural policy of Iran abroad, a trend which continues to this day. 
Officially, two offices work in Berlin today. They both call themselves “cultural 
attaché” or Kulturabteilung. Nevertheless, since Rayzani is supervised by ICRO, 
and the cultural office of the embassy is supervised by the ambassador, and 
consequently by the Iranian foreign ministry, they are different. 
                                                          
61 In those years the embassy was in Bonn. After World War II, Iran, like many other countries, moved its 
diplomatic mission from Berlin to Bonn. After the unification of Germany in 1990, it was nearly a decade 
before the embassy was moved back to Berlin (Rajabi, personal communication, 2016).   
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ICRO has branch offices and cultural centers in 61 countries worldwide. In some 
countries Rayzani are located inside embassies, but in others, such as Germany, 
they are located separately outside the embassy. Officially, the Rayzani of Berlin 
is in charge of cultural activities, but according to an unwritten agreement 
between the embassy and Rayzani, it deals with specific and not all cultural 
issues. The cultural section of the embassy deals with cultural affairs, such as 
academic exchanges, museum cooperation and sporting competitions and events, 
film and theater festivals. Rayzani, meanwhile, deals with the remaining cultural 
affairs such as promotion of Farsi language programs, religious activities and 
ceremonies (Abbasi, personal communication, 2016; Movahedifar, personal 
communication, 2015). However, both actors are unhappy with this arrangement. 
In the view of a former director of Rayzani, there is no point in having a cultural 
section in the embassy at all when Rayzani works in Germany on behalf of the 
Iranian state: 
“At the beginning it was supposed to close down all the cultural sections (of 
embassies). The foreign affairs ministry asked us [ICRO] to add cultural sections 
to embassies, in the countries that had no Rayzani. That was our agreement… the 
agreement is even available in writing…but then they kept cultural sections even 
in mission countries which already have Rayzani” (Imanipour, personal 
communication, 2014).  
 
Also in the view of another former director of Rayzani, the existence of two 
offices contradicts the initial agreement and wastes the budget. He previously 
criticized Kamal Kharazi, the foreign minister at the time of President Khatami, 
on this issue, attempting to convince him to eliminate the office from the Iranian 
embassy in Berlin:  
“I told him: ‘Please clarify our duties and responsibilities. If in some countries 
you don’t have Rayzani, then it is good idea to let cultural sections of the 
embassies to work. But if in a country you already have Rayzani, what does 
cultural section want to do? You are wasting your money. Consequently you are 
creating a clash between Rayzani and Cultural section’. He answered: ‘Yes, your 
comment is correct. We should go to the higher council and talk about it. Yes, we 
should take this point serious’. But I got no relevant news after that (regarding 
closing down the cultural section). And that was a problem!” (Rajabi, personal 
communication, 2016)  
 
Another director of Rayzani who held office under Ahmadinejad continued to 
criticize this situation to Manouchehr Mottaki, a foreign minister at that time. His 
Chapter 6: Iranian and German Implementing Actors of Intercultural Dialogue 
224  
criticism led to the cultural budget of the Iranian embassy being cut, but still not 
to the elimination of its cultural section:  
“In the time of Mr. Mottaki, the budget of cultural sections of the embassies was 
cut, to take away motivation from them [embassy], to not create a cultural office 
and to prevent parallel working… if the idea has been operated, that would be 
great; because then the budget could transfer to ICRO which has faced a budget 
deficit to direct cultural affairs. But the foreign affairs ministry saved the budget 
which was officially devoted to its cultural section and in fact decreased its 
cultural activities… some embassies tried to keep their cultural sections and fund 
them with other sources of budget that the Ambassador holds” (Imanipour, 
personal communication, 2014)  
 
Working under the authority of the embassy has not been popular with directors 
and members of staff of Rayzani. Rayzani works according to the policies and 
aims of ICRO, but it is also under the authority of the Iranian embassy. According 
to an international accepted norm, the embassy is the only representative of or 
responsible authority for the diplomatic missions of a country. The head of the 
mission is usually the ambassador or a high commissioner. Therefore, different 
economic, media and cultural centers of any country can work abroad, but, strictly 
speaking, they do so under the supervision of the diplomatic mission. Being 
managed or authorized by two state organizations is not a happy situation for 
Rayzani’s members. The process of decision making in ICRO was also mentioned 
as a problem by some interviewees. The higher council of ICRO is headed by the 
minister of Islamic culture and guidance, which means that a minister who is in 
charge of domestic cultural affairs also leads a council that decides on foreign 
cultural affairs. A former head of Rayzani uses this point to mention a structural 
problem with decision making. In his view, the expertise of a foreign minister 
who has to do with diplomatic relations and the international realm is better suited 
to foreign cultural policy than a culture minister whose expertise is mostly 
concentrated on domestic cultural issues (Rajabi, personal communication, 2016) 
Rayzani, like many other branches of ICRO around the world, is supposed to 
follow aims such as promoting the Islamic Republic’s ideas, Islamic values, and 
building relationships with religious organizations and groups. This point was 
used by some participants of the study, from the embassy, to challenge the 
expertise of Rayzani. In their view, Rayzani’s expertise is supposed to be in 
religious issues, not cultural issues in their general sense. That is why it is 
necessary to have a cultural section with special expertise to fill the gaps 
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(Movahedifar, personal communication, 2015; Khatibzadeh, personal 
communication, 2014). There are a few researchers, such as Ahmad Naghibzadeh, 
who indirectly reflected the same view (Naghibzadeh 1999, Naghibzadeh 2009). 
It is worth considering why the issue is not deeply and directly discussed in the 
academic or expert sphere in Iranian society. In an interview with Naghibzadeh it 
became clear that the reason for neglecting this issue is a lack of interest in both 
sectors of the Iranian state to come to an agreement over the power clash:  
“[Nobody] criticizes [it] because the state does not want to hear. See, there is a 
conflict between foreign ministry and ICRO. This [one side] wants to define its 
own cultural components and that [other side] wants to express [the cultural 
components] itself. All of the clash is to cover their own political activities. Then 
what do you want to say in such a situation?” (Naghibzadeh, personal 
communication, 2015). 
 
An informal talk with another expert who implemented some of Iran’s initial 
interfaith dialogue meetings in the 1980s gives another reason. In his view, 
criticizing ICRO can be a challenging issue for experts and academics, because 
the top senior officers and heads of ICRO have had a strong relationship with the 
leader (Soroush, personal communication, 2012). Criticizing ICRO can therefore 
be perceived as criticizing the leader himself. That is why this organization is 
rarely criticized in public. One of those rare criticisms came from Salman Safavi. 
He is the brother of Rehman Safavi, a military advisor to the leader, and 
personally played a key role in some of Iran’s informal security lobbies abroad, 
such as negotiating to release an Israeli soldier in 2006 (the Independent 2011). 
With such a background, it is understandable that his criticism would not cost him 
heavily, because he himself is part of the religiously legitimated sector. He 
criticized the activities of Rayzani of ICRO abroad for having unrealistic short 
and long-term programs. He mentioned that these branch offices omitted to 
promote the art and cultural image of Iran internationally abroad, and in most 
cases they reported in a way that magnified their achievements (Safavi 2013).  
Meanwhile, there are facts which indicate that Rayzani has not been perceived 
fully by some German actors. Since Rayzani is located apart from the Iranian 
embassy in Berlin, its presence is not apparent to all diplomatic and cultural 
visitors to the Iranian ambassador at the embassy. For instance, one of the staff of 
the German foreign ministry who worked for a long time in the intercultural 
dialogue section of the department of culture and media roughly knew the name 
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of Rayzani or of “an Iranian cultural center apart from the Iranian embassy”. She 
knew the name of the director of Rayzani at that time, but she remarked that she 
had never understood the function and relationship between “that center” and “the 
cultural section” inside the Iranian embassy (Tutakhel, personal communication, 
2015). A German volunteer group, the Grüter family62, which implemented some 
intercultural dialogue activities for Iranian and German participants, also did not 
mention Rayzani. They were therefore asked specifically about Rayzani, but still 
did not remember it: “No – we can’t remember that organization. May be that they were 
somewhere involved but we don’t know”. With more information about the type of 
organization Rayzani is, they recognized it: 
“[…] OK, so you mean with Rayzani Farhangi, the Kulturabteilung der I.R. Iran 
in Berlin, Drakestraße. Indeed, we had a very good and intensive contact to them 
till today” (Manfred and Gisela Grüter, personal communication, 2016). 
 
Furthermore, Rayzani has been understood by some German diplomats as a 
representative of the “Iranian regime” and not as a state deputation like the Iranian 
embassy: 
“But you know the embassy here (in Berlin) has an ambassador … but then they 
have special cultural counselor. And this special cultural counselor I don’t know 
to whom he reports. Sometimes the ambassador is more open than him in 
dialogue. I don’t know some of these guys seem to be a member of the regime, 
you know? And therefore it is very difficult to […]I see it as a problem. Because 
the cultural attaché is more linked to the regime, and spreading regime 
propaganda. Maybe the embassy wants to… wants good relationship and increase 
the cooperation in economic interaction and this cultural attaché I think […] I 
don’t know” (Mulack, personal communication, 2015). 
 
According to this diplomat, Rayzani is under the authority of the religiously 
legitimated sector of the Iranian state. He expresses the point using the word 
“regime”. A German diplomat calling the Iranian state or part of the Iranian state 
“regime” gives a paradoxical message. It is paradoxical because it challenges the 
frank view of the German actor in dialogue. Dialogue, as it was discussed in 
chapter 3, is a communication between two (or more) sides that respect each other 
on an equal level. When this diplomat considers the Iranian side as a regime, it 
means either he or she does not consider Iran to be equal with Germany as a 
democratic state, or considers the German state also to be a regime.  
                                                          
62 Manfred and Gisela Grüter are a family who implemented many cultural activities under the discourse of 
“European-Islamic cultural dialogue”. More information about their activities follows in 6.1.3. 
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Another diplomat, who was previously German ambassador in Iran, thinks 
differently. He understands Rayzani to be like the Goethe Institute, which to a 
limited degree is under the authority of the German foreign ministry: 
“Yes, I have participated in their events, so I know that they are independent, the 
personnel are independent. Most people here say ok, maybe they are like Goethe 
Institute, which is officially also independent, but in the case of political conflict, 
then the government intervenes. I mean if GI was doing something that is 
absolutely against the political mainstream, then they would have problems. But 
they do not get permission to plan things and to do things, only in the case of the 
conflict which is exceptional, then they can do intervention. And I think this is 
rather similar to the Iranian cultural institute. It is not an institute which just 
follows the plan of the government; it has also its own planning and 
implementation. But as soon as there is an indication that it is going very contrary 
to the basic principles of politics, then there will also be a sort of intervention” 
(Erbel, personal communication, 2015).  
 
That the German diplomats perceive Rayzani to be a regime-appointed office or 
an institute like the Goethe Institute indicates that its aims and function are still 
not fully understood by the German authorities.  
6.1.1.2 Organizational Structure  
The director of Rayzani in Germany is called the Rayzan [cultural counselor], 
who works with a team of officials including a deputy and financial and 
administrative officers. There is a library and a seminar room inside the Rayzani 
building. There are some employees who take care of cultural affairs, such as 
German-Farsi translation, public relations, website, publication, research, audio 
and photography. These employees are employed from the local population in 
Germany as well as Iranian students who are studying in Germany. 
The director of Rayzani in Germany is neither necessarily appointed from 
employees of ICRO nor from diplomats of the foreign ministry. In some cases, 
individuals were suggested by Presidents Khatami and Ahmadinejad to the head 
of the higher council of ICRO. The head of the council is actually the minister of 
Islamic culture and guidance, who is appointed by the president himself. The 
recommended persons could therefore be chosen as director of Rayzani (Rajabi, 
personal communication, 2016). Two people were appointed to the position 
during Khatami’s presidency, and two during Ahmadinejad’s. 
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The annual budget of the Iranian parliament shows that ICRO received an average 
annual budget of 50 million Euro from the Iranian parliament between 1998 and 
2013. Appendix 5 gives more details of the ICRO budget. It is not clear what 
amount of this budget is allocated to Rayzani centers in 61 countries. Moreover, 
some members of staff of Rayzani argued that ICRO received different amounts 
of financial assistance from organizations dependent on the leader (Tarighat, 
personal communication, 2014).  
 
6.1.1.3 Practices: Generally and Specifically for Intercultural Dialogue 
Rayzani organized and coordinated different activities between 1998 and 2013, 
including participating in book, tourism, photographic and handicraft exhibitions 
and cultural weeks in different German cities. It also held conferences, seminars 
and weekly or monthly meetings on Islamic theology issues and sent delegates to 
participate in conferences and seminars of religious institutes such as 
Evangelische Akademie Loccum (referred to here as Loccum Academy), which 
belongs to the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Hannover. Organizing events and 
ceremonies for Iranian residents abroad, such as Nowruz [Iranian New Year], and 
the birthday of the Prophet Mohammad and Shia Imams, are also mentioned as 
activities of Rayzani. In terms of interreligious dialogue, there have been no round 
table meetings implemented by the Center for Interreligious Dialogue (CID) of 
ICRO. Nonetheless, Rayzani has used the potential of the network of ICRO and 
religious centers of Qum to participate in relevant meetings and seminars 
organized in Germany, as the information of some participants suggests (Rajabi, 
personal communication, 2016).  
Further activities include the publication of books, studies and journals. The 
journal Aus dem Iran/Kulturmeldungen aus Iran, which in Farsi is called didar-e 
Ashena, the journals az digaran [from others], Spektrum Iran and sobh-e Omid 
[morning of hope] are considerable in this regard. There are also some books, 
brochures and pamphlets on Iran, Islam and the West that received publishing 
support from Rayzani, for instance Janeb-e Qarbi [the West’s Side].63 The 
                                                          
63 Janeb-e Qarbi was published during the time that Dr. Faridzadeh was the director of Rayzani. He held this 
position before 1998 and then in 1998 became the first head of the ICDAC as well as an advisor to Khatami. 
He has been very active regarding introducing and reading different books in the field of philosophy, Islam, 
and relations between Iran and the West. In Janeb-e Qarbi he analyzed the content of 75 magazines, focusing 
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periodical Pažuheš hā-ye farhangi [Cultural investigations] is also significant; it 
features research in fields such as Iran studies, religion in Germany, Islam in the 
West and cultural educational policies in Germany. Research on foreign and 
educational policies of Germany (Rayzani in Germany n.d.) and research on the 
relationship between the West and the Islamic world (Rayzani in Germany 1392 
[2013]) are notable from this publication. The last research contains a translation 
of a co-written book which is published by ifa and will be discussed in 6.2.3.3.64  
 
The publications of Rayzani have not had a large audience in German and Iranian 
society (Aghaee, personal communication, 2016 and Tarighat, personal 
communication, 2014). Spektrum Iran, which has been published in German since 
1987, covers broad issues in the field of Iran studies, orientalism, Islam studies, 
Sufism, fundamentalism and philosophy. From 2014 it was acknowledged by the 
ministry of science and research of Iran as a scientific journal. Almost all 
interviewees from Rayzani proudly emphasized the journal of Spektrum Iran as a 
main activity of Rayzani. They argued that it represented Iran’s name in German 
academic society. Rayzani was scheduled to distibute 500 copies of each volume 
among German universities and academic institutions free of charge. However, 
some of the universities declined because of “having no enough space” (Tarighat, 
personal communication, 2014). The articles of the Spektrum Iran are not written 
by native German speakers. Therefore the translation is an important and 
expensive part of producing this journal. According to a member of staff of 
Rayzani, publishing one volume of Spektrum Iran costs approximately four 
thousand Euro (Tarighat, personal communication, 2014). According to an Iranian 
student who participated in a translation project for Rayzani, journals and books 
are published mostly for their bureaucratic function. The publication is to give an 
impression to ICRO that Rayzani is active. Directors of Rayzani or senior officers 
of ICRO give these publications as gifts to their international or Iranian guests to 
                                                                                                                                                               
on the answer to this question: How has the West perceived Muslims? (Faridzadeh, personal communication, 
2013) (a  
64 The research clearly violates the ethical aspects of the translation. It is published in the format of research 
or a report, not a translation. It mentions the name of the original authors at the end of the text with an 
explanation that the “view of these authors have been used in this research”. But the text in parts, such as 
chapters six and seven, is actually the direct translation of the ifa book, chapters 11 and 12 Bakr, 
Salwa/Ezbidi, Basem/Kassab-Hassan, Hanan /Karcic, Fikret/Zaidi, Mazhar/Jawhar Hassan, Dato' 2004: Der 
Westen Und Die Islamische Welt – Eine Muslimische Position [the West and the Islamic World - a Muslim 
Position]. Translated by Magdi Cherifa/Gaines, Jeremy. Stuttgart: Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (ifa). 
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illustrate that they take cultural activity in Germany seriously (Aghaee, personal 
communication, 2016).  
Promoting Farsi language and literature is another activity of Rayzani in 
Germany, although it does not have a specific center for teaching Farsi in 
Germany. It often provides Farsi language courses in some German schools and 
universities. The Center of Dissemination of Farsi Language of ICRO assists 
Rayzani to do this, but cooperation between them is limited. Since 2012, there has 
been an organizational change in the structure of ICRO. Through this change, all 
ICRO Farsi language centers around the world and the Dissemination of Farsi 
Language Center are merged into one organization: the Saadi foundation.65 The 
idea has been to coordinate all Farsi language teaching activities abroad, overseen 
by one unified policy, as well as to create “concentration, synergy and coherence” 
among them, according to the constitution of the Saadi Foundation (Šorā Āli 
Enqelāb Farhangi 1389 [2010]). According to a member of the staff of Rayzani, 
such coordination has never happened. The request to establish the Saadi 
Foundation was rejected three times by the Iranian parliament. Finally, on the 
insistence of Dr. Ghlamali Haddad Adel,66 who at that time was the head of the 
Academy of Farsi Language, the parliament agreed to its establishment. In the 
view of this member of staff, it was a wrong decision to establish the Saadi 
Foundation and did not lead to more coordinated activities to promote the Farsi 
language abroad, because ICRO itself, after two decades, still faced difficulties 
coordinating cultural activities with the foreign ministry (Abbasi, personal 
communication, 2016). 
Besides the aims and bureaucratic guidelines of ICRO, the personality and 
character of the different directors also informed the type of activities Rayzani 
undertook, which were not limited to religious activities, as was expected by 
ICRO. It also engaged in fields like music and art. For instance, Mohammad Ali 
Rajabi, a director of Rayzani at the time of Khatami, besides organizing religious 
practices, also organized a seminar to commemorate Annemarie Schimmel, a 
female German Islam and Orient scholar. Furthermore, Rajabi’s intention was to 
                                                          
65 Abū-Muhammad Muslih al-Dīn bin Abdallāh Shīrāzī, famous by his pen-name Saadi, was one of the well-
known poets of Iran who was born in the early 13th century. Besides Farsi-speaking countries, Saadi also 
attracted the attention of western literary scholars.  
66 The name of Haddad Adel was mentioned as the permanent member of the higher council of ICRO, 
appointed by the leader. His daughter is also married to the son of the leader.  
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support traditional Iranian music concerts in Germany. He was on good terms 
with the then-director of Hause der Kulturen der Welt (HKW), Hans-Georg 
Knopp. Knopp later became the general secretary of the Goethe Institute. Through 
this friendly relationship Knopp organized an exhibition on Iranian art and society 
in the HKW for around three months in 2002. He visited Iran a year later and 
consequently initiated more cultural activities (Knopp, personal communication 
2016 and Rajabi, personal communication, 2016), as will be discussed further in 
6.2.4 and 6.2.5. Rajabi’s attention to the issue of music is significant. He 
explained that, in his view, music is a cultural favorite of German audiences. That 
is why he wanted to use this instrument to introduce Iranian culture in Germany, 
but he mentioned how the idea was welcomed by the top junior officers of ICRO: 
“Well, we were organizing to bring traditional music from Iran to Germany […] 
then Teheran was responding that ‘would it not be better if you instead of taking 
traditional Maghami Music over there, organizing a lecture?’ […] a religious 
lecture would not be better? […] they were not aware what audience here 
[Germany] are expecting” (Rajabi, personal communication, 2016).  
 
Moreover, a German volunteer group received strong support from Rayzani 
during Rajabi’s time. The group mentioned his name as “opening many doors” in 
Iranian society (Manfred and Gisela Grüter, personal communication, 2016). This 
point will be explained later in 6.2.5. 
The impact of the next director of Rayzani, who came to office at the time of 
Ahmadinejad, on the form of its activities was slightly different. He studied 
philosophy, religion and mysticism and showed a specific interest in debate and 
talking to Islamic thinkers and intellectuals in the period in which he held his 
position in Rayzani. For example, his visit to a famous Muslim professor, Nasr 
Hamid Abu Zaid,67 at a conference on Koran studies in Frankfurt is mentioned on 
the Rayzani website (Rayzani in Berlin 2008b). In his time, Rayzani supported 
publication of the book Denn Dein ist das Reich; Gebete aus dem Islam [For thine 
is the kingdom; prayers from Islam], which was written by Annemarie Schimmel 
(Rayzani in Berlin 2008a). He also emphasized in a public interview that 
activities, such as “sending cultural and academic groups from Germany to Iran 
and sending clergymen from Iran to Germany”, “inviting cultural attaché of 
                                                          
67 Professor Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid is an Egyptian Islam and Quran studies scholar. He lives and teaches in 
the Netherlands.  
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Muslim countries in Germany in Ramadhan month, and discussing problems of 
Muslim countries”, and holding meetings to introduce “Shia Islam” and 
“achievements of Islamic Revolution” and “nuclear energy successes” to 
strengthen the “unification between Muslims of the world”, as “the leader’s 
wishes” (Hemati 16.03.2008) are amongst the main duties and approaches of the 
Rayzani.  
A few years later, another director came to Rayzani towards the end of 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency. During his time, two NGOs started to work closely 
with Rayzani. The first is Stiftung für Islamische Studien (SIS) [Islamic Studies 
Foundation], which is headed by Mahdi Esfahani. It concentrates on Islam studies 
and dialogue between the world’s religions, as its website says (SIS 2015). The 
second NGO is the Hafiz Institute, which worked formerly under the name of 
Amirkabir cultural association (Hafis-Institut 2013). Based on information and 
observation in the field study, both institutes receive their main financial support 
from Rayzani. The main reason to work with these two NGOs has been mentioned 
by a former director as follows: 
“It is usual in developed countries to create a foundation, with format of NGO; 
then this foundation is going and working on cultural activities, abroad. Of course 
inside their own country they are sticking to their own foreign affairs ministry. 
That means inside their own country, they are practically an obedience of their 
foreign affairs ministries, but outside they get distance from their embassy. They 
tried to show themselves non-state, like Goethe Institute and so on…what we do 
is in contrary [of what they do]… for that reason we have resulted that our 
activities should not necessarily be done in an official/state format. [That is why] 
I founded two NGOs in Germany” (Imanipour, personal communication, 2014).  
 
The director of Rayzani clearly understood the point of the incompatibility of 
Iranian and German structures relating to foreign cultural activities. Then he tried 
to use a short-cut to fill the gap through the NGO’s work. Using this solution he 
could successfully conclude a contract with the Centre for Islamic Theology, 
University of Münster. Through this contract a three-year Junior Professorship in 
Shia studies was established. Without SIS, Rayzani would not have been able to 
convince the University to cooperate on establishing this junior professorship, 
some participants in the field study said (Abbasi, personal communication, 2016 
and Imanipour, personal communication, 2014). On the University of Münster 
homepage, conclusion of the contract is reported, but the name of the then-
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director of Rayzani is mentioned in the report without reference to his position 
(director of Rayzani). 
Informal conversations with members of the staff and former directors of Rayzani 
revealed that generally all cultural and religious activities are articulated as 
intercultural dialogue with Germany. Based on the collected data, however, it is 
clear that Rayzani does not implement specific activities regarding interfaith 
dialogue and dialogue among civilizations. As was discussed in 5.2.3.1, the center 
for interreligious dialogue (CID) of ICRO implemented many interreligious 
dialogues with different religious institutes and churches in Western countries 
such as Greece, Russia, Italy, Britain, Switzerland and Austria. But Germany is 
not on the list. Some of the volumes of Spektrum Iran (Spektrum 2002, Wenzel 
2003), however, deal with the issue of interreligious dialogue and dialogue among 
civilizations.  
Four reasons are given in the field study for the weak role of Rayzani to 
implement cultural activities in the framework of intercultural dialogue. Firstly, 
the low budget is mentioned by some participants. However, because there is no 
record of the total budget devoted to this organization, it is difficult to examine 
this reason. Secondly, the priority for cultural activities was religious issues, as 
some participants of the study pointed out. This reason may be partly relevant to 
the discourse of dialogue among civilizations, too, but not to the discourse of 
interfaith dialogue. Thirdly, the fact that different directors has different priorities 
at different times on the one hand, and the lack of a specific plan for Rayzani in 
Germany (whether determined by ICRO or Rayzani itself) on the other, have been 
mentioned by some participants as reasons for the weak role of Rayzani to 
implement specific projects regarding intercultural dialogue (Tarighat. personal 
communication 2014). Fourthly, the lack of a new “governmental cultural 
agreement” between Iran and Germany is mentioned as an obstable by one 
participant in the study (Abbasi, personal communication, 2014), although as 
already mentioned in 2.3, cultural agreements between the Iranian and German 
states has played a symbolic and not exclusive role in implementation of cultural 
activities. Conclusion of the twin-cities agreement between Weimar and Shiraz in 
2009, and between Isfahan and Freiburg in 2000, as well as the signing of a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Iranian ministry of science, 
research and technology and the DAAD in 2012 are indications that it was 
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possible to implement some organized cultural activities between the two 
countries even without re-concluding a governmental agreement. 
There was also no clear cooperation between Rayzani and the ICDAC. 
Coordination of an international conference through cooperation between ICRO 
(headquarters in Tehran) and the ICDAC in 2002 showed that the issue of 
dialogue among civilizations could also be undertaken practically in the Rayzani 
in Germany. Rayzani around the world received articles from prospective 
participants in this conference from 102 countries, including Germany (Kermani 
2002: 9 and 10). Rayzani thus played an important role in connecting the 
international audience with the ICDAC’s coordinators. Also, the Saadi 
Foundation of Tirana in Albania in 2000 (Saadi Shirazi Foundation 2008) and 
Rayzani of Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2001 (Cultural Center of ICRO 
Sarayevo n.d.) commemorated the year of dialogue among civilizations by 
holding conferences. The question is therefore why the issue of “dialogue among 
civilizations” did not attract the attention of Rayzani of Germany in those years. A 
former director of Rayzani answered that the reason was the absence of a clear 
plan regarding the idea of “dialogue among civilizations” from Khatami himself, 
his cultural advising team and the ICDAC: 
“When I was appointed as Rayzani director, I thought this issue [Dialogue among 
civilizations] is in responsibility of Rayzani centers. There was a guy [---], who 
was the cultural deputy of Mr. Khatami. He came to talk to us on behalf Mr. 
Khatami and the ICDAC. I asked him some questions, hummm, we have been 
some new appointed directors [of Rayzani centers], I asked him: ‘Which duty do 
you expect us to hold [regarding to dialogue among civilizations]’? He respond: 
‘Nothhhhhhhhing! I asked: you mean we have no role over there [abroad]”? He 
answered: ‘Yes. This is in responsibility of our institute, itself’. So that shows 
that there were absolutely no plan (Rajabi, personal communication, 2016).  
 
Rayzani also did not network effectively with other Iranian institutes and 
organizations which were located in Germany. The Islamic Center of Hamburg 
had contact with Rayzani in cases such as participating in religious seminars, but 
when Rayzani needed a non-governmental organization to establish a Shia studies 
Junior Professorship at the University of Münster, the gap was not filled by the 
Islamic Center of Hamburg. Furthermore, when an administrative officer of 
Rayzani was asked for contact information of key people who work in Germany’s 
branch office of the Iranian TV or news agency IRNA, he replied that the 
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relationship between Rayzani and these branch offices was not that strong 
(Tarighat, personal communication, 2014).   
 
6.1.1.4 A Summary of Analysis of Rayzani 
To conclude this section, it is important to recall the question as to the 
characteristics of the cultural activities of Rayzani in the framework of 
intercultural dialogue. There have been some clashes between Rayzani and the 
cultural section of the embassy. They illustrate the fragmented foreign cultural 
policy of Iran. Rayzani in Germany has followed a routine or traditional form of 
activities, especially religious activities, as the general guideline of ICRO, which 
is set for all Rayzani worldwide (and not specifically for Rayzani in a Western 
country like Germany), expects it to. The role of the director is significant in 
shaping the activities, which mostly took the form of seminars, participation in 
exhibitions and publications. They rarely took a new or advanced form. 
Furthermore, no specific cultural activity project (long-term or short-term) 
regarding specific discourses of interfaith dialogue and dialogue among 
civilizations has been implemented. Moreover, despite the non-diplomatic 
background of its directors, Rayzani illustrated a high degree of cooperation with 
some German cultural actors in implementing cultural activities for both Iranian 
and German participants. More focused points about the cultural activities of 
Rayzani will be summarized in 6.3. 
 
 
6.1.2 International Center for Dialogue among Civilizations (ICDAC) 
The International Center for Dialogue among Civilizations (ICDAC) existed for 
around six years. The original plan of its founders was to make it center of 
thinking in the Islamic World, a center at which the Muslim philosophers of the 
world would teach. However, the internal clashes between the members of 
Khatami’s team, the end of Khatami’s presidency and, consequently, the center’s 
official budget being cut led to its closure. After closure of the ICDAC, so little 
care was taken with official records, publications and books in the center’s library 
that finding relevant information to write this subchapter became a major 
challenge in the study. The relevant data was finally collected by searching 
Chapter 6: Iranian and German Implementing Actors of Intercultural Dialogue 
236  
different Iranian libraries and finding some former members of staff and high 
ranking officials. The analysis of these sections is in four segments. It looks at its 
history in 6.1.2.1, organizational structure in 6.1.2.2, practices in 6.1.2.3 and 
includes a summary of the main points in 6.1.2.4.  
 
6.1.2.1 History and Organizational Aims 
The International Center for Dialogue among Civilizations, in Farsi Markaz-e 
beinolmelali-ye goftogu-ye tamadon hā, was established in response to a proposal 
for “dialogue among civilizations” by Mohammad Khatami, fifth president of 
Iran, in September 1998, at the 53rd General Assembly of the United Nations. 
According to this proposal, 2001 was planned to be called a year of dialogue 
among civilizations, as mentioned in chapters 2 and 3. Consequently, 
representatives of all countries and a specific commission of the UN, headed by 
Giandomenico Picco, were requested to promote different national and 
international programs to celebrate 2001. The presidential office of Khatami 
accordingly founded a new institute, the International Center for Dialogue among 
Civilizations (ICDAC), in December 1998, to develop practical methods and 
promote the idea. The ICDAC worked for approximately seven years, from late 
1998 to late 2005, and under the supervision of three different presidents. At the 
end of Khatami’s presidency, the ICDAC was merged into some state 
organizations and finally closed. The center had two main buildings in Tehran: 
one of which was in the north of Tehran in a neighborhood called Farmānyeh, 
which explains why in the field study the entire building is referred to as 
Farmānyeh. It was also mentioned in the field study that the center had a branch 
office in London (Farahmand, personal communication, 2014). The aims of the 
ICDAC are described in academic writing as follows:  
“To promote dialogue among civilizations and cultures on an international scale 
as a means of advancing the interpretation of the UN Charter and of improving 
human well-being; to promote and expand the culture of dialogue at the national 
level; to promote the culture of peace in order to foster peaceful coexistence and 
prevent human rights violations; to help establish and broaden the international 
civil society through cultural interaction among nations; to strengthen spiritual, 
moral and religious culture; to conduct research on the significance and possible 
interpretations of Dialogue Among Civilizations and to release the findings 
nationally and internationally” (Tavassoli 2010: 94-95) . 
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Nevertheless, there are some publications which show that one of the key aims of 
the ICDAC was to coordinate the activities of governmental and non-
governmental organizations to extend the idea of dialogue among civilizations 
(ICDAC 2005b) in “different fields such as philosophy, kalām [theology], 
science, literature and art” (Geographical Researches 1377 [1999]: 143). As Hadi 
Nejad-Hosseinian, a then-Ambassador Permanent Representative of Iran in the 
UN, reported to the fifty-fourth session of the UN General Assembly in 
September 1999, the main mandate and activities of the center were in the 
framework of both foreign and domestic cultural policy making. On one hand, the 
ICDAC was supposed to take “theoretical consideration of dialogue among 
civilizations and cultures with a view to apply it at national and international 
levels”, and on the other, it should coordinate “activities of domestic agencies in 
respect of Dialogue among civilizations, taking into account the ideas expressed 
by the President” (Nejad Hosseinian 1999: 2). Another objective of the center in 
this report was to conceptualize issues such as “Dialogue among civilizations”, 
“culture of dialogue”, “culture of peace”, “global civil society”, and “spiritual, 
moral and religious culture”. Regarding the operational objectives of the center, 
there were some more or less abstract points such as “developing capacities for 
dialogue in the society, especially among the youth and women and engaging 
them in dialogue among civilizations and cultures relying on Islamic, cultural and 
historic heritage of Iran”. Among the operational purposes listed in the report, 
“holding international gatherings on cultural issues with a view to preparing the 
ground for and strengthening dialogue among cultures and civilizations” was also 
significant (Nejad Hosseinian 1999: 2-4).  
A considerable point of Nejad Hosseinian’s report is that the ICDAC not only had 
executive duties but also some policy-making responsibility. The position of the 
center was also taken seriously by the council of ministers in 2002, when it 
assigned to the center some duties in coordination with other state institutions. It 
appointed the president of the ICDAC as head of a commission consisted of 
ministers of “foreign affairs”, “science, research and technology”, “education and 
training”, and “Islamic culture and guidance”. This commission was expected to 
conceptualize the idea of dialogue among civilizations, develop practical 
strategies to apply it, and to report the results regularly to the council (ICDAC 
2002i: 57).  
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Despite the idea of dialogue among civilizations playing a key role in the 
domestic and foreign policies of Khatami, there was no targeted supervision of the 
activities of the center by the president or his ministers. As mentioned above, the 
center was ordered in 2002 to report to the council of ministers regularly on its 
activities. A former member of staff who was in charge of the international office 
of the center mentioned that the regular meetings to report the achievements of the 
center were held annually for the council and headed by Mohammad Khatami. 
But the meetings were ceremonial, not critical: nobody asked about or challenged 
the activities; even the main speech by Khatami in this meeting would be written 
by some experts of the ICDAC (Farahmand, personal communication, 2014).  
 
6.1.2.2 Organizational Structure 
The ICDAC had three different structures under three different presidents. The 
presidents had a key role to play in forming the structure and activities of the 
center (Shafiei, personal communication, 2015; Farahmand, personal 
communication, 2014). During the term of the first president, Mohammad-Javad 
Faridzadeh,68 the center had, in addition to library, publication and magazine 
sections, some mo’āvenat [departments]. One of them was the “research and 
investigation department”, which included eight groups – “philosophy and 
theology”, “philosophy of law and ethics”, “geography”, “social science”, 
“international relations and political science”, “culture, history and archeology”, 
“literature and art”, and “environment” (Geographical Researches 1377 [1999]: 
144). The next departments were entitled “international relations” and “education, 
studies and training”. The latter department had different training groups to deal 
with “small towns”, “youth”, “children” (which was known as Bacehā-ye Zamin 
salām! [Children of the earth, hello!]), and “women”. This department also had 
sections for sport, music and theater. There were some committees to coordinate 
cultural activities with/for pupils, students, researchers, thinkers, and a focus on 
“urban culture”, “house wife affairs” and “field study research” (ICDAC 2005b: 
73-74). As one of the participants mentioned, during the time of the first 
president, the center mostly approached parts of Iranian society that were 
                                                          
68 The name Faridzadeh is mentioned previously in this research. He was formerly a director of Rayzani in 
Germany, before 1998. He did his PhD in Germany in Philosophy and was an advisor and is a close friend of 
Mohammad Khatami. He wrote Khatami’s main speeches regarding dialogue among civilizations.  
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optimistic about the open political sphere under Khatami (Shafiei, personal 
communication, 2015).  
The organizational structure of the center changed in the time of the second 
president, Ataollah Mohajerani,69 who came to office in early 2001. During his 
presidency, sections such as publications, library, and magazines remained more 
or less the same. But sections such as “group of advisors”, “office for student 
centers and NGOs” and “scientific council” were added to the structure. The 
scientific council, which consisted of the groups “religions and mysticism”, 
“philosophy”, “political science”, “social science”, “literature and art” and 
“history of civilization”, had the capacity to make decisions on proposed projects 
from applicants. The president of the center would then confirm or reject those 
projects. During the time of the second president, some of the suboffices dealing 
with women, children and youth, as well as theater and music, were also rejected. 
Changing the structure of the center in the second’s president’s view was to save 
more budget and to help other organizations, which could concentrate 
professionally on issues such as music and theater:  
“I believed that we should not do that kind of activities, we should give them to 
Deputy of Art of the ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance. They should do 
this kind of activities. Actually I meant that we as the ICDAC, should play role of 
brain and nerve system, not role of muscle cellules. We are not hand and leg to 
do these activities. We should plan and design, others should operate it….for 
example not producing music ourselves, because we have already Symphony 
Music Orchestra of Teheran. We should help them […]” (Mohajerani, personal 
communication, 2014)  
 
In early 2003, Mahmoud Boroujerdi was appointed as the third president.70 
Because of his family background71 and because he had been in charge as the vice 
president of the ICDAC from the beginning, it was expected that he could keep 
the structure and existence of the center even after Khatami’s presidency. 
However, this did not work. At the end of the Khatami presidency in June 2005, 
the Šura-ye Āli-ye Edāri [administrative council] decided to merge the library of 
the center into the Farhangestān-e Honar [Art Academy] (Aref 1384 [2005]-b). It 
was also decided to merge the ICDAC into the foreign ministry. A few months 
                                                          
69 Mohajerani was a governor who worked as a parliament member and adviser of former-president Hashemi 
Rafsanjani. His last governmental position before the ICDAC was as minister of Islamic Culture and 
Guidance.  
70 In the news coverage of the Report on Dialogue, the name of Dr. Boroujerdi has always been mentioned as 
sarparast [supervisor] of the ICDAC. 
71 Dr. Boroujerdi was the son-in-law of Ayatollah Khomeini.  
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later, the administrative council decided to merge the ICDAC from the foreign 
affairs ministry into the center. In early 2006, ICRO combined the ICDAC into its 
Center for Interreligious Dialogue (CID). The new institute is called “the Center 
for Dialogue among Religions and Civilizations”. Consequently, members of staff 
of the former CID from the main building of ICRO moved to Fārmānyeh. The 
new center started to work under the supervision of two former heads, Boroujerdi 
and Mirdamadi (Iranian Diplomacy 1389 [2010], Miras news agency 1384 [2006], 
Pudforush 1384 [2006]). Meanwhile, there was a serious clash over financing the 
personnel and projects of the former ICDAC. This clash even led to a strike by 
members of staff of the former ICDAC. According to one of its staff, the 
limitations of working in the newly merged center became so problematic that 
after some time ICRO declared it would be closed down. But Broujerdi resisted 
this decision and tried to keep the light of Fārmānyeh on:  
“Mister Doctor [Broujerdi] used his key to open the door, but they [ICRO’s staff] 
changed the lock. I remember that we told him, to Mister Doctor –God bless him- 
‘leave them alone, why you are still there’? After that he [worked for] a program 
in Channel 4 of the TV, he was working there as an advisor. He had an office 
there. I went there. He told me they [ICRO] behaved him in a bad way, they 
offense him a lot” (Maleki, personal communication, 2013).   
 
On December 31, 2007, the administrative council headed by Ahmadinejad 
decided to merge the ICDAC from ICRO into Markaz-e Irani-ye Motāle’āt-e 
Jahāni šodan [Iranian national center for globalization studies], in short: 
Globalization center. This center belongs to the presidential office. The former 
ICDAC at that time obviously had no staff or activities. The only transformation 
that could take place was in regard to the building of Farmānyeh. But even this 
transformation did not happen until the end of the presidency of Ahmadinejad.  
The initial budget of the ICDAC came from an overall budget of the presidential 
office of Khatami (Mohajerani, personal communication, 2014; Faridzadeh, 
personal communication, 2013; Farahmand, personal communication, personal 
communication). As Iran’s budget law shows, from 2002 to 2004 the ICDAC 
received a specific budget under the title of “helping to center of dialogue among 
civilizations”, still within the framework of the presidential office. The budget 
from 2002 to 2004 was between 1.5 and 2 billion toman (Plan and Budget 
Organization 1381 [2002], Plan and Budget Organization 1383 [2004]-b); its 
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equivalent in Euro was approximately between 10 and 2 million Euro.72 Appendix 
1 contains a list showing the budget and toman and Euro rates. In the short time 
that some members of the staff of the former ICDAC were still working under the 
newly merged institute, part of the costs were paid from the budget of ICRO and 
the presidential office of Ahmadinejad (Pudforush 1384 [2006]).  
The question raised here is why the administrative council decided to merge the 
ICDAC into state organizations. There are various arguments. Firstly, the merger 
of the ICDAC has been described as an unavoidable process, because the center 
was funded by the presidential office of Khatami but his presidency then came to 
an end. Secondly, guessing that the ICDAC would not have any future under the 
next president, Khatami tried to protect the activities and projects of the ICDAC 
as much as possible. He therefore wanted to select an organization that would 
continue to pursue the aims of the center. One year before his presidency came to 
an end he mentioned that he wanted to apply a model that foreign countries 
applied for dialogue among civilizations, and since they used the NGO model and 
not the governmental model, he would follow their experience (ICDAC 2004a). 
He therefore made administrative arrangements for the merger on the one hand, 
and on the other hand established an NGO to pursue the idea of dialogue among 
civilizations as he intended (Khaniki, personal communication, 2013; Kharazi, 
personal communication, 2014; Khatami, personal communication, 2014). The 
third argument is that Khatami decided to merge the ICDAC into ICRO because it 
was the most relevant organization in terms of the idea of cultural dialogue on an 
international level (Mohajerani, personal communication; Khatami, personal 
communication, 2014). Nevertheless, some think that if that was so, it was too late 
(Abbasi, personal communication, 2014; Maleki, personal communication, 2014). 
The fourth argument on the question of merging the ICDAC is that Khatami was 
going to corrupt the state sources to the benefit of his own NGO. This is the 
argument from some hardliners who were sceptical about Khatami’s dialogue 
among civilizations from the beginning. For instance, one of the editors of Resalat 
newspaper73 states that Khatami closed down the ICDAC in order to coordinate 
dialogue projects after his presidency through his own NGO and with a state 
                                                          
72 The budget in toman had increased during the years but declined in Euro because of the falling currency 
rate in Iran at that time. 
73 Resalat is a conservative daily newspaper in Iran which has been published since 1985.  
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budget. In his view, the dialogue projects of the NGO were funded by a budget for 
dialogue among civilizations that was in the hands of ICRO (Anbarluee, personal 
communication, 2013). But this argument does not fit with the observed facts. 
During the presidency of Ahmadinejad, neither Ahmadinejad’s office nor ICRO 
requested a budget for dialogue among civilizations. Consequently they received 
no budget from the Iranian parliament. The only available relevant legislation to 
give assistance to Khatami’s NGO was a scheduled purchase of 49% of state-
owned shares of a publication by the NGO (Aref 1384 [2005]-a), though the 
legislation was immediately withdrawn after Ahmadinejad became president. 
More details of the budget of Khatami’s NGO are provided in 6.3.1. 
The next question about merging the ICDAC concerns why dialogue activities 
were not pursued in the host organizations: the foreign ministry and ICRO. The 
foreign ministry was unable to continue cultural activities of the center because of 
its organizational structure, as one of the participants mentioned (Khatibzadeh, 
personal communication, 2014). The edare-ye farhangi [cultural office] of the 
Iranian foreign ministry “disappeared” at the end of Khatami’s presidency. Such a 
change can be explained in the context of a division of labor between ICRO and 
the foreign ministry, as discussed in 5.2.2. Hence there was no specific budget or 
relevant office that the foreign ministry could merge the ICDAC into. But still the 
question remains, that if the foreign ministry had no organizational capacity to 
merge the ICDAC, why did it agree to do so? The foreign minister who was in 
charge of the ministry at that time could not remember the details to answer this 
question (Kharazi, personal communication, 2014). Nevertheless, Khatami 
himself believed that the foreign minister did not care about the center; hence 
merging it into ICRO was the only remaining option: 
“Unfortunately […] my foreign affairs minister, who was expected to understand 
the issue more than everybody, he ABSOLUTELY did not understand the 
situation and was not convinced. And I was obligated to give the center to ICRO. 
That time ICRO was not very bad. There were people who were cooperating with 
us […]. I don’t mean Mr. Iraqi specifically, but I mean some people who were 
working in ICRO, whom I don’t want to name, were not bad guys” (Khatami, 
personal communication, 2014). 
 
Despite all Khatami’s hopes and confidence in ICRO, it refused to focus on the 
issue of dialogue among civilizations after one year for various reasons. Firstly, 
ICRO had a priority to focus on religious activities, not to work on other aspects 
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of culture (Abbasi, personal communication, 2014). Apart from that, it was 
mentioned that there was no interest in continuing the work of a center previously 
headed by a “former minister very bureaucratically and in detail” (Dehshiri, 
personal communication, 2013). Secondly, budget limitations and inflexibility 
were mentioned as an obstacle, suggesting that ICRO had no room for extra 
activity (Abbasi, personal communication, 2014, Dehshiri, personal 
communication, 2013). Nevertheless, looking at different volumes of the Iranian 
budget law shows that ICRO changed its budget columns at least five times 
between 1998 and 2015.  
After the official declaration that it would not pursue the activities of the ICDAC, 
ICRO used Farmānyeh for some of its relevant offices or institutes as well as 
some institutes under the authority of the leader. Some parts of the building were 
changed, and one of its floors was turned into a guesthouse for specific purposes 
of ICRO, as some participants of the study mentioned (Habibi, personal 
communication, 2013 and Maleki, personal communication, 2013). The library of 
the ICDAC was merged into the Academy of Art and the books and documents 
transferred to its library, although most were “lost” and “looted” after some time, 
according to a member of the academy library staff who was formerly the head of 
the library at the ICDAC (Zarrabi, personal communication, 2011).  
An attempt to merge the ICDAC into the third state organization, the National 
Center for Globalization Studies (NCGS), in late 2007 led to a clash between this 
center and ICRO. The reason for the clash was Farmānyeh, not dialogue among 
civilizations. A former head of the international department of the center of 
globalization mentioned that it was officially declared in late 2007 that “dialogue 
among civilizations” would be one of the issues of the center. But there was no 
meaningful change in the activities and aims of the center besides a few related 
meetings which were organized from 2011 (Teimouri, personal communication, 
2013), such as a seminar on interfaith dialogue and globalization (NCGS 1390 
[2011]). However, the center of globalization was going to use any issue, 
including “dialogue among civilizations and cultures”, to express the idea of a 
“Common Management of the World”, which was an international discourse of 
Ahmadinejad (Teimouri, personal communication, 2013). To resolve the clash 
with ICRO over Farmānyeh, the head of the administrative department of the 
globalization center wrote letters to the Divān-e edālat-e edāri [council of 
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administrative justice], but they failed to achieve any result (Habibi, personal 
communication, 2013). Farmānyeh was handed over to the presidential office at 
the time of President Rouhani.  
 
6.1.2.3 Practices: Generally and Specifically for Intercultural Dialogue 
Between 1997 and 2005, diverse activities were undertaken by the ICDAC. 
Coordinating and organizing internal and international conferences and seminars, 
funding academic projects and supporting publication were among the main 
general activities of the center. Although the center did not have its own 
publication, it supported at least 25 Iranian publishers to print more than 100 
books and translations in fields such as history, civilization, religion, mythology, 
poetry, art, music, legends of different countries, plus different topics relating to 
philosophy, Islam and modernity. Some of these supported books attracted 
international attention. For instance, the Encyclopedia of the Musical Instruments 
of Iran won the “Klaus P. Wachsmann Prize” for the best publication in the field 
of musical instrument research and organology in 2001 (ICDAC 2002j: 128, 
Williams 2003: 7). The Encyclopedia of Dialogue among Civilizations was 
another project which started at the time of the third president of the ICDAC 
(ICDAC 2004e: 216-217), although the project was never finished.  
The center’s library was one of the richest in Iran, taking into account its size and 
age. This point was mentioned by the former presidents (Mohajerani, personal 
communication, 2014; Faridzadeh, personal communication, 2013), the members 
of staff (Maleki, personal communication, 2013; Zrarabi, personal 
communication, 2011) of the ICDAC and informed individuals (Khaniki, personal 
communication, 2014). The library contained 12,100 books in Farsi and more than 
34,595 books in Arabic, English, German and French (ICDAC 2005b: 77). Some 
valuable art collections and documentaries (films) were also held in the library 
(Maleki, personal communication, 2013).  
The ICDAC also had its own magazine. At the beginning of the center’s activities, 
two, “Children of the earth” and “Culture of dialogue”, were published, but they 
were replaced during the time of the second president by Gozāreš-e Goftegu 
[“Report on dialogue”]. No information about the circulation of the report on 
dialogue is available. However, it was mentioned in the field study that the 
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magazine was welcomed by Iranian students, professors and an educated 
audience. It was regularly sent to different libraries, academic institutes and 
universities of Iran (Malkei, personal communication, 2013; Zarabi, personal 
communication, 2011 and Farahmand, personal communication, 2014). Some 
magazines were also published with the support of the ICDAC, albeit on 
condition that some of their volumes would be devoted to the issue of dialogue 
among civilizations. For example, the magazine Pol-e Firouze devoted 11 issues 
(ICDAC 2005b) and Bokhara magazine one of its volumes to dialogue among 
civilizations. Both magazines were aimed at an educated audience with an interest 
in art and culture. The magazines would be sold in press kiosks of different cities 
in Iran.  
With regard to research and inquiry, the scientific council of the center supported 
53 MA and PhD dissertations and 17 projects (ICDAC 2005b: 79). It also funded 
activities such as film and music festivals, among them some works of Iranian 
directors such as Bahman Qobadi for the film Songs of My Motherland and 
Yasmin Malek-Nasr for the film Afghanistan (ICDAC 2003: 178). Also with the 
support of the center, an Iranian sculptor, Hossein Fakhimi, made a statue of 
Hakim Omar Khayyam,74 which was scheduled to be installed in Florence, Italy 
(ICDAC 2002k: 31).  
As far as training programs were concerned, the center cooperated on some 
projects with Āmuzeš va Parvareš [the education ministry]. One of the projects 
was compiling a pedagogic book which was published to guide teachers of 
schools at motavasseteh75-level education to teach a specific course called 
“dialogue among civilizations” (Ghezelsofla et al. 1382 [2003]). Although the 
center held a seminar and invited a number of teachers from most of the cities and 
towns of Iran to prepare them for teaching the book, the project did not work out. 
According to one of the NGO activists who worked on the project, it had failed 
because of “some disagreements” between the center and the ministry of 
education and training, even before the end of Khatami’s presidency (Sadr, 
personal communication, 2014). 
                                                          
74 Hakim Omar Khayyam was an Iranian polymath, scholar, mathematician and poet who lived in the 12th 
century.  
75 In the Iranian school system, the motavassette consists of three educational bases: seventh, eighth and ninth 
classes.   
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It was also planned to establish a specific type of philosophy training system, as 
the first president of the ICDAC called it a Collège de France, to make the 
ICDAC a “thinking center” of the Islamic world: 
“I liked to establish a Collège de France […]. It is a big thinking center in 
France… the center of natural science and philosophy in France. It has some 
characteristics. [Firstly] everybody in every age and without showing any 
certification can participate in and use the courses [...]. [Secondly] it was not 
giving any certification. Thirdly, that was the point that the biggest thinkers of the 
world would teach there, in. Many people have a dream to just teach two 
semesters in Collège de France. After being able to teach in Collège de France, 
Michel Foucault was recognized as a famous philosopher… And if somebody 
had studied these courses, it would be worth like ten PhDs of the France system. I 
wanted to make something like Collège de France, that everybody from the 
Islamic world comes to and teaches over there. I planned to make its main 
language English and German. If it would be necessary we could develop it to 
French, Arabic and Farsi. Who was coming to teach? The biggest figures of the 
world … yes that was the plan of the ICDAC” (Faridzadeh, personal 
communication, 2013).   
 
However, the idea of turning the ICDAC into a Collège de France was not realized. 
It remained just an idea.  
Another activity of the center was inviting well-known world figures to Iran, for 
example the Brazilian author Paulo Coelho76 (FarsNews 1392 [2013]); Dr. Jürgen 
Habermas,77 the German philosopher (Hoffmann 2002); and Alvin Plantinga, an 
American religious philosopher (ICDAC 2002l: 128) were invited to Iran and 
gave lectures for Iranian audiences. The center furthermore coordinated major 
events to commemorate the work of some German scholars, such as Annemarie 
Schimmel78 in the field of Orientalism and Islam studies, (ICDAC 2002k: 33) and 
Dr. Eckart Ehlers in the field of geography studies (ICDAC 2001: 14). The 
ICDAC had contact with some foreign academic institutes and was able to 
conclude agreements with the Technische Universität Berlin [Technical 
University of Berlin] (ICDAC 2002k: 33), which led to some joint workshops 
(ICDAC 2003: 181). An agreement between the center and the Classic Foundation 
of Weimar 79 (ICDAC 2002m: 117) also resulted in it organizing a conference on 
                                                          
76 In 2000 by mutual invitation of the Ministry of Culture and the Iranian publication Karun 
77 Was invited to Iran in 2000. He held a lecture at the University of Tehran on secularism and its effects on 
Western society. 
78 Cooperating with the Institute of “Extension of Knowledge and Investigation of Iran” –moassese tose- eye 
danesh va pajoohesh-, University of Tehran, and University of Al-Zahra 
79 The ICDAC and Hellmut Th. Seemann, president of foundation of Weimar in 2001, agreed to hold regular 
conferences in Iran and Germany on “dialogue among civilizations”, 13.10.2002, -- 
Chapter 6: Iranian and German Implementing Actors of Intercultural Dialogue 
247  
“Nietzsche, a transnational philosopher”, in Tehran in February 2003 (ICDAC 
2003: 176). In addition to this, the ICDAC became acquainted with 
representatives of some other German institutes, such as Wolfgang Frühwald, the 
then-president of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation80 (ICDAC 2002a: 
117), and Gunter Mulack, the commissioner of intercultural dialogue in the 
German foreign ministry (ICDAC 2002b: 118-119). The center moreover 
cooperated with foreign embassies to show their own culture in Iran. For instance, 
a cultural week of Greece in Kashan in 2004 (ICDAC 2004b: 174), which was 
organized by the Greek embassy, and a conference on the “Influence of Karl 
Raimund Popper on thinking of 20th Century” (ICDAC 2003: 176), which was 
held by the Austrian embassy, both received support from the ICDAC.  
The issue of interfaith dialogue was another axis of the ICDAC’s activities, 
although it did not coordinate any long-term round table meetings over the issue 
as the CID of ICRO had been planning. It focused on the issue of religion as a 
subject of inquiry. It also prepared some meetings and visits with international 
religious delegates. Among the visitors were a delegation from the Association of 
Protestant Churches in Germany (EKD) and a delegation from the Loccum 
Academy (ICDAC 2002c: 112-113).  
The ICDAC mostly concentrated on activities such as conferences, funding 
studies and publications. It did not develop its activities into other forms such as 
student and pupil exchange. A reason mentioned for this limitation was its limited 
budget. In the view of a former president of the ICDAC, funding travel of “100 
pupil, for example, from Morocco, Iran and Germany” called for a big budget, 
which was not within “the capability of the ICDAC” (Mohajerani, personal 
communication, 2014). Domestic political problems were mentioned as another 
reason for the limited activities of the center. According to him even gossip about 
an international activity of the ICDAC could be enough for a call from the 
ministry of Etela’āt [Intelligence Service]. The domestic political pressures were 
not limited to the intelligence service, but came from different conservative media 
and religious groups, too. The newspapers Keyhan and Resalat, for instance, 
covered relevant news regarding the center negatively (Farahmand, personal 
                                                          
80 1999-2007 
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communication, 2014). Furthermore, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi,81 a top clergymen 
of Qum, criticized the political aims of the center, especially after Khatami’s 
presidency ended. He frequently condemned the activities of the ICDAC for being 
to the benefit of “foreign enemies and some specific domestic parties” and having 
nothing to do with the “national interest” of Iranians (Tabnak News 1386 [2007]). 
Moreover, he challenged the budget of the center with the argument that 
“spending millions of dollars” to hold dialogue “behind the closed doors” between 
“certain people” who are accepted by dolat [the administration of Khatami] was 
not acceptable (Fars News 1386 [2007]). Unfortunately, attempts to contact 
Mesbah Yazdi to discuss the issue failed. Nevertheless, a clergymen who has 
participated in some interfaith dialogue of ICRO advised the researcher not to 
insist on visiting Mesbah Yazdi, because it may threaten her security and research 
process (Mohaghegh Damad, personal communication, 2013).  
The activities and policies of the center were not only formed by its aims, age and 
obstacles but also by the personality of its presidents. As mentioned above, the 
first president of the center wrote Khatami’s lecture in the UN on dialogue among 
civilizations. He started running a center that did not fit, organizationally 
speaking, with other state organizations such as the foreign ministry and ICRO. 
Thus it was his ambitious spirit to develop dialogue among civilizations as a 
global idea and to form the structure of the center. It was also his background of 
studying philosophy in Germany and his familiarity with Western philosophical 
academies that motivated him to attempt to plan projects such as the Collège de 
France. He aimed to turn the center into a center of thinking in the Islamic World. 
Some of his colleagues were even convinced that, if the ICDAC had been able to 
continue its activities under his supervision, it would “definitely” have prevented 
the 9/11 attacks (Shafiei, personal communication, 2015). Some believed, 
however, that devoting budget to projects of his trusted people caused a major 
mess when it came to managing the center’s financial crisis, because it received 
only limited funds from the general budget of the presidential office (Farahmand, 
personal communication, 2014). Consequently, a clash between the first president 
of the center and the administration of Khatami over the budget, among some 
other reasons, led to his resignation (Faridzadeh, personal communication, 2013).  
                                                          
81 The name of Mesbah Yazdi is mentioned in 3.2.2 for his critical view on the vague concept of dialogue 
among civilizations, as well as in 5.2.4 for his supportive approach to discourse of interfaith dialogue.  
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The second president, who was formerly a vice president and then a minister of 
culture, changed the structure of the center and made it more systematized and 
rationalized. He was referred to in the field study as “a real bureaucrat” because of 
his rich experience in state organizations (Shafiei, personal communication, 2015; 
Farahmand, personal communication, 2014), so it can be argued that it was his 
personal influence that turned the ICDAC into both a diplomatic center and a 
small cultural ministry. He started to receive high-ranking foreign diplomatic 
delegates from Arab countries, such as the ambassador of Morocco (ICDAC 
2002h: 84), the deputy president of Algeria (ICDAC 2002d: 85), the adviser to the 
King of Oman, (ICDAC 2002e: 116), the ambassador of Bahrein (ICDAC 2002f: 
106), as well as diplomatic guests from Western countries such as the Australian 
ambassador and German consul. These diplomatic visits were not just to build 
bridges between cultures; they were organized to pursue political aims, too. For 
instance, visiting the German consul, Mohajerani mentioned the case of 
fingerprinting of Iranian people at German airports (which seemed to happen in 
some cases in 2002) as a factor that hurt cultural relations between the two 
countries. The consul responded that, because Germany had faced a problem with 
rejecting 4,000 Iranian refugee applications and had seen no response from Iran 
with regard to their return, controls had been tightened at German airports 
(ICDAC 2002c: 112-113). Through these diplomatic visits he tried to subtilize a 
foreign image of Iran. On visiting Giandomenico Picco, the UN representative 
involved in dialogue among civilizations affairs, Mohajerani mentioned that the 
problem of a negative image of Iran could be solved “completely” with visits of 
famous figures like Jürgen Habermas to Iran (ICDAC 2002g: 106).  
With regard to turning the ICDAC into a small cultural ministry in Mohajerani’s 
time, the fields of research, art and publishing received extensive attention from 
him. It seems that he was continuing his domestic cultural activities, this time 
with the means of the center. In some cases, however, he was working beyond the 
bureaucracy and without regard for the views of the scientific groups which where 
assessing the project applications. For instance, an application to direct a film 
about Afghanistan was rejected by experts of the center, but Mohajerani ordered 
the film to be funded anyway (Farahmand, personal communication, 2014). Also, 
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according to a member of the ICDAC staff, who later wrote her PhD82 on the 
organizational sociology of the center, it was challenging to work under his 
supervision, because he cared about increasing quantity, not improving quality: 
“Under his [Mohajerani] management Tolid [production] was sacrificed. There 
was nothing else, too much tankard and hip, too little lunch and dinner. 83 He 
believed that it was so bad that we did not have computer in the ICDAC, you 
know that in time period of 2000 computer did not have its today’s role for 
bureaucratic work in Iranian offices? Right? So he ordered computer. We had 
then computer but to do what? [...] By the way, when you were looking at the 
production of his time, you could see that it is not even one fifth of the production 
of the former president. Again I remind that it was the period time of domination 
of bureaucracy. Therefore everybody tries to show that everything officially has a 
good order. But there was no excitement and love and energy like the time of first 
management” (Shafiei, personal communication, 2015). 
 
The third president’s main role was to protect the ICDAC, though this attempt 
was finally nullified when the center was merged a short time after Khatami’s 
presidency. In fact, his approach to the issue of merging the center was to ignore 
the reality of the newly merged institute: Firstly, the last few issues of the “Report 
on dialogue” (the journal of the ICDAC) covered no news regarding the new 
structure of the center. Secondly, the budget problem of the center was one of his 
concerns. This concern was reflected in the media (Miras news agency 1384 
[2006], Pudforush 1384 [2006]), but it is significant that talking about the budget 
of the former ICDAC when there was a new, merged institute did not make sense. 
Thirdly, appointing him officially as advisor to the head of ICRO indicates a clear 
signal to him from ICRO about a new organizational order (Iranian Diplomacy 
1389 [2010]). However, the fact that two presidents, of the CID and the ICDAC, 
in keeping their positions were working under the roof of the newly merged 
institute illustrates that ICRO for some reason, perhaps respecting Boroujerdi as a 
family member of Ayatollah Khomeini, avoided dismissing one of the directors. 
That is why Boroujerdi continued to ignore the reality of the new, merged 
institute. Finally, members of staff of the ICDAC who suffered in the process of 
the merger were not informed completely about details of the merger by Dr. 
Boroujerdi. According to a former employee of the ICDAC, the members of staff 
                                                          
82 Sahfiei’s dissertation is later published as a book in 2011. Because the book is in French, it 
could not be used in this research. The title of the book is “Etude politico-sociologique d'une 
nouvelle institution en Iran”. 
« Le Centre du Dialogue des Civilisations » 1999- 2006 
83 A Persian metaphor which is used when some marginal and unimportant issues become more important 
than a key issue. 
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did not realize exactly what was going on until they wrote a letter to the council of 
administrative justice: 
“I was informed about things because we wrote a letter of complaint to the 
council of administrative justice […]. There I recognized that the institute of 
dialogue among civilization has been closed down. That means officially there 
was a discussion over CLOSING IT. Just the issue of dialogue among 
civilizations did matter. It meant that there was no ICDAC anymore to be merged 
inside ICRO. It was agreed that ICRO pursue the issue of dialogue among 
civilizations. But it [ICRO] had [officially] no responsibility regarding its staff 
and its building. The building was donated because it was originally owned by 
the municipality [of Tehran]. It was given [firstly] to the ICDAC and then to 
ICRO (Maleki, personal communication, 2013). 
 
6.1.2.4 A Summary on Analysis of the ICDAC 
To complete this section, it is important to again ask the question: What are the 
characteristics of the ICDAC’s cultural activities within the framework of 
intercultural dialogue? The ICDAC was affected by Iran’s fragmented foreign 
cultural policy. A new center was established to focus on the idea of dialogue 
among civilizations, because neither the foreign ministry nor ICRO were able to 
do so. After 1994 and ICRO’s authorization as the responsible organization for 
Iranian foreign cultural policy, the foreign ministry was not a proper fit to focus 
on the idea. Equally, ICRO’s priority was to focus on religious aims and therefore 
also not a good fit. It can be concluded that the foreign cultural policy of Iran was 
too fragmented to be able to deal with the dialogue among civilizations. At that 
time, establishing the ICDAC therefore made more sense or at least was a 
solution. The cultural activities were influenced by the personality and expertise 
of the center’s three presidents. The main target of the cultural activities was a 
domestic (Iranian) audience. The priority was to inform the Iranian audience 
about other cultures and show the world that Iranians are interested in dialogue. 
The cultural activities generally appeared to follow a routine or traditional form, 
such as seminars, participation in exhibitions, publications and support for studies 
and cultural projects. Nevertheless, the center had contact with international 
cultural institutions and actors, including Germany, and cooperated with them on 
some cultural activities. The main focus of activities was on dialogue among 
civilizations. Most of the project titles were articulated with this discourse, for 
example “Environment and dialogue among civilizations” and “Art and dialogue 
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among civilizations”. The presidents of the center were not diplomats, but they 
were key political figures.  
 
 
6.1.3 Other Iranian Actors 
As mentioned at the beginning of 6.1, besides Rayzani and the ICDAC there are 
some other Iranian institutes, organizations, private groups and individual 
volunteers that play a role in implementing (or supporting implementation of) 
cultural activities. Their activities are categorized in this section, because 
compared with Rayzani and the ICDAC, they play a lesser role in dealing with 
intercultural dialogue. Some of them will be discussed briefly in this section. 
 
6.1.3.1 Political Institutions  
Parties and think tanks in Iran have influenced intercultural dialogue only slightly. 
A reason is that they are not strong, and they face limitations in Iran. Among the 
Iranian parties which were legally allowed to work in the Iranian presidential 
election in 2013, there were three conservative parties Etelāf-e Ābādgarān-e Iran-
e Eslāmi [Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran], Hezb-e Etelāf-e Eslāmi [Islamic 
Coalition Party], and Jāme’e-ye Eslāmi Mohandesin [Islamic Society of 
Engineers]. One right-wing party, Kārgozārān-e Sāzandegi [Executives of 
Construction Party], and one reformist party, Hezb-e Etehād-e Mellat-e Iran 
[Union of Islamic Iranian People Party], were also legally active. Many parties 
were also banned after the Islamic Revolution. Most of these parties did not share 
the same views as the conservative ones, or they had reformist ideas. Generally 
speaking, reformist parties attempt to open up international relations with Western 
countries, including Germany. Hence from this point of view they positively but 
indirectly influenced intercultural dialogue with Germany. Because they are under 
political pressure and their members are often sentenced by the Iranian judicial 
system (Radio Free Europe 2017),84 they cannot be that successful in their 
                                                          
84 It was reported in October 2017 that seven leaders of the reformist party Mošārekat [participation front], 
which had already been banned since 2010, had been sentenced to prison. It is therefore clear, if members of 
reformist parties cannot act freely in the country and express themselves freely, they cannot open up 
relationships with the West or work towards dialogue with the West.   
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attempts. Efforts to find members of these parties who are also members of the 
Iranian parliament to participate in this study failed.  
There are some, although not very many, political research institutes in Iran which 
play a role as think tanks. Among them are the Center for Strategic Research 
(CSR) and the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS). The CSR 
was established in 1989 to focus on strategic studies in various fields, including 
political and cultural issues, and to advise the Iranian presidential office, as its 
website states. At the end of the presidency of Hashemi Rafasanjani in 1997, the 
CSR was annexed to the Expediency Council, an organization which was under 
the authority of Hashemi Rafsanjani until his death. Seyed Hossein Mousavian, 
who was the Iranian ambassador in Germany from 1990 to 1997, was a vice 
president of the CSR from 2005 to 2008, which shows that diplomats with 
experience of working with European countries had close contact with this think 
tank. The CSR was also one of the partners in an intercultural dialogue project of 
the DAAD in 2013. This point will be explained more in 6.2.2.  
The next think tank, IPIS, is actually part of the Iranian foreign ministry. Its main 
office is in the ministry’s center for international education and research. The fact 
that it is part of the ministry may challenge the accuracy of IPIS being described 
as a think tank, but at the same time this fact increases its international partners, 
which are actually from the contact list of the ministry. According to its official 
website, IPIS was established in 1983 in order to provide decision making on 
Iranian policy. The Iranian embassies abroad are in close contact with IPIS. It 
periodically appoints researchers to undertake academic activities in those 
embassies. Though IPIS is a political actor, its academic activities are considered 
by the interviewees to be cultural because it represents Iranian views in different 
international meetings and conferences on political issues (Khatibzadeh, personal 
communication, 2014). 
IPIS at the time of Khatami had many exchanges with think tanks, academic and 
political institutes and governmental delegations from Western countries. In 
chapter 2 it was mentioned that Iran at the time of Khatami participated in 
“constructive dialogue”. IPIS was one of the main Iranian actors in charge of 
those meetings. The bulletin of IPIS shows the different Western countries that 
participated in meetings with IPIS as follows: the Stockholm International Peace 
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Research Institute (IPIS 1377 [1998]-b); the Swedish Institute of International 
Relations (Asadzadeh 1378 [1999]-a); the American Center for Muslim-Christian 
Understanding at Georgetown University (IPIS 1377 [1998]-a); the Canadian 
Parliament (Mirfakhraee 1377 [1999]); the Canadian University of Ottawa 
(Dokhanchi 1381 [2002]); the French Parliament (Asadzadeh 1378 [1999]-b); Le 
Centre de Recherches Internationales [center for international studies] (Seif Afjeii 
1383 [2004]); Leiden University from the Netherlands (Asadzadeh 1378 [1999]-
c); the Intercollege University of Cyprus (Khatibzadeh 1379 [2000]); the Institute 
for Political International Studies (Motaghinejad 1379[2000]); the Institute for 
Asian and African Studies from Italy (Mohammadi 1379 [2000]); the Institute for 
Cooperation and International Security (Farsaee 1379 [2000]) together with the 
International Affairs and Foreign Policy Institute from Spain (Hajijafari 1383 
[2004]-b, Moradi 1384 [2005]); Chatham House. The Royal institute of 
International Affairs (Amirbeik 1380 [2001], Sajadpour 1383 [2004]) together 
with the Foreign Policy Center from Britain (Yadegari 1384 [2005]); the Center 
for Arab and Islamic Studies from the Australian National University (Al Habib 
1381 [2002], Khatibzadeh 1380 [2001]); the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs (NUPI) (Farsaee 1381 [2002]); the Royal Institute for International 
Relations and the University of Liège and the foreign affairs ministry of Belgium 
(Hajijafari 1381 [2002]). Furthermore, some diplomatic delegates from the 
foreign ministries of Serbia and Montenegro (Qods 1383 [2004]), Hungary, 
(Moradi 1383 [2004]), Finland (Musavi 1378 [1999], Sharifian 1381 [2002]), and 
Poland (Qods 1380 [2001], Qods 1381 [2002]) were in exchange with IPIS in that 
period. In almost all the meetings, “dialogue among civilizations” was mentioned 
by IPIS as a main foreign policy approach of Iran towards Western countries.  
IPIS also had contacts with different German political actors such as Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) (Araghchi 1378 [1999], Dabiri 1381 [2002], 
Shirgholami 1382 [2003]), the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Qods 1382 [2003]), 
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (Musavi 1383 [2004]), Leibniz-Institut Hessische 
Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung [the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt] 
(Hajijafari 1383 [2004]-a) and some delegations from the German federal 
parliament, for instance from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party (Qods 
1382 [2003]). It is also notable that IPIS participated in a conference, “Europe and 
Islamic World: Role of Dialogue”, which was held in Islamabad in 2004 with the 
Chapter 6: Iranian and German Implementing Actors of Intercultural Dialogue 
255  
support of the Hanns Seidel Stiftung (Khodagholipour 1383 [2004]). Meetings 
between the German side and IPIS were on different issues, such as the Caspian 
Sea, energy, the situation of Iraq after the 2003 war, and the nuclear technology of 
Iran. The latter issue in 2004 resulted in some tensions between the Iranian and 
German participants. The atmosphere of a meeting which took place after a report 
of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) on Iran’s secret attempts to 
enrich uranium was not especially positive. The report of the meeting illustrates 
that members of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and IPIS could not trust 
each other and had security concerns85 (Hajijafari 1383 [2004]-a). In a meeting 
between the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and IPIS in 2004, Udo Steinbach, a 
German participant who had a key role in “critical dialogue” between the EU and 
Iran, also criticized a “dichotomy” in Iran’s decision-making process regarding 
nuclear power and the EU. He argued that the domestic policy of Iran and the 
clash between conservatives and reformists had prevented European countries 
from understanding Iran’s clear approach. Steinbach’s comment was met with 
opposition from two Iranian diplomats in the meeting. Mostafa Tork Zahrani 
stated that decision making on Iranian foreign policy was always according to the 
Iranian constitution. Abbas Araghchi also responded that the Islamic Republic of 
Iran was a successful model of combining religion and policy. He complained that 
Steinbach had an incomplete understanding of the Iranian political system (Nili 
1383 [2004]).  
In round tables, a combination of German actors rather than a delegation from a 
single German institute often participated, while on the Iranian side such a 
diversity of delegates was rarely apparent. The presence of Boroujerdi, the last 
president of the ICDAC, in a meeting with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung was one 
of those rare cases (Qods 1382 [2003]). 
                                                          
85 In 2002, one of the Iranian exile groups publicly disclosed some locations of Iran’s illegal nuclear activity. 
Afterwards, there was skepticism at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and internationally 
about Iran’s honesty and its responsibility to respect its promises. Based on the Paris agreement between Iran 
and the European Union 3 -France, Germany and United Kingdom-, Iran made a deal to suspend its 
enrichment process. By early 2004, however, based on some reports, the IAEA argued that Iran had 
unraveled the deal. In the meeting between IPIS and the Peace Institute of Frankfurt, the German and Iranian 
sides both gave their views of this issue. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 
who at that time was advisor to the foreign affairs minister, mentioned three points to clarify the Iranian side: 
1. Iran purchased enriched uranium from Germany, England and France for more than 20 years, although the 
good was never delivered to Iran, therefore there is no way for Iran to simply attempt to release it from its 
own resources. 2. Iran voluntarily accepted to suspend enrichment of uranium, therefore Iran did not break 
any rule when it resumed enrichment, judicially speaking. 3. There is a lesson for Iran never to trust 
international agreements and Western countries. 
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From 1997 to 2005, IPIS also attempted to support the ICDAC by putting it in 
contact with some Western embassies and international institutes (Shafiei, 
personal communication, 2015). At the commemoration of Annemarie Schimmel 
(ICDAC 2005a: 189), the conference of Immanuel Kant (Sajadpour, personal 
communication, 2013), invitation to the inter-parliamentary conference between 
Iran, Italy, Egypt and Greek under the title of “Millennium of understanding, the 
relationship between Eastern and Western civilizations”86 (Amirbeik 1379 [1999]) 
and the conference of “Human rights and dialogue among civilizations” 
(Sharifian/Hadivash 1380 [2001]),87 IPIS assisted the ICDAC or other institutes 
which were active in the field of intercultural dialogue. Moreover, IPIS had sent 
some of its experts to intercultural dialogue conferences in India (IPIS 1379 
[2001]) and Japan (Sonboli 1380 [2001]). It also invited Chandra Mozaffar, the 
first director of the Center for Civilizational Dialogue at the University of 
Malaysia (Alavikia 1377 [1999]), and Simon Frederick Peter Halliday, a scholar 
in international relations and Middle East studies (Amirbeik 1379 [1999]), for an 
individual meeting. The head of the ministry’s center of education at that time was 
Sadegh Kharazi. He supported IPIS to undertake more cultural activities and was 
a key person who accompanied Khatami in the dialogue among civilizations 
activities of his NGO in Geneva from 2005 (Kharazi, personal communication, 
2013). This point will be discussed more in 6.1.3.4. 
Although IPIS had an engaged role regarding the issue of dialogue among 
civilizations, it did not merge the ICDAC into the foreign ministry in 2005. 
Support for IPIS was intended to reach two aims in the view of Ali Mousavi: 
firstly, to institutionalize the idea of dialogue among civilizations; and secondly, 
to form a theoretical basis for the foreign policy of Iran. But the lack of a practical 
program for the idea was a major weak point and turned it into “a beautiful empty 
moto” (Musavi 1380 [2001]). However, it is significant that Khatami did believe 
that IPIS, which belonged to the foreign ministry, was the best option for the 
ICDAC could merge into: 
“I liked to merge this center [ICDAC] to research institute of the foreign affairs 
ministry, which has worked in this field [intercultural dialogue] a lot. Yes, there 
was a research institute there. The ICDAC also could work over there, but 
                                                          
86 Original title in Farsi: Hezāre-ye tafāhom, ravābet-e mian-e tamadonhā-ye šarq v qarb 
87 Cooperating with the university of Mofid of Qum, the information office of the UN, National Commission 
of UNESCO, Commission of Islamic Human Rights 
Chapter 6: Iranian and German Implementing Actors of Intercultural Dialogue 
257  
unfortunately it did not […] That time Mr. Moayyeri was its head, it was very 
good” (Khatami, personal communication, 2014).  
 
During the presidency of Ahmadinejad from 2005 to 2013, many Western 
institutes and partners did not continue their contact with IPIS, as information 
from Iranian participants and the internal bulletins of IPIS show. A few Western 
countries, such as Romania (As'ad 1388 [2009], Shahmohammadi 1386 [2007]-b), 
Poland (Karami 1387 [2008]), Sweden (Seif Afjeii 1388 [2009], Shahmohammadi 
1391 [2013]), Norway (Javidnia 1389 [2010]), and Italy (Karami 1392 [2013]) 
remained in contact with IPIS. Some institutes, such as the Danish Institute for 
International Studies (Bazubandi 1391 [2012]), were added to the list of Western 
partners of IPIS. Some researchers from IPIS and the Freie Universität Berlin 
participated in an international conference, “Salzburg Energy”, which took place 
in Austria in 2010. The news of this conference was titled in the bulletin as 
“roundtable with Frei university of Berlin” (Binyaz 1389 [2010]). But the content 
informs readers that representatives from Freie Universität and IPIS participated 
in an international conference, not a special session.  
According to a researcher of the SWP, there was no longer any interest among the 
German political institutes to maintain their contact with IPIS, because the head of 
the Iranian state in that period clearly denied the Holocaust (Zamirirad, personal 
communication, 2015). IPIS itself was not happy with the lack of meetings with 
Western partners. The titles of some meetings of IPIS at that time show that its 
members were looking for a way to re-connect with their European partners. For 
instance, the topic of a meeting in 2007 was to discuss Germany as a proper 
alternative partner for Iran (Shahmohammadi 1386 [2007]-a: 18-21). In 2011 
there was another meeting, held by IPIS, to discuss solutions and strategies to 
make connections with European countries (Seif Afjeii 1390 [2011]). 
Besides IPIS, the Office for Documents and Diplomatic History of the Iranian 
foreign ministry prepared a two-day conference in Tehran in early 2001 on the 
issue of Turan, which refers to an ethnic group of the same name that lived in 
Central Asia.88 The conference was held to discuss different dimensions of this 
ethnicity, such as language, identity and literature, with academics and diplomats 
                                                          
88 Stories of Turan are mentioned in Iranian literature and ancient books such as Avesta and Shahnameh. 
According to these stories, the people of Turan chose to settle in different geographical locations in Central 
Asia. 
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from Tajikistan, Russia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, as 
well as experts from Western countries including Hungary, Greece and the USA. 
The participation of Mohajerani, the second president of the ICDAC, in this 
conference was significant. Initially, the Turkish foreign ministry intended to 
reject the invitation, perceiving the conference as a tool to convince the world that 
Iran had the major portion in the Turan heritage, as a member of the conference 
organizing team stated. But the misunderstanding was solved through pre-talks. A 
Turkish delegation finally participated in the conference, as the aim of the 
conference was peace, as this member of the team mentioned: 
“We wanted to say, we are not different. We are all children of Fereydun, who 
the last centuries have been separated. Let’s talk about our common origin in 
peace” (Moujani, personal communication, 2016).  
 
To sum up the points regarding Iranian political institutions, it can be said that the 
active political institutions are dependent on the Iranian state. The political parties 
have limitations on how they can act and work; they are under pressure from the 
judicial system. The variety of parties is limited; members of reformist parties are 
often imprisoned for a time or at least sentenced to prison. At the time of 
Khatami, when the parties had representatives in the parliament, they were able to 
support the relationship and dialogue with the West, but after Khatami their 
activities were restricted. Among the active think tanks, IPIS is fully dependent on 
the Iranian foreign ministry. Consequently, at the time of the reformist president 
Khatami, it conducted more meetings (and used the discourse of dialogue among 
civilizations in its communications) with Western and German partners than at 
that of hardliner president Ahmadinejad.  
 
 
6.1.3.3 Religious Institutions 
There are some Iranian institutes and centers which are active in the religious 
realm and conduct interfaith dialogues. Most of them have a base in Qom. Their 
financial sources are not mentioned on their official websites; but, based on 
information from the field study, they get their financial support from the 
religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state, Qum seminaries and the top 
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clergymen of Qum (Khaniki, 2013, personal communication, 2014; Tabatabaei, 
personal communication, 2013). Since some of these institutes train and educate 
students in the field of theology, they also have a budget from the Iranian 
parliament as academic institutes. The other Iranian religious centers and 
institutes are located in Germany and, according to the information from the field 
study, mostly receive financial support from the Iranian Islamic Center of 
Hamburg, and consequently from the religiously legitimated sector (Tarighat, 
personal communication, 2014). From the huge number of Iranian religious 
institutes, some which are mentioned significantly by participants in the field 
study are described briefly in the following. 
Majma’e Taqrib-e Mazāheb [Assembly for approximating the Islamic 
denominations] is an institute which was merged into the new organizational 
structure of ICRO in 1995, as discussed in 2.4.2 and 5.2.2. Taqrib has close 
contact with other religious institutes and universities of Qum. It represents the 
official views of the Iranian state, and specifically those of the leader, at 
international events and conferences.  
Moassese-ye āmuzeši va pazuheši-ye Adyān va Mazāheb-e Hoze-ye Elmyeh Qum 
[Center for religious studies of the Qum seminary] has been established since 
1996. It began its activities as a library. Afterwards it was extended to become a 
research institute and held meetings and seminars on different religions of the 
world (Tavassoli 2010: 98).  
Moassese-ye āmuzeši va pazuheši-ye Emam Khomeini [Imam Khomeini education 
and research institute] initially received financial support from Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Since his death, it has been financed by the leader at the time. In 1995, 
according to its official website, its name was changed to Imam Khomini Institute 
(IKIRI 2015). It is headed by Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi, a clergyman whose name 
has been mentioned previously in this research for his critical views on dialogue 
among civilizations, his political support of Ahmadinejad and also his active role 
in some interfaith dialogues.  
Dānešgāh-e Adyān va Mazāheb [University of Religions and Denominations] was 
established in 1994. According to information on its official website, the institute 
was founded by some scholars of the Qum seminary to focus on the three fields of 
Abrahamian, Eastern and Islamic religions (including theological schools, sects, 
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mysticism and Sufism). Ten years later, in 2004, the institute was recognized as 
an academic center by the ministry of science and could receive students. The 
university is in cooperation with 48 international and national institutes, including 
Paderborn University in Germany and the Iranian Al-Mustafa University. It also 
engaged in intercultural dialogue cooperation within the framework of the DAAD 
activities by both Paderborn and Al-Mustafa University. This will be explained 
later, in 6.2.2.  
Jamā’atal Mustafā al-Ālamyeh [Al-Mustafa International University] has 50,000 
students from 122 countries in the field of religious studies (Al-Mustafa 
University 2015). It was established in 2007 from the merger of two state 
organizations, the Organization of Schools and Seminaries Abroad and the Global 
Center of Islamic Science (A'erafi 1394 [2016]). The university has a 
parliamentary budget. Its director is appointed by the leader (A'erafi 1394 [2016]). 
Al-Mustafa University and the University of Religions and Denominations were 
both partners of Paderborn University in the field of interreligious dialogue, as 
mentioned above.  
The religious institutes of Qum represent official state views. Nevertheless a 
participant of the study, who did his PhD on the topic of Iran’s interfaith dialogue, 
argues that even such an engagement in interfaith dialogue has positive aspects for 
two reasons. His first is that one cannot argue that, because these religious 
institutes are funded by the Iranian state or the leader, there is no dissident person 
within them. Even among very radical and official delegates there is sometimes an 
opportunity for a liberal thinker to participate: 
“[…] I have seen many people who seem to be from the [Iranian] state, like from 
gang of Khamenei, perhaps they officially are on top. But see, amongst 
themselves they have different views which could be even against the 
government and Khamenei. That is the reason that [I say] I have seen a kind of 
freedom there. Perhaps one officer is very formal but his talks and views were 
according to Soroush ideas and religious pluralism… for instance Dr. Malekian 
three times a week was going to Qum. In one of the organizations which he was 
teaching, one of the organizations that was strongly governmental and had 
support from Khamenei. Talks of Malekian had milliards miles distance from 
[talks] of Mullas such as Khamenei […] and then you see somebody like Dr. 
Akrami an incredibly open-minded man as the head of interfaith dialogue [CID of 
the ICRO] (Tavassoli, personal communication, 2015).  
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His second reason is that, even if the views of a radical religious clergy represent 
Iranian official views on an issue, this must still be perceived as a progressive 
step, because it indicates that even the hardliner section of the Iranian state has a 
dialogue approach towards communication with the world: 
“See, the referee of my dissertation was the one who had more than anybody else 
interfaith dialogue with Mesbah Yazdi and his gang […] Mesbah himself went 
frequently over there and became guest of him […] Hence I know what the 
position of Mesbah in our country is, but at least in front of foreigners he got 
gesture like this […]. See, for me that is enough to tell the West that even an 
extremist wild person like him still involves in dialogue. Just expressing such a 
point was my first aim” (Tavassoli, personal communication, 2015) 
 
Although most of the institutes which are involved in interfaith dialogue are 
located in Qum, some of them have been active in Tehran. Moasese-ye Goftogu-
ye Adyān [Institute for Interreligious Dialogue] (IID) is one of those institutes. It 
was established in 2001 and its director is Mohammad Ali Abtahi (Tavassoli 
2010: 96). It is located in Tehran and focuses on interfaith dialogue by holding 
seminars, courses, and programs for pupils, as well as religious tours for 
participants of different religions. It works as a non-governmental institute, that is 
to say, without the support of clergymen of Qum, or the leader (Abtahi, personal 
communication, 2013).  
Abtahi was the head of Mohammad Khatami’s office during his presidency. After 
Abtahi’s arrest following the presidential election in 2009, the institute reduced its 
activities. Abtahi mentioned in an interview that when the IID was active, he tried 
to represent an Islamic partner, contrary to some institutes of Qum, which does 
not insist on the truth of its own view. He wanted to show the Christian side that 
he believes in common ground between Islam and other religions: 
“You should take a common ground between religions and start from that point 
for example believe in God […] the approach of institutes in Qum, like Mr. 
Mesbah’s institute, is that “we are the total truth”. And because we are the total 
truth, we have to have dialogue to express it” (Abtahi, personal communication, 
2013). 
 
At the time that the IID was active, Abtahi used (at least) two opportunities to 
extend its relations with other religious actors. Firstly, as the head of the 
president’s office for Khatami, he had close contact with religious delegates who 
came to Iran and were guests of the president. Through one of these visits, Abtahi, 
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in cooperation with Martin Affolderbach from Evangelische Kirche in 
Deutschland (EKD), managed to hold a triangle interfaith dialogue between Iran, 
Germany and Britain. The second opportunity, which was mentioned by 
participants in the field study, was using the internet (Abtahi, personal 
communication, 2013; Akrami, personal communication, 2015; Sadr, personal 
communication, 2014). At that time (from 2001 to 2005), internet use among 
Iranians was increasing. Hence the IID started to set up its website and its 
electronic magazine. It established contacts with several institutes and individual 
users internationally through its internet facilities.  
Some of the Iranian religious institutions which have engaged in interfaith 
dialogue are located in Germany, for instance Markaz-e Eslāmi-ye Hamburg 
[Islamic Center of Hamburg]. Its name has been mentioned several times in this 
research. A history of its establishment in the 1950s is provided in 2.3. Key 
figures such as Ayatollah Beheshti, who was a founding father of the Islamic 
Revolution of Iran; Dr. Shabestari, a dissident religious intellectual; Mohammad 
Khatami, the former Iranian president; and Mohammad Moghaddam, the head of 
the publication of Imam Khomieni in Iran were Imam/directors of the center at 
various times. They were appointed by clergymen of Qum, as the center’s website 
suggests (IZH 2013). It is not clear from the text who appointed the succeeding 
directors of the center; but because it is mentioned in the field study that the main 
financial source of the center is the leader’s international office (Moghadam, 
personal communication, 2012, Tarighat, personal communication, 2014), it can 
be surmised that the directors are appointed by the leader. The center is an Iranian 
foreign cultural instrument for expressing “true Islam” and the “Islamic 
Revolution’s values” in Europe (Ansari 1391 [2012]). It also sometimes receives 
parliamentary financial assistance for specific needs, such as construction or 
repairs (Habibi 1376 [1997]).  
The Islamic Center of Hamburg holds religious seminars and events. It supports 
translation and publication of books regarding Islamic issues in Farsi, Arabic and 
German. It has connections with some German religious institutes. Some German 
participants identify the name of the center with its former directors, Shabestari 
and Khatami (Mulack, personal communication, 2015; Kreft, personal 
communication, 2014; Steinbach, personal communication, 2014). Abbas 
Hosseini Ghaemmaghami, who was the head of the center from 2004 to 2008, was 
Chapter 6: Iranian and German Implementing Actors of Intercultural Dialogue 
263  
also mentioned as an open-minded clergyman in the field study (Steinbach, 
personal communication, 2014). Ghaemmaghami published an article in German 
which argues that there is no sentence in the Quran that confirms the death penalty 
by stoning for adulterers (Ghaemmaghami 2010), as well as a book on Islam in 
Europe (Hosseini Ghaemmaghami 2010). According to an interviewee in the field 
study, the directors and members of staff of the center have shown great tolerance 
toward ideas which are not necessarily compatible with their own. In an 
anniversary meeting he spoke about the key role of Shabestari, Khatami and 
Ghaemmaghami in intercultural dialogue. This comment met with a reluctant 
response in the meeting, but still he was surprised to be tolerated by those who did 
not agree with his view: 
“When I was talking in the seminar, part of them looking at somewhere else […]. 
They did not like it at all. […] But nevertheless I appreciated that. Although they 
knew that I am very close to Ghaemmaghami- or all the time that Khatami was 
coming to Hamburg, we meet each other. So they knew that. Despite this fact, 
they invited me. That again shows that people [in the Islamic Center of Hamburg] 
are large brain and perception” (Steinbach, personal communication, 2014).  
 
Among the latest activities of the Islamic Center of Hamburg, its cooperation with 
the Academy for World Religions of the University of Hamburg to hold seminars 
on “unity of religious groups” and “anti-extremism” is notable. The presence of 
Katayoun Amirpour as a deputy director of the academy at those events is 
significant, because she is a follower of religious intellectuals such as Shabestari; 
and she does not wear the hijab,89 which is obligatory in Iran. 
Interreligious dialogue has not been seen at the heart of activities of the 
institutions discussed above. Reviewing the content of their websites and their 
publications that were available for this study suggests that they focus on 
educational programs, training young Iranian and international Tollab and 
Moballegh, rather than implementation of interreligious dialogue with the 
Western countries. Most of them are nevertheless dependent on the funds of high 
clergymen (like Mesbah Yazdi, the leader himself) to administer their seminary 
and various interfaith dialogue programs (Moghadam, personal communication, 
                                                          
89 The word hijab refers to a typical Islamic garment. Women wear hijab in the presence of adult males 
outside of their immediate family, to cover their head and chest. Wearing hijab in Iran is obligatory even for 
foreign and non-Muslim women. 
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2012). Those which have been active without dependency on those financial 
sources and support (like IID) had no opportunity to work for a long time.  
 
6.1.3.4 Dialogue Institutions  
As mentioned in 2.4.2, civil society was able to operate in the open political 
landscape at the time of Khatami from 1997 to 2005. Many NGOs were 
established during that period. The scope for their work was general, but they 
were able to initiate diverse activities on themes such as dissent theology and 
women’s rights. But the balance of this situation shifted back into the hands of 
conservatives in early 2006, when Ahmadinejad came to office. Thus the civil 
society actors gradually disappeared or became inactive like the IID, which was 
discussed in 6.1.3.3. Among those NGOs, some were working within the 
framework of intercultural dialogue. According to one of the former officers of 
the ICDAC in charge of cooperating with NGOs and university centers, up to the 
end of 2005 there were nearly 100 NGOs in different Iranian cities that were 
working on the topic of dialogue among civilizations. Nearly every university has 
a dialogue among civilizations center (Shadorvan, personal communication, 
2013). Two significant NGOs in this field are described below. 
The Dialogue among Civilizations and Cultures Institute, in short dialogue NGO 
of Khatami, which was established in 2005 by Khatami and some of his friends, 
such as Hadi Khaniki. The first director of the NGO was Ahmad Masjidjamee, a 
former culture minister, after which Khatami himself was the director for a short 
period, followed by Hadi Khaniki. The NGO had two offices: one in Tehran and 
one in Geneva (Khaniki, personal communication, 2013; Khatami, personal 
communication, 2014; Kharazi, personal communication, 2013). The Geneva 
office, the Foundation for Dialogue among Civilizations, is mostly managed by 
Sadegh Kharazi. The foundation received financial support from some former 
world leaders and international institutes such as the Oslo Center for Peace and 
Human Rights (Khatami, personal communication, 2014; Kharazi, personal 
communication, 2013).  
The dialogue NGO of Khatami organized activities such as the “religion in the 
new world” conference in Tehran in 2008. This conference attracted public 
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attention for inviting famous international figures like Kofi Annan, the former UN 
Secretary General. The NGO also managed to hold different seminars and events, 
for instance in recognition of William C. Chittick, an American Islamic 
philosopher in 2008 (Sadeghi 1387 [2008]), who was invited to take part. The 
Egyptian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs also invited Khatami, as the head 
of the NGO, to participate in its annual conference at Al-Azhar University in 
2007. The event attracted the attention of Arab intellectuals and journalists. For 
instance, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, one the most popular journalists of the 
Arab world, invited Khatami and his group to his private farm (Khaniki, personal 
communication, 2013: Khatami, personal communication, 2014). The NGO at 
that time was optimistic about strengthening the relationship between the main 
actors of the Islamic world through common cultural activities between Egypt and 
Iran. However, this trend was interrupted by the post-presidential election of 
2009. 
The main source of funding for the NGO were two international speeches that 
Khatami conducted before the presidential election of 2009. Although its financial 
sources have been questioned by some conservative media, specifically Resalat 
newspaper (Anbarluee, personal communication, 2013), it was significant that the 
budget was constructed from legal incomes of Khatami as a former president. 
Earning money from speeches is an international norm for former presidents. 
Khatami stated that he mostly resisted accepting payment for his speeches at 
international conferences, because he was aware that Iranian conservatives would 
easily label him as an agent supported by the Western countries:  
“I got no financial assistance. Although [some people] claim that I was getting 
money from this and that place. But I did not demand any money. I even did not 
use my legitimate right. You know that when Mr. Clinton, Mr. Gorbatschow and 
all other former presidents were going to give a speech to any place, a huge 
amount of money would be invoice to their bank account. Not to their personal 
bank account, of course [but their institute]. I also could do the same. I could say 
that when you invite me to a university, then invoice 100,000 $ to a specific bank 
account… there would be no problem. But I was not doing that. Just two 
institutes […] without my demand, they transfer money to the bank account of 
NGO of dialogue among civilizations” (Khatami, personal communication, 
2014). 
 
The speaking fee that the former president Bill Clinton earned is an average of $ 
110,000 per speech (Bovée 2003: 94). The fees Khatami earned from his 
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speeches, which were $ 25,000 $ and $40,000, were thus between 22% and 36% 
of the fee that Clinton charged for his speeches. 
The activities of both offices of the dialogue NGO of Khatami decreased after the 
presidential election of 2009 for two reasons. Firstly, the political atmosphere in 
society did not allow the staff of the NGO to undertake activities easily; and 
secondly, the passports of key figures of the NGO such as Mohammad Khatami 
and Hadi Khaniki were confiscated. Consequently, there were limitations on their 
ability to participate in international events.90 It also meant that Khatami could not 
make speeches abroad to support the NGO financially. The illness of Sadegh 
Kharazi also led to the activities of the Geneva office being paralyzed.91   
Kānun-e Goftogu [dialogue center] is the next organization which has been active 
in implementing dialogue activities. It belongs to the cultural and research 
institute of Imam Musa Sadr in Iran. The Imam Musa Sadr Institute has an office 
in Lebanon and one in Iran. Its Iran office was established in 1382 [2002] to 
pursue the destiny of the kidnapping of Imam Musa Sadr.92 The institute engaged 
in dialogue among civilizations by organizing a seminar in 2001 in Beirut. The 
opening messages of the seminar were from Mohammad Khatami and Pope John 
Paul II (ICDAC, 1380 [2001]-b, p. 28). The dialogue center was established a few 
years later to hold workshops and training courses to teach dialogue skills. The 
institute and the center are managed mostly by Imam Musa’s nephews, 
grandchildren and cousins.  
The dialogue center was established with the efforts of Fatemeh Sadr, a volunteer 
activist who had contact with the ICDAC, Khatami’s dialogue NGO. She is also a 
distant relative and friend of Mohammad Khatami. Fatemeh Sadr has been living 
in Germany since the 1960s, although she has maintained close contact with 
Iranian society. She translated a book by Johannes Hartkemeyer on dialogue skills 
and consequently invited Johannes and Martina Hartkemeyer to Iran, with the 
support of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, in 1384 [2005]. The invitation to the 
                                                          
90 Observation: From talking to both Khtamai and Khaniki at the end of 2014 and updating the information at 
the end of 2016, it became apparent that they still do not have their passports. Both of them made fun of it in 
our conversations.  
91 Observation: Sadegh Kharazi Kharazi has suffered from, and survived, a bout of cancer. It was obvious 
from visiting him at Frankfurt am Main airport in March 2013 for the research interview that he had become 
very weak and cannot often travel internationally. In conversation, it was clear that he nevertheless has great 
passion for diplomatic activities. 
92 Imam Musa Sadr was an Iranian-Lebanese clergyman, philosopher and leader of a Shī‘ah minority in 
Lebanon. He went missing while traveling to Libya in 1978. All searches and efforts to clarify his 
disappearance have produced no result to this day. 
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Hartkemeyer family at that time was also welcomed by the ICDAC. Through this 
invitation, Fatemeh Sadr was also able to convince the main team of the Imam 
Musa Sadr Institute to establish a dialogue center. As a result, the newly 
established center developed some activities, such as training courses relating to 
the issue of dialogue. Johannes Schopp was the next expert to be invited from 
Germany to hold training workshops in dialogue methods for parents in 2007 
(Wehner/Schopp 2008). Thereafter, the center extended its activities to include 
training dialogue guides, too. The center focused on conducting dialogue courses 
for family members, physicians, teachers, pupils, therapists and similar. It avoided 
engaging in political issues or dialogue between Iran’s religious groups, as a 
member of the institute explains: 
“Our work has started but very slow. Because we don’t perceive ourselves 
political. Individually anybody can have [political] approaches, but the center is 
COMPLETELY apolitical […] but if you mean working with religious groups, 
we don’t have still such a plan. We believe that they are not our priority. Means 
that our main problem is not in field of relationship between Jewish, Christian 
and Muslim people in Iran. We think the main problem is now the problem of 
little tolerance among ourselves…we don’t claim to work on plural political 
groups” (Daeepour, personal communication, 2013).  
 
Through her contact with both Iranian and German society, her friendship with 
Khatami and communication with the ICDAC and Khatami’s dialogue NGO, 
Fatameh Sadr played a key role in initiating some future dialogue programs 
between Iran and Germany. Her role cannot be explained accurately by her 
personal interest and work as a volunteer or her institutional efforts to promote 
knowledge of dialogue skills in Iranian society by translating books and articles 
and inviting German experts. She rather played the role of an informed mediator 
between the two countries. She recommended Khatami invite Dr. Jochen Hippler, 
a German Middle East scholar, to Iran in 2008. This invitation led at a later stage 
to academic exchanges between Iran and Germany and specifically turned into a 
DAAD exchange project from 2012 to 2015 within the framework of intercultural 
dialogue. The question is therefore why the ICDAC and Rayzani of Iran in 
Germany and ICRO have not benefited more from her assistance. Fatemeh Sadr 
responded to this question as follows: 
“Before I start the project of workshop of dialogue in the center of Imam Musa 
Sadr’s institute, I suggested it to the ICDAC. I went to Mr. Mohajerani [the 
second president]. I told him that one of the bases of dialogue among civilizations 
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is firstly to learn how to conduct dialogue. If the ICDAC supported us [I and my 
team], we would hold workshops and would teach dialogue skills over there. Mr. 
Mohajerani did not understand my point and told me that there are some 
telephones which one can call them and talk about his/her problem. Perhaps I did 
not explain my meaning properly. I also told Dr. Boroujerdi about it, but it did 
not work […] I have heard from some people that I should go to the ICDAC and 
size my project with an insistence, but I am not such a person” (Sadr, personal 
communication, 2014). 
 
When asked about contact with Rayzani, she responded that she had no indication 
that cooperation with Rayzani would be possible at that time. She or her team had 
not explored such an option. In conversation with participants of Rayzani, nobody 
could remember her name. They could not remember details of cooperation which 
took place a couple of years before the time of the research.  
There are not many organizations and groups which implement dialogue activities 
as discussed above. The dialogue NGO of Khatami faced political restrictions 
after 2009. The dialogue center of Imam Musa Sadr Institute concentrates on 
gaining distance from political issues to be able to continue its work. It seems that 
it has been able to work since its establishment without a break or any ban. It 
promotes methods and techniques of dialogue among families and young people.  
 
6.1.3.5 Academic Institutions  
Academic organizations of the Iranian state such as the Ministry of Science, 
Research and Technology, Ministry of Health and Medical Education as well as 
ICRO have a role in supporting international academic exchanges, including 
giving financial assistance to Iranian students to study abroad and supporting 
foreign students to study in Iran. Some Iranian universities also individually have 
programs to support foreign students. For instance, Al-Mustafa International 
University, which was discussed in 6.1.3.3, supports foreign theology students to 
study in Iran. Alzahra University (a women-only university), Beheshti University, 
Isfahan University, Amirkabir University, Tehran University of Medical Sciences 
(which is under the authority of the Ministry of Health and Medical Education), 
Tehran University, and Azad University (which is run by the private sector in 
Iran) provide opportunities for foreign students to study in Iran. Financial support 
for foreign students is allowed in two forms: the first exempts them from 
Chapter 6: Iranian and German Implementing Actors of Intercultural Dialogue 
269  
registration fees, paying costs of accommodation and family members; the second 
covers registration fees (Moin/Farhadi 2000).   
Unfortunately, no statistics regarding the number of foreign students, the number 
of scholarships and the change in numbers between 1998 and 2013 are available. 
The websites of both ministries and ICRO do not present relevant information. 
Several attempts to contact experts and members of staff of these organizations, 
by email and telephone calls, likewise produced no result.93 Nevertheless, news 
releases suggest that 1,000 foreign students annually are studying at Iranian 
universities. Of those, 250 students are studying Farsi language (Tasnim news 
12.01.2016). In a meeting held between Nili Ahmadabadi, the dean of the 
University of Tehran, and Ebrahimi Torkaman, the head of ICRO, it was stressed 
that the University of Tehran and ICRO should conclude an agreement to support 
foreign students financially to encourage them to study in Iran (Tasnim news 
12.01.2016). The head of the Department of Education and Research of ICRO 
also announced in a press interview that ICRO planned in 2011 to give 400 Indian 
students scholarships to study Farsi (Mehr news 04.02.2011). ICRO gave some 
scholarships to students of Central Asian countries, for instance to students of the 
Eurasian National University of Kazakhstan, to study Iran studies (ICRO 2016b). 
 
6.1.3.6 A Summary on Other Iranian Actors  
To sum up this section, one question must be repeated: What are the 
characteristics of cultural activities implemented or supported by the Iranian 
actors in the framework of intercultural dialogue? What have they done with 
regard to intercultural dialogue? Their activities are incoherent and fragmented. 
Religious institutes which are under the authority or close to the religiously 
legitimated sector have implemented some interfaith dialogues almost throughout 
the 1998–2013 period. However, interfaith dialogue has not been the focus of 
their activities. Organizations which have worked in a non-governmental capacity 
and closer to reformists have faced obstacles to working continuously in Iran. 
NGOs which work specifically on dialogue have faced political pressures in a way 
that has decreased their activities or prompted them to focus on target groups 
                                                          
93 Attempts have been made to contact Dr. Ebrahim Hajizadeh, head of the office of scholarship of the 
Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, and Abdulhossein Daneshfar, head of the Germany section in 
the scholarship office, for more information. Unfortunately, no response has been received by the researcher. 
Last update of contact with them: 2017.3.23 
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(such as parents and teachers) on a domestic level. Despite these limitations, these 
actors still had a positive effect on the relationship between Iran and Germany. 
For instance, IPIS conducted several meetings with European diplomatic 
delegations at the time of Khatami and indirectly used the discourse of dialogue 
among civilizations to strengthen diplomatic relations with them. Moreover, 
interreligious dialogue and seminars conducted by institutes which are close to or 
under the authority of the religiously legitimated sector have been discussed as a 
positive step towards peace: firstly, because liberal and open-minded persons are 
working in these institutes, and secondly, because it sends out a positive signal 
internationally to show that even the so-called hardliners of Iran believe in 
dialogue in their communication. Among the other Iranian actors, the position of 
an informed mediator with great potential to develop opportunities for Iranian and 
German participants was significant. Through her volunteer and institutional 
activities, she attempted to connect actors of the two societies with each other, but 
her capacities were little used by Iranian actors. The final point concerns 
academic support for foreign students to study in Iran, which does not follow a 
certain order and cannot be seen through a unified policy. Two ministries, of 
education and medical care, as well as ICRO and some universities play a role in 
this field, but it is difficult to ascertain the number of foreign students during the 
time under review.   
 
6.1.4 Attention of Iranian Media to Intercultural Dialogue 
Media in each society play an important role in creating an initial image of the 
world and other cultures. TV, newspapers and magazines and movies give people 
a general impression of how other cultures look. There is a challenge in deciding 
whether media can be discussed as an “actor” of intercultural dialogue or a 
“mediator”. In this chapter it is discussed separately from the actors. Analysis in 
6.1.4 is divided into two sections: Section 6.1.4.1 presents analysis on Iranian TV 
and radio and their political atmosphere. Information on Iranian press media 
follows in 6.1.4.2. Social media are naturally becoming increasingly important in 
Iran, but this study does not deal with them. 
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6.1.4.1 Iranian TV and Radio 
Iranian TV and radio (IRIB) are governmental and work to a high degree under 
the authority of the religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state. The IRIB 
receives a parliamentary budget, though its head is appointed by the leader 
directly. The head of the IRIB is also one of the members of the higher council of 
ICRO. The IRIB has been criticized often for its biased news coverage to the 
benefit of conservatives and hardliners in Iran and against the reformists. In 1997 
the “neutrality” of the IRIB became the subject of a heated debate when it played 
a dubious role in covering news in favor of the conservative presidential candidate 
Ali-Akbar Nategh-Nouri, a rival of Mohammad Khatami. The documentary 
Cherāgh [light], which was produced by the IRIB, was criticized for “accusing 
supporters of Khatami for being behind the wave of political assassinations” 
(Khiabany 2009: 178), well known as the “Chain Murders” of Iranian liberal 
authors, which is mentioned in 5.2.4. In this context, the dialogue activities of the 
ICDAC were given neither positive nor negative coverage by the IRIB, as 
according to a conversation with a member of the ICDAC staff (Farahmand, 
personal communication, 2014).94 Nevertheless, there was negative coverage that 
had a destructive effect on Khatami’s intercultural dialogue approach. It was 
conducted by the branch offices of the IRIB and the news agency IRNA, which 
are located in the Pressehaus in Berlin. In 2000 the Heinrich Böll Foundation 
coordinated a conference called “Iran after Election” to reflect views of Iranian 
reformists, authors, political, religious and human rights activists on the victory of 
reformists in Iran in the parliamentary election. The IRIB, with the help of its 
branch offices in Berlin, broadcast a program “made up of 30 minutes of selected 
and edited coverage of the Berlin conference”. The program presented a negative 
image of those reformists who attended the conference (Khiabany 2009: 178). 
Contrastingly, the IRIB reported neutrally on the opening of the Hafiz-Goethe 
Memorial in Weimar by Khatami and Johannes Rau, which happened a few 
months after the conference, covering it just as a brief news item. The IRIB has 
also not appeared to be a close partner of the Rayzani in implementing cultural 
                                                          
94 The statement of this member of staff of the ICDAC is important because he was in charge of a team that 
monitored media coverage on the issue of dialogue among civilizations on a daily basis. So in some cases, 
when something was expressed negatively by the media, the team would record it, and if it did not correspond 
to reality, the team would notify the media. That is why the statement of this participant concerning the 
negative or positive coverage of the IRIB on the ICDAC or the issue of dialogue among civilizations was 
relevant. 
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activities, as mentioned in 6.1.2.3. Nevertheless, because Iranian TV takes an 
open approach to broadcasting foreign films and serials,95 it can be argued that it 
indirectly plays a role in opening doors to other cultures for Iranian audiences.  
 
6.1.4.2 Iranian Press Media 
Press media in Iran, those which have no dependency to the Iranian religiously 
legitimated sector of the state, work under the restrictions of the judiciary. The 
judiciary in Iran, as mentioned in 5.1.1, is broadly under the authority of the 
religiously legitimated sector. The judicial system is biasedly strict toward 
reformist newspapers and consequently liberal and reformist journalists. The 
number of reformist press media increased significantly at the time of the 
reformist president Khatami. Between 1998 and 2000, up to thirty dailies were 
published in the city of Tehran alone. A short time later, the reformist media faced 
severe restrictions from the judiciary, with 120 reformist print media being closed 
by 2001. The brief period in which there was a high number of reformist print 
media created a dynamic that had not been seen before: a period of the press 
behaving like a “revolutionary press” (Farhi 2003: 149). The conservative press 
media, such as Keyhan, Resalat and Yassarat-al-Hossaein, have been able to 
operate without any serious obstacle from the judiciary. Yassarat-al-Hossein, for 
instance, which according to Hossein Shahidi is strongly “critical of the secular 
thinkers outside” the religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state as well as 
anyone within the state “who could be described as liberal or reformist” (Shahidi 
2007: 49), was issued a judicial order in 2016 to stop publishing its weekly, which 
it nevertheless continued to publish (Young Journalists news 03.08.2016).  
Despite limitations and discrimination against reformist and liberal press media, 
some of them were able, during a certain period of time, to reflect on issues such 
as Western culture, Islam, the literature and art of other cultures. Some of them 
are as follows:  
 Madrese [school] is a monthly that was established in 2005 in the field of 
philosophy and culture. Madrase reflected religious views of scholars such 
as Abdolkarim Soroush, Mojtahed-e Shabestari and Mohsen Kadivar.  
                                                          
95 According to a report from Mehr news agency in 2007, three times more foreign films than domestic films 
were broadcast on Iranian TV. From the total number of 954 films, 738 were produced abroad (Mehr 
news.11.08.2007)  
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 Āeen [manner] was a magazine established after 2003 as the official forum 
of the political party of Mošārekat-e Eslāmi [Islamic Participation]. Āeen 
mostly expressed the views of Khatami and other reformists. In the first 
year of Āeen’s existence it was not published. The editors were 
concentrating on meeting each other and discussing the main issues they 
wanted to publish.  
 
 Nāfe [odorous substance] was a magazine published after 2000. It mostly 
analyzed and commented on works of dissident artists and authors such as 
Mahmoud Dolatabadi and Simin Behbahani. 
 
There are also journals which echo the voices of dissident authors and thinkers 
and reflect other cultures in the Iranian public sphere, like Pol Firoozeh 
(published between 2002 and 2010), and Bokhara (published since 1998). Both 
journals are mentioned in 6.1.2.3. Most of the magazines and journals mentioned 
above operated for a short period of time. Bans on their publication were for 
reasons such as desecrating the Iranian Revolution or blaspheming Islam or 
Islamic rules. Madrese, for instance, was closed down in late 2007 by the press 
supervisory board for publishing an interview with Mojtahed Shabestari on  
hermeneutic and religious interpretation of the world (Mehr news 10.11.2007). 
Āeen-e Goftogu, which was intending to reflect on the issue of dialogue, was 
published once only. Mehrnāme [letter of kindness] is the only magazine that is 
still published and since 2009 has been sympathetic to reformists’ views. Some 
editors and authors of magazines mentioned above are in the main editorial team 
of Mehrnāme. 
In summary, it can be said that the national TV and radio and the press media 
represent other cultures and views in a different and fragmented way. They are not 
treated the same way by the Iranian state. Radio and TV are monopolized by a 
single organization, which is under the authority of a religiously legitimated actor. 
Consequently, they cover news in a way that is biased against the cultural 
activities (including regarding dialogue among civilizations) of the democratically 
legitimated sector. This fragmentation also showed itself in discrimination against 
the reformist press. But correspondents of the reformist press used many 
individual opportunities to write on various dimensions of other cultures. Despite 
all limitations of working in Iran, they have used their short-lived publications 
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(because they often face publication bans) as a fortress for dialogue with other 
views and cultures. But overall, the media in Iran have not managed to play a 
significant role in continuously implementing aimful programs to reflect a 
positive dimension of Western and German culture, so they cannot be categorized 
as actors of intercultural dialogue.  
  
6.2 German Implementing Actors of Intercultural Dialogue 
As mentioned in 2.4.1, the German state after World War II changed its foreign 
cultural policy approach and used Mittlerorganisationen and civil society to a 
large degree to represent Germany culturally abroad. Reviewing the annual 
reports on German foreign cultural policy (Auswärtiges Amt 1999, 2000 b, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2012a, 2013a, 
2014) confirms that these organizations were significant for the foreign ministry 
as well. Besides state organizations such as the cultural section of the German 
embassy abroad, a huge number of parastatal institutes and organizations, 
Mittlerorganisationen, NGOs and individuals undertook cultural activities from 
1998 to 2013. Table 8 shows their names and the years in which they 
implemented cultural activities. 
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Table 8. German cultural actors which are mentioned in annual reports on German foreign cultural policy from 1998 to 2013 
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Source: annual reports on foreign cultural policy of Germany (1998-2013), made by researcher 
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The abbreviated names of the organizations in table 8 are presented here in full 
(alphabetical order): 
1. AvH (Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung) [Alexander von Humboldt 
Foundation], an academic higher education institution, 
2. BIBB (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung) [Federal Institute for Vocational 
Education and Training], 
3. DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) [German Academic 
Exchange Service], 
4. DAFI (Deutsche Akademische Flüchtlingsinitiative Albert Einstein des 
UNHCR) [German Academic Refugee Initiative Albert Einstein of the 
UNHCR], a program which focuses on academic programs for refugees 
and works within the framework of the UN, 
5. DAG (Deutsche Auslandsgesellschaft) [community of Germans abroad] 
6. DAI (Deutsches Archäologisches Institut) [German Archology Institute] 
7. DAKG (Deutsch-ausländische Kulturgesellschaften) [German-
international cultural community] 
8. Deutsch-Amerikanische Fulbright-Kommission [German American 
Fulbright Commision], which is a program to promote academic relations 
between America and Germany, 
9. DGIA and also MWS (Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im 
Ausland) [German Human Science Institute abroad]; the institute was 
incorporated into the Max Weber Foundation/MWS in 2006,  
10. DMR (Deutscher Musikrat) [German Music Council] 
11. DUK (Deutsche UNESCO-Kommission) [German UNESCO Commission]  
12. DW (Deutsche Welle), a multimedia broadcaster operated mainly by the 
German state,  
13. GI (Goethe Institut) [Goethe Institute], a cultural institute which focuses 
on German language as well as art, music and literature projects abroad, 
14. HKW (Haus der Kulturen der Welt) [House of Cultures of the World], 
which is located in Berlin and aims at implementing and cooperating in 
international cultural activities for people in the German capital  
15. Ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen) [Institute for Foreign Relations], 
which focuses on planning art exhibitions abroad as well as implementing 
projects to inform German state and society about important foreign issues  
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16. IJAB-Fachstelle für Internationale Jugendarbeit der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland e. V. [Partner for International Youth Work in Europe and 
Around the World], a German institute which works on implementing 
cultural activities at a European level 
17. IN (InterNationes) which was an institute established in 1952 to spread 
information and literature on Germany abroad. In 2001, for budget saving 
reasons it was merged into the Goethe Institute (Paschalidis 2014: 466), 
459 
18. Kirchen [churches]. Although churches and religious institutes have 
always cooperated in cultural activities abroad, since 2013 churches 
specifically have been included under foreign cultural activities in the 
annual report  
19. KSB (Kulturstiftung des Bundes) [German Federal Cultural Foundation], 
which promotes art and culture within the scope of federal competence at 
international level, 
20. PAD (Pädagogischer Austauschdienst) [Pedagogical Exchange Service], 
which is a state institute in charge of training projects for teachers and 
promoting the educational system  
21. ZfA (Bundesverwaltungsamt – Zentralstelle für das Auslandsschulwesen) 
[Central Office for Foreign Schools, part for the Federal Administration 
Office] 
 
Clearly there are a lot of organizations which have implemented cultural activities 
abroad. So how were specific organizations selected to focus on in the study? An 
initial review of these organizations suggests that some are presented consistently 
in the reports, although some were only active a few years. For instance, DAFI 
was active in the recent years of the time period of the study. Some other actors, 
like the Deutscher Musikrat, were not mentioned after 2000. Furthermore, it has 
become clear that some of the institutions which are mentioned as 
Mittlerorganisationen in the annual report do not exactly fit this category. For 
instance, DW or ZfA are rather state or parastatal organizations, which means that 
they are owned or operated wholly or partly by the German state. Moreover, some 
institutions have not been active with regard to Muslim countries or specifically 
toward Iran. For instance, the Villa Aurora organization deals specifically with 
cultural activities of German-Jewish artists of the USA.  
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Therefore those organizations which have been mentioned repeatedly by the 
annual report as active organizations, those mentioned consistently in specific 
projects of “European-Islamic cultural dialogue”, and those which are positively 
recommended in the initial informal conversations of the study are selected to be 
analyzed. Consequently, the study focuses on the cultural section of the German 
embassy, the DAAD, ifa and the Goethe Institute. 
This subchapter presents information and analysis on the DAAD (in 6.2.2), ifa (in 
6.2.3), and the Goethe Institute (in 6.2.4). The cultural section of the German 
embassy is a further focus of this study in 6.2.1 for its role in coordinating 
activities of the Mittlerogranisationen and directly implementing some cultural 
activities as an agent of the state. The remaining organizations, institutes and 
private groups which implemented and cooperated in intercultural dialogue 
programs for German and Iranian participants (but whose activities or budget 
were not as great as those of the four organizations above) have been considered 
as “other German actors” in 6.2.5. The attention of the German media to the issue 
of intercultural dialogue will also be discussed in 6.2.6. A summary of the main 
points of this subchapter follows in 6.2.7. 
 
6.2.1 Kulturabteilung/Cultural Section of the German Embassy in Iran 
The cultural section of the German embassy in Tehran is the first organization 
which is discussed here. Its website has been a helpful source in giving an overall 
image of its own activities as well as the activities of the other German cultural 
actors in Iran. Members of staff of the cultural section and some of its high-
ranking officials participated in interviews in this study. This section presents that 
information in three segments: history and organizational aims, organizational 
structure, and practices of the cultural section.  
 
6.2.1.1 History and Organizational Aims 
The Kulturabteilung [cultural section] is a suboffice of the German embassy and 
located inside the embassy in Ferdousi street in Tehran. It must be considered the 
successor of the respective cultural office of the first German embassy in Iran. 
The first German embassy was established in 1885 in Tehran (Martin 1959: 30). It 
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is still active. It is the only agent of the German state in Iran to deal with cultural 
affairs.   
 
6.2.1.2 Organizational Structure 
The cultural section works with a number of different sections of the embassy. 
They include the political section; rights and accounting section; visa section; 
economic section; press section, Militärattachéstab [defence attaché]; and 
administrative section. Employees of the cultural section are mostly appointed by 
the foreign ministry, and its Kulturreferenten in der Deutschen Botschaft 
[directors] are accomplished diplomats. Unfortunately, information on all the 
directors that held office between 1998 and 2013 was unavailable. Silke Riecken-
Daerr, who was in office between 2005 and 2011,96 and Otto Graf, who was in 
office from 2011 to early 2015, are the most recent officers of this section. Justus 
Kemper was appointed director of the cultural section from late 2015. 
The cultural section works closely with the press section and German 
Mittleroganisationen, especially the Goethe Institute, ifa, DAI and the DAAD. 
Institutes such as Deutsche Botschaftsschule Teheran [German embassy school], 
Das Deutsche Sprachinstitut Teheran [German language institute], Evangelische 
Gemeinde Deutsche Sprache in Iran [Evangelical community of German 
language speakers in Iran], commonly known as the “German Church”; Die 
Deutsch-Iranische Industrie- und Handelskammer [German-Iranian Chamber of 
Commerce], Freundeskreis Freiburg-Isfahan e. V. [institute of Freiburg-Isfahan 
circle of friends] and Deutsch-Iranische Krebsliga [German-Iranian Cancer 
League] are in contact with the cultural section to organize cultural projects for 
Iranian and German participants. 
 
6.2.1.3 Practices: Generally and Specifically for Intercultural Dialogue  
The cultural section has three key activities, according to a participant of the field 
study: firstly, dealing with German-Iranian cooperation in the higher education 
and research; secondly, promoting the exchange between German and Iranian 
artists; and thirdly, sponsoring dissemination and teaching of German language in 
Iran (Kemper, personal communication, 2016). To perform these activities, the 
                                                          
96 The researcher was in contact per email with Mrs. Silke Ricken-Daerr in 2010 to make a student 
appointment in the German embassy, but it was not possible for the researcher to reach her after that.  
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cultural section has benefited from the assistance of Mittlerorganisationen. As far 
as academic cooperation with Iran is concerned, there has been strong mutual 
interaction between the embassy and the DAAD. For instance, in a period under 
Ahmadienjad, the DAAD had difficulties working in Iran. This point will be 
explained more in 6.2.2. The cultural department has played a very important role 
in enabling it to continue with its activities. It provided the assistance of a local 
employee97 to deal with academic affairs of the DAAD, such as advising students 
and giving them information on current scholarship offers (Erbel, personal 
communication, 2015; Maleki, personal communication, 2016). In addition, some 
professors have been supported by the cultural section in implementing cultural 
projects. For instance, Christoph Werner from Philipps-Universität Marburg, 
Center for Near and Middle East Studies, organized the Iran Exkursion program 
for German students of the Centrum für Nah-und Mittelost-Studien/CNMS in 
2010. Ulrik Marzolph from the University of Göttingen and Birgit Hoffmann from 
the University of Bamberg were active in the field of Iran studies. Ludwig Paul is 
mentioned too for writing a travel guide on Iran together with Hartmut Niemann. 
The names of these researchers have often been mentioned in contact with the 
German participants of the study (Erbel, personal communication, 2015; Thier, 
personal communication, 2014).  
With regard to art activities, there is cooperation between the contact office of the 
Goethe Institute and the cultural and press sections. As mentioned in 2.4.1, the 
Goethe Institute has not been active officially in Iran since 1987, but it still has a 
contact office in the cultural section. This office supports theatre and music 
activities, more details of which will be given in 6.4.2.  
The German language has been promoted in Iran with the help of the Goethe 
Institute, too. The German language institute Tehran (DSIT) was originally under 
the management of the Goethe Institute. 
The contact office of the Goethe Institute and the press section have together 
coordinated projects such as study trips. In these study trips, which have taken 
place almost every year, a team of Iranian and German artists, journalists, students 
or employees of different Iranian state organizations receive support to travel to 
Germany and Iran respectively and discuss different topics and issues which are -
                                                          
97 This employee’s name is Mostafa Maleki. At that time he was a PhD student in German Studies at the 
University of Tehran. He played a very positive role in keeping the limited projects and activities of the 
DAAD going during 2008 and 2012.  
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important in both Iranian and German society. A director of the press section at 
that time explained that the study trips have to be explained in the context of 
intercultural dialogue: 
“Yes, this is dialogue because we select 10 Germans, and then need their 
counterparts from Iran. We select a team we think there are a lot of skills of 
dialogue between Iranians and Germans, for example we had a team of 
demographic change and productive medicine, it is slightly loftily titled but what 
we want to do is bringing together population expert. Because Iran has much 
younger population at the moment. (It can) face the challenge, it will be aging 
country in the future. Because the population you know many will be 80 or so in 
future. So it is also the hit topic between the conservatives and moderators at the 
moment” (Their, personal communication, 2014). 
 
“Media dialogue” and “Photo competition” (Auswärtiges Amt 2013b) are other 
programs which have been organized by the press section to create dialogue 
between Iranian and German journalists and photographers. Moreover, the press 
section supported Teamreisen [team travels], which is travel specific to issues 
such as disaster management, and Theatertreffen [theater meetings]. It also assists 
Iranian artists and film makers to attend the Berlinale film festival. Furthermore, 
on a diplomatic level, the press section funds a program called “exchange of 
diplomats”, through which it sends two or three Iranian diplomats annually to take 
part in training courses in Germany (Thier, personal communication, 2014). Some 
of the programs, such as media dialogue, have been stopped since 2005 for being 
“too risky for Iranian journalists”. A study trip was also canceled because an 
Iranian state authority did not allow some participants take part in the program 
after it recognized that the travel group had a mixture of participants, including 
journalists and NGO representatives (Thier, personal communication, 2014). 
Some private groups organized cultural activities with the support of the cultural 
section of the German embassy, too. “Youth in dialogue” is one of the well-
known projects, organized by a volunteer group, which will be discussed more in 
6.2.5. Also, German music groups have received support annually from the 
cultural section to hold concerts in Iran. The West Östlicher Diwan Festival 
Weimar GmbH, for instance, organized a concert trip to Tehran, Isfahan, Yazd 
and Shiraz (Bauch, personal communication, 2014).  
The cultural section has also supported German religious delegates who 
participated in interfaith dialogue meetings with the Iranian side, and religious 
representatives who attended events of the German church located in Tehran. It 
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also helped some Iranian clergymen to participate in relevant religious meetings 
in Germany by facilitating the visa process for them, as one of the former heads 
mentioned (Graf, personal communication, 2014).  
The cultural section has played a significant role in celebrating the “day of 
German Unification”98 every year in Iran. The celebration is called “German 
cultural week in Iran”. It starts with the reception party of the ambassador in his 
garden in Amjadieh, north of Tehran. It continues with theater and music 
programs, and art exhibitions in different galleries in Tehran. Cultural actors such 
as the DAAD, Goethe Institute and DSIT have an opportunity to present their 
activities on exhibition stands in the German ambassador’s garden during the 
reception party. Iranian institutes, news agencies and media representatives are 
also invited to the party.99 It is significant that some volunteer groups which 
implemented intercultural dialogue activities years before have also attended the 
reception party.  
The cultural section also covered news on intercultural dialogue programs of ifa 
and the DAAD. It introduced the website of Qantara, which is a special forum for 
intercultural dialogue between Germany and Muslim countries. It published a 
newsletter about cultural activities in Iran. At a specific time it had a dedicated 
advisor from the European-Islamic cultural dialogue office of the foreign 
ministry. After one or two years, however, that advisor was working for another 
service of the foreign ministry (Erbel, personal communication, 2015; Mulack, 
personal communication, 2015). Unfortunately, the researcher could not obtain 
information regarding the exact name of the advisor and details of his/her work. 
The cultural section also used to apply for the dedicated budget of European-
Islamic cultural dialogue when Ahmadinejad was president of Iran. However, 
because some events were canceled for political reasons, the German foreign 
ministry suspended this particular budget of the cultural section (Thier, personal 
communication, 2014; Graf, personal communication, 2014). It is nevertheless 
significant that the cultural section engaged in intercultural dialogue activities 
even without that specific budget. One reason for this is that the embassy and its 
different sections can apply for other relevant budgets of the federal government 
or foreign ministry. For instance, a director of the press section applied for the 
                                                          
98 The day of German unification is celebrated on 3rd October. It commemorates the anniversary of 
unification of West and East Germany in 1990. 
99 Observation and participation of the researcher in the reception party and some art exhibitions 
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budget of Deutschland Bild im Ausland (DA)100 as soon as she realized that the 
political situation under Rouhani made it possible to implement a media dialogue 
(Thier, personal communication, 2014). 
The political situation in Ahmadinejad’s time also had an effect on data collection 
relating to the cultural section. The German embassy moved its important 
documents including annual reports from Tehran to Berlin in 2011 for 
safekeeping after an attack organized by some Iranian demonstrators, including 
members of Basij,101 on the British embassy in November 2011 (Sreberny/Torfeh 
2014: 163). In this attack, some offices of the British embassy were ransacked and 
its documents stolen. The British embassy is located near the German embassy in 
Tehran. Consequently, the German embassy decided to move all important data to 
Berlin in late 2011 (Erbel, personal communication, 2015; Thier, personal 
communication, 2014). The security considerations regarding the behaviors of 
radical groups in Iran generally was so high that the official website of the 
embassy became extremely careful to advertise the cultural programs offering 
opportunities for studying, internships and travel to Iranian participants. The 
cultural section therefore used an unofficial network to present information for 
Iranian applicants. In the media dialogue implemented in 2013, for instance, the 
Iranian journalists were informed through a small network of journalists that was 
in contact with the press section (Thier, personal communication, 2014).  
Despite all the difficulties, the Iranian state had an interest in or at least no 
opposition to maintaining academic and interreligious cooperation. In Graf’s view 
this interest is not enough. For him, providing dialogue opportunities for normal 
people had priority over implementing dialogue for experts such as professors and 
theologians: 
“For us it is not priority to have an event to bring people together and then have 
some kind of booklet, but our priority is really that the people who should talk to 
each other, talk to each other […] So this is a very open dialogue, and this is 
going on, all the time. I think it is just a lack that I see. Between theologies we 
have quite reasonable exchange. But what is a little bit missing is maybe [having] 
more people, having a broader audience in Germany. I mean the interested people 
[Germans] they also get to know Iranians’ views. I mean we have Ayatollahs in 
                                                          
100 DA is a specific budget which is allocated for activities intended to represent Germany’s image culturally 
in the world. Division 600 of the media and culture department of the foreign ministry is in charge of this 
budget. 
101 Basij is a militia group consisted of young people, including Iranian pupils, students and staff members of 
state organizations. Structurally Basij is part of the Sepah Pasdaran [Revolutionary Guardian Militia] Golkar, 
Saeid 2015: Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Iran: Columbia University Press..    
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Germany in some universities. [They are] giving lectures, having discussions. So 
the academic work is rather well connected […] What is a little bit missing is a 
little bit of bigger circle, but this is not duty of activities of academics …but this 
has a lot to do with general perception of Iran” (Graf, personal communication, 
2014). 
 
Graf also emphasized creating a proper dialogue method for making a “better 
perception about Iran” in Germany. His suggestion was to give more opportunities 
to German journalists to travel to Iran. In his time, the cultural section had 
unsuccessfully tried to support travel by some German journalists to Iran. To his 
mind, refusing German journalists visas and consequently preventing them from 
visiting Iran would lead to “keeping the positive advertisement away” (Graf, 
personal communication, 2014). Visa denial or restrictions were common 
problems of the cultural and other sections of the German embassy under 
Ahmadinejad. Even some music concerts and exhibitions were canceled because 
of visa problems, even though the embassy had previously received assurances 
from the Iranian authorities. Up to the last moment there was no way to be sure 
that a cultural event would take place in Iran, as a former ambassador explained: 
“In the Iranian side there were some plans and projects [to cooperate with us]. 
And even when the ministry of [Islamic] culture and guidance was completely 
agree with that, but at the end somebody was refused at the airport, or visa 
[problem] or whatever it was. So then you also had some forces in the 
background […] sure, the problem was not cultural. The problem was the 
political groups, who wanted to avoid the cultural events which produce positive 
results” (Erbel, personal communication, 2015).  
 
It is not clear exactly which Iranian political groups were against the cultural 
activities of the German embassy The role of Vezārat-e Etelā’āt [Iranian 
intelligence service], Basij groups, as well as biased news media coverage, 
specifically by Keyhan, were mentioned in the field study as preventive power 
sources in Iranian society. The cultural section of the German embassy 
nevertheless managed to implement some cultural activities through cooperation 
with state organizations such as Sāzmān-e mirās-e farhangi v sanāye’e dasti v 
gardešgari [Cultural Heritage, Handcrafts and Tourism Organization]. The name 
of Mohammad Javad Adabi, who was director of the Anjoman Asar v mafakher 
farhangi Society of cultural figures and heritage] is mentioned for assisting the 
embassy to organize a concert of the German West-East Orchestra from Halle in 
Weimar in 2012. The name of the source of the above information must remain 
anonymous.  
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Obstacles to the intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany have not been 
created by the Iranian side alone. Some individuals and groups on the German 
side also did not agree with intercultural dialogue with Iran. For instance, the anti-
Israeli discourse of Ahmadinejad caused some disagreements on this issue. As a 
former German ambassador in Iran explained, especially on the eve of cultural 
events, even apolitical ones such as a meeting on the issue of Hafiz and Goethe in 
Germany, opposition groups and individuals would be active and demonstrate 
against them (Erbel, personal communication, 2015). 102 
 
6.2.1.4 A Summary on Analysis of the Cultural Section 
In summing up this section, one question must be reiterated: What are 
characteristics of the cultural activities which the cultural section of the German 
embassy implement or support in the framework of intercultural dialogue? The 
cultural section has been observed as being a central actor in coordinating cultural 
activities of German institutes and organizations, including Mittlerorganisationen. 
Through this coordination it specifically works to implement art and music 
activities, academic exchanges and German language courses. It has maintained 
its networking with German actors on different occasions. It seems that the 
participants of the study from the cultural section not only learned how to manage 
the difficulties of working in Iran under Ahmadinejad, they also took a step 
forward and could discover the strong points of working in the region. Despite the 
difficulties, they talked enthusiastically about attempting a variety of cultural 
activities in the framework of cultural dialogue. Some Iranian authorities and 
German groups, journalists and authors have been mentioned as opponents of the 
dialogue projects between the two countries. The cultural section seems to play 
the role of an actor that knows the difficulties of working in Iran and uses this 
knowledge to assist German actors to work in the region without interruption.  
 
 
                                                          
102 Attempts have been made to investigate this issue further. Two interviews, with Benjamin Weinthal and 
Mathias Küntzel, were even conducted. However, they have been omitted from the chapters of this study 
because firstly, the content of the two interviews is not enough for a full discussion about opposition to 
dialogue with Iran in Germany; and secondly, because the argument is not relevant to clarify the role of 
intercultural dialogue in the foreign cultural policy of Germany. 
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6.2.2 Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD) 
The DAAD is an association of German universities, academic institutes and 
student bodies. It has a strong (and for outsiders complicated to understand) 
organizational structure. Its worldwide network is unique among the organizations 
investigated in this study. Like a ministry, it has a complex organizational 
structure. The DAAD has been one of the strongest partners of the “European-
Islamic cultural dialogue” until today. The information presented in this section is 
the result of data collected with the help of the DAAD website, DAAD annual 
reports and AKBP annual reports, as well as interviews with different participants. 
It is divided into three segments: history and aims, organizational structure, and 
practices of the DAAD. 
 
6.2.2.1 History and Organizational Aims  
The DAAD is a type of association of German universities103. It was established 
in 1925 when a German student, Carl Joachim Friedrich visited the New York 
Institute of International Education with 13 other German students in 1922. On his 
return to Germany in 1923 he decided to found a similar institute. Through this 
institute he wanted to implement student exchange into and from Germany. He 
initially established the Akademische Austauschdienst e. V. (AAD) in Heidelberg. 
The idea of the exchange via the AAD’s activities was welcomed by some 
German universities. It therefore received more assistance and was moved to 
Berlin. In January 1931, through a structural transformation by the German state, 
the AAD together with two other academic institutes established a new body 
called Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD) [German Academic 
Exchange Service]. In the last years of World War II, the activities of the DAAD 
were limited. After the war, the DAAD faced a period of suspension like other 
German Mittlerorganisationen, as explained in 2.4.1. Thanks to the efforts of 
academic institutions in the USA, Britain and France, and the perseverance of a 
professor at Bonn University, Theodor Klauser, the DAAD re-opened in 1950 
(DAAD 2015).  
The DAAD budget comes from different state, non-state and industry 
organizations. According to information on its official website, the DAAD has 
                                                          
103 In the field study there were participants who also used the term “university club” to describe the type of 
academic service of the DAAD, though it seems that “association of German universities” best explains the 
type of organization the DAAD is. 
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supported more than 1.9 million scholars in Germany and abroad since 1925. The 
academic activities of the DAAD are not limited to scholarships and also include 
implementing projects to achieve aims such as the internationalization of German 
universities, promoting German studies and the German language abroad. The 
DAAD has assisted developing countries to establish universities. It implements 
advisory programs and academic workshops, and it sends lecturers to those 
universities, too.  
There are five key aims which are mentioned in almost all annual reports of the 
DAAD (DAAD 2005: 8, DAAD 2006: 10, DAAD 2008: 10, DAAD 2009: 10, 
DAAD 2010: 12, DAAD 2011a: 15-16, DAAD 2012a: 16-17, DAAD 2013b: 16-
17, DAAD 2014c: 16-17). The first aim is to support young foreign elites (in 
terms of academic achievement) to make them future leaders in the fields of 
science, culture, economics, politics and media. By promoting their knowledge, 
the DAAD expects to make them “proper partners and friends” for Germany. The 
second aim is “supporting young German elites” to make them future leaders in 
science, culture, economics, politics and the media internationally and to promote 
their intercultural experiences. Promoting the internationality of German 
universities so that Germany remains or will be the premier destination for young 
scientists from all over the world is the third aim. The fourth is to promote 
German studies and German language, literature and cultural studies at the 
selected foreign universities. This way, the DAAD intends to strengthen the 
position of German culture and language and convey interest and sympathy 
towards Germany worldwide. The fifth aim is to promote and develop universities 
in the developing and transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe in order 
to support their economic and democratic reform process.  
The DAAD also attempts to increase dialogue between cultures and university-
related reconstruction assistance in war situations or natural disasters. Projects 
such as academic analysis on crisis situations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and in 
natural crises like tsunamis (DAAD 2005: 14-15, DAAD 2006: 16-17, DAAD 
2008: 16-17, DAAD 2009: 16-17, DAAD 2010: 18-19, DAAD 2011a: 18-38, 
DAAD 2012a: 18-40, DAAD 2013b: 18-38) are among the studies. The DAAD 
has also defined three specific strategies to optimize its tasks up to 2020: offering 
scholarships to the best, promoting structures for internationalization, and 
encouraging expertise for academic collaboration (DAAD 2013a, DAAD 2014c: 
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18-46). To sum up, the DAAD strives to represent Germany as an academic 
power in the world. 
 
6.2.2.2 Organizational Structure and Budget 
The organizational structure of the DAAD is complicated, but each year the 
annual report contains information and a diagram to illustrate its mechanisms and 
changes in numbers of its committees and groups. To give a brief and simple 
explanation of its structure, the DAAD operates under the format of a Kuratorium 
[board of trustees] and Vorstand [board of directors or executive committee]. The 
Vorstand and Kuratorium cooperatively manage the entire system. The 
Kuratorium consists of different members, including a specific number of 
representatives of the federal government, federal states, universities, student 
organizations and members of the general assembly of the DAAD. The head of 
the Kuratorium is the president of the DAAD, who together with the vice 
president is nominated and elected by the Kuratorium. The Kuratorium considers 
the financial statements and approval of the economic plans of the DAAD. The 
Vorstand is in charge of the DAAD’s strategic approaches and programs, 
establishes a selection committee for certain projects and decides on the economic 
plans of the DAAD. The Vorstand also appoints the general secretary after 
nomination by the president. The general secretary has a main executive role. 
Among the members of the Vorstand, besides the president and vice president, 
there are also members of universities and student organizations. In addition to the 
Kuratorium and Vorstand, there is another section which is called the 
Mitgliederversammlung [general assembly]. The general assembly usually meets 
once a year in Bonn. It consists of representatives of nearly all universities and 
academic centers in Germany. The general assembly elects the members of the 
Vorstand. Based on updated information from 2016, there are 239 university and 
105 student organization members of the general assembly. To decide on DAAD 
matters in the meeting, each university member has two votes and each student 
organization member has one vote.  
The DAAD had six departments up to the end of 2013. They were the 
departments of central services; strategy; northern hemisphere; southern 
hemisphere; internationalization and communication; and national agency for EU 
higher education cooperation. Administrative affairs, budget, finance, and human 
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resources are the task of the central services. The department of strategy considers 
issues such as policy planning, evaluation and statistics. The northern hemisphere 
department deals with university projects relating to Western Europe, North 
America, Central and Eastern Europe, while the southern hemisphere department 
deals with university and academic matters of countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America, Asia-Pacific, and North Africa and the Middle East. The 
department of internationalization and communication focuses on projects in 
specific fields and international doctoral programs. It helps to introduce German 
universities to international partners and mediates information on international 
universities to German universities. The communication and marketing section is 
an important part of this department and deals with holding exhibitions and 
workshops in Germany and abroad, among other things, to introduce the two sides 
to each other. The department of national agency for EU higher education 
cooperation deals with specific programs at EU level, such as cooperation and 
partnership projects in the Erasmus program. The structure of the departments 
changed in 2015.104 
The DAAD has more than 900 employees, 15 foreign branch offices, and 55 
information centers in 60 countries of the world (DAAD 2014c: 15). It has more 
than 500 Lektorinnen and Lektoren [lecturers] and language assistants.105 They are 
employed by the DAAD in the partner countries all over the world (DAAD 
2014c: 38). Lecturers are native German speakers who have academic knowledge 
relating to German language and German studies. They are divided into four 
groups, Hochschullektorat [university lecturers], Fachlectorat [professional 
lecturers], IC-Lektorat [Information Center lecturers] and zur besonderen 
Verwendung/zbV Lektorat [special purpose lecturers]. There is also another form 
of academic exchange in higher education, which is called Lang- und 
Kurzzeitdozenturen [long and short-term lectureships]. By promoting long and 
short lectureships, the foreign universities or academic institutes would be able to 
invite highly qualified scientists from German universities, using their assistance 
in different courses or scientific cooperation (DAAD 2011c: 11-14). 
In some special projects the DAAD cooperates with other German organizations 
such as the Hochschulrektorenkonferenz/HRK [German Rectors’ Conference], 
                                                          
104 For instance, all individual scholarship programs of different northern and southern hemisphere 
departments are transferred to a new “scholarship” department. 
105 These Lektorinnen and Lektoren are mostly trained in German/German as a Foreign Language to teach in 
universities. The word here is translated as lecturer. 
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among others, on the Dialogue on Innovative Higher Education Strategies (DIES) 
project. The annual reports of the DAAD reported in detail on its activities and 
annual budget. The budget is supplied mainly by the federal government, the 
foreign ministry and other ministries. Table 9 illustrates the financial sponsors and 
amount of their contribtion between 2000 and 2013.  
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Source: (DAAD 2005: 31, DAAD 2006: 35, DAAD 2008: 35, DAAD 2009: 37, DAAD 
2010: 41, DAAD 2011a: 15-16, DAAD 2011b: 15-16, DAAD 2012a: 14-16, DAAD 
2013b: 14-16, DAAD 2014c), updated by the researcher 
 
As Table 9 shows, the main budget comes from the foreign ministry, and then 
from the federal ministry of education and research (BMBF), the federal ministry 
of economic cooperation and development (BMZ) and of economics and labor 
(BMWA/ ERP). The next financial sources are income of the DAAD from other 
federal organizations. The European Union (EU) and some companies, 
organizations and foreign governments (international and German) additionally 
support the DAAD to establish or continue special academic projects.  
 
6.2.2.3 Practices: Generally and Specifically for Intercultural Dialogue 
The DAAD supports academic exchange between German and foreign 
universities. It creates opportunities for German and international universities to 
cooperate on academic projects in various fields depending on their needs and 
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requests, as well as on a specific priority of a certain state or private organization. 
For instance, the BMW carmaker wants to develop expertise in a specific 
technical field. The role of the DAAD is then to use the BMW’s budget to offer 
specific scholarships or projects to target students of certain countries or Germany 
in certain engineering fields. Generally, students at BA, MA and PhD level, 
scholars, researchers, teachers, professors and even staff of universities are the 
target group of DAAD activities. The DAAD has supported 1.9 million academics 
in Germany and abroad since 1925. The number of German academics who 
received support from the DAAD increased from 16,909 in 1990 to nearly 70,000 
in 2013, that of international academics from 21,974 in 1990 to nearly 50,000 in 
2013. The number of academic projects supported by the DAAD increased from 
25.5 in 1990 to 623 in 2013 (DAAD 2014c: 14-16).  
The DAAD has supported academics on different continents through diverse 
programs, as the annual reports show. But the focus here is on its academic 
activities with Iran. As mentioned in 2.3, from the 1960s the DAAD started to 
offer scholarships to Iranian students. Around 2000 and 2001, the DAAD had an 
information center and a lecturer in Tehran and a lecturer in Isfahan. The 
lectureship program was interrupted between 2008/2009 and 2012, during the 
presidency of Ahmadinejad. The Iranian authorities, officially the Iranian 
Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, refused to prolong the contract of 
Tehran’s lecturer in 2008 and Isfahan’s lecturer in 2009 (Haridi and Dietrich, 
personal communication, 2014; Schroeder, personal communication, 2014). The 
problem was not just about extending the contract but was also mixed with some 
political considerations and bureaucratic, time-consuming processes. For instance, 
the visa for the next lecturer candidate was initially refused and then issued too 
late, as the candidate had already found a new job (Erbel, personal 
communication, 2015).  
The DAAD has nevertheless managed to continue its activities with assistance 
from the cultural section of the German embassy in Tehran, as explained in 
6.2.1.3. In 2012, after signing of the MoU between the DAAD and the Ministry of 
Science, Research and Technology, a lecturer from the DAAD was once again 
appointed to the University of Beheshti, and one year later a further lecturer was 
appointed to the University of Isfahan. Furthermore, the DAAD was able to open 
in 2013 (Schroeder, personal communication, 2015).  
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Although the DAAD is a long-standing academic partner of Iran, it has not been 
properly understood by Iranian state and academic organizations which have the 
authority to decide on cooperation. The DAAD is an association of universities, it 
is managed as a Mittlerorganisation, and its organizational structure is 
complicated, as shown in 6.2.2.2.2. According to German participants in the 
study, the DAAD’s structure is “like a ministry” and it is “too fishy” (Schroeder, 
personal communication, 2014) to be perceived easily by an outsider. This is 
especially true when there is no academic institute or organization in Iran which 
fits the definition of a “university club” or Mittlerorganisation. As discussed in 
6.1, the active cultural and academic organizations are mostly dependent on the 
Iranian state and are fragmented because of the dualism of the Iranian state, which 
itself is fragmented into religiously and democratically legitimated sectors. In 
such a context, understanding the structure of the DAAD, which receives most of 
its budget from the federal state but claims to work independently, is more 
challenging. A former director of the DAAD information center in Iran talks 
about this experience as follows: 
“In many meetings, in universities, with officials of the ministry of education we 
have to always explain we are not a development agency, we are not a 
governmental organization, it is very important that DAAD is a club of 
universities. And of course after university visits, I would say 80% cases, two or 
three young men are approaching me, [men] with beards, and asking me: is 
DAAD a governmental organization? [...] but you know what I mean. I also ask 
them whether they are also governmental organizations. But after talk and 
explanation everything was fine so far” (Schroeder, personal communication, 
2014).  
 
Besides single scholarships for MA courses, the DAAD also ran a project for 
Iranian PhD students. It was a scholarship called the “Sandwich Modell”, which 
would enable PhD students to spend part of their research time in Germany 
(DAAD 1999: 57, DAAD 2000: 76, DAAD 2001: 80-81, DAAD 2002: 76-77, 
DAAD 2004: 157). They could spend the beginning of their doctorate in Iran, 
then continue their research at a German university for a two-year research period 
with the support of the DAAD. The last part of their PhD must be done in their 
Iranian university. They would finalize their PhD with advice from both German 
and Iranian supervisors (DAAD 2005: 57).  
Since 2008 there has been German-language academic cooperation between 
Potsdam University and the University of Tehran with support from the DAAD. 
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The period of the project is set at ten years. According to information of the 
official website of the University of Potsdam, the project gives an opportunity to 
Iranian PhD students to spend part of their study time in Germany. It also supports 
guest lectureship and workshops for Iranian PhD students and provides the 
University of Tehran library with books on German language studies (University 
Potsdam 2015).  
The number of scholarships to Iranian students increased steadily between 1998 
and 2013, with a significant increase from 2006, as figure 10 shows: 
 
Figure 9. Change in number of Iranian and German DAAD Scholarship holders, 1998-
2013 
 
Source: DAAD (2014d: 2), updated by the researcher  
 
The budget spent by the DAAD on academic exchanges with Iran has increased 
from nearly 626 thousand Euro in 2000 to nearly four million Euro in 2012, as 
DAAD documents show (DAAD 2014d: 2). The DAAD has also implemented a 
specific project under the title of the “German/Iranian/Arabic University 
Dialogue”, which is funded from the special program of European-Islamic 
cultural dialogue. The DAAD has used this budget since 2002 and implemented 
some intercultural dialogue projects, and planning of Deutsch-Arabisch/Iranischer 
Hochschuldialog [the German -Arabic/Iranian university dialogue] was initiated 
from 2006. The project was organized by a section of the Southern Hemisphere 
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Partnership-Cultural Dialogue”. A working group in Referat 444 made a detailed 
map to monitor different activities, outputs, inputs and impacts which the DAAD 
expects a university undertake or achieve (DAAD 2012b). As the minimized 
model of this map in figure 11 shows, five general impacts of projects are 
expected to be “modernization of teaching”, “promotion of young and female 
academics”, “promotion of cultural dialogue and intercultural understanding”, 
“regional networking in the region and with Germany” and “contribution towards 
social development”.  
 
Figure 10. Monitoring levels of “German-Arabic/Iranian Higher Education Dialogue” 
 
Source: DAAD (2012b), summarized by the researcher 
Figure 11 shows that a “scholarship” can firstly lead to the output of “access to 
research sources in a partner country”; secondly to the outcome of “improvement 
of research possibilities”; and finally it can achieve an impact of “promotion of 
young and female academics”. Different activities, outputs, outcomes, and 
impacts which are determined in the map are intended to achieve the final aim of 
“shaping peaceful cooperation across cultural borders”. Besides scholarship, the 
project suggests a variety of other activities, including conferences, lectures, 
summer schools, common projects, language courses, coordination meetings, 
planning and academic workshops, common advising of PhD and MA 
dissertation, and intercultural forums.  
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A member of Referat 444 explained that to start the project the working group 
sent a call for applications to all German universities belonging to the general 
assembly of the DAAD, letting them know about key points of the project such as 
“objective”, “subject focus”, “partner regions”, “funding criteria”, “preparatory 
measures”, “documentation and content of application” and “decision on 
sponsorship and approval of funds” (DAAD 2014e). The offer met with a positive 
response from the universities. From 76 applications, 18 applications which best 
fit the structure of the project were selected by a team of referees of the DAAD 
(DAAD 2006: 173). The number of applicants in coming years increased as more 
German academics got to know about the project from their colleagues, as a 
member of Referat 444 explained (Löck, personal communication, 2014). 
Although the DAAD faced some problems in Iran, like closing of the information 
center, the Iranian and German universities managed to conduct successful 
cooperation between 2005 and 2013 through the German-Arabic/Iranian 
university dialogue. A list of projects which have taken place between German 
and Iranian universities under this project, together with the date and a brief 
explanation of the content of their activities, is provided in Appendix 7. The list is 
made according to information on the official DAAD website (DAAD 2016), with 
the help of a former director of the information center in Tehran and a member of 
Referat 444 (Schroerder, personal communication, 2014; Löck, personal 
communication, 2014).106 The projects cover diverse issues including “computer 
science and medical care”, “geography and geology”, “theater”, “film”, “forestry 
management”, “zoology and biodiversity research”, “earthquake-proof housing”, 
“sustainable habitat development”, “natural disaster risk and management”, “IT 
and culture and gender issues”, “comparative translation in Farsi and German”, 
“management and health care”, “linguistic”, “urban and geography”, “urban 
regeneration of deteriorated areas research”, “comparative theology”, “Arab 
Spring and peaceful change”, “sustainable water research”, “psychology and 
health care” and “comparative methods in religious studies”. 
There are six points relating to academic cooperation under the German-
Arabic/Iranian university dialogue project: 1) The projects cover diverse issues, 
such as health and medical science, engineering, water and earthquakes, political 
science, theater and film, linguistics and translation, interfaith dialogue, forestry, 
                                                          
106 The list is written with help of Cornelia Michels-Lampo, a member of a DAAD project on dialogue with 
Muslim countries, Referat P24, in 2015.  
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environment and urban structure; 2) Iranian and German universities are not the 
only participants in some of the projects. The DAAD was able to give different 
Muslim countries a chance to enter into dialogue and exchange their ideas in a 
single project; 3) almost all of the projects have been structured in a period of 
three years, which is a relatively good time to construct a network between 
participants, as the participants of these projects suggested (Mohagheghi, personal 
communication, 2016; Hippler, personal communication, 2016; Honrath, personal 
communication, 2016); 4) most of projects enabled travel to both Iran and 
Germany. Consequently, German and Iranian participants equally were able to 
experience each other’s culture; 5) the diverse form of activities in each project 
has been significant. Participants were able to go on excursions, participate in 
group discussions and develop their knowledge on specific academic issues; 6) 
the planning of the German-Arabic/Iranian university dialogue project was 
detailed. Not only the map of monitoring aims and objective of figure 11 indicate 
that it takes the aims of intercultural dialogue and the context of the DAAD into 
account, Referat 444 also conducted a study to assess each university project to 
find out the extent to which it reaches its aims and what have been the main 
positive and negative points. For instance, research to assess the project of 
Peaceful Change and Violent Conflict shows that 80% of participants rated their 
stay in the guest country as “very good”.107 Also, 50.41% perceived other cultures 
as interesting before travel and exchange, while this number increased to 78% 
thereafter (DAAD 2014b). Such a detailed assessment on participants of the 
projects illustrates that the organizers of the DAAD do not care just about 
sophisticated reports and proposals but also measure how well they achieve their 
objectives.  
The DAAD also supported academic cooperation among universities in Iran, 
Israel and Germany in 2011 and in the framework of the German-Arabic/Iranian 
university dialogue. An official of the DAAD confirmed this, but he said that he 
cannot be named as a source of information in this study. Because publishing 
details of that project can endanger the security of the Iranian and Israeli academic 
participant, this information is classified in the DAAD.  
The project of German-Arabic/Iranian university dialogue is also practical 
evidence illustrating that the DAAD tried to define dialogue between Germany 
                                                          
107 That assessment is based on the contributions of 21 out of 41 participants in the project. 
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and Muslim countries practically in the context of its activities. For the DAAD, 
dialogue means to react to the needs of the academic community. It does not want 
to specifically define it, as the head of the Iran section of the DAAD argues: 
“Our strategy is reasonably [to] react to the need of the academic community. 
And we will tell [them] to give us the money to do it according to [the] need of 
the universities […] So DAAD will tell [that] we will use the budget for the 
academic exchange and we will not focus on cultural fields. But what the culture 
is, is about what the concept is. It is very vague and does not need to be defined” 
(Haridi, personal communication, 2014).  
To understand how projects of German-Arabic/Iranian university dialogue 
respond to the needs of the German and Iranian academic community, two of the 
projects are discussed in more detail in the next section.  
 
6.2.2.3.1 Project of Peaceful Change from 2012 to 2015 
Some details on the project of “peaceful change and violent conflict – the 
transformation of the Middle East and Western-Muslim relations” are presented in 
Appendix 7. The project was initiated and led by Jochen Hippler from the 
University of Duisburg-Essen in Germany. The project had partners from three 
other countries, Morocco, Pakistan and Iran and focused on the Arab Spring, 
which was a topical issue among academics of Western and Muslim countries. An 
attempt was made to select partners in the fields of social, humanitarian and 
political sciences to reflect academic views in those Muslim countries on the 
social change taking place in the Middle East (Hippler, personal communication, 
2016). The project was initiated by Jochen Hippler, whose name was mentioned 
as an invited German expert to Iran in 2008. It was also mentioned in 6.2.1.3 that 
he was invited thanks to the efforts of Fatemeh Sadr to participate in conferences 
and seminars of Khatami’s dialogue NGO. The project is the result of a network 
which Hippler built during his visits to Iran and contact with academic partners in 
Iran.   
The academic format of the project was in “two pillars”. The first was an 
academic exchange with different scholars and teachers from different 
universities. The second considers activities such as student exchange, summer 
school, workshops and seminars which were related to the specific topic of 
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change in the Middle East. The target group was therefore students (Honrath, 
personal communication, 2016).  
The Arab Spring was not the only focus of the project. Issues such as the role of 
theological intellectuals in Iran, social movements in Arab countries, and the role 
of women in Muslim countries were also discussed in different parts of the 
project. German and Iranian students who participated in the project mentioned 
that their image of each other’s countries altered significantly after the cultural 
exchange. The results of the assessment by the DAAD (DAAD 2014b) and 
talking to some participants confirm this point. A German student explained that 
by gaining more experience of the everyday life of women in Iran she developed a 
better understanding of women in social life in Iran. For instance, she realized that 
women in the north of Iran, like in the city of Rasht, wear hijab in a looser way 
than women in more traditional cities such as Isfahan. She had experience of 
talking to a female NGO activist and learning about how women, despite the 
difficulties, participate to assert their rights (Mahla, personal communication, 
2016). On the other hand, a male Iranian student who participated in the project 
stated that he realized after travelling to Germany that he had had a fantasy image 
in his mind: “In this travel I visited cities of Duisburg, Köln and Bonn. So 
honestly I realized for the first time that ALL streets in Germany are not 
necessarily clean. There are also some dirty ones” (Daryoushi, personal 
communication, 2016). The social participation of students became more active in 
the second and third exchange of the project. This may be for two reasons, as 
some participants of the study suggest. Firstly, students got to know each other 
better, so they could communicate with each other in a more relaxed way. The 
second reason is that the second and third exchange took place during the 
presidency of Rouhani in Iran, so Iranian students were more relaxed and 
confident about expressing their views informally (Hippler, personal 
communication, 2016; Honrath, personal communication, 2016).  
Some German participants in the field study argued that Iranian students were not 
confident about expressing their views in meetings in front of their professors. 
Even in informal activities, they, especially female students, appeared silent or 
taciturn. In the view of some German participants, a reason for this is rooted in the 
difference between the training system in German and Iranian countries. In Iran, 
there is a kind of “cathedral teaching”. In this educational system, the teacher has 
Chapter 6: Iranian and German Implementing Actors of Intercultural Dialogue 
299  
a central role. In Germany, meanwhile, usually a form of “seminar teaching” is 
apparent (Honrath, personal communication, 2016). Hence it seems that Iranian 
students, because they have little experience of discussing issues in normal 
educational life, appeared to be shy about criticizing other students’, and 
especially their professors’, views. Moreover, the Iranian professor who 
coordinated the project from the University of Tehran was not satisfied with the 
political issues that German students brought up in the discussions. He 
nevertheless mentioned, proudly, that he made “a situation” in which even “the 
most sensitive issues” could be addressed freely by German students 
(Nourbakhsh, personal communication, 2016). It seems that the Iranian professor 
considered certain issues to be wrong for discussion; consequently, the Iranian 
students followed his unwritten rule.  
An attempt was also made to discuss this issue with Iranian students who 
participated in the project. Most of them did not respond to the question. One 
student who agreed to participate in the research confirmed that the Iranian 
students were supposed to respect some behavioral codes, such as wearing hijab 
(however, in Germany it is not obligatory), not shaking hands with the opposite 
sex, and not talking about issues which can challenge Iran’s positive image in 
Germany (Daryoushi, personal communication, 2016). German students were also 
advised, before traveling to Iran, to respect some specific behavioral codes. For 
instance, the female students were asked to wear hijab (because it is obligatory in 
Iran) and to avoid shaking hands with the opposite sex in Iran (Mahla, personal 
communication, 2016).  
Some of the German participants also mentioned that Iranian students felt 
insecure about expressing their views in case a “spy” was among them. An 
attempt was also made to explore this issue. The only Iranian student who 
participated in the research argued that he had a strong feeling that a specific 
student was spying on all the students. In front of this specific student, he once 
talked very openly to German students about a political issue. The next day he 
was called by his professor, who was the Iranian director of the project. He was 
accused by the professor in this meeting of syahnamāei [blackwashing] the image 
of Iran in informal talks with foreigners. After that meeting, he studied carefully 
the behavior of that specific student and became reasonably sure that he was 
spying on other students. He still believes, however, that the student was not 
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appointed by a university authority or the professor to spy. In his view, the student 
was being opportunistic, as he wanted to connect with the main authorities of the 
university in order to obtain a PhD position or a job in future. So, by spying on 
other students, this student probably wanted to show the university’s authorities 
that he can take care of Iranian students in international projects, and protect the 
values and ideology of the Iranian state.   
The security and spying issues were not perceived just in the case of students but 
also in the case of the German director of the project. The German director of the 
project was labeled as or accused of being a spy by a professor at the University 
of Tehran in this project.108 This accusation was without basis in fact and an 
apology was made by the dean of the Faculty of World Studies at that time. But 
the German director of project believes that he was not supported properly by his 
Iranian counterpart. That was one, but not the only, reason that the project 
changed its Iranian partner from the University of Tehran to the Institute for 
Humanities and Cultural Studies at the end of second year of the project. 
Nevertheless, the second Iranian partner was also changed after a short time due 
to inappropriate management practices by the contact person at that Iranian 
institute, as a German member of the project explained (Honrath, personal 
communication, 2016). However, in the view of the Iranian contact person, 
cooperation stopped because the time of the project was over (Miri, personal 
communication, 2015). The third partner of the project was the Center for 
Strategic Research (CSR), which was mentioned as an Iranian think tank in 
6.1.3.2. The cooperation with CSR has been referred to by the German director of 
the project as an “impressive exchange of ideas”. Some researchers on the project 
from Morocco, Pakistan and Germany participated in the joint seminar with the 
experts of the CSR in Tehran in late 2014. Issues relating to change in the Middle 
East were discussed “frankly”, “professionally” and “smartly” in this meeting 
(Hippler, personal communication, 2016). The project period ended after that 
meeting. 
Both the German director and the Iranian coordinators of the project were 
satisfied with the results of their cooperation. In the view of the German director, 
it was worth getting to know three different partners in Iran and giving several 
Iranian and German students and researchers an opportunity to get to know each 
                                                          
108 The German director of the project was labeled a spy by a professor who at that time, 2012-2013, was the 
director of the Department of American Studies in the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran.  
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other’s culture in a dialogue activity. For the Iranian directors also, the same 
issues were important, although one Iranian coordinator specifically highlighted 
his appreciation of the German director’s understanding of cultural sensibilities 
such as hijab. 
 
6.2.2.3.2 Project of Theological University Dialogue from 2012 to 2014 
The director of the project of theological university dialogue was Prof. Dr. Klaus 
von Stosch from Paderborn University. Appendix 7 provides more information on 
this project. Academics in the field of Catholic Christian theology from Germany, 
Lebanon and Iran, with participants from the University of Religions and 
Denominations of Qum (the local name is Adyān University) and Al-Mustafa 
International Qom took part in the project. It focused on the issue of interfaith 
dialogue and was designed to encourage scientific discussions among young 
students and scholars from both faiths, Islam and Christianity. The project 
managed to organize travel to Germany, Lebanon and Iran. Its main issues were 
hermeneutical concepts for the dialogue of denominations and religions, the 
hermeneutical level of the Muslim-Christian dialogue and faith and freedom. 
Moreover, besides a workshop, summer school, seminar, and small discussion 
groups, the project also enabled partner universities to run co-teaching seminars 
on issues such as theology of friendship and love in Islam and Christianity. The 
project helped to fund one to two months of a research visit to Germany for 
Iranian professors. In the productive atmosphere of the project, a subproject was 
initiated for co-writing teaching booklets of Shia Islam and Catholic Christianity 
(DAAD 2014a). This project continued later, even when financial support from 
the DAAD ended after three years.  
The project began with cooperation between German and Lebanese universities. 
Nevertheless, thanks to the efforts of a member of the executive team of the 
project, Hamideh Mohagheghi, a female Iranian researcher (Mohagheghi, 
personal communication, 2016), and three Iranian PhD students of Paderborn 
University, the project continued with the participation of two Iranian universities 
in the field of theology. According to an internal assessment of the DAAD, these 
students had a perceptible positive effect on the university dialogue, because the 
border between the German side and the Iranian side became more flexible 
(DAAD 2014a).  
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Both Iranian and German students were informed about behavioral codes, more or 
less similar to what was mentioned in 6.2.2.3.1, during travel to Iran and 
Germany. Some German students of the project told the director and assistants 
that they felt they were not allowed to talk about specific issues in the discussions. 
According to internal assessment by the DAAD, Iranian students expressed 
themselves more freely in seminars which took place in Germany and in small 
groups without the presence of their professors (DAAD 2014a: 8).  
One of the topics of the project in a seminar held in Germany was the issue of 
“freedom and faith”. This issue is discussed based on the views of Mohammad 
Shabestari and his presence in the seminar. Shabestari was mentioned in 5.2.2 as 
an Iranian dissident theologian who started Iran’s interfaith dialogues after the 
Revolution from the Hekmat academy. The presence of Shabestari as a dissident 
theologian in the interfaith dialogue between Iran and Germany is significant 
because it is a reminder that Iranian Islamic theology does not have just a single 
dimension and there are theologians in Iran who share cosmopolitan and more 
liberal views in this regard, despite all limitations and difficulties. German 
participants in the project were impressed that they could discuss issues with 
Iranian participants who were open-minded and have a liberal approach to 
understanding the Quran. 
A problem of theological discussions among the participants of interfaith 
dialogues is the clichéd perception of interfaith dialogue as an opportunity to 
propagate Islam (or Christianity). A participant of the study mentioned that, 
“fortunately”, not only did Adyān University not perceive interfaith dialogue as a 
propagation opportunity, it also cooperated in the project as a partner that 
understands comparative theology.109 Moreover, it was mentioned in the field 
study that despite the active role of Al-Mustafa University in the field of theology 
on an international level, some participants on the German side were not 
completely sure about its purely academic approach in meetings. The university 
has a strong connection with the Iranian state, the religiously legitimated body. 
Hence cooperation with Al-Mustafa University has declined.  
                                                          
109 Because the name of Al-Mustafa University is not mentioned in the comment relating to understanding 
comparative theology in interfaith dialogue, it seems that the point of the interviewee was indirectly to 
criticize a propagation approach of this university in the meetings. But she did not go into detail; in her view, 
the positive dimensions of interfaith dialogue must be deepened, not the negative ones. 
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The participants in the interfaith dialogue project also had difficulty translating 
what exactly they had in mind at the time of the discussions. Although all 
seminars and meetings had translators, some terminology of Islamic and Christian 
theologies was still difficult to translate. For instance, the word “hereafter” or 
“other world”, which refers to life after death, has a different context and meaning 
in Islamic and Christian theology. In Catholic Christianity, according to the 
German theologians on this project, it is called Jenseits. In translation for the 
Iranian side it was interpreted to Āxerat. In the view of Mohagheghi, who knows 
both the Shia tradition of Islam and the Catholic tradition of Christianity, this 
translation is not appropriate. Raising this problem, in her view, is a good step 
toward recognizing that more academic research is needed in the field of 
comparative theology between different religions and cultures.  
Despite the limitations and difficulties of the project, some German and Iranian 
students developed a friendship and stayed in contact with each other. With the 
help of the internet and social networks, these connections became stronger. One 
German student even traveled to Iran a year after the project to experience the 
tradition of Ashura.110 He received assistance and support from his Iranian friends 
during his stay in Iran.  
 
6.2.2.4 A Summary on Analysis of DAAD 
To conclude 6.2.2, the relevant question will be repeated: What are the main 
characteristics of the intercultural dialogue activities implemented by the DAAD, 
and what were the main points that influenced them? The work of the DAAD in 
the context of European-Islamic cultural dialogue has reflected the integrated 
foreign cultural policy of Germany. On one hand, it has been a 
Mittlerorganisation which steadily received the relevant budget from the foreign 
office, and on the other it works closely with the cultural section of the German 
embassy in Tehran, specifically when it faces political problems in Iran. It used its 
existing means and activities to promote a specific project in the framework of 
intercultural dialogue. Hence it defined intercultural dialogue practically in its 
own context as a reflection of what academic society needs. It planned a specific 
                                                          
110 Ashura is the day of remembrance of martyrdom of Hussain ibn Ali, the second Imam in the Shi’a 
religion. It happened in the seventh century, according to the Islamic calendar, on tenth of the month of 
Muharram. 
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project and then carried out systematic assessment of the achievements of its 
projects. The transparency of information regarding its organization, budget and 
variety of projects has been significant. It has increasing academic exchange with 
Iran, although in the view of some participants of the study it has not been 
understood completely as a Mittlerorganisation in that context. About twenty 
projects were implemented during 2005 and 2013 between German and Iranian 
universities under intercultural dialogue and on a variety of issues, from medicine 
and natural sciences to social and political issues.  
 
 
6.2.3 Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (ifa) 
Compared to the Goethe Institute and the DAAD, ifa is a relatively small 
Mittlerorganisation, but its place in the foreign cultural policy of Germany is still 
significant. How it used the opportunity of the “European-Islamic cultural 
dialogue” to develop cultural work in Muslim countries has been one of the 
interesting points of this study. ifa has not only organized exhibitions of fine art 
for domestic and foreign countries but also innovatively created some new forms 
of activities, like exchange internships for German and Muslim participants as a 
basis of intercultural dialogue. The present section contains information gathered 
from studying published texts of ifa, such as its annual reports, and interviewing 
some relevant groups in this regard. The content of this subchapter are divided 
into four segments: An overview of the history and aims of ifa is presented in 
6.2.3.1 and the organizational structure of ifa is explained in 6.2.3.2. Because ifa 
has implemented different activities in the field of cultural dialogue with other 
countries, details of its general and specific practices is presented in four smaller 
segments, in 6.2.3.3. A summary of all the points of the subchapter is provided in 
6.2.3.4. 
 
6.2.3.1 History and Organizational Aims  
The current ifa is rooted originally in an organization called the Museum und 
Institut zur Kunde des Auslanddeutschtums zur Förderung detuscher Interessen 
im Ausland [Museum and institute for German foreign trade and promotion of 
German interests abroad]. It was established in the last years of World War I in 
1917, under the patronage of King Wilhelm II of Württemberg. According to Udo 
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M. Metzinger, the institute later changed its name to Deutsches Ausland-Institut 
(DAI). It organized cultural activities such as exhibitions and photo shows for 
German-speaking people abroad. Between 1933 and 1945 its activities were 
influenced under agendas of race politics and Germanization. A few years after 
World War II, in 1949, its name was changed to the current Insitut für 
Ausßlandsbetzihungen (ifa). It aims at organizing art exhibitions in Germany and 
abroad and was involved in mediating a new image for Germany internationally 
through art exhibitions and German language courses (Metzinger 2013, Metzinger 
2007).  
According to its official website, ifa has three main aims: firstly, to promote 
“cultural exchange to assist peoples, nations and religions in learning from one 
another and in living together”; secondly, to “achieve peace and justice, protecting 
human livelihoods and cultures and attaining a united Europe”; and thirdly, to 
take “dialogue” into account as a center of its activities, because it “counts 
cultural diversity as a valuable asset”. Other aims ifa sets out to achieve are 
initiating “intercultural dialogue”, working as a “competence center” for the 
foreign affairs ministry, and giving “international people an opportunity to get to 
know Germany”. The operational field of ifa is in cultural, educational, civil 
society, political and media networks as a European base institute. It aims at target 
groups such as young people and those active in the field of media and culture, 
scholars and academics, as well as political and cultural institutes, NGOs and 
policy makers (ifa 2015a).   
 
6.2.3.2 Organizational Structure  
ifa has a main office, an art gallery, a library and a German language course 
institute in Stuttgart. Its Zivik office and an art gallery are located in Berlin. Up to 
2005 it had an art gallery in Bonn, which was closed down due to financial 
problems. ifa is governed by a Präsidium [steering committee] and 
Generalsekretär [general secretary]. The presidency generally does not deal with 
executive duties but makes decisions such as choosing the executive team. There 
is little information about the mechanisms of the presidency and its members, 
although the available information illustrates that the members of the presidency 
are diverse, from representatives of the foreign ministry to representatives of the 
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Land of Baden-Württemberg and the city of Stuttgart.111 The head of the 
executive body is the general secretary. From 1998 to 2013, ifa was led by two 
different general secretaries. The first was Prof. Dr. Kurt-Jürgen Maaß, who 
served in this position from 1997 to 2008; Maaß is a researcher in the field of 
foreign cultural policy, and his book was reviewed in 3.2.5. From 2008 to the end 
of the analysis period of this research, Ronald Grätz was in the position of general 
secretary of ifa.  
ifa works with four departments: dialogue, media, art and administration. The 
dialogue department has had sections such as Dialogforen [dialogue forums]; 
integration and media; Zivik program [civil program]. The civil program 
concentrates on supporting NGOs and civil society actors that work in so-called 
third world countries. The dialogue department is in charge of the German 
language course institute, which is located in Stuttgart. The dialogue forum of the 
dialogue department was first established in 1997. It is supported by the press and 
information office of the federal government and foreign ministry of Germany (ifa 
2003: 62).112 It addresses media and their influence on society, and media is the 
main issue of the programs which it implemented together with professional 
experts and journalists (ifa 2005a: 40). According to the ifa annual report, the 
special program of European-Islamic cultural dialogue between 2001 and 2006 is 
organized under this section. The details will be explained later. The media 
department mainly focused on publishing the magazine Kulturaustausch [cultural 
exchange] and activities of the ifa library. Later it was involved with the issue of 
Grundsatzfragen Auswärtiger Kulturpolitik [basic questions of foreign cultural 
policy], under which research and scientific activities are promoted in the field of 
foreign cultural policy. Activities such as the Rave research prize and Qantara 
internet portal have been organized in this department. The responsibility for the 
dialogue forum was also transferred to this department from 2012. The 
department of art deals with a very original and historical task of ifa, which is to 
hold art exhibitions abroad. Based on ifa’s annual reports, one of the main areas of 
focus of this department between 1998 and 2013 was the ifa-Tourneeausstellung 
                                                          
111 This part of the organizational structure of ifa, the combination of federal and Länder organizations, is 
significant. It reflects the fact that German foreign cultural activities in some cases are organized through 
cooperation between organizations which are in charge of German domestic and foreign policy. 
112 The point of the dialogue section being supported by the press and information office of the federal 
government in 1997 coincides with a time at which the federal ministry attempted to work more actively in 
cultural policy but the Länder wanted to limit this interference at domestic level, as mentioned in 5.1.2. 
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[ifa touring exhibition]. Within the framework of this tour, a selected art 
exhibition is shown abroad yearly.  
The structure of ifa changed slightly during the period of analysis of this study. 
For instance, after 2012 the section of “policy issues regarding to foreign cultural 
policy” of the media department was merged into or replaced by the dialogue 
forum. The dialogue forum as mentioned above was previously moved from the 
dialogue department to the media department. Hence the new section name is 
Forschungsprogramm/Dialogforen [research program/dialogue forums] from 
2013. ifa’s annual report explains that this change was to give an opportunity to 
the personnel of the “research” and “dialogue forum” to work closely together (ifa 
2012: 1). But according to a member of ifa’s staff, a reason for this change was 
incompatibility between the work and income of directors of the Department of 
Dialogue and Department of Media. Since a director in the Department of 
Dialogue at that time had an income equal to the director of Department of Media, 
he demanded to decrease sections and consequently works of its own department 
(Houssaini, personal communication, 2014).  
ifa receives financial support from different sources, the foreign ministry, the 
Land of Baden-Wüttemberg and the city of Stuttgart. Its budget is smaller than the 
budget of other Mittlerorganisationen that receive assistance from the foreign 
ministry, although it has been increased yearly. For instance, the annual reports 
show that its total budget increased from about € 17 million in 2006 (ifa 2006b: 
91) to more than € 18 million in 2008 (ifa 2008: 89).  
 
6.2.3.3 Practices: Generally and Specifically for Intercultural Dialogue 
General activities of ifa have been in the field of art exhibitions and German 
language classes. They have also included granting internships and scholarships to 
German and international applicants, holding seminars and conferences and 
inviting experts, diplomats, artists and journalists from Germany and other 
countries, as well as supporting civil society actors especially from Muslim and 
developing countries.  
Although the main building, library and gallery of ifa are located in Stuttgart and 
not in Berlin, ifa still has many visitors. In 2002, about 25 thousand visitors went 
to the ifa gallery in Stuttgart and seven thousand people used the library facilities 
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of ifa. Also, 20 thousand books were borrowed from the library (ifa 2002b: II). 
The ifa library has rich documentation and books on foreign cultural policy113 and 
close contact with the Goethe Institute. Based on a deposit agreement between 
them, a copy of all new publications of the Goethe Institute is sent to the ifa 
library every year (ifa 2009: 16, ifa 2012: 16). On average, two million 
participants from almost 100 countries take part in the German language courses 
of ifa (ifa 2002b: II, ifa 2007: 3, ifa 2008: 3). The language courses, which were 
later offered under the name of ifa-Akademie, give a variety of options to 
international students by teaching lessons on the internet or physically in the 
evenings and at weekends and in the summer holidays (ifa 2012: 14).  
The ifa gallery and art exhibition on an international level received positive 
feedback from the public. Between 2002 and 2008, at least one million people 
annually visited ifa art exhibitions and art tours around the world (ifa 2002b: II, 
ifa 2006b: 3, ifa 2007: 3, ifa 2008: 3). Iran has also been one of the destinations of 
the touring exhibitions. In 2005, an exhibition and symposium on the art of the 
German painter and sculptor Gerhard Richter took place in the Museum of 
Contemporary Art of Tehran (Goethe-Institute, 2005, p. 130). In 2013, Günther 
Uecker, a German painter and object artist, presented his visual art in an 
exhibition in Isfahan (ifa, 2013, p. 6).114 
Publication of the Kulturaustausch magazine in hard and online prints is another 
ifa activity in the field of intercultural dialogue. One of the roles of the magazine 
is to discuss and analyze current issues that ifa includes in its programs. The 
Stuttgarter Schlossgespräch [Stuttgart castle conversation] is also jointly 
organized by ifa and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. This conference takes place 
annually. Issues such as immigration, integration and cultural globalization are 
discussed between experts from academia, media, politics and culture. The results 
of discussions of this conference have been published regularly in 
Kulturaustausch (ifa 2006b: 48, ifa 2007: 38).  
From 2001, the Rave Stiftung in cooperation with ifa ran two scholarship and 
prize-giving programs. The Rave prize, which since 2013 has been called the ifa-
Forschungspreis Auswärtige Kulturpolitik [Ifa research prize on foreign cultural 
                                                          
113 According to the personal observation of the researcher, the library has books on a diversity of issues 
relating to foreign cultural policy and is visited by students and researchers four days a week.  
114 The successful cultural exchanges like these did not have a chance of being covered in the top news; but 
the unsuccessful exchanges like the cancelation of cooperation between museums in Berlin and Teheran, as 
mentioned in chapter 1, did receive a lot of media attention in 2016. 
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policy] (ifa 2013: 28), is to encourage researchers at Master’s and PhD level to 
work in the field of intercultural dialogue and foreign cultural policy. Two 
researchers of Iranian origin have won this prize. In 2005 it was awarded for the 
PhD dissertation of Naika Foroutan on the topic of inter-civilizational cultural 
dialogue between the Western and Islamic world,115 and in 2012 for the PhD 
dissertation of Katayon Meier on the issue of culture and education: Neo-Kantian 
pedagogy as a transcultural education concept (ifa 2015b). The second program is 
the Rave scholarship, which goes to young curators, restorers, museum 
technicians and cultural managers from countries in transition and developing 
countries, as well as to applicants from Germany, enabling them to do an 
internship in their relevant field (ifa 2004: 65).   
The online magazine Aktuelle Kunst aus der islamischen Welt [contemporary art 
from the Islamic world] received assistance from ifa from 2001. The website is an 
online art portal and gives artists from Muslim countries, South America and 
Africa an opportunity to present their artistic material. The website has been 
visited by 1.4 million users annually and is available in German, English and 
Arabic (ifa 2005a: 35, ifa 2008: 3). In 2007, the name of the online magazine 
changed to Nafas. According to the editors of the website, the new name fits more 
with representing the artwork of artists who are from countries with Muslim 
majorities. Nafas in many languages, including Arabic, Persian, Turkish and 
Urdu, means “breath” and metaphorically in Sufism means “freedom”.  
ifa also implements projects to strengthen civil society of the third world countries 
via the Zivik department program called zivile Konfliktbearbeitung [civilian 
conflict management]. Zivik was established in 2001 to advise NGOs and the 
foreign ministry on issues relevant to civil conflicts. Zivik promotes and supports 
documented and evaluated projects in crisis regions of the world. According to its 
action plan, it is expected to consider armed conflicts including new forms such as 
terrorism and civil war (Die Bundesregierung 2004). From 2009 to 2011, more 
than 200 NGOs received advice from the Zivik department. Nearly seven million 
Euro per year have been allocated to the NGO projects in Africa, Asia and South 
America and in Israel and Palestine by Zivik (ifa 2009: 10, ifa 2011b). 
                                                          
115 This dissertation which is published as a book is reviewed in 3.2.4 of this research. 
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Along with the arrival of a new general secretary, Ronal Grätz, in 2008, some new 
projects were added to the activities of ifa in the field of press and media, prize 
awards and seminars. Since 2008 ifa has been cooperating with the European 
journal Kulturreport/EUNC Jahrbuch. This magazine has a European base and is 
printed in four languages, English, French, German and Spanish (ifa 2013: 31). In 
2009 ifa established the Theodor Wanner Prize, to be awarded to artists and 
activists in social, political, entrepreneurial or financial fields. Individuals who 
strive to foster dialogue among cultures through their art and social activities can 
be nominated for this prize. Furthermore, to inform German citizens of 
international relations and provide a forum for dialogue between them and the 
foreign ministry, ifa created a new program in 2011 called Außenpolitik-live - 
Diplomaten im Dialog [Foreign policy live- diplomats in dialogue]. Major players 
in this program are German diplomats who hold foreign posts abroad. Based on 
information from the ifa annual report, the seminars have taken place in different 
federal states of Germany and in the presence of German ambassadors from 
France, Egypt, Russia and Poland (ifa 2012: 11-12).  
The Arab Spring (ifa 2011b: 16) and climate change (ifa 2011b: 11) have been the 
recent topics of lecture programs and studies of ifa. The reality of “digital age” 
has changed the form but not the content of ifa activities. The changes are 
intended to fit ifa activities with a global and unclear audience in the world: 
“Yes, there is a change. So now we don’t think about departments, in format or in 
target groups, we think on issues. The main issue for the institute in the next 
years, to 2017, is global citizenship. So I ask about global ethic, or to discuss 
global issues, global citizenship in a sense that Ban Ki-moon said, and command 
these global developments from the cultural perspective. The first training would 
be full on digital diplomacy. Or how to use digital instrument in social networks 
in foreign relations [...] We have to think about the other kinds of dialogues. 
Maybe all the electronic instruments help us to get through dialogue. Nowadays, 
in this moment, they resolve problems. For example, we have no target group 
which we can define. The target group is anybody, in twitter or Facebook, it can 
be a young person or a journalist, it can be EVERYBODY. And you get a 
response and answer from everybody. And you have to react. And react really 
quickly. And meet another structure, another institute, the man’s power” (Grätz, 
personal communication, 2015).  
 
There were so many analytical points on the cultural activities of ifa regarding 
intercultural dialogue that it is more effective to present them in four smaller 
segments. The following give an overview of “media dialogue” activities, a 
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specific forum established to deal with a project of European-Islamic cultural 
dialogue, the internship program of “Cross-Cultural Praktika”, and the specific 
attention paid by ifa to civil society.  
 
6.2.3.3.1 Dialogue with Muslim Countries through Media Dialogue 
ifa started through its dialogue forum to implement Mediendialog [media 
dialogue] with Arab countries from 1997, three years before it focused on those 
countries with the specific budget of European-Islamic cultural dialogue. The 
media dialogue was to hold seminars and workshops on democracy and the role of 
media in democratic societies. In 1997 a seminar was held in Heidelberg and 
attended by experts from Arab countries and Germany (ifa 1997). The next media 
dialogue was held in 1998 in Amman, Jordan, where issues such as human rights 
and the rights of women were discussed (Abu Zaid 1998: 11). The media dialogue 
in 1999 took place in Rabat, Morocco. A result of that media dialogue was 
submission of a resolution by participants from 13 Arab countries, Germany and 
Switzerland. The resolution was determined in 10 articles (ifa 1999). 
In the post-9/11 period, the media dialogue extended to include new issues and 
more Muslim countries. Academics, journalists and political experts from Egypt, 
Amman, Syria, Algeria, Palestine, Morocco, Lebanon, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Germany 
can be seen among the participants in this period (ifa 2003: 69, ifa 2006a: 80, ifa 
2007: 38-39). Also, the media dialogue was not limited to Muslim countries, with 
participants from countries such as Serbia, Ukraine, USA, France, Israel also 
among the partners of the project (ifa 2002b, ifa 2006a: 75).  
Iran was also a partner of ifa media dialogue between 2002 and 2005. The first 
German-Iranian dialogue took place in 2002 in the offices of IPIS in Tehran. The 
topic of this dialogue was “globalization, challenges and chances” (ifa 2002b: 63, 
ifa 2003: 70). The second was in 2003 in Hamburg and Berlin and discussed 
issues such as the relationship between Iran and its neighbor countries in the 
Middle East and the chances for democratic development of legal security in the 
region (ifa 2004: 71). In 2005, the third German-Iranian media dialogue was held 
in the offices of IPIS on the responsibility of the media in relation to global threats 
(ifa 2005b: 87, ifa 2006a: 74). The ifa further coordinated some scientific 
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seminars in 2005 in Isfahan and Tehran. From the German side Dr. Oliver Hahn, a 
research fellow from Dortmund University, presented topics such as trends in the 
conflict, crisis and coverage of crisis in the Middle East, journalistic cultures, 
public diplomacy and media diplomacy among Western and Middle Eastern 
countries. From the Iranian side some professors from the Allameh Tabtabtabaee 
University, Tehran University, University of Isfahan, as well as journalists, 
broadcasters from news agencies and experts from Iranian radio and TV 
participated (ifa 2006a: 81).  
After 2005, some projects regarding Iran that were also supported by ifa were in 
the context of media and journalism. In 2008, ifa initiated a program for six local 
politicians, including some staff of the city council of Tehran, and two journalists 
to visit Germany. It took place in Berlin, Cologne and Essen (ifa, 2008, p. 44). Ifa 
also coordinated a conference for German and Iranian journalists, NGO activists 
and media experts in 2010. The conference was a response to the situation of the 
post-2009 presidential election in Iran and the role social media played in civilian 
demonstrations in the streets of Tehran and other cities. Deutsche Welle also 
assisted with holding this conference (ifa 2010a: 12, ifa 2011a).  
 
6.2.3.3.2 A Forum for Dialogue and Understanding  
What has ifa specifically done regarding European-Islamic cultural dialogue? At 
the time, ifa received very little budget from the foreign ministry compared with 
other Mittlerorganisationen. This program and budget of European-Islamic 
cultural dialogue was therefore perceived as an opportunity to illustrate the ability 
of ifa to implement convincing cultural projects. The forum of Dialog und 
Verständigung [Dialogue and understanding], Cross-Cultural Praktika [Cross-
cultural internships], and cooperating with other German cultural actors in the 
online magazine Nafas and the website of Qantara are among the specific efforts 
of ifa regarding European-Islamic foreign cultural policy. 
The Forum of Dialogue and Understanding was established in 2002 by the 
department of dialogue to conceptualize and then implement specific projects 
relevant to dialogue with Muslim countries. The project started from a concept 
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paper which was developed by Jochen Hippler.116 The concept paper explains 
basic political conditions for conducting intercultural dialogue between Germany 
as a Western country and Muslim countries. The paper also mentioned conceptual 
initial considerations which had to be taken into account by German partners in 
dialogue with Muslim partners. The paper advises that attention should be paid to 
target groups of the Muslim countries in the future dialogue programs, and that 
the audience in “Muslim countries” should not be viewed so generally. Moreover, 
it mentions that the focus of dialogue should not be merely on academics and 
intellectuals but on ordinary people in Muslim countries, too. The paper finally 
suggested initiating intercultural dialogue with a mix of projects, such as writing a 
“white paper” about the position of intercultural relationships, inventing a 
“journalism prize” called “dialogue among cultures”, coordinating “co-written 
books” by German and Muslim authors, and finally directing a “film” on the issue 
of intercultural dialogue. The paper expected that these intercultural dialogue 
projects could be implemented within four years (ifa 2002a).  
The dialogue department took the points of the concept paper seriously and 
implemented some intercultural dialogue accordingly. In 2002, ifa organized a 
seminar in Schloss Neuhardenberg and invited politicians, diplomats, journalists 
and authors from Germany and Muslim countries. The result of the seminar was 
the creation of a group to work on writing a joint book. The dialogue department 
held many workshops and meetings between authors from Germany and some 
Muslim countries to manage and finalize the co-written book. It was a report 
about the Muslim-Western relationship (ifa 2003: 62) on the topic of “western and 
Islamic world- a Muslim position” (ifa 2004: 64). It was finally written jointly by 
six authors from six different Muslim countries (Bakr et al. 2004).117 Co-writing 
the book was difficult for the authors because the articles were not written 
individually but jointly by at least two different authors. Also, this was not easy 
for the organizers of ifa, because they had to coordinate meetings and discussions 
                                                          
116 This is the third time that the name Jochen Hippler has been mentioned thematically in this research. He 
was invited to Iran in 2008 with the assistance of Fatemeh Sadr to participate in a conference of the dialogue 
NGO of Khatami (see 6.1.3.4). He was the director of one of the twenty projects which the DAAD funded 
from 2005 to 2013 in academic exchanges between Iran and Germany (see 6.2.2.3.1). Both participation in 
the conference in Iran and leading the DAAD project took place years after Jochen Hippler wrote this 
working paper for ifa. 
117 The authors of the book “western and Islamic world- a Muslim position” were as follows: Salwa Bakr 
from Egypt, Bassam Ezbidi from Palestine, Hassan Kassab-Hassan from Syria, Fikret Karcic from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Mazhar Zaidi from Pakistan and Dato Jawhar Hassan from Malaysia. The preface of the 
book is written by Alois Graf von Waldburg-Zeil, the president of ifa at that time, and the introduction is by 
Jochen Hippler. 
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about different parts of the book. But in the end, both were satisfied with the 
result. Work on the book began in 2002, and it was finally published in 2004 in 
three languages, German, English and Arabic (ifa 2004: 64, ifa 2005a: 42). A 
former general secretary of ifa mentioned that the co-written book was a unique 
experience, because it showed a development in the German attitude towards 
cultural dialogue with the Islamic world: 
“Because one of the key findings was that the Muslim intellectuals who 
participated in the book said that the problem is that the West already set the 
agenda, over hundreds of years, and our countries do not want it anymore. We 
want to set the agenda jointly. This is possible just by dialogue” (Maaß, personal 
communication, 2015).  
 
Also, he explained that the book was welcomed by the German institutions, 
including cultural and political ones. Many German cultural organizations which 
were unfamiliar with the idea of the Euro-Islamic cultural dialogue but had an 
interest in implementing relevant activities in the post-9/11 period paid attention 
to the book. Hence it was republished immediately after its first publication, as the 
former general secretary mentioned (Maaß, personal communication, 2015). The 
book was also partly translated in one of the research projects which received 
support from Rayzani in Berlin (Rayzani in Germany 1392 [2013]). This indicates 
that it also attracted the attention of a main Iranian cultural actor in Germany.  
The next co-written book to be produced in the framework of intercultural 
dialogue was War, repression, terrorism: Political Violence and Civilization in 
Western and Muslim societies. Writing of the book started in 2003 and continued 
up to 2005 (ifa 2003: 64, ifa 2005a: 39). The final book was published in 2006 
(Hippler et al. 2006) and distributed in 6,000 issues (ifa 2006b: 42). 
In none of the mentioned co-written books have the Muslim participants been 
Iranian authors. This point has been raised with some participants in the field 
study. A former general secretary responded that it was because decision makers 
in ifa could not be sure that Iran would keep its stable peaceful approach towards 
the international realm, even at the time of Khatami. In his view, Ahmadinejad’s 
anti-Israeli discourse made ifa’s decision makers sure that they made the correct 
decision not to start a deep cultural dialogue with Iran: 
“I think, you know, Germany has [a] special relation with Israel. Because of our 
own history and there was a president of Iran who said that we have to kill 
(them). But for a German government it is very difficult to start a special 
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dialogue program with Iran, because of Israel. You saw how Israel reacted to 
Obama […] against Iran […]118 I think Obama made a good thing with Iran but 
Germany is not in [that] position to react like that (Maaß, personal 
communication, 2015).  
 
But a person who managed both projects of co-written books explained that he did 
not include Iranian authors in the project, simply because he did not have enough 
knowledge about Iran and Iranian authors at that time: 
“I personally think I had at that time not enough experience and study on Iran. So 
I was avoiding Iran because it was too complicated and big for me. I did not want 
to interfere with Iranian side when I did not know my partner. So I used my 
contacts that I knew from the other Muslim countries” (Hippler, personal 
communication, 2016).  
 
ifa also planned some seminars in the context of intercultural dialogue for the 
federal government to explain how a realistic picture of Germany should be 
mediated through cultural activities. Relevant activities by ifa include holding the 
seminar of “Germany as a partner in intercultural dialogue” and inviting 
researchers such as Udo Steinbach, who had experience in Arab-EU dialogue and 
“critical dialogue”, as a key speaker (ifa 2003: 65).  
 
6.2.3.3.3 Cross-Cultural Praktika, a New Form of Intercultural Dialogue 
The next dialogue-based program is introduced from 2005 as part of a scholarship 
program. It is called Cross-Cultural-Praktika (CCP) [Cross-cultural internships]. 
CCP does not offer an opportunity for studying and educational courses, but it is 
aimed at young applicants who want to gain experience of working in their field 
studies and in “intercultural competence” (ifa 2004: 65, ifa 2005a: 39). Because 
ifa does not have branch offices abroad, the German embassies in different 
countries help it to conduct its cultural programs. With regard to the CCP, the 
German embassies abroad, including in Iran, advertise the project and collect 
initial applications from applicants. As mentioned in 6.2.1.3, a director of the 
press section in cooperation with the cultural section interviewed and selected 
Iranian applicants for CCP in the first stage. The second stage of selection is done 
by a specific team of the CCP project. The final list of applicants with great 
                                                          
118 This refers to the reaction of Benjamin Netanyahu to the Obama administration’s progressive approach to 
the nuclear deal with Iran. In a speech to a joint session of the USA Congress, Netanyahu successfully 
mobilized republican senators to pressure their democratic senators to oppose Obama. 
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potential to receive the scholarship is then clarified, after prior agreement with the 
foreign ministry. According to an ifa statistic, there were three times more CCP 
applications from Muslim countries in 2010 than in 2005. The number of 
scholarships started from 20 per year in 2005 and reached 70 per year in 2014 (ifa 
2010b). Based on information from the official website of ifa, about 360 women 
and men from 31 countries have participated in the project, including 27 from 
Egypt, 16 from Iran, 11 from Kyrgyzstan and 56 from Germany. 
Iranian applicants have been awarded the CCP scholarship almost every year. 
They received 6% of the internships from 2005 to 2010. This number is lower 
than the number awarded to countries like Afghanistan, although Iraq, Syria, 
Malaysia, Lebanon, Indonesia, Yemen, Palestine, Jordan, Algeria and Nigeria had 
fewer participants than Iran up to the end of 2010. 18% of participants have taken 
part in the CCP project from Germany (ifa 2010b). Iranian applicants who 
participated in the CCP program have originally been employees or colleagues of 
institutes and organizations. They were mostly from Tehran, and then from cities 
such as Qazvin and Gorgan. Seyed Emad Tabatabaei, the second Iranian CCP 
scholarship holder, was introduced by the Imam Musa Sadr Institute, which was 
mentioned in 6.1.3.4. In an interview for this research, Tabatabaei mentioned that 
he heard about CCP when he was organizing travel for Johannes and Martina 
Hartkemeyer from Germany to Iran. This couple taught in a workshop of the 
dialogue center of the Imam Musa Sadr Institute. Since the cultural section of the 
German embassy assisted travel at that time, one of its employees shared the news 
about CCP with him. Tabatabaei’s field was judicial law, so he applied for the 
CCP and was able to get a four-month internship in a German court (Tabatabaei, 
personal communication, 2016). Other Iranian applicants, most of whom happen 
to be women, have received scholarships to do internships in diverse fields. Just 
one German applicant got an internship from CCP to stay in Iran. Twenty 
participants from Iran were able to participate in the program. A list of their 
names, date of their internship, their original organization in Iran and host 
organization in Germany is provided in Appendix 8 at the end of this research. 
The CCP project has received highly qualified applications from Iran. A director 
of the press section of the German embassy who is in charge of pre-selecting the 
applications mentioned that it was a tough job to select from the applications: 
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“We had 200 applicants, not every single one was so qualified but I think at the 
end I had to make such a tough decision and discussion with my colleagues, a 
group of 40 people who I could all send to Germany” (Their, personal 
communication, 2014).  
The limited budget for CCP is one of the reasons that, despite receiving high-
quality applications, ifa cannot give internships to more Iranians. Countries such 
as Afghanistan have a specific extra budget from the foreign ministry relating to 
stabilizing the social situation there. Countries of the so-called Arab Spring are 
also in the category of “transition countries” for the specific budget from the 
foreign ministry. Hence CCP is able for organizational reasons to give more 
internship opportunities to applicants from those countries.  
The fact that just one German applicant had the opportunity of completing an 
internship under CCP from 2005 to 2013 has been scrutinized. A head of CCP 
answered that firstly, CCP theoretically gave more opportunities to international 
than German applicants. Secondly, Iran attracted less attention among the German 
applicants, and this is not something in ifa’s control. German applicants have 
more interest to go to Asian countries like Malaysia or Indonesia. Thirdly, in the 
few cases in which German applicants had an interest in doing an internship in 
Iran, they faced visa problems (Sodeik-Zecha, personal communication, 2014).  
A variety of German organizations and institutes cooperated on the CCP project 
by giving young applicants from Muslim countries and elsewhere the opportunity 
to do an internship. Among the organizations, ifa’s annual reports mention the 
following: Deutsch-Arabische Gesellschaft für Umweltstudien; Al-Jazeera 
Channel; Berlin Bureau; Deutsche Welle (DW) – Online and Radio sections, 
3sat/ZDF; Redaktion Kulturzeit; exilio – Hilfe für Migranten, Flüchtlinge und 
Folterüberlebende e.V.; Literaturwerkstatt; Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches 
und internationales Strafrecht; Medienprojekt Wuppertal; Miteinander – Netzwerk 
für Demokratie und Weltoffenheit; Photomarketing; Plenum im Landkreis 
Reutlingen – Region Aktiv e.V.; Qantara.de – Dialogue with the Islamic world; 
Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg/ RBB – radiomultikulti; Südwestrundfunk/ SWR; 
and the Theater an der Ruhr in Mülheim an der Ruhr (ifa 2006b: 43).  
Because CCP was launched with assistance from the special budget of European-
Islamic cultural dialogue, it seems that it theoretically has to do with preventing 
conflict and terror. A director of the project mentioned that the project does not 
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have a major political aim, but at the lowest level it contributes to resolving the 
conflict between Western and Muslim countries. It is an activity to influence 
participants on a personal level:  
“I think we are contributing in a sense that there is this theory of conflict 
resolution with track 1, track 2, track 3. But what is clear is that we are on the 
lowest level […]. In this individual level, every change in politics somehow is 
with people, with individuals. We are contributing with that, if we help people to 
understand how intercultural dialogue work, what are the challenges, what are the 
risks, what are the barriers, because our internships, are the people who are 
coming here. They face these problems in a very small quantity level which is 
[rooted] also in a big political level, like an American president does not 
understand some cultural social religious aspects underground, [so he makes] a 
big mistake. Because he does not understand how people think and behave. We 
try to help them [participants] to find solutions. [to understand] how to overcome 
these barriers […]. So these are very very small experiences, and lessons, learned 
by people who come here or the Germans who go to the different countries” 
(Sodeik-Techa, personal communication, 2014). 
CCP has developed and increased a diversity of projects from its original form. 
For instance, in 2007 Cross-Cultural-Journalistenpraktika [journalism 
internships] were initiated alongside the routine CCP scholarships for Muslim 
countries, which gave seven journalists from six Arabic countries internships to 
work in media centers in Germany (ifa 2007: 37). Also in 2012, because the Arab 
Spring issue was high on the agenda for the foreign ministry, “Cross-Cultural-
Plus” was established with the budget of “transformation partnership” of the 
foreign ministry. The project was to give more internship opportunities to 
applicants from Egypt and Tunisia and Germany (ifa 2012: 13). Cross-Cultural 
Plus is like the CCP project, but it additionally gives scholarship holders an 
opportunity to apply for funding to undertake a project in their own countries after 
their internship, as a head of the project explained (Hülquist, personal 
communication, 2014). He added that the funds allocated to alumni of this project 
are between two and three thousand Euros. Children in Peace, which was 
completed in Yemen in sport, and Allez les femmes- envisages Tunis/Blasti [Go 
women- regarding Tunis/Blasti], which was a photo project to give opportunities 
to the women of Tunisia, are examples of activities of alumni of Cross-Cultural 
Plus (ifa 2013: 24). In early 2013, the main CCP project team decided to establish 
a network of CCP alumni. A council of representatives from 15 countries, 
including Iran, was therefore established. The network aims, among other 
objectives, to plan some projects with the help of alumni (ifa 2013: 23). From 
2009, the subheading Islamic-European dialogue was removed from the list of 
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activities of ifa’s annual report. The main sources of projects such as CCP were 
supplied by the dialogue budget of the foreign affairs ministry (Sodeik-Zecha, 
personal communication, 2014).  
 
6.2.3.3.4 Supporting Civil Society  
The last point concerns the status of the relationship between ifa and the German 
foreign ministry. As mentioned above, ifa initially sent a dialogue proposal to the 
foreign ministry and could thus illustrate its efficiency with regard to 
implementing activities for European-Islamic cultural dialogue. According to a 
former general secretary, ifa at that time had a small budget. It started dialogue 
projects with a modest budget of 300,000 Euro. The dialogue projects were so 
developed that, in 2013/2014, ifa received seven million Euro for implementing 
them. In fact, one third of the ifa budget, according to the former general 
secretary, comes from the financial sources of cultural dialogue (Maaß, personal 
communication, 2015). Close contact with the foreign ministry and convincing it 
of ifa’s ability to implement dialogue activities are significant points. Together 
they raise the question of whether ifa is under the authority of the foreign ministry 
because of its financial sources, or is the foreign ministry is dependent on ifa 
because of its diverse and high-quality cultural dialogue activities with Muslim 
countries. Is ifa a civil society? How can it be explained?  
One answer is that, since the foreign ministry does not have expertise in 
implementing cultural activities abroad (because it operates in the diplomatic and 
political rather than cultural field), it is dependent on its Mittlerorganisationen, 
including ifa (Hülquist, personal communication, 2014). Each year it requests 
cultural institutes to propose their projects on specific issues, including European-
Islamic cultural dialogue. Based on the proposals, the foreign ministry decides 
which best fits the issues. It is therefore difficult to say that the foreign ministry 
dominates the decision making of Mittlerorganisationen, because it needs their 
professional cultural activities. In some regards, Mittlerorganisationen like ifa are 
dependent on the foreign ministry. For instance, with regard to the CCP project, a 
director explains that the bureaucrats of the foreign ministry had to be convinced 
that this project still needs to continue. A ceremony to celebrate its 10th 
anniversary was held for that reason in 2016; it was a tactic to attract public 
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attention to the importance of this project (Sodeik-Zecha, personal 
communication, 2014). The first answer is thus that the relationship between ifa 
and the foreign ministry is mutual rather than one sided.  
The second answer is that, as far as political issues in cultural programs are 
concerned, the foreign ministry has a tendency to interfere. For instance, one of 
the Iranian applicants who had a good chance of getting a CCP internship failed at 
the final stage of ifa decision making, because the foreign ministry specifically 
was against him. This applicant was working in a news agency dependent on the 
Iranian state; the foreign ministry therefore perceived him to be a radical or 
closed-minded person and declined to give him a chance. To the mind of the 
member of ifa staff who told this story, all people, whether liberal or radical, 
should have an equal chance of intercultural dialogue. According to the analysis 
of another participant of the study, however, because Mittleroganisationen, 
including ifa, can endanger the relationship between Germany and other countries 
through their cultural activities, it is rational to expect the foreign ministry to 
interfere in some cases which may be politically risky (Hippler, personal 
communication, 2016).   
The third answer is that, as far as strengthening civil society is concerned, ifa 
attempts to pursue its activities even if the foreign ministry as part of the German 
state is not happy about it. The permanent projects of ifa which were mentioned 
above illustrate that there has been a gradual approach in ifa to strengthen civil 
society. The projects gave different opportunities to NGOs as well as to artists, 
researchers and journalists inside and outside Germany. But how can an institute 
convince the state to step into “two-way” communication? A director of the 
dialogue forum of ifa explained in conversation that convincing the German state 
had been always a tough job; but because Germany is a democratic country, there 
is a great possibility to do that:  
“This is fortunately Germany, you know? I mean this is difficult. This is a 
fascinating question to ask what state is and what the civil society is. This is so 
hard to answer. Even Western society differs a lot. Even in Western Europe some 
of the cultural institutes really are part of the foreign office, ja? And in some, not, 
and in Germany they are not. I mean by law legally we are independent, we are 
civil society but we receive the public money, ja? And this is no secret, we are 
depending on it. So we cannot do anything which endangers receiving this 
money. From a broader perspective, it is very well done. If it works well, it is a 
wonderful system of check and balance... because foreign ministry they don’t 
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have personnel means and professional skills to implement what we do. So in this 
regard they depend on us. And we depend to their money […]. I can try, and I 
hope I don’t enter to the prison. So the worst thing that can happen is that a 
person in AA [foreign ministry] says I hate this Mrs. Triebel, ja? […] but not 
more than this against me. I mean they are boss to decide how this tax-paid 
money is used for the broader target to keep Germany as a civic power in the 
international field in a sustainable way” (Triebel, personal communication, 2014).  
 
Therefore it can be said that ifa increasingly attempts to be independent from the 
German state despite being a civil society organization which is dependent on it 
financially.  
 
6.2.3.4 A Summary on Analysis of ifa 
To conclude this section, a question will be repeated: What are the main 
characteristics of the intercultural dialogue activities which have been 
implemented by ifa and what have been the main points to influence them? Since 
the original cultural activities of ifa were art exhibitions and cultural activities 
abroad, the activities in the framework of intercultural dialogue were in the same 
field. It has been significant, however, that the content of these cultural activities 
found more dialogical dimensions over time. For instance, communication with 
global citizens through the website and Facebook became more serious. ifa 
specifically implemented projects relating to European-Islamic cultural dialogue, 
although it had already implemented some media dialogue from 1997. It initially 
proposed it to the foreign ministry in such a professional and innovative way that 
its dialogue budget was gradually increased. ifa’s activities and organizational 
structure underwent some changes between 1998 and 2013 according to the 
priorities of the foreign ministry (9/11 and Arab Spring), general secretaries 
(focus of Latin American countries in time of Grätz) and time (climate change and 
communication technologies). Transparency of information has been significant 
in ifa, which has made it possible to study the cultural activities of this institute in 
this research. It has been significant that dialogue activities such as CCP are not 
only still ongoing today but also their basis and format are used to implement 
other activities aiming at transformation countries or refugees. ifa has also 
cooperated with other German cultural actors, like the press section of the German 
embassy in Iran, to initially select applicants for CCP. The relationship between 
ifa and the foreign ministry has been mentioned mostly as a mutual relationship, 
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although interference by the foreign ministry in political cases or ifa’s insistence 
regarding work as a civil society organization have been observed.   
 
 
6.2.4 Goethe Institute 
The Goethe Institute is one of the oldest German cultural institutes. Many old 
Iranians remember its name automatically with a memory of “ten nights of 
Goethe”, which was held before the Islamic Revolution in Tehran. This event was 
organized by the Goethe Institute and an Iranian writers’ association. Young 
Iranians, however, remember the Goethe Institute automatically as the name of 
the German language school of the German embassy in Tehran. The Goethe 
Institute does not have permission for political reasons to work officially in Iran, 
but it undertakes its activities as part of the German embassy. In fact, the Goethe 
Institute has not implemented a specific project like the DAAD and ifa in the 
framework of European-Islamic cultural dialogue. But since it has supported the 
intercultural dialogue activities of the German embassy on the one hand, and kept 
in contact with Iranian artists and authors on the other, details of its activities are 
presented here. Its history is described in 6.2.4.1, its organizational structure in 
6.2.4.2., details of its practices in 6.2.4.3., and a summary of the points in this 
section in 6.2.4.3. 
 
6.2.4.1 History and Organizational Aims 
The story of the Goethe Institute/GI goes back to 1923, when the Deutsche 
Akademie (DA) was established to develop and institutionalize the German 
language at domestic and foreign level. After World War II, in 1951, when 
German intellectuals and politicians, learning from the bitter lesson of the Nazi 
era, planned to represent Germany in a new way, the DA changed its name to the 
Goethe Institute. The institute reflected different objectives of German foreign 
cultural policy. For instance, it used to develop the national-socialist policies from 
1933 to 1939 (Michels 2005: 102) and the propagation policies between 1939 and 
1945 (Michels 2005: 176). Changing the DA to Goethe Institute in 1951 did not 
happen from Stunde Null [hour zero] as Steffen Kathe argues (2005: 65). It took 
time to gradually change the status of relationship of the new institute with the 
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German state, to modify its structure, ideas, personnel and activities in a way to 
mediate the image of a nette Deutsche [nice German] abroad and to set a “good 
foreign cultural policy” through “public relations” (Kathe 2005: 46). As the 
chronology of activities of the Goethe Institute on its official website shows, its 
activities have gradually developed from running language courses to organizing 
cultural activities abroad. In the period of Willy Brandt, the Goethe Institute 
adjusted its activities to a developed concept of foreign cultural policy, which was 
defined as “dialogue and partnership”. One of the main high points of establishing 
this relationship between the Goethe Institute and the foreign ministry is a 
contract between them which was first made in 1976 and renewed at various 
intervals.119 This contract regulates the independence of the Goethe Institute as a 
cultural institution.  
As mentioned in the Goethe Institute’s annual reports, besides promoting German 
language knowledge around the world, it aims to maintain international cultural 
cooperation and mediate a comprehensive picture of Germany by providing 
information on cultural, social and political life (Goethe Institut 2007b: 2, Goethe 
Institut 2008: 7, Goethe Institut 2010c: 2, Goethe Institut 2013b: 4). Moreover, the 
Goethe Institute considers encouraging and teaching the German language to be a 
key qualification for education, vocational training and understanding. It claims 
that the German language is the link between many people and Germany. The 
Goethe Institute therefore sees it as a duty to set quality standards for teaching 
German in the world.  
 
6.2.4.2 Organizational Structure and Budget  
The Goethe Institute is governed by the Präsidium [board of trustees] and 
Vorstand [board of directors]. The official website of the Goethe Institute 
provides detailed information on its organizational structure (Goethe Institut 
2015b). The president is head of the Präsidum and the Mitgliederversammlung 
[general assembly]. The president does not run operations in the Goethe Institute 
but makes long-term decisions. The secretary general of the Goethe Institute is 
actually head of Vorstand and has a senior position. He/she answers to the 
Präsidium on the operational activities of the Goethe Institute.  
                                                          
119 The last date of renewing this contract was 2004, between the general secretary of the Goethe Institute at 
the time, Andreas Schlüter, and the director of the department of culture and education of the German foreign 
ministry, Wilfried Grolig.  
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Members of the board of trustees are not just from the top positions of the Goethe 
Institute, such as its president and vice-president; three members of the board are 
also from the foreign and domestic offices of the Goethe Institute. Moreover, 
there are members such as president of the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts and 
director of the German Literature Archive on the board. It correspondingly has 
two members from the federal government and two guest members, who, 
according to information on the official website of the Goethe Institute, are from 
the federal foreign office -head of division 606- and the president of the DAAD. 
Members of the general assembly are supposed to discuss conceptual issues of 
Goethe Institute activities in the biannual meetings. The 32 full members of this 
meeting are not only employees of the Goethe Institute and representatives of 
other cultural organizations but also individual personalities, such as a writer, a 
dancer, a publisher and an artist. Besides advising the board of trustees and 
general assembly, the Beiräte [advisory board or individual board members] offer 
professional advice on the Goethe Institute projects. One of the duties of the 
advisory board is, for instance, preparing the Goethe Institute’s awards event, 
which is called Goethe Medaille.  
The general secretary is in charge of different departments and sections. As the 
organizational chart of the Goethe Institute illustrates, the board of directors deals 
with both sections, located in Germany and internationally. The six departments 
of the Goethe Institute are as follows: information; culture; language; human 
resources; finance and central services. The main building of the Goethe Institute 
including these departments is located in Munich. The thirteen regional offices 
which work abroad are as follows: Central Eastern Europe (Prague); Northern 
Africa/Middle East (Cairo); North America (New York); Eastern Asia (Seoul);  
Southern Asia/Australia/New Zealand (Jakarta); Sub-Saharan Africa (San Paulo); 
Southern Asia (New Delhi); Eastern Europe/Central Asia (Moscow); 
Southwestern Europe (Brussels); and finally Southwestern Europe (Athens).  
With such a complicated and sophisticated structure, the Goethe Institute is able 
to extend its cultural and contact offices over a large area. According to its annual 
report 2012/2013, besides managing 13 institutes in Germany and 13 regional 
offices, the Goethe Institute runs 135 institutes and 12 Verbindungsbüros [contact 
offices] in 93 countries. It offered more than 246,000 German language courses 
and 5,800 cultural events worldwide and worked with three thousand employees 
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in 2013 (Goethe Institut 2013c: 73 and 107). In 2004 it established its own 
headquarter in Pyongyang in North Korea. It is the first Western information 
center in the country. The Goethe Institute has offices in most Muslim countries, 
including Morocco and Egypt.  
In Iran, the Goethe Institute had a contact office and a German language institute 
(though officially it is under the authority of the German embassy) between 1998 
and 2013. As mentioned in 2.3, the Goethe Institute established an office in 
Tehran in 1958, aiming at offering German language courses there. It later 
developed its activities to include cultural activities such as collaborative music 
concerts, exhibitions, film shows. It also cooperated with Iranian artists and 
authors on different projects. According to H. E. Chehabi, more than 10,000 
visitors attended the cultural activities of the Goethe Institute in Tehran in 1970. 
In 1975 it opened its second office in Shiraz. The Goethe Ten Nights was a 
literature program of the Goethe Institute which attracted a great deal of attention 
from Iranian authors and intellectuals in 1977. The program was coordinated with 
the help of the Anjoman-e adabi-e Tehran [literature association of Tehran], 
which was famous for being an opponent of Mohammad Reza Shah, the last king 
of the Pahlavi dynasty. After the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty, it was expected 
that the Goethe Institute would have a good chance of being tolerated by the new 
Iranian state, because it had echoed the voice of Pahlavi’s opponents. But this 
expectation proved to be wrong (Chehabi 2001). The Goethe Institute’s activities 
faced some limitations and finally, in 1987, following the Rudis Tagesshow crisis 
(as mentioned in 2.3), Iran’s Goethe Institute was closed down. Later, the Goethe 
Institute was able to work through a few offices as follows: a contact office, 
which is located in the cultural section of the German embassy in Tehran; a 
language institute, which is called the Deutsches Sprachinstitut Teheran (DSIT), 
and a Dialogpunkt [dialogue point], which works like a library for Iranians who 
want to learn German.  
The director of the contact office of the Goethe Institute in Tehran argues that 
there have been several meetings and negotiations to open the Goethe Institute 
officially in Iran, but still there is no positive result.120 He did not mention any 
Iranian authority as a negotiation partner. He just stated that the German 
                                                          
120 The interview was conducted in September 2014. When the information was updated at the 
beginning of 2017, the Goethe Institute was still not officially open in Iran.  
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ambassador deals with this issue in his meetings with Iranian authorities (Buhtz, 
personal communication, 2014). In the view of a former general secretary of the 
Goethe Institute, the issue of re-opening becomes “very complicated and strange” 
but negotiations are so positively developed that “any moment” the Goethe 
Institute can be opened officially in Iran (Knopp, personal communication, 2016). 
Nevertheless, it seems that there is still some hesitation among Iranian authorities 
on this issue. In talks with a former director of Rayzani, it was mentioned that the 
minister of Islamic culture and guidance of Iran at the time of Rouhani had a very 
encouraging view regarding re-opening the Goethe Institute in Iran, but he was 
concerned that, if the Goethe Institute started to cooperate with Iranian dissident 
authors and artists, it would be difficult for him to manage the radical reactions 
from Iranian hardliners (Imanipour, personal communication, 2014). It is 
important here to remember the clash of powers between the democratically 
legitimated sector of the Iranian state and institutes under the authority of the 
religiously legitimated sector, which was argued in 5.2.1. It can explain this 
concern on the part of the culture minister, who at that time was Ali Jannati. The 
minister was battling on two fronts to negotiate both with conservatives and civil 
society, including authors and artists, to find a solution for implementing diverse 
cultural activities, such as concerts and music events, in Iran. This is one of many 
contexts that help to explain why re-opening the Goethe Institute was problematic. 
Jannati resigned at the end of 2016.  
Although the Goethe Institute does not work officially in Iran, it has an active role 
through the work of its other offices in the country. Even the German language 
institute DSIT is known as the Goethe Institute amongst Iranian language 
learners.121 DSIT opened in 1995. It holds courses and exams at different 
elementary and advanced levels for language learners. It also organizes different 
workshops and seminars for teachers. The contact office has been established 
since 2003 to consider the reopening process of the Goethe Institute in Tehran. 
Christiane Krämer-Hus-Hus (Goethe Institut 2003: 108), Alfred Walter in 2004 
(Goethe Institut 2005: 130), Filiz Durak in 2008, (Goethe Institut 2009: 94), Rita 
Sachse-Toussaint in 2010 (Goethe Institut 2010b: 102), and Rainer Buhtz in 2013 
(Goethe Institut 2014: 110-111) were directors of the contact office until 2013. 
The role of the dialogue point, which was established in 2005, is also significant. 
                                                          
121 According to observations of the researcher. 
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Talking to the first Iranian director of the dialogue point revealed that it has an 
important role in promoting the language skills of Iranian applicants of the DSIT 
and creating an opportunity for dialogue among them. They would gather there 
and spend their time with books and CDs in different fields in the German 
language (Riazi, personal communication, 2016). The dialogue point centers, 
according to the official website of the Goethe Institute, are located in countries 
that have no Goethe Institute. They have basic equipment for learning German, 
including reference books, electronic media, video films, music recordings, daily 
newspapers and weekly magazines in German. Besides Iran, seven other countries 
including Iraq and Tunisia have a dialogue point. The Iranian dialogue point is 
operated under the supervision of the regional office of the Goethe Institute, 
located in New Delhi (Goethe Institut 2015a). Iran’s dialogue point, besides 
dealing with the field of German language, focused on two more cultural issues: 
“architecture, art, design” and “environment” (Goethe Institut 2013a).  
Besides the contact office, other buildings of the Goethe Institute are located 
outside the German embassy. The first building of the DSIT was located in the 
north of Tehran, in Yakhchal. It held Goethe Institute courses and exams up to 
2013. Since then, the main classes of the DSIT, its library amd its Mediothek have 
been transferred to a new building near to Yakhchal in Dibaji Street. The dialogue 
point is located in the old building in Yakhchal. It is interesting to mention that the 
information office of the DAAD has moved since 2014 to one the buildings of the 
Goethe Institute in Yakhchal.  
The main budget of the Goethe Institute comes from the foreign affairs ministry, 
although it also has some internal income, sponsors, partners and third party 
institutes to supply its financial needs. According to its official website in 2014, 
the Goethe Institute had 106 sponsors and 22 partners with a variety of 
international bases, including Indonesia (YAD foundation), and French and 
American (French-American Cultural Foundation) and Thai (Thai-Deutschte 
Kulturstiftung) cultural institutes. Moreover, there are business foundations, such 
as the Siemens foundation, and political foundations, such as the Heinrich Böll 
and the Bosch foundation, which support the Goethe Institute financially. The 
total budget of the Goethe Institute increased between 1998 and 2013. Its total 
budget increased from 196.1 million Euro in 2006 (Goethe Institut 2007a: 114) to 
301.5 million Euro in 2013 (Goethe Institut 2014: 208). Approximately three 
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quarters of the budget comes from the German foreign ministry and one quarter 
from the income of the institute, including German language courses and cultural 
events and activities.  
The Goethe Institute also receives the budget of the European-Islamic cultural 
dialogue from the foreign ministry. According to annual reports of the Goethe 
Institute, it allocated 466,000 Euro in 2005, then 540,000 Euro in 2006 (Goethe 
Institut 2007b: 16) and 764,000 Euro in 2007 (Goethe Institut 2008: 16) to 
promote cultural activities relating to “European-Islamic dialogue”.  
 
6.2.4.3 Practices: Generally and Specifically for Intercultural Dialogue 
The main activities of the Goethe Institute include promoting German language 
learning inside and outside Germany and cooperating and coordinating cultural 
activities such as theater and music festivals. The Goethe Institute also supports 
researchers and authors in the fields of linguistics, culture and science, and it 
finances the publication of books, magazine and brochures, as well as online and 
e-print journals.  
The Goethe Institute has several publications. Its annual report is available online 
on its official website. There are also some brochures that it publishes on different 
issues. For instance, the Flugmodus brochure reports on a selection of articles 
which have already been published online on its website (Goethe Institut 2012a: 
II). The Goethe-Institute and Europe is another brochure which provides 
information on cultural and educational projects and activities of the Goethe 
Institute at European level (Goethe Institut 2011b: 6). In the specific field of 
intercultural dialogue between Western and Muslim countries, there is a cultural 
journal which is supported by the Goethe Institute. It is called Fikrun wa Fann 
[Art and thought]. The first issue of Fikrun wa Fann was released in 1963 by 
Annemarie Schimmel, who has already been mentioned as a scholar in the field of 
Islam and the Middle East and is highly respected by both Iranian cultural actors, 
Rayzani and ICDAC. The journal gave writers of Western and Muslim countries 
an opportunity to write on literature and philosophy topics and thus exchange 
ideas. The magazine has been published in Arabic, English and German. Since 
2010, along with publishing its first e-paper, Farsi has also been added to the 
languages of Fikrun wa Fann (Goethe-Institute, 2010a, p. 33). The editorial team 
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of Fikrun wa Fann reacted to the so-called Arab Spring from its initial moments 
in early 2011 by coordinating a meeting between writers and journalists from 
Egypt, Taman, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iran, Britain and Germany to 
discuss the issue of “from 9/11 to Arab Revolution” (Goethe Institut 2012b: 49).  
The presence of some Iranian writers and intellectuals in Fikrun wa Fann is 
significant. One of its editors is Manuchehr Amirpour, who was a former director 
of the cultural attaché of Iran before the Islamic Revolution. Even after leaving his 
official position, he cooperated on Spektrum-Iran, the permanent magazine of 
Rayzani, by publishing his articles (Amirpur 1996, Amirpur 2001).122 Navid 
Kermani is another cultural figure of Iranian origin who had close contact with 
Fikrun wa Fann in the period of the study. He is a scholar, famous for his analysis 
and writings.123 Kermani’s view regarding interfaith dialogue in the Middle East 
was reviewed in 3.2.1. He was also one of the intellectuals invited to the dialogue 
with Islam conference which was organized by the cultural department of the 
foreign ministry in 2005, as mentioned in 5.1.2. He was also especially selected as 
a guest key speaker at the 65th anniversary of the German constitution in the 
German federal parliament, in May 2014. In his speech he mentioned the concept 
of freedom and religious tolerance. He argued that there was a long way to go for 
both to be reached in German society. He innovatively used this point to promise 
both Iranian and German authorities present at the meeting that both will be 
reached in Iranian society, too: 
“In the other country which I have its passport [Iran], despite all protests and all 
sacrifices, freedom remained impossible. But I want to say from this desk that, 
Gentlemen President, Madam Chancellor, ladies and gentlemen, dear guests and 
the excellency the ambassador of the Islamic Republic […]: it will take no 65 
years and not even 15 years till time that in Iran, a Christian, a Jew, a Zoroastrian 
or a Bahai [all from religious minority groups in Iran] naturally can speak as the 
guest speaker in a freely elected parliament” (Kermani 2014). 
 
Navid Kermani was one of the candidates that the CDU seriously discussed in 
2016 to nominate for the German presidency. Although finally Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, then foreign minister, was nominated and elected as president, this 
                                                          
122 He is also the father of Katajoun Amirpour, an Islam scholar, who was mentioned 6.1.3.3 as a female 
scholar of the World Religions Academy of Hamburg, the academy which was in cooperation with the 
Islamic Center of Hamburg. 
123 Dein Name [your name] is the title of a book he wrote which tells stories from his grandfather. The book is 
in German and gives completely different images: It describes different atmospheres that come from his 
origins, Iranian culture. Gott ist schön – Das ästhetische Erleben des Korans [God is beautiful - the aesthetic 
experience of the Quran] is the name of another book by Kermani. The book gives a non-theological 
approach to understanding the Quran. 
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degree of attention to Kermani, as a theologian and author, in the German political 
sphere is significant. It can be concluded with this point that the Goethe Institute, 
even without having an official institute open in Iran, has reflected the voice of 
Iranian former cultural actors and dissent authors through its journal Fikrun wa 
Fann.  
The Goethe Institute has also cooperated on the Quantara project, which will be 
explained further in the next subchapter. The other dialogue forum which is 
supported by the Goethe Institute is the website of Li-lak, which was established 
in 2006 to promote a dialogue opportunity for young Arab and German authors 
(Goethe Institut 2010b: 33). Li-Lak in English means “for me - for you”. The 
target group of Li-lak is young Arab and German students in Germany. According 
to a report on its activities, it tries to open up discussion about “integration”, 
football, music and optimistic future prospects in Germany (Gsell 2006). Hence it 
can be said that this website of the Goethe Institute is mostly involved in domestic 
cultural activities.  
The discourse of European-Islamic cultural dialogue is included by the Goethe 
Institute in its annual reports after 2002. Activities such as reopening the Goethe 
Institute in Kabul in 2002 and increasing cultural events and programs with 
Muslim countries have been mentioned as the main “focus on dialogue with 
Islamic world” (Goethe Institut 2003: 22). The project “MIDAD-Stadtscheiber” 
[writer/recorder of the city] is also significant. It gave an opportunity to writers 
and journalists of both Germany and some Muslim countries to exchange their 
knowledge and views. In 2004, for instance, the German write Jose Oliver and the 
Egyptian writer Ibrahim al-Farghali participated in the MIDAD-Stadtschreiber 
project to hold German-Arabic literature forums in the cities of Cairo and 
Stuttgart respectively (Goethe Institut 2005: 97). Another German writer, Ulla 
Lenze, also had an opportunity to participate in this program and travel to 
Damascus in 2004. She conducted an online-diary writing workshop for a Syrian 
audience (Goethe Institut 2005: 89). In 2006, a program of German language 
classes for Turkish Imams and diplomats was held, which was mentioned in the 
annual report in the framework of the integration policy and intercultural dialogue 
(Goethe Institut 2007a: 34-35). The Goethe Institute also supported some 
individual artists who implemented dialogue-based activities. A significant project 
in this regard is this situation. It was directed by Tino Sehgal and was an art 
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project intended to create temporary situations for unregulated discussion in 
different places. Mostly the situation was to talk about philosophical issues. This 
situation started as a result of travel from Germany to India. Members of the team 
communicated with some local people from different countries located between 
Germany and India. They encouraged people to participate in their discussions. 
During four months of travel, local participants from different cities of Germany, 
Serbia, Turkey, Georgia, Iran, the Emirates and India were instructed by the team 
members in the rules of the project and then participated in it themselves. There 
was an exhibition on the project of this situation in November 2011 in Tehran 
(Goethe Institut 2012b: 78-79).  
The Goethe Institute managed to implement different cultural activities in Iran 
between 1998 and 2013. For instance, the 2006/2007 annual report showed that 16 
cultural programs were held in 2006 in the fields of literature, music, film theater 
and exhibitions, and nearly 22 thousand people participated in them (Goethe 
Institut 2007a: 71). One of the main focuses of the Goethe Institute in Iran has 
been to hold German language courses. In 2006 and 2007 an average of 150 
Iranian applicants (Goethe Institut 2007a: 14, Goethe Institut 2008: 107) took part 
in German language courses of the DSIT. Based on observation in the period of 
conducting this research (from 2012 to 2016), the DSIT was not the only institute 
to hold German language classes. Language institutes such as Kish and Kish-Air 
were offering English and German language courses. The interest of Iranian 
applicants to take the DSIT German language exams was so high that an average 
of 2,000 Iranian applicants sat them between 2008 and 2011 (Goethe Institut 
2009: 94, Goethe Institut 2010b: 102, Goethe Institut 2011a: 122, Goethe Institut 
2012b: 119). The dialogue point, library and mediathek of the Goethe Institute are 
open five days a week. Use of their equipment and material is possible both for 
learners at the DSIT and other applicants (Riazi, personal communication, 2016).  
The Goethe Institute used available cultural opportunities in Iran between 1998 
and 2013 to implement or support implementation of cultural activities. One 
cultural opportunity was supporting German artists to participate in the 
international Fajr festival of Tehran.124 In the field of theater, in 2003 a group 
from Stuttgart Theater participated in the festival with a play called I Furiosi 
(Goethe Institut 2003: 108). In 2005 a German artist, Helena Waldmann, who 
                                                          
124 The Fajr Festival has been held every year since the early years after the Islamic Revolution of Iran in the 
fields of theater, film, music and puppet play. 
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cooperated with an Iranian group, performed the play Letters from Tentland 
(Goethe Institut 2005: 130). A German director, Ania Gronau, participated in the 
Fajr festival in the same year with an act of a play Johanna (Goethe Institut 2006: 
124). Another German director, Johannes Volkmann, directed a paper theater 
titled Die Töne reissen aus [the sounds of tearing] in 2003 at the Fajr international 
puppet festival (Goethe Institut 2003: 108). In the field of music, the band 
Ensemble Integrales from Hamburg participated in the Fajr music festival in 2003 
(Goethe Institut 2003: 108). One year later the band coordinated a joint concert 
with an Iranian composer, Alireza Mashayekhi, in Tehran (Goethe Institut 2005: 
130). The twin friendship between the cities of Isfahan and Freiburg was used as 
an opportunity by Theater im Marienbad, a theater from Freiburg. A group from 
this theater played in Isfahan and afterwards in Tehran (Goethe Institut 2004: 118) 
with support from the Goethe Institute. In a cooperation between the German and 
French embassies, concerts, literature meetings and script readings were 
conducted in the city of Isfahan in 2005. This event is reflected in the annual 
report of the Goethe Institute (Goethe Institut 2005: 130), so it is likely to have 
also been supported by the Goethe Institute. A number of seminars and workshops 
were held in the field of film. A series of discussions and events between some 
Iranian film producers, documentary makers, TV producers and a group of media 
producers from the ARTE TV channel, a European cultural channel (Goethe 
Institut 2003: 108), took place in 2003, as reflected in the annual report of the 
Goethe Institute. There were also some book exhibitions which were prepared for 
children on Freuden der Kindheit [Joys of Childhood]. Literature events were also 
organized with the support of the Goethe Institute in different Iranian cities. 
Readings of the West-Eastern Divan of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe by the 
German poet Albert Osterhaus Maier and the Iranian writer Shariar Mandanipour 
in Isfahan, Shiraz and Tehran are one example of those events (Goethe Institut 
2006: 124). The Goethe Institute also held an exhibition, Verletzungen – 
Verbindungen, of the paintings of Günther Uecker125 in the Museum of 
Contemporary Art of Tehran in 2012 (Goethe Institut 2013c: 132).  
The Goethe Institute planned some cultural events in Germany for Iranian authors, 
too. For instance, the ICDAC, whose activities were discussed in 6.1.2, reported 
                                                          
125 There is a claim that he was the first Western artist for decades to be invited to the Museum of 
Contemporary Art in Tehran; this claim is wrong, because the Goethe Institute itself reported that in 2007, ifa 
coordinated an exhibition by a German painter in the same museum.  
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in its journal that the Goethe Institute held literature seminars and workshops in 
Berlin in 2004 with participation by Iranian authors and poets, among them 
Moniru Ravanipor, Syamak Golshiri, Shams Langrudi and Ali Abdullahi (ICDAC 
2004c: 169). Cooperation between the ICDAC and the Goethe Institute during the 
last years of Khatami’s presidency has also been discussed. In a joint meeting in 
2004, for instance, Boroujerdi, the last president of the ICDAC, and Paul von 
Maltzahn, then German ambassador in Iran, (ICDAC 2004d: 116) talked about 
increasing cooperation between the ICDAC and German institutions, including 
the Goethe Institute.  
Reviewing the cultural activities which have been mentioned above indicates that 
the Goethe Institute had a high level of cooperation with both Iranian and German 
institutes. For instance, it cooperated with Kānun-e Parvareš Fekri-ye Kudakān va 
Nojavānān [Center for intellectual development of children and youth] (Kanun for 
short), a significant Iranian cultural actor. Kanun also appeared to be a partner of 
activities of the Grüter family, as will be mentioned in the next subchapter. The 
other Iranian cultural institutes that have cooperated in activities of the Goethe 
Institute are as follows: the dramatic art center of Iran; the dramatic art center of 
Isfahan; the Roudaki foundation; and Cinematheque at the Museum of 
Contemporary Art of Tehran. On the German side, the Land of Baden-
Württemberg, the Berlin Hauptfond; the German foreign ministry; and Berliner 
Festspiel GmbH [Festival theater foundation of Berlin] are significant.  
As studying annual reports and information of participants in the study suggest, 
besides strengthening its existing cultural activities, the Goethe Institute did not 
implement any specific project regarding European-Islamic cultural dialogue like 
those implemented by the DAAD and ifa in their context. There are some reasons 
for this: Firstly, as a director of the section of culture and development of the 
Goethe Institute explained, the political restrictions on the Goethe Institute in Iran 
generally caused a low level of engagement with this country. Secondly, Iran was 
not a priority of European-Islamic cultural dialogue, because the main aims of that 
dialogue were to prevent terrorist attacks after 9/11. The Goethe Institute therefore 
approached the Arabic-speaking countries and Indonesia as the main target 
countries of this dialogue (Wetzel, personal communication, 2014). Thirdly, a 
former general secretary of the Goethe Institute argued that it did not have the 
intention to implement the project of European-Islamic cultural dialogue in a 
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framework that the foreign ministry expected from the Goethe Institute. In his 
view, there was always resistance from the Goethe Institute to follow “whatever” 
the foreign ministry expected it to do (Knopp, personal communication, 2016). 
 
6.2.4.4 A Summary on Analysis of the Goethe Institute 
To close this section on the Goethe Institute, it is necessary to repeat the question: 
What are the main characteristics of the intercultural dialogue activities which 
have been implemented by the Goethe Institute and what have been the main 
points to influence them? From studying its cultural activities generally, it is clear 
that the Goethe Institute had success in implementing or helping to implement a 
variety of cultural activities, including German language courses, art, music and 
theater events. It managed to implement these activities through its different 
offices and with the assistance of the cultural section of the German embassy, 
despite having no official status in Iran. Not only in Iran but also in Germany the 
Goethe Institute has implemented activities with the participation of open-minded 
and dissenting Iranian thinkers. This dimension of cultural activities of the Goethe 
Institute has been so clear that it even created some concerns with regard to 
opening its office in Iran in the open political atmosphere under Iranian president 
Rouhani. Unlike the DAAD and ifa, the Goethe Institute did not implement a 




6.2.5 Other German Cultural Actors 
Besides the cultural institutes and organizations mentioned above, there are other 
German institutes, centers and private groups which also played a role in 
supporting intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany. However, they were 
involved in this type of activities to a lesser degree than the main actors discussed 
above. Some of these cultural actors will be described briefly in this subchapter.  
 
6.2.5.1 Political Institutions 
The German parliament, political parties and institutes have influenced 
intercultural dialogue between German and Muslim countries in different ways. 
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For instance, a budget established for “European-Islamic cultural dialogue” by the 
foreign cultural commission of the German federal parliament is one of the 
instruments they use. The visit to Iran by Wolfgang Thierse, a member of the 
SPD, and at the time president of the German parliament, positively influenced 
the relationship between Iran and Germany in 2001. When Thierse traveled to 
Iran, he visited his counterpart, Mehdi Karroubi. Because Thierse talked to 
Karroubi during this meeting on issues including the future of the arrested Iranian 
participants of the conference of “Iran after the Elections” (which will be 
discussed later), some of the Iranian hardliners accused him of interfering in the 
domestic affairs of Iran. But Karroubi defended him against this accusation and 
mentioned that it is common for politicians to talk about internal, international 
and regional issues (Frankfurter Allgemeine 02.02.2001). During this visit, 
Thierse not only promised to open political and economic cooperation of the two 
countries (Spiegel 19.02.2001) but also encouraged pupil exchange between Iran 
and Germany (Manfred and Gisela Grüter, personal communication, 2016). This 
issue will be discussed in detail in 6.2.5.7. Furthermore, at the time of Khatami, 
members of political parties frequently participated in joint round tables with 
IPIS, as mentioned in 6.1.3.2.  
There are six political foundations which play an important role promoting 
political knowledge in German society. They are think tanks of different political 
parties of Germany and at the same time hold seminars and workshops to improve 
the knowledge of German citizens of political and social issues. For instance, in 
2007 more than 45,000 German citizens attended programs of these six political 
foundations (Anheier/Toepler 2009: 724). A main part of their budget comes from 
the German parliament. Each political foundation receives its budget according to 
the amount of votes its supported party has already gained in each parliamentary 
election (Massing 2015). The six political foundations are as follows: 
1. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (“Stiftung” means foundation), which is 
associated with the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/CDU 
party. It has been established since 1955;  
2. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, which politically is affiliated with the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands/SPD. It has been established 
since 1954; 
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3. Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, which is close to the Christlich-Soziale 
Union/CSU. It has been established since 1966; 
4. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, which politically is associated with the Bündnis 
90/die Grünen. It has been established since 1986; 
5. Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, which is associated with die LINKE [left wing]. 
It has been established since 1990; 
6. Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, which is close to the Freie Demokratische 
Partei/FDP. It has been established since 1958.  
 
Three of these political foundations were mentioned specifically in the field study. 
The Konrad-Adenauer foundation has organized the Hafis-Dialog Weimar 
seminar since 2010. The seminar takes place annually in Weimar and offers 
experts, professors of universities, authors and artists who participated in joint 
cultural and educational projects between Iran and Germany a chance to discuss 
their views and exchange ideas. Some of the participants of this study, like Fatima 
Chahin-Dörfliner (personal communication, 2015) and Azadeh Zamirirad 
(personal communication, 2015), were reached through the Hafis-Dialog Weimar 
2014. Moreover, the Iran-Reader is the name of a periodical on Iran which is 
published by the Konrad-Adenauer foundation and under the supervision of the 
director of the Iran section, Oliver Ernst.  
The Friedrich-Ebert foundation has been mentioned by some members of the 
dialogue center of the Imam Musa Sadr Institute. In 2005, the foundation 
supported the dialogue center to invite Johannes and Martina Hartkemeyer to Iran 
to lead a workshop on dialogue skills and techniques (Tabatabaei, personal 
communication, 2016; Sadr, personal communication, 2014).  
The Heinrich-Böll foundation is mentioned in the field study because of its role in 
organizing a conference called “Iran after the elections”. According to Ziba Mir-
Hosseini and Richard Tapper, the victory of reformists in the parliamentary 
election of Iran in February 2000 prompted the foundation to organize a 
conference on this topic. Different authors, human rights activists, clergymen and 
politicians were invited to take part in the conference in Berlin. Although the 
Heinrich-Böll foundation’s organizers wanted to open the atmosphere to talk 
about the possibility of democratic progress in Iranian society, it “attracted 
attention of huge Iranian groups who live in exile” and were opponents of the 
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Iranian government (Mir-Hosseini/Tapper 2006: 36-37). Meanwhile, as discussed 
in 6.1.3.1, the Iranian national TV, the IRIB, propagated this event negatively 
against reformists of Iran, which created a problem for some of the Iranian 
conference participants. On their return to Iran, some of them were arrested, and 
the death penalty was even initially imposed on one of them, Hasan Yousefi 
Eshkevari (Mir-Hosseini/Tapper 2006: 39). The sentence was changed to a lighter 
punishment, and he currently lives under political asylum in Germany. 
The next institute is a think tank, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) 
[German Institute for International and Security Affairs]. According to its official 
website, the SWP was founded as a private initiative in 1962. In 1965 the German 
parliament unanimously decided to support it as an “independent research center”. 
Besides specific financial support from the parliament, the SWP receives funds 
from some German and foreign research funding organizations (SPW 2012). The 
SWP also had joint meetings with Iran’s IPIS at the time of Khatami, as 
mentioned in 6.1.3.2., but the SPW decided to decrease its relationship in the 
period of Ahmadinejad. A member of staff of the SWP explained that, after 
President Ahmadinejad expressed his official views against Israel, the SWP 
experts decided to stop their meetings and exchanges with IPIS (Zamirirad, 
personal communication, 2015).  
The next German organization is the Deutsche Islamkonferenz [German Islam 
conference]. This organization is discussed as a political rather religious 
institution, because the aim behind establishing it related to the integration of 
Muslim communities in Germany, not mobilizing them religiously. It was 
established in 2006 by the ministry of the interior to conduct dialogue between 
Muslim communities and the German state and focus on improving social the 
integration of Muslims in Germany (Busch/Goltz 2011: 29). Some academic 
debates regarding the German Islam conference have been reviewed in 3.2.4. 
Although the Islam conference is characterized by domestic cultural policy, some 
diplomats who participated in this study argued that it achieves an aim of foreign 
cultural policy too. It does so because preparing an opportunity for dialogue 
between the German state and Muslims in Germany sends out a signal on an 
international level that an attempt is being made to decrease cultural 
misunderstanding between the state and Muslim immigrants (Kreft, personal 
communication, 2014; Gnodtke, personal communication, 2016). A former 
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commissioner of the dialogue amongst cultures told a story to explain the strong 
connection between domestic and foreign policy in this context: the publication of 
the cartoon of Prophet Mohammad by a member of the press media in Denmark in 
2005 met with reactions from some groups in Germany. These reactions created 
some problems for Germany in Muslim countries: 
“For example, in Germany we have a small group which is called pro-Köln, pro-
NRW or pro-Deutschland, a right wing group. They wanted to do a 
demonstration in Berlin, showing Mohammad cartoons in front of Mosques, 
provoking Muslims in Berlin. The senate (of the Innenministerium or interior 
ministry) prohibited the demonstration with this argument that this would disturb 
public order. [The] right wing group went to the court and they got a right 
[allowance] by the court. The court accepted that showing the cartoons is covered 
by the freedom of speech and freedom of opinion. So they had demonstration. 
This was reported in Al-Ahram, for example, a main newspaper in Egypt. And 
there was an attack to our embassy. Not a very effective one but somebody used a 
Molotov cocktail through the wall and tried to smash the window. He has a copy 
of the report of Al-Ahram in (his) pocket which was about that demonstration in 
Berlin” (Kreft, personal communication, 2014).  
 
The attack on the German embassy in Egypt was not “an effective one”, as the 
interviewee explained, but an attack on the American embassy in the same context 
was much more brutal. The demonstrations on a similar issue in Libya resulted in 
the murder of the American Ambassador in Libya in 2011. This shows why the 
German Islam Conference can have a foreign cultural effect: The attack on the 
German embassy in Egypt could have been avoided if there had been intercultural 
dialogue between different German groups and the German state about the issue 
of the Mohammad cartoons in 2005. In the view of this interviewee, it is 
important to explain for all involved German groups that the German state has a 
difficult responsibility to protect minority rights as well as the right of freedom of 
speech.  
 
6.2.5.2 Religious Institutions  
The German Catholic and Protestant churches and organizations have played a 
key role in starting cultural dialogue with immigrants who came to Germany after 
the early 1950s. These immigrants mostly had a Muslim background. The 
Deutsche Bischofskonferenz (DBK) [German bishops conference], which is a 
Catholic institution and one of those that have been active in the realm of dialogue 
with immigrants and Muslim communities in Germany. The DBK has also 
organized different interfaith dialogues with Muslim communities all over the 
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world. Moreover, it dedicated the main topic of its annual gathering in 2003 to 
“Christians and Muslims in Germany” (CIBEDO e.v 2009: 537). The Deutsche 
Ordensobernkonferenz [German superiors conference] is another religious actor 
that participated in interreligious activities, as the annual report on German 
foreign cultural policy illustrates (Auswärtiges Amt 2014: 180).  
The financial resources of religious institutions in Germany generally come from 
Kirchensteuer [church tax], which is paid by German citizens who are officially 
members of the church (FOWID 2005, Petersen 2007). The institutions also 
receive support from the German federal government, for instance from the 
foreign ministry to implement activities in specific issues or with specific 
countries. Between 2009 and 2013, religious and church institutions and 
organizations received approximately two million Euro annually (Auswärtiges 
Amt 2010: 80, Auswärtiges Amt 2011a: 85, Auswärtiges Amt 2012a: 81, 
Auswärtiges Amt 2013a: 121, Auswärtiges Amt 2014: 180) to implement cultural 
activities abroad. In addition, the foreign ministry cooperates with the 
Katholischer Akademischer Ausländerdienst/KAAD [Catholic academic exchange 
service] and Brot für die Welt [Bread for the world] to fund scholarship programs 
abroad (Auswärtiges Amt 2014: 180).  
The role of the Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands (EKD) is also considerable 
because of its domestic as well as its international efforts in the realm of 
interreligious dialogue. According to Martin Affolderbach, in 1974 the EKD 
published numerous brochures on the issue of Islam and under “Muslims in 
Germany”. It also published a book, What everyone needs to know about Islam, 
the eighth edition of which was published in 2011. Also, the EKD played an 
important role relating to establishment of the Islamisch-christliche Arbeitsgruppe 
(ICA) [Islamic-Christian working group] project. The ICA is a permanent 
discussion forum which consists of members of Islamic organizations and the 
Protestant and Catholic churches in Germany. It is considered to be the “first 
nationwide dialogue committee of this kind” (Affolderbach 2015: 33-34).  
The EKD also implemented a specific interfaith dialogue with religious delegates 
from Iran and Britain between 2005 and 2006. As mentioned in 6.1.2.3, in 2002 
an official delegation from the EKD traveled to Iran to visit the German church of 
Tehran. The delegation also visited other cultural and religious institutions 
including the ICDAC, ICRO and the IID NGO. During these meetings and 
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through these contacts, Martin Affolderbach, who was a member of the EKD 
delegation, was able to develop a triangle interfaith dialogue jointly with the head 
of the IID, Ali Abtahi, as well as Charles Reed from the Church of England. The 
triangle conference was called “Building Communities through Dialogue”. The 
first meeting was held in October 2005 in London, the second in Tehran in 
January 2006, and the third in May 2006 in Berlin (Affolderbach, personal 
communication, 2015). These three meetings are explained in detail on the official 
website of the EKD (Affolderbach 2006, EKD 2006). The main topic of the first 
meeting, in London, was the role of religion in the formation of values and 
cohesion of societies. Interreligious cooperation in Britain was also discussed. 
Besides the religious delegates, some British politicians and members of the 
Anglican Archbishop’s staff of Lambeth Palace participated in this meeting. The 
London meeting was an initial level to allow the three German, Iranian and British 
participants to get to know each other. One of questions from the Iranian 
participants in this meeting was about the freedom of religion in Iran. The Iranians 
were evasive in answering this question. The second meeting of the conference, 
which took place in January 2006 in Tehran, was mostly on the issue of religious 
minorities. The presence of Jewish and Armenian participants from Iran and 
participation of some members of religious institutes of Qum and the Iranian state 
institutes were significant points of the second meeting. The former president 
Khatami also attended. Networking between various participants developed on a 
more personal level during the second meeting. Nevertheless, some questions 
regarding the freedom of minority religions in Iran were left unanswered by the 
Iranian delegates. The third meeting of the conference was held a few months 
later, in May 2006, in Berlin. One of the topics of this meeting was Christian-
Muslim cooperation in Germany. The experiences of the foreign ministry and the 
federal chancellor’s office in cultural activities with Muslim people in and outside 
Germany were discussed. Also in the third meeting a conference was organized at 
Humboldt University. Professor Feldtkeller from the German side, Dr. Riordan 
from the British side, and Dr. Pazouki from the Iranian side were among the 
participants of this meeting. Although the triangle conference, in the view of both 
the German and the Iranian partners, was considered a success, it did not continue 
after 2006. One of the reasons for stopping the project was the political problem 
that the director of IID faced in Iran after the 2009 presidential election. Ali 
Abtahi was arrested in that period and could no longer work actively in the field 
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of interfaith dialogue. As an organizer of the EKD explained, this event led to 
discontinuation of the meetings:  
“And after that we wanted to continue, the next sessions. It was interrupted by 
something which you may call the green revolution. And Mr. Abtahi was 
arrested. And as far as I know he was in a while in the prison. We tried to get a 
contact with him and continue but it was very difficult to do. So I just have the 
draft of this continuation in my hand which was planned for 2008 and 2009. But 
they did not take place” (Affolderbach, personal communication, 2015). 
 
The Evangelische Akademie Loccum (Loccum Academy for short here) is a 
further institute that has organized seminars and conference on both sociopolitical 
and interreligious dialogue. Iran has also been one of the issues the Loccum 
Academy was interested in working on. The Iranian Rayzani and the Iranian 
embassy were mostly the permanent invited guests of the Loccum Academy’s 
events, as a former director of Rayzani mentioned (Rajabi, personal 
communication, 2016). For instance, the conference “Der Iran- Ein Land im 
Aufbruch” [Iran- a country on the verge od change] is one of those activities. It 
was supported by the German foreign ministry and took place over three days. 
The main topics of this conference were “Iranian culture and art”, “the role of 
policy and religion in social life”, and “rights of minorities and women”. Different 
experts, professors, diplomats and journalists from both Iran and Germany 
participated in this conference. Especially participation of academic figures such 
as Reza Dawari, who was at that time the head of the Iranian Academy of 
Education, and Udo Steinbach, who was previously mentioned as a German 
delegate in the critical dialogue and at that time was the head of the Orient 
Institute of Hamburg, are significant (Loccum Akademie 2002). The next event to 
be organized by the Loccum Academy was an exhibition of Iranische Kalligrafie 
[Iranian calligraphy], which was visited by members of the Iranian Rayzani and 
embassy. This event took place in 2004 (Mohr 2004). A two-day conference with 
the title Wie kann die iranische Zivilgesellschaft gestärkt werden? [How can 
Iranian civil society be made stronger?] was also organized by the academy in 
2013. The conference dealt with the topic of the nuclear program of Iran and was 
held with the participation of the Iranian ambassador and some Iranian and 
German diplomats and experts (Loccum-Akademie 2013).  
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6.2.5.3 Academic and Pedagogical Institutes  
Three academic institutes have been mentioned in the field study because of their 
role in ntercultural dialogue with Muslim countries, including Iran. The Alexander 
von Humboldt Stiftung (AvH) is significant for its support of academic projects 
and applicants at higher educational level. The Zentralstelle für das 
Auslandsschulwesen (ZfA) and Pädagogischer Austauschdienst (PAD) are key in 
the field of training at school level. Their relevant activities are presented in this 
section. 
The AvH is an academic institute in the field of higher education activities. The 
foundation was established shortly after the death of Alexander von Humboldt, a 
German explorer and cosmopolitan who was famous for fighting for the freedom 
of research, in 1860. At the beginning it was dedicated to “nature research” and 
“tourism”. It was re-established in 1953 by the former German chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer to sponsor scholars on lengthy periods of research in Germany (AvH 
1999: 10). Its budget is provided by institutes and federal ministries such as the 
foreign ministry, ministry of education and research, and ministry for economic 
cooperation and development (AvH, 2003, p. 27). The AvH aims at improving its 
offers for “global researchers”, “to win the best of the best”, and so to “strengthen 
research in Germany”. At the same time, it claims to support “the international 
cultural dialogue as a long-term peace and security policy” (AvH 2006, AvH 
2007, AvH 2008, AvH 2009, AvH 2010, AvH 2011, AvH 2012, AvH 2013, AvH 
2014). The academic support of the AvH is provided by encouraging “persons” 
and not “projects” (AvH 2011: 6). It grants research fellowships to foreign and 
German scholars who already have PhD degrees; in some cases, for instance for 
the project of “the German Chancellor fellowship for prospective leaders and 
international climate protection fellowship program”, applications can be made 
from other, lower educational levels, as a member of staff of the AvH explained 
(Schaarschmidt, personal communication, 2014). Furthermore, the AvH offers 
research awards to internationally recognized foreign scholars of any age (AvH 
2000: 30).  
Since 2002 the AvH has also been receiving support from the special fund for 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue from the foreign ministry. With this budget 
the AvH added a new subheading to its annual report under “European-Islamic 
dialogue”. A short-term scholarship for former scholarship holders, who are called 
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Humboldtians and come from Muslim countries, is mentioned in the framework 
of this European-Islamic dialogue (AvH 2004: 141, AvH 2005: 67, AvH 2006: 
32, AvH 2007: 37, AvH 2008: 29, AvH 2009: 81, AvH 2010: 78, AvH 2011: 28, 
AvH 2012: 28, AvH 2013: 28, AvH 2014). Some seminars and university 
speeches on topics such as “the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and its 
repercussions on the tribal areas of Pakistan”, “Pakistan after September 11”, or 
“Democratization in Bangladesh and the recourse to Islam for political purpose”, 
“Turkish literature in German language books- a study of conditions for 
intercultural understanding through translated literature” were also supported by 
the AvH and reflected in the annual reports under European-Islamic dialogue 
(AvH 2003: 178). Moreover, 203 researchers in various scientific fields were 
supported by the AvH between 2002 and 2014 in the framework of European-
Islamic dialogue, as a member of the AvH staff explained. They came from 33 
countries, including Egypt, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Iran, Pakistan, 
Turkey and Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, it seems that the AvH list is a little 
inaccurate because it even mentions applicants from Israel, Slovakia and South 
Africa. These countries do not seem to be significant for their Muslim population. 
In this framework, some Iranian applicants have had an opportunity to receive a 
scholarship from the AvH in the fields of electronics, material science, metal 
physics, organizational chemistry, theoretical chemistry, macromolecular 
chemistry, physical chemistry, technical chemistry, linguistics, Iran studies, and 
palaeontology, according to information from the field study (Schaarschmidt, 
personal communication, 2014). However, it is not clear whether these lists and 
information refer to the European-Islamic dialogue project exclusively or are 
mixed with the list of the routine scholarships that can go to Iranian applicants 
yearly. It was highly significant that annual AvH reports were available from 
1998 to 2013. Members of AvH staff assisted the researcher with accessing the 
annual reports and answering her questions by email. Her request for a face-to-
face interview was refused, however, for reasons such as a change of building.   
PAD is the next institute which has implemented some projects in the intercultural 
dialogue realm. PAD is a parastatal organization and part of the 
Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK) [The standing conference of the ministers of 
education and cultural affairs of the Länder in the federal republic of Germany]. 
In 5.1.2 it was explained that cultural affairs in Germany are not managed by a 
federal cultural ministry. Each Land has a ministry of culture to deal with its 
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cultural affairs. The KMK works on behalf of the Länder of Germany on issues 
which need to be considered in a unified way. In this context, PAD works in the 
international school-exchange and international cooperation fields. PAD has 
launched different programs to empower both teachers and pupils. For instance, 
the Schulen: Partner der Zukunft (PASCH) [Schools: Partners for the Future] 
program, which has been established since 2008, is significant. It was launched 
with the support of the foreign ministry to give young people access to German 
language and education worldwide. It has a network of schools that teach in 
German abroad. The foreign ministry has selected the Goethe Institute, the center 
for foreign education (ZfA), 126 the DAAD and PAD to implement the PASCH 
initiative (Goethe Institut 2010a). PASCH had 1,800 members worldwide in 2016 
(KmK 2016).   
PAD also initiated a specific program within the framework of European-Islamic 
cultural dialogue in 2002. Through this program, female experts in the education 
field from Muslim countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Palestine and Indonesia were 
invited to Germany to participate in special seminars. The seminars informed the 
participants about the German education system generally and about measures to 
integrate pupils from immigrant/Muslim families in German schools in particular. 
An example of the schools discussed were those in the Land of North Rhine-
Westphalia, which has the majority of Muslim immigrants in Germany. Although 
the budget for the program ended at the end of 2004, the program continued in 
2005 because of the interest of the participants from the Muslim countries (PAD 
2008a: 17). In 2006, it changed with the assistance of the foreign ministry to 
include male experts as participants in the projects. Also some theoretical issues, 
such as “separation of state and religion in the educational school system”, were 
further discussed in the teacher-training seminars (PAD 2007b: 23, PAD 2008a: 
7). In 2008, a new program, the Africa-Initiative, was added to the structure of the 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue project of PAD. Hence more participants from 
countries such as Mauretania, Mali and Morocco were included in the program 
(PAD 2008a: 17). The program was discontinued after 2009, as a member of the 
PAD staff mentioned (Finkenberger, personal communication, 2014) and the 
annual reports confirm. The number of participants between 2006 and 2009 was 
188 (table 10). Considering different parts of the project between 2004 and 2009, 
                                                          
126 More information about ZfA is provided later. 
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it can be said that it stimulated knowledge on the roles of church and state in the 
educational systems of a Western-style democracy. It gave information on the 
basic patterns of secular societies and their constitutional and legal system, 
according to annual reports of PAD. The seminars in the project provided an 
opportunity for discussion between educational experts from different 
backgrounds (PAD 2007b: 23, PAD 2008a: 17, PAD 2009b: 31-32). Seven 
Iranian participants also took part in the PAD program from 2004 to 2009 (PAD 
2005, PAD 2007a: 10, PAD 2008b: 9, PAD 2009a: 13).  
 
Table 10. Number of participants of PAD program of European-Islamic cultural dialogue, 
2002-2009, made by researcher   
International 
participants 

















Number  21 36 24 20 17 16 41 32 207 
Source: PAD (PAD 2005: 9, PAD 2007a: 10, PAD 2009a: 13, PAD 2010: 17), reformed 
by the researcher 
 
Another institute is ZfA, which was established in 1968 and is part of the federal 
office of administration. The work of the ZfA in some regards is similar to that of 
PAD, but PAD focuses on projects to train and promote the knowledge of teachers 
while the ZfA’s focus is on pupils. The ZfA works with international German 
schools and some other schools abroad. It supports about 1,200 schools world-
wide, including more than 140 German schools abroad (ZfA 2016). International 
German schools have both German and international pupils. For instance, based 
on information of the annual report of the ZfA, just 17 out of 83 pupils of the 
German school of Iran (DBST) in 2008 were German. The rest were Iranian and 
international pupils (ZfA 2008: 157). The lessons in the German schools abroad 
are taught in German. Pupils who are not German can acquire the German 
language certificate (DSD) after passing their courses. The ZfA provides the 
German schools abroad with personnel, financial and pedagogical assistance. To 
meet its responsibilities, the ZfA receives assistance from the foreign ministry and 
the federal government. About 2,000 teachers working in the German schools are 
employed by the ZfA.  
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The ZfA has been one of the institutes to receive the special budget for European-
Islamic cultural dialogue from the foreign ministry. Although intercultural 
dialogue has been mentioned in its annual reports as a significant point of its 
cultural projects, there appears to be no specific project like those implemented by 
the DAAD and ifa on European-Islamic cultural dialogue, although the Aktion 
Afrika project covers participants from some Muslim countries. Aktion Afrika 
began in 2008 and aimed at educational and cultural cooperation in Africa. The 
project is coordinated with other German cultural institutes such as the Goethe 
Institute and the DAAD and state actors such as PAD and the DW (ZfA 2008: 20-
21). The other project which has been conceptualized in the framework of 
intercultural dialogue between the Western and Muslim world in the post-9/11 
period is Unterschiede Leben – gemeinsam füreinander da sein [living differences 
- to be together for each other]. It is a school exchange project which was 
conducted in 2007 and 2008 between four schools from two European and two 
Arab countries. Pupils of the German school in Egypt, the German School in 
Prague, the Schmidt School in Jerusalem and the sibling School-Gymnasium in 
Winterberg participated in this exchange (ZfA 2008: 129). 
A project led by the German school of Iran (DBST) can also be seen in the 
context of intercultural dialogue for giving opportunities to Iranian pupils of a 
school in the city of Bam and German pupils of DBST. The story of this exchange 
goes back to an earthquake which devastated the city of Bam in the south of Iran 
in 2003. In this earthquake one third of the population of Bam lost their lives. 
Two years later, some teachers of the DBST joined a visit to Bam which was 
organized by the Evangelical church of Tehran in early 2005. On this visit they 
heard about the school of Shamsadini, a school specifically for female pupils. The 
school was completely destroyed in the earthquake. Its pupils lost all or most of 
their family members and their lives were devastated. The visit motivated the 
teachers to initiate meetings and projects between the two schools. In their view, 
these projects may help the Iranian pupils to overcome their sorrow. The initiative 
was supported by the German embassy and the German auto company Daimler 
Chrysler (ZfA 2008: 155-157). Later, the project received 2,000 Euro in donations 
from the public to two bank accounts which were advertised for the project in 
Tehran and Cologne (DW 2008). The project took place in three exchange 
programs in 2006 and implemented different cooperation activities such as the art 
project Bam rā dobāre misāzim [Rebuilding Bam], as well as cooking, 
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constructing a model airplane, and Farsi calligraphy. The project was continued 
later in a new project called “100 flowers in Bam” (DW 2008). Pupils of both 
schools cooperated in this project to make a flower garden in front of the newly 
rebuilt Shamsadini school. A significant point in the DBST pupil exchange was 
that most of the participants were female. One of the organizers of these projects 
stated in a published interview that female pupils of DBST were selected for the 
exchanges because Shamsadini was a female school, but in future she hoped 
mixed groups could participate in cultural exchanges between the two schools 
(DW 2008). The project between the DBST and the school in Bam did not 
continue after 2008. A reason, as one of the organizers of that project mentioned, 
was the political and economic atmosphere under Ahmadinejad. Most of the 
pupils of the DBST were children of people who worked in international and 
German business centers. The economic and political business of international 
partners in Iran gradually slackened at that time, so some of the German and 
international families, and consequently their children, slowly started to leave 
Iran. As a result, the school did not have the same ability as in the past to initiate 
and continue its cultural activities (Chahin-Dörflinger, personal communication, 
2015).  
 
6.2.5.6 Art and Cultural Institutions  
One of the institutes which have implemented activities to reflect international, 
including Iranian, culture for a German audience is the Haus der Kulturen der 
Welt (HKW) [House of cultures of the world]. HKW is a cultural institute that 
exhibits international contemporary art in the German capital Berlin. It was 
established in 1989 by the federal government commissioner for culture and the 
media (BKM), although it also receives support from other federal institutes such 
as the foreign ministry, as well as from the city of Berlin (Auswärtiges Amt 2002: 
40).  
Among the cultural activities of the HKW, specific programs were conducted to 
present Iranian culture and society. As mentioned in subchapter 6.1.1.3, a director 
of the Iranian Rayzani, Mohammad Ali Rajabi, had a close friendship with Hans-
Georg Knopp, a head of HKW at that time. Through this friendship, some 
traditional music concerts were conducted with the support of the HKW in 2001. 
Also, the HKW organized a three-month festival of Iranian art in 2004. In this 
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festival, which was called Entfernte Nähe [a far near distance], new art by Iranian 
artists was shown. The festival had various dimensions because it presented the 
relationship of Iranian artists who live in exile to their homeland, as well as the 
relationship between Iranian artists who live in Iran and abroad. For instance, 
Farhad Moshiri exhibited his project of materials in gold, from a sofa to a stereo. 
Through his art he was criticizing the new-rich generation in Iran and the culture 
of consumption. Another artwork in this festival featured a key, shining in green, 
white and red, the colors of the Iranian flag. The key was reminding all young 
Iranian soldiers who were “brainwashed” in the Iran-Iraq war, as the artist himself 
explained in the report of HKW. According to the narration, before some military 
operations, some young Iranian soldiers were given a “small plastic key”, which 
was supposed to open the door to “paradise”. Another exhibit in this festival was 
by Parasto Forouhar, whose parents were murdered in 1998 in an organized terror 
attack in Iran, which is discussed in 6.1.3.1 under the serial killing of authors. The 
artist presented a fabric, printed with images of small sharp knives. Shadi 
Ghadirian also participated in the festival with her photo project titled “domestic 
life”. The photos presented some women in traditional Iranian dress with their 
faces covered by kitchen materials. Part of the festival was assigned to showing a 
film by Marjane Satrapi titled “Persepolis”. The film was a narration of the 
director’s childhood in Iran. The festival also had a relic of Imam Khomeini on 
show in a glass case, though this part of the exhibition was attacked by some of 
the Iranian audience, who seemed to be from Iranian opposition groups in exile, 
as mentioned in the report of the HKW (HKW 2004).   
 
6.2.5.7 Volunteer Projects   
Some individual German volunteer groups have also implemented cultural 
activities in the framework of intercultural dialogue. The volunteer group of 
Manfred and Gisela Grüter, referred to in this research as the Grüter family, is a 
significant example and implemented many cultural activities between Iran and 
Germany. The Grüter family implemented different projects, including pupil 
exchange, art exhibitions and pedagogic seminars for teachers. Each of these 
projects was organized officially under the name of an institute such as Königin 
Luise Stiftung (KLS) or Hafis Gesellschaft. But the volunteer presence of the 
Grüter family played a main role in implementation of the initial activities and 
creating a network. With the help of the network they managed to initiate the next 
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intercultural dialogue activities. Projects took place from 2001 to 2015. From 
2016, the Grüter family changed the focus of their cultural activities to refugees 
coming to Germany. The initial idea of organizing these activities came to the 
Grüter family in 2000, after they participated in a major anti-racism event, 
Menschlichkeit und Toleranz [Humanity and tolerance], which was organized in 
front of a Jewish synagogue in Berlin: 
“[It was a] manifestation in Berlin against racism and for friendship with other 
cultures. This manifestation was supported by democratic parties, churches of 
different religions including Muslims, Jewish, Protestants and Catholics, as well 
as high political representatives. After that we thought we should do something” 
(Manfred and Gisela Grüter, personal communication, 2016). 
 
After that event, the couple decided to launch a project to inform themselves and 
others about different cultures. They wanted to challenge the “enemy image” that 
young German people might have in their mind of “foreign cultures”. At that 
time, Manfred Grüter was a teacher at the KLS, so the family decided to develop 
their idea in this school. They started to contact different embassies, requesting 
information about their cultures. Among them, the Iranian embassy answered 
immediately and positively. Although in the framework of the first project, the 
Grüter family organized exchange with Malta and Slovenia, the exchange with 
Iranian partners was developed because of the “positive feedback of Iranian 
embassy” and active engagement of Iranian partners in the coming years 
(Manfred and Gisela Grüter, personal communication, 2016). Consequently, the 
Grüter family led a cultural program between the KLS and the Iranian embassy 
school of Berlin. Through this cultural program the Iranian pupils received 
assistance with the German language from the German pupils of the KLS. Also, 
both sets of pupils participated in each other’s celebrations: Nowruz and 
Christmas. A significant point of this project was to explore the tolerance of 
Iranian families regarding German school culture, as explained in a report for a 
member of the German press. Part of the school activities in Germany is 
swimming in mixed female and male groups. This is routine in German school 
programs, but it can be a controversial issue among the immigrant or international 
families who live in Germany. A question therefore arose as to whether 
swimming would be included or excluded in the exchange between KLS and the 
Iranian embassy school. This question was discussed one year later, between a 
father of a male pupil of the Iranian school and Manfred Grüter. The father gave 
Chapter 6: Iranian and German Implementing Actors of Intercultural Dialogue 
350  
his permission with the argument that, “he [his son] should just learn to close his 
inner eyes to sin” (Lohse 14.03.2004). 
The Grüter family managed to organize a series of cultural programs after the 
experience of the first exchange with the Iranian embassy school. Appendix 9 
presents details of these projects. The appendix suggests that a variety of 
organizations and institutes supported their projects. The KLS received assistance 
in the initial projects of the Grüter family; the cultural section of the German 
embassy in Tehran; the UNESCO school project/the German UN Commission; 
the section of dialogue among cultures of the foreign ministry; and the German-
Iranian Handelskammer industrial association also assisted the projects. The 
UNESCO Weltnaturerbe Wattenmeer [UNESCO World Heritage Wadden Sea] 
mainly supported the photography project in 2010. The Kunst baut Brücken [Art 
builds bridges] project was conducted in the framework of activities of the Hafis 
Gesellschaft, but the evangelical church of Iran played a supporting role, too. 
Potsdam University and the Technical University of Berlin also promoted the 
scientific part of seminars for pupils and teachers in some projects.  
On the Iranian side, a number of organizations have supported the programs of the 
Grüter family. They are the ministry of labor and social affairs, the Iranian 
embassy and Rayzani in Germany. The Iranian schools Shohadaye Kargar, 
Farzanegan, Kherad, and Mahdavi Educational Complex, as well as the school 
network Bonyād-e Dāneš va Honar [Science and art foundation], contributed to 
some projects. The Iranian parliament library, Khāne-ye Honarmandan [Iran art 
forum], and Kanun supported and were involved in some projects of the Grüter 
family too. The University of Sharif has helped to create the core of the school 
network and support some scientific seminars for projects. Projects of the Grüter 
family in the period of analysis of this study up to 2013 are presented in appendix 
9. The details have been gathered in several informal and formal communications 
with the Grüter family as well as relevant extended texts collected in the field 
study.  
The Grüter family managed to develop these diverse projects by networking with 
both Iranian and German partners. Although German actors have assisted projects 
of the Grüter family in an active way, the Grüter family has stated that without the 
steady cooporation and affirmative view of Iranian actors such as the embassy and 
Rayzani, working on these projects would be almost impossible. In one of the 
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pupil exchanges the participants had a chance to visit the NGO of IID of Ali 
Abtahi, which illustrates that the projects have cooperation from both Iranian state 
and non-state actors. Female and male pupils participated in the projects. German 
pupils in Iran were sometimes invited to stay with the families of Iranian pupils 
during the project period, and vice versa. The close relationship between the 
Grüter family and Mohammad Ali Rajabi, a director of Rayzani, was a high point 
in assisting the Grüter family to construct a network with Iranian partners of the 
projects. Even when Rajabi left office, the Grüter family remained in contact with 
him, which resulted in more projects with his assistance when he became the 
director of the library of the Iranian parliament.  
 
6.2.5.8 A Summary on Analysis of other German Actors 
To conclude the points of 6.2.5, it is necessary to return to the question of the 
main characteristics of the intercultural dialogue activities that were implemented 
by the other German actors and the main points influencing them? Most activities 
in this category were implemented in the context of education, such as school 
exchanges of the ZfA and the Grüter family, pedagogic projects of PAD and 
higher education scholarships of AvH. Networking has been one of the high 
points in the work of other cultural actors in Germany, which reflects an 
integrated foreign cultural policy with a central role of the German embassy in 
Iran. The role of the German media, especially DW, in supporting dialogue 
between Iranian journalists was significant, but the time of this support, in the 
post-2009 presidential election period, indicates that political reasons played a 
role. German political foundations and the Loccum Academy followed democratic 
trends in Iran and consequently attempted to construct the cultural relations 
between the two countries by holding sessions and seminars on those trends. 
Nevertheless, these attempts have not always been successful when it comes to 
the reactions of hardliners in Iran and opponents of dialogue in Germany. Other 
issues, such as separation of state and religion, have also been discussed in the 
context of pedagogic projects of the PAD. Because some participants of these 
projects were Iranian, and in Iran the separation of state and religion does not 
officially apply, it seems that this issue has been indirectly political rather than 
pedagogic. Remarkably, some projects which have been titled cultural dialogue 
have a new form, like the photography exchange of the Grüter family. Moreover, 
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the focus of projects was not just on social and cultural issues, but also natural 
disasters, which were a topic of some projects of the ZfA and the Grüter family. 
The EKD, too, managed to conduct triangle interreligious dialogue with the 
assistance of the NGO IID between Germany, Britain and Iran. Also, diverse 
images of the culture of Iran were presented in Berlin with the efforts of the 
HKW. The final point relates to the high transparency of information on activities 
and organizational structure of the majority of actors which have been discussed 
in this subchapter. This transparency made listing the activities and analysis 
possible and easier.   
 
 
6.2.6 Attention of the German Media to Intercultural Dialogue 
Besides the cultural organizations and groups, the media also play a role in 
foreign cultural policy. Media like TV, newspapers and magazines, films and 
internet portals create an image for people about other cultures. There is a 
question of whether media counts as an “actor” or a “mediator” of intercultural 
dialogue; in this study it is discussed separately from the actors, although this 
question is returned to at the end of the segment. The analysis is presented in three 
segments: 6.2.6.1 considers the structure of the German media; 6.2.6.2 contains 
information on DW as a state media broadcaster responsible for creating a cultural 
image of Germany abroad; and 6.2.6.3 discusses internet media which are active 
specifically in the field of intercultural dialogue. The concluding points are made 
in 6.2.6.4. 
 
6.2.6.1 Structure of the German Media 
The media in Germany are managed by both “public” and “private broadcasting 
industries” (Bösch et al. 2016). The Länder play a strong role in public 
broadcasting, according to rules stipulated in the German federal constitution. The 
Länder create programs of public broadcasting individually or jointly based on 
agreements. All public broadcasting corporations are governed by an independent 
broadcasting council, which is called the Rundfunkrat. The Allgemeine 
Rundfunkanstalten Deutschlands (ARD), which is also called Das Erste [the first], 
is an example of public broadcasting, while RTL is an example of private 
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broadcasting in Germany. Deutsche Welle (DW) is the exception in the German 
media system. Based on the federal legislation, it is designed to provide services, 
including radio, TV and internet, to foreign countries. The German newspapers 
are managed locally and regionally. In 2008 it was reported that 135 daily 
newspapers and 354 weekly newspapers were printed. There is only a small 
number of national newspapers published in Germany, as among them 
Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.  
The German media play a role in intercultural dialogue because they cover news 
regarding Muslim countries generally and Iran specifically. This research has not 
scrutinized literature on the German media; however, a comparative analysis with 
the Iranian media illustrates its significant characteristics. Because the role of the 
German judicial system in defending the rights of minority groups (including 
Muslims) is strong, it is difficult for the media to noticeably use Islamophobia 
rhetoric. At the same time, the freedom of the press is defended by the 
constitution and the judicial system. Hence sometimes, in cases such as publishing 
or re-publishing the cartoon of Prophet Mohammad, the media do partially create 
an image of Islam. Furthermore, fear of foreigners, and specifically of Muslim 
refugees, among the German population is reported to have risen since 2014 
(Huffington Post 16.06.2016).127 The right-wing organizations are also 
increasingly using anti-Islamic rhetoric to further their ideas and find receptive 
supporters. Some experts refer to this situation as “Germany’s new Islamophobia 
boom” (Gude et al. 2014). The point is that, even if the media covers news in 
German society in a neutural way, it still cannot ignore covering demonstrations 
by right-wing political groups. The work of the German media can then be seen as 
a representation of Islamophobia after all. Moreover, the German media, like 
many others in the world, care about news value in their news coverage. In this 
context, because “bad news” is worth covering,128 news relating to Iran’s nuclear 
program and the cancelation of cultural events between Iran and Germany has a 
better chance of being covered. Nevertheless, issues such as the high number of 
female students at Iranian universities or a significant reduction in the sentence of 
                                                          
127 The Huffington Post reviews a study in this news which claims “every second respondent […] of 2,420 
people said they sometimes felt like a foreigner in their own country due to the many Muslims here, up from 
43 percent in 2014 and 30.2 percent in 2009”. 
128 News items which essentially reflect negative issues, whether about “war” or a “local sewer commission”, 
practically speaking “will get out” and attract more attention from audiences than happy or neutral news 
Fuller, Jack 1997: News Values: Ideas for an Information Age: University of Chicago Press. This explains 
the well-known saying “bad news is good news”. 
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stoning in Iran after the “critical dialogue” between Iran and the EU still attract 
less attention from them.   
The media are also perceived as an important instrument in German foreign 
cultural policy, as the annual reports on German foreign cultural policy regularly 
emphasize. Publication and exhibitions of books at international level, as well as 
the production of films and coordination of film festivals, are some of the 
activities which are mentioned frequently in the annual reports (Auswärtiges Amt 
2002: 24-27, Auswärtiges Amt 2006: 27-30, Auswärtiges Amt 2012a: 30-31). 
Nevertheless, the member of the media in Germany in the realm of foreign 
cultural policy is Deutsche Welle, which has covered and implemented different 
cultural activities to make an image for Germany abroad. The following segments 
provide more information on this broadcaster. 
 
6.2.6.2 Deutsche Welle 
Deutsche Welle (DW) was established in 1992. Its 24-hour TV program is 
broadcast in three languages, German, English and Spanish (Auswärtiges Amt 
2001: 10), and its radio version and website are available daily in more than 30 
languages. DW cooperates with international partners on some projects. For 
instance, through the program of the DW Fortbildungszentrum, which is 
supported by the BMZ, DW cooperates on media projects with international 
partners and awards scholarships to international applicants (Auswärtiges Amt 
1999: 9, Auswärtiges Amt 2000a: 10). DW contributes to training programs for a 
regular international audience through its learning ear radio program 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2011a: 37). It assists journalists through seminar and exchange 
programs, which are implemented by the DW Academy. For instance, the “Young 
Media Summit” workshop was held in Cairo with the participation of bloggers 
and citizen journalists of Muslim countries. DW also prepared a three-day 
program of “Media dialogue” in Mexico City with the participation of journalists, 
opinion makers and media artists from Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, 
Mexico and Germany (DW-Akademie 2012: 23-26).  
DW has specifically promoted internet portals under the discourse of European-
Islamic cultural dialogue and further media cooperation for Iranian participants. 
The next subchapter deals with these portals. 




6.2.6.3 Internet Portals 
DW has specifically been involved in a number of projects relating to intercultural 
dialogue with Muslim countries. Firstly, almost all of its Farsi content is 
broadcasted through the DW Farsi website. Secondly, DW cooperated in the 
internet portal project for Qantara (since 2003), whichin Arabic means “bridge”. It 
is in three languages, English, Arabic and German and contributes to dialogue 
with Muslim countries by producing news and analysis on cultural events and 
social concerns in those regions. Qantara has also reflected on significant issues 
such as “nuclear agreement between Iran and Western countries” and “refugees”. 
The Goethe Institute, ifa and the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung [Federal 
center for political education] also cooperate in the Qantara portal. An evaluation 
study undertaken by the department of culture and communication of the foreign 
ministry in 2013 showed that Qantara has been highly appreciated by the public 
and is recognized as a bridge between Germany, Europe and the Islamic world. 
Based on this evaluation, Qantara could work as a “credible tool of foreign 
cultural policy”(Bickel 2014). In 2014, there were some discussions on closing 
down Qantara. But it was finally decided that the project had to be continued as it 
was, as a former commissioner of the intercultural dialogue of the foreign 
ministry explained (Mulack, personal communication, 2015).  
The next internet portal which is operated by DW to facilitate intercultural 
dialogue between Germany and Muslim countries is called “Ru dar Ru”, which 
means “face to face” in Farsi. It was established in 2010 to extend the journalism 
skills of normal Iranian internet users. The project was developed after the 2009 
presidential election crisis with the support of the Farsi internet portal of DW. It 
aimed at supporting the “engaged Iranians” who had an interest in participating in 
citizen journalism and engaging in “independent information gathering”, as 
Cornelia Pieper, a state minister of the foreign ministry at that time, mentioned in 
a seminar which was organized by ifa and DW. Ru dar Ru gave Iranian users an 
opportunity to write their posts in the portal. Afterwards, their written text would 
have a chance to be professionally evaluated and processed, and then it could be 
uploaded onto the website as a news item (ifa 2011a: 7). Ru dar Ru also 
introduced some weblogs by Farsi-language bloggers to its audiences (DW 
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To sum up the relevant points of this segment, the specific structure of the public 
media in Germany and the active role of DW are both relevant to creat a 
possibility for intercultural dialogue. The public media in Germany allows 
different state and non-state actors to play a role. It works with a system of checks 
and balances to let different voices be heard within society. Because the different 
actors also highlight different cultural priorities, it seems that they have a good 
opportunity to indirectly prepare ordinary German audiences for intercultural 
dialogue. It is significant that the DW does not just cover news about the world 
and Germany in thirty languages (including Farsi) but also actively implemented 
and supported specific internet portals to give access to more and younger 
audiences all over the world. It is therefore possible to conclude that the German 
media has played a role beyond that of a mediator. 
 
 
6.3 Discussion of the Results of Chapter 6 
The main points of chapter 6 will be presented in 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, with a 
constructive summary of each implementing actor following in 6.3.1. Because 
there are eight actors in total, 6.3.1 contains a long text and eight sections. 
Characteristics of intercultural dialogue activities which have been implemented 
by Iranian and German implementing actors will be analyzed in 6.3.2. The content 
of both subchapters of the summary are useful; firstly, because it gives a quick 
image of the background, organization and practices of the implementing actors of 
Iran and Germany; and secondly, because it is useful for the reader to follow the 
analysis of the next chapter, which will discuss why intercultural dialogue 
between Iran and Germany has had its specific characteristics. 
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6.3.1 Summary of Points on Iranian and German Implementing Actors 
This subchapter presents the main points concluded from the investigation of the 
field study of Iran regarding actors of intercultural dialogue. Some of the points 
will be discussed in 6.3.2 to explain the characteristics of intercultural dialogue 
between Iran and Germany. Some will be used in chapter 7 to discuss the different 
dimensions of Iranian and German foreign cultural policy and the role 
intercultural dialogue has played in the foreign cultural policy of Iran and 
Germany towards each other.  
 
6.3.1.1 Summary of Points on Rayzani 
 Focus on conferences and seminars: Rayzani was involved mainly in 
cultural activities such as exhibitions, cultural weeks, publications, 
seminars and conferences. It also supported other German cultural actors 
such as the HKW with music concerts and the Grüter family with their 
pupil exchange. It is significant that, among those activities, seminar and 
conference are the forms of activity which can be categorized as “two-way 
communication” with Rayzani playing an active role. 
 Lack of long-term projects: publishing the Spektrum Iran journal is one 
of the main and long-term activities of Rayzani. No other long-term 
projects in the realm of cultural dialogue between Iranian and German 
participants or interfaith dialogue have been implemented by Rayzani. 
Nevertheless, the concept of a long-term project is not unfamiliar in the 
context of ICRO and consequently for the staff of Rayzani, because the 
CID has continuously implemented round table meetings on the issue of 
interfaith dialogue with international churches and institutes, as discussed 
in 5.2.3.  
 Accompanying German cultural actors: although Rayzani did not play 
an active role in implementing the various cultural activities in the 
framework of intercultural dialogue, it often assisted German actors that 
wanted to implement cultural activities between Iranian and German 
participants.  
 Failure to coordinate cultural activities: Rayzani failed to play a central 
role in coordinating foreign cultural activities of the ICDAC and the 
embassy in Germany. Firstly, the main people who decided on the 
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activities of the ICDAC had no interest in working with Rayzani between 
2000 and 2005. Secondly, there has been disagreement between the 
Iranian embassy in Germany and Rayzani. The embassy has preferred to 
coordinate some of its cultural activities, such educational and film 
activities, through a small office in the embassy called the cultural section. 
Rayzani also did not network actively with Iranian cultural institutes 
located in Germany, such as the Islamic Center of Hamburg. It seems that 
it even did not network actively with suboffices of ICRO, such as the 
Saadi foundation and the CID. Some organizational and administrative 
reasons were given in the field study for this fact. Consequently, despite 
officially being the main actor to deal with cultural activities in Germany 
on behalf of the Iranian state, Rayzani practically failed to play a 
coordinative and central role.  
 Establishing a new NGO to fit the German structure: Rayzani 
supported the founding of the Islamic studies foundation NGO, according 
to one of its directors, in order to establish a Shia professorship at a 
German university. The reason has been mentioned that Rayzani was 
unable to do this because of its governmental base. This point suggests 
that the directors of Rayzani themselves were fully aware of the 
incompatibility of cultural structures in Iran and Germany.  
 Overlooking available potentials: there is a question of whether Rayzani 
could or could not use the available potential of the available Iranian 
cultural actors. For instance, the Islamic Center of Hamburg, the CID of 
ICRO, and Kanun in some regards were able to meet the needs of Rayzani 
in specific fields. With their assistance Rayzani could fill the gap of 
incompatibility of its structure with the German structure. This point 
nevertheless requires more study.  
 Confusing for German actors as external to the embassy: because 
Rayzani is located apart from the Iranian embassy, some German 
diplomats who have been in contact with the embassy fail to understand 
exactly Rayzani’s role and its functions compared with the cultural section 
of the embassy.  
 Understanding Rayzani as a type of Goethe Institute or an agent of 
the regime: in the view of some German and Iranian participants of the 
study, Rayzani is like the Goethe Institute, with marginal differences, 
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while some German participants understood it to be an institute under the 
authority of the Iranian “regime”. These two points suggest that, firstly, 
the structure of German and Iranian cultural actors of foreign cultural 
activities is understood according to the participants’ knowledge of their 
own cultural institutes and structures. Secondly, understanding of the 
cultural institutes in the other country was, in some cases, influenced by 
political issues. Thirdly, some German participants of the study were not 
aware of key differences between Iranian and German cultural institutes.  
 Role of directors to form activities: directors of Rayzani had a key role 
in forming the main cultural activities at different times. Despite the 
guidelines and aims of ICRO, which Rayzani is supposed to follow, its 
directors practically place specific priorities, such as music in one period 
or religious activities in another, above other activities.   
 Lack of reports on the activities: the access to information on the 
activities of Rayzani has been a major challenge. No annual report or 
official records on activities were available to the researcher. Data 
collection was therefore limited to information from participants in the 
field study and some websites.  
 
6.3.1.2 Summary of Points on the ICDAC 
 Short life: the ICDAC worked from 1997 to 2005, after which it started to 
merge into Iranian state organizations. The short life of the ICDAC has 
been cited by some of the participants of the study as one of the reasons 
that it could not achieve its aims. 
 Organizationally new: following the initiation of the idea of dialogue 
among civilizations, Khatami intended to establish a new center, despite 
using available cultural institutes and organizations like the foreign 
ministry or ICRO. This center was intended to be as little dependent on the 
state as possible and pursue its aims liberally. The problem with this idea 
was that such a center was new in the context of Iranian organizations. It 
could not continue its life after his presidency, not only for political 
reasons (the new president Ahmadinejad was not sympathetic to the idea) 
but also for organizational ones. A reason for its short life was the 
incompatibility of its structure with that of existing institutes in Iran.  
Chapter 6: Iranian and German Implementing Actors of Intercultural Dialogue 
360  
 General aims and duties: reviewing the aims of the ICDAC “to 
coordinate the activities of governmental and non-governmental 
organizations to extend the idea of dialogue among civilizations” indicates 
that it was overlapping with the aims of ICRO regarding coordination of 
foreign cultural activities with international organizations. Also, one of the 
aims was “to coordinate foreign cultural activities of the state institutes 
based on views of Khatami”. Achievement of such an aim by a non-state 
organization is not foreseen in any legislation passed by the parliament. 
This raises the question of how, without having such organizational 
efficiency, the ICDAC could achieve this aim.  
 Lack of an action paper: it was not only a purpose of the ICDAC but also 
the council of ministers’ expectation of it to conceptualize the idea of 
dialogue among civilizations in practical terms. However, in the end, no 
concept paper or action paper was produced by the ICDAC. Either such a 
concept exists and the researcher was unable to find it, despite searching 
libraries and talking to former presidents, or the aim was too abstract or 
the life of the ICDAC too short for it to be achieved. Still, for an institute 
which worked under the presidential office budget and in the context of 
the Iranian political system, its short life should not be surprising. 
 Not networking with proper German partners: the ICDAC had contact 
with a variety of international partners including Germany. But it did not 
develop contacts with those whose activities fit its own. For instance, the 
journal of the ICDAC mentions AvH as one of the future partners. But 
AvH is a German higher education foundation. It is not the best fit for 
cooperating with a multicultural organizational center like the ICDAC. 
Then, paradoxically, relevant institutes whose activities were compatible 
with the ICDAC were neglected as future partners. For instance, there was 
no active cooperation between the intercultural dialogue section of the 
German foreign ministry and the section of dialogue with Islam of the 
EKD or with the interfaith dialogue section of the ICDAC. The EKD later 
develop an interfaith dialogue with the NGO IID. 
 Initiating but not accomplishing projects: the ICDAC supported many 
investigations and publications on diverse issues. Most of those projects 
were successfully undertaken in the time of the ICDAC, although some 
were not completed. For instance, with assistance from the ministry of 
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education and training, the ICDAC revealed a project to teach a book on 
“dialogue among civilizations” in schools. But the project had not been 
implemented even before the presidency of Khatami was over.  
 Activities shaped by ICDAC presidents: presidents of the ICDAC had 
changed the focus of activities and even structure of the center in their 
periods of office.129 The first president had a very diverse approach to art, 
film, and philosophy, and to audiences, like youth and women and small 
towns. The structure of the ICDAC served those activities at that time. The 
second president, who had experience of heading the ministry of Islamic 
culture and guidance, focused on fields such as publication and translation, 
as well as academic research on history and philosophy, among other 
things.  
 Merger in Khatami’s time: the process of merging the ICDAC into state 
organizations and finally closing it down began under Khatami, not 
Ahmadinejad. One narrative which is strongly echoed by many Iranian 
participants of the study is that the ICDAC was closed because of 
limitations imposed under Ahmadinejad. This story puts all the burden of 
the merger and closure of the ICDAC on the shoulders of the Ahmadinejad 
administration, while the merger had organizational reasons, too, and 
started in Khatami’s time.  
 Not informing staff about merging the ICDAC: members of staff of the 
ICDAC and staff of the CID worked in the new institute of dialogue 
among religions and civilizations in the initial stage of the merger, but 
they did so separately, and then steadily began to clash. A lack of budget 
and pressure from ICRO on employees of the former ICDAC to resign are 
some of the reasons for this clash. Another reason is neglected in the 
narrative of the participants in this research: On the eve of the merger, 
there was still a lack of information among members of staff of the 
ICDAC about what was going on. A failure to inform staff may have been 
caused by an emotional reaction of junior officers, the president of the 
ICDAC and the administration of Khatami, for they hoped that the ICDAC 
could survive with the current staff in the newly emerged center. The lack 
                                                          
129 With the exception of Boroujerdi, who was president in a time of crisis for the ICDAC; he attempted just 
to keep the existing organizational structure, so the changes in his time were out of his control.  
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of information could also have been a political reaction, however, to put 
pressure on ICRO not to close the ICDAC immediately.  
 Focus on domestic activities: the ICDAC implemented several cultural 
activities, such as the publication of books, journals and translations, 
holding seminars and exhibitions, construction of memorials, inviting 
important figures (such as Jürgen Habermas) to Iran, and assisting 
academic research and similar. Moreover, it cooperated on some 
international academic conferences, although the main focus of these 
activities was domestic audiences rather than the international public, and 
the target groups were mostly Iranians. The ICDAC did not focus 
practically on implementing activities which bring together Iranian and 
international participants.  
 Criticism from hardliners: some international activities of the ICDAC 
and its budget thereafter attracted a great deal of attention from some 
conservative press media and clergymen. According to the budget law of 
Iran, however, the ICDAC received much less budget than ICRO. 
Appendix 1 shows a comparison of the budgets. 
 
6.3.1.3 Summary of Points on Other Iranian Cultural Actors 
 Weak role of Iranian political parties and parliament: although 
reformist parties at the time of Khatami supported the discourse of 
“dialogue among civilizations”, they did not actively play a role in 
constructing the infrastructure to apply it in an organized and 
institutionalized way. For instance, the specific budget at that time was 
allocated to the ICDAC as a subsection of the presidency. The budget was 
not offered to all relevant cultural institutes, asking them to apply for 
activities relating to the specific issue of dialogue among civilizations, but 
allocated to a section which would clearly only exist in the short period of 
a presidency. At the end of Khatami’s presidency, the Iranian parliament 
was mostly occupied by conservative representatives. The failure of 
reformist parties can therefore be counted as one of the reasons that the 
budget for dialogue among civilizations could not be replaced in a new 
structure.  
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 IPIS using dialogue among civilization as discourse: participants in this 
research stated that the reason for the ICDAC not being merged inside the 
foreign ministry was that it did not fit into the ministry’s structure. But the 
discourse of “dialogue among civilizations” mostly had a central role in 
talks of members of IPIS in their meetings with Western coutries, 
including Germany, at the time of Khatami. Therefore, it seems that the 
discourse was perceived rather as rhetoric than a full program for IPIS and 
consequently for the foreign ministry. It was rhetoric which had an expiry 
date and was not used in the international meetings of IPIS after Khatami. 
 Interfaith dialogue implemented even by hardliners: a variety of 
religious institutes which received support from the seminary of Qum and 
the religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state played a role in 
studying different religions and cooperating in interfaith dialogue 
activities. Among them, Adyan and Al-Mustafa Universities have 
academic cooperation with the DAAD in the context of intercultural 
dialogue. Hence even Iranian religious institutes which are identified 
through their conservative approach or their hardliner directors have 
shown themselves internationally to be partners of “dialogue”. 
 Limited opportunity of civil society: those NGOs which get no support 
from the Iranian state, like the interfaith NGO IID and the dialogue NGO 
of Khatami, have faced limitations to work in last two decades in Iran, 
especially after the presidential election of 2009. The dialogue center of 
Imam Musa Sadr is still working, although it does so in the field of 
teaching the skills of dialogue, not conducting dialogue among cultural 
and political groups. 
 Lack of data on academic exchange: there is a lack of information about 
the number of foreign students who had the chance to study in Iran and 
receive financial support from ICRO and relevant Iranian ministries. It 
seems that there is a tendency to support foreign students in the field of 
Islamic studies, Farsi language and Iran studies, though there are also 
exchanges in engineering and medical science.  
 Role of an intercultural dialogue volunteer: in the period in which there 
was a good chance of the idea of dialogue among civilizations initiating 
intercultural dialogue activities from the Iranian side with the rest of the 
world, the volunteer activities of Fatemeh Sadr were significant. She had 
Chapter 6: Iranian and German Implementing Actors of Intercultural Dialogue 
364  
experience of living in Germany, knowledge of the German language, 
friendship and kinship with Khatami, as well as a keen interest in dialogue. 
These elements all together made her an informed mediator to advise on 
inviting German experts on relevant issues to Iran. She translated a book 
in this field from German to Farsi and was part of the project of the school 
book on dialogue among civilizations which was implemented by the 
ICDAC. Finally, she established the dialogue center of Imam Musa Sadr.  
 Recognition for the Islamic Center of Hamburg through people like 
Khatami: the Center is under the authority of the religiously legitimated 
sector of the Iranian state, although it has been identified by German 
participants of the study with its former directors, such as Khatami and 
Shabestari Ghaemmaghami, who are well known for their dissident 
thinking. This center has not appeared as a significant religious actor in 
Germany to implement organized and long-term interfaith dialogues with 
certain churches or institutes in Germany.  
 Questioning the financial sources for Khatami’s dialogue NGO: 
conservative press media like Resalat challenged the financial sources for 
Khatami’s dialogue NGO. Their argument was that Khatami made a new 
law in his late presidency to preserve a budget for his own NGO. Though 
such a law has not been found, Khatami did pay the expenses of the NGO 
from the income of his international speeches as former president. This 
source dried up when Khatami’s passport was confiscated by the Iranian 
authorities in the post-2009 presidential election period. 
 Lack of transparency: it is difficult to conclude with any degree of 
certainty the role that other Iranian cultural actors played in intercultural 
dialogue. Perhaps there are reports or internal bulletins which could not be 
accessed by the researcher. It is hard to believe that cultural organizations 
and state authorities in charge of Iranian foreign cultural policy do not 
reflect the results of their work in an organized way in annual reports. But 
since there has been a lack of transparency of information for the public, 
and for the researcher as well, it is concluded here that the role of other 
cultural actors in intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany has 
been weak and vague. 
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6.3.1.4 Summary of Points on Iranian Media 
 Partial coverage by the IRIB: the Iranian TV and Radio (IRIB) are under 
the authority of the religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state. The 
discourses of intercultural dialogue have not received noteworthy coverage 
by it, negative or positive, although the IRIB partially covered the 
conference of “Iran after Election”, which was initiated by the Heinrich 
Böll foundation. This led to long prison sentences for several Iranian 
participants on their return to Iran. It consequently influenced the image of 
Iran in Germany and vice versa. The conference was an opportunity to 
discuss the victory of reformists in an Iranian parliamentary election. 
 Efforts of limited press media: some press media, even under judicial 
limitations and short life made great efforts to reflect news and articles on 
other cultures. Nafe and Madresse magazines are examples of this type of 
press media. Some press media also wished to establish communities for 
dialogue between reformists and intellectuals. The main editorial team of 
the Āeen, which was established by a reformist party, started their 
meetings one year before publishing the magazine.  
 
6.3.1.5 Summary of Points on Cultural Section of the German Embassy 
 Coordinating with a central role: the cultural section cooperated closely 
with other sections of the German embassy in Tehran, like the press 
section. It also supported other Mittlerorganisationen. It supported the 
Goethe Institute by giving it a contact office and continuing its German 
language courses under the name of DSIT. The cultural section assisted 
the DAAD by continuing its academic activities via its information center 
and lectureships in Tehran and Isfahan when the DAAD could not 
officially work, between 2008 and 2012. Together with the press section it 
aided ifa in the process of selecting Iranian applicants for the CCP project. 
The reception party of the ambassador on the anniversary of German 
reunification was a chance for the cultural section to gather small and large 
cultural actors that have implemented cultural and intercultural dialogue 
activities. As part of this gathering they communicated with an Iranian 
audience and informed them about their activities. 
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 Cultural activities despite difficulties: the cultural section faced some 
political limitations to implementing cultural activities in Iran. It was also 
criticized by some German opposition groups and individuals. It faced 
intercultural dialogue budget limitations from the foreign ministry after 
some of its cultural programs in Ahmadinejad’s time were canceled. From 
the activities of the cultural section, however, it is still apparent that it 
engaged heavily with German cultural actors to implement cultural and 
intercultural dialogue activities. The difficulties of working in Iran were 
lessons for the cultural section in overcoming them or finding short-cuts to 
focus on cultural activities in an innovative way. In some interviews with 
German participants, the point that there are two sectors of the Iranian 
state was mentioned as a key problem. The interviewees stated that there is 
a good chance to work with the democratically legitimated sector of the 
Iranian state, but they should be observant to identify the correct time. A 
director of the press section, for instance, applied for a different budget 
from the foreign ministry for a media dialogue when she realized that the 
political atmosphere in Iran made it appropriate to do so. She also 
suggested a study trip project with the cooperation of the Goethe Institute. 
These are examples of short-cuts.  
 Cancelation of projects for security reasons: according to participants of 
both the cultural and press sections, some cultural projects like media 
dialogue were canceled by the Iranian authorities in the period of 
Ahmadinejad because of security concerns.  
 Observing interest of the Iranian young generation: it was mentioned 
that the young Iranian population makes up the biggest portion of the 
audience at music concerts and art exhibitions from Germany in Iran. 
Also, where cultural projects of Mittlerogranisationen, such as ifa’s CCP 
and the DAAD scholarships, were advertised through limited informal 
networks of the cultural section, a high number of qualified candidates 
applied.  
 Developing dialogue with ordinary people: the cultural section assisted 
intercultural dialogue activities for specific target groups, such as students 
and theologians. It also assisted activities like the study trip for different 
German and Iranian journalists, artists and staff of organizations. In this 
type of intercultural dialogue, ordinary participants would also get the 
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chance of dialogue with people of other cultures. A head of the cultural 
section specifically emphasized that the dialogue should not be limited to 
experts and professors and should be developed to also give ordinary 
people and journalists a chance.   
 
6.3.1.6 Summary of Points on the DAAD 
 Working as a university club: the DAAD claims to work as a university 
club and represents Germany through its academic activities. What was 
observed in the field study confirms that it works in such a capacity: It 
attempts on the one hand to supply financial resources to German and 
foreign university projects, and on the other hand it encourages German 
universities to cooperate with international universities on different 
projects. It has a complicated organizational structure, but universities 
which have experience of working with it are familiar with its difficulties 
and complications. In collecting data in the field study, it became apparent 
that reflecting the needs of universities is the main concern. Participants of 
two teams which received a specific budget of intercultural dialogue from 
the DAAD stated that they had a free hand to determine different parts of 
their projects independently. 
 Complicated organizational structure: the organizational structure of 
the DAAD is complicated and difficult to understand for outsiders. 
Nevertheless, firstly, relevant and detailed information on the structure is 
available from reviewing its annual reports. Secondly, the map of the 
DAAD structure, updated each year in the annual report, provided access 
to the relevant section in charge of discourse of European-Islamic cultural 
dialogue. The DAAD launched a specific project of “German-
Arab/Iranian-university dialogue” by Referat 444 in the southern 
hemisphere department.  
 Transparency on projects and budgets: the annual reports of the DAAD 
from 1998 to 2013 were available, partly through its website and partly 
through visits to the DAAD offices in Bonn. The annual report contains 
detailed information on the structure, aims, projects and budget of the 
DAAD, supported by different tables, charts and figures.    
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 Increased cooperation with Iran, despite difficulties: a budget that the 
DAAD assigned to academic cooperation with Iran shows an upward trend 
from 1998 to 2013. Despite facing official problems at the time of 
Ahmadinejad, the DAAD could continue its activities with the assistance 
of the cultural section of the German embassy in Iran. When it could not 
keep its information office open and the contracts of its lecturers in Tehran 
and Isfahan were not extended by the Iranian authorities, it was able to 
continue to offer scholarships and work with universities which were the 
partners of German-Arabic/Iranian university dialogue with the help of a 
local employee.  
 Lack of understanding in Iran as civil society: the complicated structure 
of the DAAD on one hand and the transparency of information on its 
financial source, which is the German foreign ministry, are two reasons 
why it is not perceived as being independent from the German state. A 
director of the information center explained that, in most academic and 
official meetings with Iranian partners, he will be asked whether the 
DAAD is a foreign ministry agent. The next reason for such a problem can 
be the lack of existence of a university club or Mittlerorganisation in Iran.  
 Definition of dialogue in the DAAD context: the discourse of European-
Islamic cultural dialogue has expressed and defined itself in the academic 
context of the DAAD as a specific project, though it was organized in such 
a way as to continue its ongoing academic exchanges. It was mentioned by 
a participant of the research that, because the aim of the DAAD is to 
reflect the academic community’s needs, the meaning of dialogue is the 
implementation of more projects which reflect their demands. Therefore, 
without going into an abstract definition of culture, culture has been 
defined at the DAAD as working more with international universities, he 
explained.  
 Detailed planning and assessment of dialogue projects: the DAAD 
implemented the German-Arabic/Iranian university dialogue program 
from 2005. This project has a detailed and sophisticated map illustrating 
which different activities are expected to reach certain outputs, outcomes 
and impacts and finally achieve the aim of “shaping peaceful cooperation 
across cultural boarders”. The DAAD also undertook research to assess 
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individual university projects. The assessment shows that the DAAD cares 
whether it achieves its claimed aims or not. 
 Supporting diverse issues as dialogue projects: the DAAD supported 21 
academic projects in the framework of German-Arabic/Iranian university 
dialogue. The projects cover diverse issues from “computer science and 
medical care” to “theater” and “film”.  
 Understanding different dimensions of the other society: through 
interfaith university dialogue, the German side realized that the Iranian 
side was more open-minded than it originally believed before the project. 
The project was a door to realizing how different theologians in Iran think 
about other religions. Also, participants in the peaceful change project 
emphasized that students learned new things which were unknown to them 
before their visit. For instance, German students learn about social 
participation of women and different types of hijab in Iran.  
 Cooperation beyond the DAAD project: the interfaith university 
dialogue project continued to work with its Iranian partners even after the 
financial resources from the DAAD ended. The new project concerned a 
study book on Shi’a Islam and Catholicism with the cooperation of 
professors of the partner universities. German and Iranian students had 
built a friendship, too. One German student some time later made a study 
visit to Iran and was assisted by Iranian participants of that project. 
Duisburg-Essen University and the institute for humanities and cultural 
studies of Iran also concluded an agreement to continue their academic 
activities in future.  
 Realizing specific apolitical complications: both investigated DAAD 
projects faced some complications in their intercultural dialogue activities, 
but the complications had little to do with political issues. For intsatnce, 
cooperation in the peaceful change project with the second partner was 
stopped because of inappropriate responses from the Iranian coordinator of 
that institute. Hence the problem was in “organizational coordination”, 
which plays an imprtant role in intercultural dialogue between two 
countries which have different organizational efficiencies. Also, it has 
been stated that translation of key thelogical notions has been a challenge 
in the interfaith university dialogue project. Hence the problem lay in the 
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“theological vocabulary”, which plays an important role in intercultural 
dialogue between two different faiths of two different countries. 
  
6.3.1.7 Summary of Points on ifa 
 Implementing cultural activities to actual audience: One of the roots of 
ifa is a museum which was to prepare art exhibitions for Germans abroad 
at the beginning of the 20th century. Later, ifa could shape its activities to 
the requirements of German foreign cultural policy in each period. 
Reviewing the activities of ifa according to the collected data of this 
research shows that it added activities to its routine cultural activities 
based on the necessities of European-Islamic cultural dialogue from 2002 
to 2008 and the Arab Spring from 2011 and 2013, although it also pursues 
aims such as strengthening civil society abroad. It also takes the 
development of media and social communication into account. In the last 
years of the analysis period of the research, issues such as global citizens, 
digital diplomacy and climate change, and activities such as implementing 
dialogue between diplomats and an ordinary audience and promotion of 
cultural awards attracted more attention from the general secretary of ifa. 
It can therefore be concluded that ifa has taken the actual time and 
audience into account.  
 Transparency of projects and budget: Open access is available to the 
annual reports of ifa. They contain detailed information about its activities, 
visitor numbers at the exhibitions, and its budget. There is very little 
information about the organizational structure of ifa in the annual report, 
but its official website provides a version of an updated organizational 
chart.  
 Changing structure and activities over time: The structure of ifa did not 
change between 1998 and 2013 and always operates with four 
departments. But there have been changes to some sections of its 
departments, which are explained in the field study with bureaucratic 
reasons and the concerns of directors of departments. Also, following the 
issue of European-Islamic cultural dialogue and the Arab Spring, the form 
of some activities brought new additions to the structure, with CCP, for 
instance, becoming a permanent section of the dialogue department from 
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2005. The backgrounds of the general secretaries have also had some 
effects. At the time of Ronald Grätz, who is Brazilian-German, some 
cultural activities between Germany and South American countries were 
implemented by ifa.  
 Dialogue even before 9/11: ifa started the media dialogue seminars with 
Arab countries in 1997. This refutes the claim of some Iranian participants 
that practices regarding intercultural dialogue attracted attention 
worldwide after 1998 and Khatami’s idea of dialogue among civilizations.    
 Competing for dialogue budget: As a small Mittlerorganisation, ifa has 
attempted to evidence its efficiency in implementing activities in the 
context of European-Islamic cultural dialogue. When the dialogue budget 
was established, the then general secretary Maaß and his team applied for 
it, although with some reservations. They were nevertheless gradually able 
to demonstrate their efficiency in dialogue projects and obtain a large part 
of ifa’s budget from the dialogue funds.  
 Conceptualizing dialogue with Muslim countries: One of the initial 
activities of ifa in the context of European-Isalmic cultural dialogue was to 
determine a concept-paper regarding dialogue with Muslim countries. The 
concept-paper not only defined the dialogue but also expressed its 
sensitivities and suggested practical projects to realize it. ifa was the only 
German cultural actor to devise such a concept-paper. The concept 
produced activities such as two co-written books and the CCP project. The 
co-written books gave the opportunity to different Muslim authors to write 
together about their views on the West and terrorism. CCP is designed to 
give applicants from Muslim countries the opportunity to do an internship 
and work for a certain time in Germany and for German applicants to 
work for a certain time in Muslim countries.  
 Keeping the CCP project alive: It has been significant that the CCP 
project existed until the end of 2013 and even up to the time of finalizing 
this research (end of 2016). The structure of the project fits the issues, for 
instance, in the context of journalism and the Arab Spring. A recent update 
of the research showed that a project like CCP gave opportunities to 
refugees.  
 Focusing on small aims: CCP is a project which originated in the context 
of European-Islamic cultural dialogue. Hence it is expected to achieve 
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general aims such as prevention of terrorism. But it was stated in the field 
study that CCP is intended to achieve small aims, such as communicating 
with Muslim people on a personal level and practical experiences.  
 Not focusing on dialogue with Iran: ifa has implemented a variety of 
activities, such as media dialogue, art exhibitions, mutual visits, seminars 
and internships under CCP, with Iranian participants. Nevertheless, ifa did 
not focus on Iran in its projects in the context of European-Islamic cultural 
dialogue compared with other Muslim countries. Political reservations 
because of Ahmadinejad’s radical rhetoric against Israel and the lack of 
knowledge of Iran on the part of the director co-written projects and the 
low budget for CCP have been given as main reasons of this lack of focus.  
 Close contact and cooperation: ifa cooperated closely with the foreign 
ministry. For instance, it has been significant to observe a seminar called 
Diplomaten in Dialog at the open days of the foreign ministry in 2015 and 
2016, both of which were organized by ifa. It also worked closely with 
DW, the Goethe Institute on the Qantara project, and Rave Stiftung and 
the Robert Bosch Stiftung on joint projects such as awards. CCP received 
assistance from the cultural section and press section of the German 
embassy in Tehran to conduct the first stage of its selection process. Even 
the interpersonal relationship inside ifa has been significant. The former 
general secretary of ifa was still in close contact with the current members 
of staff of ifa, according to observations of this research.  
 Bargaining over civil society: One of ifa’s priorities in cultural activities 
is civil society. Its Zivik section, for instance, is specifically designed to 
support NGOs and civil society actors abroad. Also, the importance of the 
issue of civil society is apparent from the details of ifa’s other cultural 
activities. For instance, most Iranian CCP applicants between 2005 and 
2013 were women. Strengthening women is one of the aims of civil 
society activities. Such support by ifa of civil society is interesting, 
because a large part of ifa’s budget comes from the state, specifically the 
foreign ministry. How is it possible to strengthen civil society with state 
funds? Firstly, ifa has attempted to remain the expert for cultural activities 
and studies. Compared with the foreign ministry, which needs cultural 
activities but does not have the expertise to implement them, it has a 
bargaining advantage. Secondly, because it is small, it is used to 
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competing with other cultural institutes to obtain funds for its projects. 
Thirdly, since Germany is a democratic state, as mentioned by a director 
of the ifa dialogue forum, it is possible to bargain with the state to 
strengthen civil society without the threat of prison for ifa staff.  
 
6.3.1.8 Summary of Points on the Goethe Institute  
 Operating the German language institute in Iran: The origins of the 
Goethe Institute are in a German language institute that was established in 
1923. Its tasks developed to include more diverse cultural activities, such 
as cooperating in the cultural field internationally and mediating an image 
of Germany through information. Apart from a short suspension after 
World War II, it has been working continuously ever since. In Iran, 
although the institute faced problems working officially, it continued its 
German language courses in the framework of the DSIT. 
 A defined relationship with the foreign ministry: The Goethe Institute 
addresses its independency in a contract with the foreign ministry in 1976. 
This contract explains in detail the boundaries of tasks and expectations on 
both sides. It gives a great deal of independence to the Goethe Institute in 
the sense that its financial needs are met by the foreign ministry but it can 
determine its programs and policies independently.  
 Multi-member bodies: Although the Goethe Institute has been perceived 
by some Iranian participants of this study as a suboffice of the foreign 
ministry, there is evidence to prove its independence in some regards. Its 
abovementioned contract with the foreign ministry is evidence that the 
institute strives to remain independent. Also, the organizational structure 
of the Goethe Institute shows that the board of trustees and directors are 
diverse. They are not merely members of the German state; some Länder 
and county representatives, as well as artists and authors, can also be seen 
in this structure.  
 Identification with Iranian dissident authors: In an Iranian context, the 
Goethe Institute is perceived to a high degree to engage with dissident 
authors. Firstly, its old journal, Fikrun wa Fann, is published in Farsi 
besides English, German and Arabic. Secondly, the presence of dissident 
authors such as Navid Kermani on the editorial board of the journal is 
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significant. Thirdly, it is apparent that the ministry of Islamic culture and 
guidance had an interest in opening the Goethe Institute but was concerned 
about its support of Iranian dissident authors and artists.  
 Assisting innovative dialogue activities: The Goethe Institute assisted 
through its contact office with the study trip project of the press section, as 
mentioned in 5.2.2.1. It also supported an individual dialogue project, “this 
situation”, undertaken by the artist Tino Sehgal. 
 Constructing a new working structure in Iran: Although the Goethe 
Institute was not officially open in Iran from1998 to 2013, it was able to 
contribute to cultural and intercultural dialogue activities. For instance, 
young Iranians who used to learn German in the DSIT courses called it the 
Goethe Institute, not DSIT. The Goethe Institute contact office in the 
cultural section of the German embassy also assisted in projects such as 
journalist exchanges and study trips together with the press section. Also, 
its dialogue point turned out to be a favorite place for Iranian language 
learners to gather and meet. Talking to a director of the contact office 
revealed that he was not fully aware of which Iranian authorities are 
responsible for allowing the Goethe Institute to open in Iran. Taking all 
this information into account, it seems that the Goethe Institute 
constructed a new structure for dealing with cultural affairs in Iran without 
even being officially open in the country. Not being officially open has not 
prevented it from undertaking cultural activities in Iran.   
 No special project on European-Islamic cultural dialogue: Besides 
strengthening cultural activities in Muslim countries, the results of this 
research show that the Goethe Institute did not conduct a specific project 
on European-Islamic cultural dialogue like that of ifa and the DAAD. 
Because the Goethe Institute has constantly resisted the interference of the 
foreign ministry in its programs, it tried to implement the cultural activities 
from the European-Islamic cultural dialogue budget in its own way. It was 
stated in the field study that Iran was not the focus of the Goethe Institute 
projects in European-Islamic cultural dialogue, firstly because Iran was not 
the focus of terror prevention in the post-9/11 period, and secondly 
because it did not have an official office in Iran.  
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6.3.1.9 Summary of Points on Other German Cultural Actors  
 Transparency of information: Common to the “other” institutes and 
organizations, including media, political, religious, academic, art and 
volunteer German actors, is that most of them had an annul report or 
organized website which gave detailed information about their structure, 
aims and activities. Where more information was needed, members of staff 
of PAD, ZfA and AvH assisted the researcher. AvH even sent its annual 
reports and the Grüter family some publications and reports to the 
researcher. 
 Pedagogic framework for dialogue: PAD, which works specifically on 
pedagogic issues for teachers and educational systems, implemented some 
projects in the field of European-Islamic cultural dialogue. Teachers and 
academics from different Muslim countries had a chance in these 
workshops to learn about different school contexts in the German Länder, 
and specifically that of North Rhine-Westphalia.  
 Discussion of sensitive issues: Although all topics of PAD discussions 
and dialogues are not reflected in the annual reports, it is clear that one 
issue was the separation of state and religion in the German school system. 
This is a sensitive issue, because some participants of these workshops 
came from countries in which the relationship between the state and 
religion is controversial. In Iran, for instance, the state, the Islamic 
Republic, respects Islam as its official religion. Hence discussing the 
separation of religion and state is a political rather than cultural issue for 
participants. At the same time, however, the issue reflects current 
challenges of German schools in specific Länder which have pupils from 
Muslim immigrant families. Hence the separation of state and religion is 
expressed as a solution to form educational behaviors and lessons in those 
schools, otherwise Muslim pupils would be forced to respect Christian 
rules, which are those of the religion of the majority of the German 
population. As a result, it seems that the issue is double-edged considering 
both political and apolitical problems.  
 Implementing dialogue in the international school system: German 
schools abroad engaged in intercultural dialogue activities of the PAD 
project, PASCH and ZfA. Specifically in the field of intercultural dialogue 
between Iran and Germany, the project of the German school of Tehran 
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and a school in Bam, and pupil exchanges of the Grüter family are 
siginificant.  
 Strengthening high education scholarship as dialogue: The discourse of 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue has been realized in AvH projects by 
supporting more academics in Muslim countries.  
 Natural disasters in dialogue: Besides social and cultural issues, other 
issues such as natural disasters have also been considered in dialogue 
projects. The initial motivation behind the exchange between the German 
school of Tehran and a school in Bam was to help the female pupils who 
had lost their families in the Bam earthquake.  
 Failure and success in dialogue on political issues: The conference 
implemented by the Böll foundation in 2000 in Berlin to represent a 
reformist image of Iran in Germany attracted the attention of opposition 
groups, who demonstrated against it, and biased coverage on Iranian TV. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that it failed to achieve its aims. By 
contrast, the Friedrich Ebert foundation successfully assisted the dialogue 
center of the Imam Musa Sadr Institute to hold specific seminars on skills 
of dialogue in Iran with the assistance of a German expert. From 2010 the 
Konrad Adenaur foundation succeeded in holding the Hafis-Dialog 
Weimar to discuss actual cultural projects and issues with both German 
and Iranian participants. The SPW has also participated in some meetings 
with IPIS in the framework of constructive dialogue. Loccum Academy, 
too, has managed to organize different events with Iranian partners, not 
only on interfaith dialogue and art but also on human rights and nuclear 
power issues. These examples show that attempts to implement dialogue 
in political issues have not always failed.  
 Foreign dimension of the German Islam Conference: The German 
Islam Conference has also been involved in dialogue between the German 
state and Muslim communities since 2006. The foreign cultural policy 
dimension of the German Islam Conference has been emphasized as a 
significant point. It was mentioned in the field study that, because a 
German court decision to allow demonstrations supporting the cartoon of 
Prophet Mohammad in 2005 resulted in an attack on the German embassy 
in Egypt, communication between the German state and Muslims inside 
Germany is also a matter of foreign cultural policy. 
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 Developing interfaith dialogue via networking: One of the members of 
the EKD delegation who traveled to Iran in 2002 developed a network 
with Iranian religious institutes and organizations. This communication 
network resulted in implementation of a triangle interfaith dialogue 
between the NGO IID of Ali Abtahi, EKD of Germany and the Church of 
England.  
 Limitations of triangle interfaith dialogue: It has been mentioned that 
delegations from three countries, Iran, Germany and Britain, have 
discussed different issues, including the rights of followers of minority 
faiths, in the interfaith dialogue meetings. Iranian participants responded 
reluctantly to such issues or left questions unanswered, however. 
 Diverse images of Iran in Berlin: The HKW specifically implemented 
cultural activities such as traditional Iranian music concerts and art 
exhibitions about Iranian culture. The friendship between a head of the 
HKW and a director of Rayzani supported these activities. The art 
exhibition on Iran reflected different dimensions of Iranian culture; for 
instance, a model of a personal room of Ayatollah Khomeini and a textile 
painted with an image of knives, which was designed by Parasto Forouhar, 
the daughter of two victims of the political serial killing in 1998 in Iran, 
both had the opportunity to be presented in the exhibition.  
 Innovative activities in pupil exchanges: Diverse projects were 
implemented by the Grüter family in the field of pupil exchanges. A 
biography project, for instance, was designed to encourage pupils of both 
Iran and Germany to collect information and write about famous German 
and Iranian figures in Iran and Germany respectively. A photography 
project also encouraged German and Iranian pupils to carefully observe 
Iran and Germany respectively and record their observations in photos. 
 Networking to develop projects: Although the starting point for the 
Grüter family’s activities was the school project, they also used 
networking with both Iranian and German institutes and actors to extend 
their activities into other fields. Calligraphy and photography are two of 
the other fields of intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany they 
explored.  
 Participation of pupils in mixed-sex groups: The pupil exchange 
between the German school of Tehran and a school in Bam shows that 
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some events were attended by female participants only. The reason was 
that the school in Bam was a girls’ school. Although some Iranian female 
schools participated in the Grüter family pupil exchanges, all the 
exchanges included participants of both sexes. The Grüter family 
mentioned that having mixed-sex groups was openly and willingly 
accepted by Iranian families and authorities.  
 
6.3.1.10 Summary of Points on German Media 
 Different voices through public and private media: There are two types 
of media system in Germany. The public system works with different 
political and social groups and organizations and receives financial 
support from the state. The private media focus on different issues 
according to industrial advertising and economic benefit. This double 
system makes it possible to reflect different voices.  
 DW and the cultural image of Germany abroad: DW is the part of the 
German media that deals specifically with issues such as mediating a 
cultural image of Germany internationally, although it has also 
implemented some specific activities regarding dialogue with the Muslim 
world. 
 Internet portal: Qantara is one of the examples of how intercultural 
dialogue is considered in German internet media. The internet makes it 
possible to reach a larger audience inside and outside Germany, in Muslim 
countries.  
 Reflecting sensitive issues in DW activities: The issue of the 2009 
presidential election played a role in creating two DW projects. In 
cooperation with ifa, DW held a conference in 2010 on the issue of 
journalism and social media. It also set up a website, Ru dar Ru, to assist 
citizen journalism in Iran in the period in which there were demonstrations 
in Iran against the results of the 2009 presidential election.  
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6.3.2 Characteristics of Intercultural Dialogue Activities between Iran and 
Germany 
This chapter specifically analyzes intercultural dialogue activities between Iran 
and Germany. They have certain distinguishing features. For instance, Iranian and 
German implementing actors did not have similar roles in implementing them. In 
some, the German actors had an active role and the Iranian actors a passive role. 
Moreover, activities in some cases were not limited to classical or traditional 
forms such as seminars or conferences but took the form of company internships 
or a philosophical discussion on a long journey from Germany, crossing Iran, to 
India. Exploring these characteristics is key to understanding the role intercultural 
dialogue has played in the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany, because it 
gives a basis for analysis of why a foreign cultural policy could or could not 
achieve a specific aim. 
Table 11 gives an overview of forms, types and content of cultural activities 
undertaken by German implementing actors. The activities of the main case study 
actors and other German cultural actors are considered in the table:  
 
Table 11. Intercultural dialogue activities undertaken by German implementing actors  
Activities  German Institutes  
Conference, seminar and meeting Ifa, some political foundations and DW 
Exchange of Iranian and German artists, and 
support to musicians and performers  
HKW, Goethe Institute and Grüter family 
Exchange of Iranian and German students, 
researchers, professors and academics, in 
framework of study trips, workshops and 
similar 
DAAD  
Exchange of Iranian and German pupils, in 
framework of study trips, workshops and 
similar 
ZfA and Grüter family 
Workshops for Iranian and German teachers  PAD and Grüter family 
Publications ifa and Goethe Institute 
Internet and online portals Qantara as a cooperative project of Goethe 
Institute, ifa, DW, Ru dar Ru as project of 
DW, Nafas as project of ifa 
Co-written book (but Iran was not the 
partner) 
Ifa 
Study travel for mixed groups e.g. Iranian 
and German journalists, artists, NGO 
activists and employees of state 
organizations 
Cultural and press section of German embassy 
and Goethe Institute 
Cultural festivals, art and book exhibitions Cultural section of German embassy, ifa and 
Goethe Institute  
Academic support for research, scholarships AvH, DAAD 
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for Iranian and German scholars 
Internships  Ifa 
Media dialogue Ifa and press section of German embassy 
German language courses  Cultural section of German Embassy, Goethe 
Institute, ifa130 
German lecturships  DAAD 
Innovative discussion projects like this 
situation 
Cultural section of the German embassy, 
Goethe Institute  
Photography project for pupils  Grüter family 
Biography project for pupils Grüter family 
Flower garden project Grüter family  
Cultural awards Ifa, Goethe Institute  
Interfaith dialogue EKD, DAAD 
 
Intercultural dialogue activities undertaken by Iranian implementing actors are 
shown in table 12:  
Table 12. Cultural activities undertaken by Iranian implementing actors 
Activities  Iranian Institutes 
Conference, seminar, meeting ICDAC, Rayzani, dialogue NGO of Khatami, 
IPIS, Islamic Center of Hamburg 
Exchange and support of musicians and artists  Rayzani, ICDAC 
Inviting and commemorating famous figures ICDAC, Rayzani, dialogue NGO of Khatami 
Publication and translation ICDAC, some Iranian press media, Rayzani 
Farsi language course Rayzani 
Academic support to Iranian and foreign 
scholars 
ICDAC, ICRO, ministry of science, research 
and technology, and ministry of medical care 
Training course for dialogue skills and 
philosophy 
Dialogue center of Imam Musa Institute and 
ICDAC 
Interfaith dialogue Rayzani, CID of ICRO and NGO IID 
 
Table 11 contains more cultural actors and more diverse activities than table 12. 
German actors implemented a large number of cultural activities in diverse forms 
and various fields. Also, several activities implemented by German actors gave 
both Iranian and German participants an opportunity for dialogue. Activities such 
as conferences, seminars and language courses are common to table 11 and 2. 
Both Iranian and German actors have therefore had an interest in implementing 
classical or traditional forms of activities which symbolize intercultural dialogue. 
Nevertheless, in table 12 it can be seen that German actors paid attention to an 
advanced or new form of activities offering cultural dialogue to both Iranian and 
German participants. For instance, ifa’s CCP program, the DAAD’s German-
                                                          
130 Ifa holds classes in Stuttgart. In some cases internship holders from the CCP project, including Iranians, 
have a chance to learn German at the ifa institute during their stay in Germany. 
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Iranian-Arab University dialogue, and the study trips of the Goethe Institute have 
a siginificant place in table 12.  
Although table 11 and 12 illustrate intercultural dialogue activities of both Iranian 
and Geman actors, they have limitations when it comes to reflecting a qualitative 
analysis of their characteristics. For instance, if German actors have appeared so 
successful in implementing intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany, this 
cannot be attributed alone to their ability to do so, but also to Iranian actors 
accompanying them to make this intercultural dialogue possible. Moreover, 
pointing out that intercultural dialogue activities have been implemented in the 
educational and academic field is not enough; it is also significant that 
intercultural dialogue activities between Iran and Germany have been 
implemented in the academic and educational field more than in any other.  
Four main characteristics of the intercultural dialogue activities between Iran and 
Germany can therefore be identified and are described below. 
 
6.3.2.1 Active Role of German Actors to implement Intercultural Dialogue 
The data collected in the study suggests that German cultural institutes, 
organizations and private groups play an active role in implementing cultural 
activities in the framework of European-Islamic cultural dialogue between Iranian 
and German participants. Meanwhile, comparison of the collected data indicates 
that the Iranian cultural institutes and organizations play a weak role in 
implementing intercultural dialogue activities in the framework of interfaith 
dialogue and dialogue among civilizations between German and Iranian 
participants.  
  
6.3.2.2 Tendency of Iranian Actors to Accompany Intercultural Dialogue 
Besides the active role of German implementing actors, it is important to 
remember that the dialogue has two sides. Without the Iranian implementing and 
political guiding actors playing an accompanying role, the German actors could 
not appear as active in the field study. For instance, the ICDAC, although weak in 
specific intercultural dialogue between Iranian and German participants, 
nevertheless represented and refreshed the concept of dialogue among 
civilizations in Iranian society at least for eight years. In this regard, it promoted 
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cultural activities on the domestic level and consequently indirectly accompanied 
German actors in implementing intercultural dialogue activities with Iranian 
participants. Similarly, it should not be ignored that Rayzani, despite having no 
specific plan to implement interfaith dialogue or dialogue among civilizations, 
and despite having some conservative members of staff and even in the difficult 
time under Ahmadinejad, still assisted some intercultural dialogue activities of 
German actors. Without Rayzani, ICRO and the Iranian authorities, it would be 
impossible for German actors to implement intercultural dialogue.  
 
6.3.2.3 Advanced and New Forms of Intercultural Dialogue 
Among the intercultural dialogue activities which have been reviewed in this 
chapter and outlined in table 11 and 12, some activities are different from the 
classical or traditional conferences and seminars between the two sides of a 
dialogue. They take a new and advanced form. For instance, ifa implemented an 
internship program, CCP, which offers applicants from Muslim countries the 
opportunity to work for four to six months in a German company or institute. The 
program also offers internships to German applicants in Muslim countries. This 
form of activity is new and offers cultural dialogue on a deeper and more 
interpersonal level to both German and Muslim, including Iranian, applicants. 
 
6.3.2.4 High Number of Intercultural Dialogue Activities in Education  
Intercultural dialogue activities in the educational and academic field were 
implemented more than in any other field, as the collected data of this study 
suggests. The DAAD has supported 21 university projects between Iranian and 
German universities. These projects not only cover scientific issues such as 
environment and engineering but also film direction, theater and interfaith 
dialogue. AvH increased the number of its scholarships to Muslim applicants, 
including Iranians, in higher education. PAD and the ZfA have appeared active in 
developing workshops and school projects with Muslim countries. Also, the 
Grüter family implemented several innovative projects with Iranian schools from 
2001 to 2013. It therefore seems that the academic and educational field appeared 
to be a safe and preferred gateway for intercultural dialogue between the two 
countries.  
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6.3.2.5 Intercultural Dialogue and the Effect of the Presidential Change in Iran 
The intercultural dialogue activities between Iran and Germany were affected by 
the presidential change in Iran. At the time of Khatami, from 1997 to 2005, some 
cultural activities were first implemented under the discourse of dialogue among 
civilizations. A triangle interfaith dialogue was launched between Iran, Germany 
and Britain. Generally, the German cultural actors had more possibilities and 
fewer problems implementing intercultural dialogue activities in Iran. During the 
presidency of Ahmadinejad, from 2005 to 2013, the ICDAC was not in operation. 
Cultural organizations like the DAAD faced limitations. They were forced to 
close the information center in Tehran. The Iranian authorities refused to extend 
visas for two German lecturers in Isfahan and Tehran. The cultural section of the 
German embassy also faced some problems. Because of the security concerns of 
some Iranian participants at the time of Ahmadinejad, the cultural sector canceled 
cultural programs.  
The presidency change in Iran clearly had an influence on intercultural dialogue 
activities. Two important points must be added to this conclusion, however. 
Firstly, at the time of Ahmadinejad, it was difficult to conduct intercultural 
dialogue, but not impossible. He did not cause the intercultural dialogue activities 
to stop entirely. Secondly, Ahmadinejad himself was not directly responsible for 
closing down the ICDAC. It has been discussed in 6.1.2 that the ICDAC officially 
started to merge into two organizations (one after the other) late in Khatami’s 
presidency following the decision of Khatami’s team. ICRO, which was 
committed to merging the ICDAC with itself, did finally stop staff of the former 
ICDAC working. The president had some power over ICRO, but he did not 
manage it directly. The ICDAC was therefore not affected directly by 
Ahmadinejad, but it did not work during his presidency.   
Chapter 6 has been a major chapter in this research. It gave a comprehensive and 
complete image of the Iranian and German actors of intercultural dialogue, their 
structure, aims and activities. The analytical points of this chapter are used to 
explore the specific characteristics of the intercultural dialogue between Iran and 
Germany in the next chapter. The next chapter further presents discussions on the 
role of intercultural dialogue in the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany.   
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Chapter 7 presents arguments to analyze four characteristics of the intercultural 
dialogue between Iran and Germany from 1998 to 2013. It contains three 
subchapters. 7.1 presents reasons for these characteristics. 7.2 deals with 
answering the research question by presenting arguments on how and in which 
regards intercultural dialogue could achieve the aims of German and Iranian 




7.1 Analysis of the Characteristics of Intercultural Dialogue 
Activities which were undertaken by the German and Iranian implementing actors 
in the framework of intercultural dialogue have four specific characteristics, as the 
results of chapter 6 show. They are 1) the active role of German actors in 
implementing intercultural dialogue activities for Iranian and German 
participants; 2) a tendency of Iranian implementing actors to accompany 
intercultural dialogue activities which were implemented by German institutes; 3) 
new and advanced forms of intercultural dialogue that are not limited to seminars 
and meetings between Iranian and German participants; 4) a multiplicity of 
intercultural dialogue activities in educational and academic fields; and 5) the 
effects of the presidential change in Iran. This subchapter will analyze why and 
how these characteristics appeared. 
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The points which were summarized in chapter six illustrate different dimensions 
of the atmosphere of intercultural dialogue activities between Iran and Germany. 
Some of these points suggest that some political tensions have influenced 
intercultural dialogue activities between the two countries. This is discussed with 
more facts in 7.1.1. Nevertheless, major differences exist between the structures 
of Iranian and German foreign cultural policy, which consequently influence the 
intercultural dialogue activities; further discussions are presented to explain this 
analysis in 7.1.2. Iranian and German cultural organizations also have different 
organizational efficiencies which shape the way they implement intercultural 
dialogue activities; more arguments to discuss this point follow in 7.1.3. 
 
7.1.1 Intercultural Dialogue as a Hostage of Politics? 
From 1998 to 2013 a variety of intercultural dialogue activities under the 
discourses of “European-Islamic cultural dialogue”, “interfaith dialogue” and 
“dialogue among civilizations” were implemented. Nevertheless, the number of 
and opportunities offered by the intercultural dialogue activities were not the same 
in all years. From 1998 to 2005 there were fewer political tensions in the 
relationship between Iran and Germany than from 2005 to 2013. It can generally 
be said that political tensions took the intercultural dialogue “hostage”, as one of 
the participants of the study formulated it (Nouripour, personal communication, 
2014). It is significant, however, that cultural activities like intercultural dialogue 
have been a reason to keep the door open to negotiate with Iran over controversial 
issues like nuclear technology. Some participants of the study emphasized that 
point. 
This subchapter argues in more detail on political issues and tensions which 
influence the implementation of intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany. 
The Iranian domestic clashes which shape the intercultural dialogue activities are 
presented in 7.1.3.1. The cautious approach of the German state towards Iran, for 
instance towards Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy objectives, is analyzed in 7.1.3.2. 
Intercultural dialogue as an opportunity to open the door to political negotiations 
with Iran between 1998 and 2013 is also analyzed in 7.1.3.3. 
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7.1.3.1 Iranian Domestic Clashes 
Domestic clashes between the democratically legitimated sector and religiously 
legitimated sector of the Iranian state influenced the relationship between Iran and 
Western countries, including Germany. The change of presidents also played a 
role in reducing intercultural dialogue activities between 1998 and 2013. It has 
been mentioned in 5.2.1 that Iranian participants in this study did not have 
anything specifically against Iran’s relationship with Germany. They perceived 
Germany as a trustable Western country, comparing it with Britain and France. 
But domestic clashes distracted the Iranian cultural actors from implementing 
intercultural dialogue activities in an organized and consistent way for Iranian and 
German participants for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, the foreign ministry and the presidential office in Khatami’s time were 
politically occupied with several crises, such as the chain murders,131 the attack on 
Said Hajjarian (in 2000),132 the ban on press media and arrests of journalists (in 
2001).133 Hence they could rarely concentrate on foreign cultural relations or 
specific Western countries in the realm of intercultural dialogue. This means that 
in those years when the young ICDAC was positioning itself among Iranian and 
international organizations as an implementer and supporter of the dialogue 
among civilizations activities, the Khatami administration was not focused on 
supporting or guiding it. Dialogue among civilizations thus became more like 
political rhetoric than cultural practice. It did play an important role in the 
speeches of Mohammad Khatami and meetings and negotiations of the foreign 
ministry and its think tank, IPIS, but it failed for political, and other, reasons, 
which will be discussed in 7.1.2 and 7.1.3.    
Secondly, the religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state generally had a 
more sympathetic relationship politically with the Ahmadinejad administration. It 
therefore found an opportunity between 2005 and 2013 to strengthen its own 
policies. Anti-Westernism, a focus on the nuclear energy, denial of the Holocaust 
                                                          
131 Chain murders refers to the killing of liberal and dissident authors and thinkers, which were partly done by 
the Etela’at [Iranian intelligence ministry] of Iran. The attack on Dariush Foruhar and his wife in 1998 
attracted attention in Iranian society to this serial killing, which had begun in 1988. This issue was already 
discussed in 2.4.2. 
132 Said Hajjarian, a reformist politician and an important member of Khatami’s team, was shot in March 
2000. His assailant was a member of Basij (Khiabany 2009: 113). 
133 Closures of the press media had already begun in 2000, when 21 newspapers closed down. This trend 
continued in 2001, when 47 press media including 16 dailies, 19 weeklies, and 7 monthlies were closed 
(Khiabany 2009: 113). As discussed in 5.2.1 and 6.1.3.1, the groups and organizations which are dependent 
on the religious sectors of the Iranian state, such as Basij and the judicial system, supported some attacks on 
reformists and put bans on the press media. 
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and challenging the legitimacy of the political existence of Israel were the main 
axials of the foreign policy of Ahmadinejad. Nevertheless, if these axials were not 
in harmony with the political views of hardliners or the leader, Ahmadinejad’s 
administration would also face crisis, like the Khatami administration faced from 
1997 to 2005. Attempts were made during Ahmadinejad’s presidency to eliminate 
the dialogue among civilizations, like any other discourse which recalled 
Khatami’s or reformist thinking. That is why the ICDAC systematically and for a 
bureaucratic reason (not having a specific budget) was closed down in the process 
of merging into ICRO. From the responses of the participants from ICRO in the 
research, like their reluctance to answer the questions or attempts to change the 
subject, it became clear that they were not politically in agreement with 
continuing cultural activities under the discourse of dialogue among civilizations, 
not because they had something against dialogue, but because it came from 
Khatami.  
The facilities of the ICDAC, like the Farmanyeh building, would probably have 
served Ahmadinejad’s idea of “global management of the world”, but some 
clashes between the religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state and 
Ahmadinejad prevented this from happening. As mentioned in 6.1.2.2, in 2008 
Ahmadinejad tried to merge the former ICDAC into the International Center for 
Globalization Studies (ICGS). This center mainly concentrated at the time of 
Ahmadinejad on developing his idea of global management. Hence the target of 
this executive order was to use the Farmanyeh building for these aims, because at 
that time the ICDAC had been eliminated as an organization and there was no 
point in merging it with a third organization. The clash between ICRO, the host 
organization of the former ICDAC, and the ICGS over owning the Farmanyeh 
building continued until 2011, when a clash between Ahmadinejad and the leader 
became publicly apparent. Ahmadinejad fired the foreign minister, Manouchehr 
Mottaki, who was initially suggested by the leader for this position, in late 2010. 
This action can be perceived as a “dispute with the leader” and a domestic power 
struggle (Warnaar 2013: 47). In this context, ICRO’s director in 2011 let the 
ICGS know that, under no circumstances or president’s executive order, would 
the Farmanyeh building be given to the center for globalization.134 Hence in the 
domestic political clash between the late Ahmadinejad administration and the 
                                                          
134 But Farmanyeh was given to the presidency at the beginning of President Rouhani’s time. 
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religiously legitimated sector, the ICDAC did not serve Ahmadinejad’s idea 
during his presidency.  
Thirdly, the clash between the cultural section of the Iranian embassy and Rayzani 
did not happen just at the time of Khatami. The conflict existed before and after 
his presidency and reflects the duality of Iranian foreign cultural policy. But in 
Khatami’s time, because the director of Rayzani was suggested by the president 
himself and the embassy had more in common politically with the president, there 
were fewer conflicts to their respective organizations working together.   
Fourthly, the limitations on civil society and the media in Iran are rooted in the 
political influence of the religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state on the 
Iranian parliament and judicial system. Homa Katuzian meanwhile argues that 
Iran is a “short-term society” compared with European societies, as discussed in 
2.1. The weak civil society and media of Iran can be understood in this context. 
But according to the results of this study, organizations such as Kanun and the 
Islamic Center of Hamburg have been working for a long time, but the social 
infrastructure of Iranian society has not been prepared to let civil society play a 
greater role in intercultural dialogue. The short-term society alone is not the 
reason for the weakness of civil society and the media in Iran. The imposition of 
restrictions on the reformist Iranian press media, which reflect dissent and liberal 
views, is political. Their right to freedom of speech must be protected legally by 
the Iranian parliament and the judicial system. As the domestic crisis at the time 
of Khatami shows, however, both of these institutions are under the authority of 
the religious sector of the Iranian state and work in the interests of the leader.  
For the four reasons discussed in this section, it can be argued that the Iranian 
discourses of intercultural dialogue were affected by the clashes between the 
democratically and religiously legitimated sectors of the Iranian state. This led to 
dialogue activities being implemented under the discourse of “dialogue among 
civilizations” for a short time. It also led to interreligious dialogue activities being 
taken out of the hands of the international office of the culture ministry (from the 
second half of the 1980s). Furthermore, the change of presidents from Khatami to 
Ahmadinejad had an impact in that the intercultural dialogue cooperation between 
the two countries generally decreased.  
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7.1.3.2 Cautious Position of Germany towards Iranian Nuclear Program and 
Official View on Israel 
Mohammad Khatami, in his speech to the 58th general assembly of the UN in 
1998, presented a peace-seeking image of Iran through his suggestion of the idea 
of dialogue among civilizations. It coincided with the beginning of Gerhard 
Schröder’s period of office as German chancellor, who paid significant attention 
to the federal government’s role in the foreign cultural policy of Germany, as 
mentioned in 5.1.2. Also, both Ronald Herzog, who was German president in 
1998, and Johannes Rau, who was the president from 1999, had an encouraging 
view towards the idea of dialogue with other/Muslim countries. In such an 
atmosphere, the cultural relationship between the two countries improved up to 
2005. For instance, Khatami and Rau met in Weimar and inaugurated the Hafiz-
Goethe memorial in 2000. The DAAD at that time established German 
lectureships in both Tehran and Isfahan. The Grüter family implemented diverse 
activities between Iranian and German pupils, with the support of Rayzani and 
other German cultural actors. Nevertheless, at the time of Khatami some German 
cultural actors still had concerns about establishing serious intercultural dialogue 
activities with Iran. A former general secretary of ifa (Maaß, personal 
communication, 2015) mentioned in an interview that, in order to invest in 
cultural dialogue activities with a country, it was important to have an approach 
for the future. With regard to Iran, he could not be sure about the future. What 
happened during the time of Ahmadinejad proved to him that he was right not to 
risk such cultural investment. 
The beginning of the presidency of Mahmud Ahmadinejad (August 2005) roughly 
coincided with the beginning Angela Merkel’s term as chancellor (November 
2005), when Horst Köhler had already been elected as German president a few 
months earlier (July 2004). In his first speech to the 62nd general assembly of the 
UN, in contrast to Khatami, Ahmadinejad presented a revolutionary image of Iran. 
He emphasized that Iran had a right to develop a civil nuclear-power program. No 
Iranian president before him had involved himself publicly in nuclear power 
affairs. The nuclear issue is usually considered by the leader and the Supreme 
National Security Council, whose members are appointed by the leader himself 
(Warnaar 2013: 137-135). The speech was an initial signal to strengthen the idea 
that Ahmadinejad’s administration generally shared a similar political view to that 
of the leader. The leader encouraged Ahmadinejad’s approach to the nuclear 
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issue. In this trend, both Ahmadinejad and the leader used the nuclear issue “to 
stigmatize reformists, depicting them as defeatists willing to negotiate away Iran’s 
interests” (Chubin 2015). In April 2006 Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had 
managed to enrich uranium to a level which is needed to make reactor fuel 
(Security Council Report 2017: 15). His words aroused concerns among the 
international powers. They started to negotiate with Iran. The failure to convince 
Iran to stop its nuclear power program resulted in new economic sanctions against 
Iran. In 2006, draft resolution 1737 was prepared by the UN Security Council 
(Security Council Report 2017: 14). Resolution 1737 was finalized in 2007 (p.15). 
In 2008 a new resolution, No. 1803, was concluded in the UN Security Council, 
setting more economic sanctions against Iran (p.10). In reaction to this 
international response, Ahmadinejad tried to attract the attention of South 
American, African and Muslim countries to support Iran’s nuclear power project. 
In this regard he had some success. For instance, in May 2010 a declaration to 
support the Iranian nuclear program was signed in Tehran by the foreign ministers 
of Iran, Turkey, and Brazil (Warnaar 2013: 148-149). Nevertheless, besides 
political satisfaction for Ahmadinejad’s administration, this declaration did not 
help the Iranian economic situation, which was in poor shape under the sanctions. 
Yet it is important to see what Germany’s reaction to Iran was politically. In the 
years 1977–1978, 1987–1988, 1995–1996, 2003–2004, 2011–2012, Germany was 
a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and therefore did not play a 
direct role in any sanctions against Iran between 2006 and 2011. Indirectly it tried 
to solve the conflict between the UN and Iran. For instance, in June 2006 the 
permanent Security Council members plus Germany, known as EU 3+3, offered 
Iran a “package of economic cooperation” in return for “suspension of Iran’s 
uranium enrichment”. But Iran did not accept this offer (International Business 
Publications/Ibp 2005: 39). This behavior of Germany, as part of EU 3+3 or 
active in the Security Council, refers to what was discussed in 2.4.1 about the 
international policy of Germany after World War II. Because of its experience of 
starting that war, Germany follows a motto of “never alone”. This political 
behavior nevertheless influenced its cultural policy towards Iran, too. It has been 
discussed in 5.1.2 that some German participants refused to apply when 
approached in this research to explain their views about German foreign cultural 
policy regarding Iran. Their reason was that any decision in this regard was 
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postponed to observe the results of the nuclear deal of the Group of P5+1 and the 
Iranian delegation of Rouhani in Switzerland.  
The next issue which created concerns for the German side to set a cultural policy 
towards Iran was the radical rhetoric of Ahmadinejad towards Israel. 
Ahmadinejad in the first year of his presidency attracted the attention of the 
international media and powers to the issue of Israel and Palestine. His view again 
was not that far from that of the leader. In his speech at the “The World without 
Zionism” conference in Tehran, Ahmadinejad quoted a statement of Ayatollah 
Khomeini that Israel should be “wiped off the map”. This statement drew a 
critical response from the Western countries and the UN (International Business 
Publications/Ibp 2005: 50). Referring to the discussion in 2.4.1, Germany has 
followed the specific motto of “never again” in its international policy since 
World War II. Because the Holocaust is part of Germany’s history, it also reacted 
to the Iranian president’s radical rhetoric against Israel. This issue stopped 
common meetings of German political actors with IPIS, for instance, as discussed 
in 6.1.3.2. It also simultaneously decreased the interest of the intercultural 
dialogue section of the German foreign ministry in improving cultural activities 
with Iran. Consequently the budget of European-Islamic cultural dialogue towards 
Iran was cut, as discussed in 6.2.1.3.  
Germany’s cautious approach to nuclear power and the anti-Israeli rhetoric of 
Ahmadinejad and consequently limiting its political relations with Iran is 
understandable. Nevertheless, restricting intercultural dialogue with Iran for 
political reasons seems to challenge the philosophy behind the European-Islamic 
cultural dialogue project. If it was initiated to promote the cultural relationship 
between Germany and Muslim countries, including Iran, then it should not stop or 
be suspended until such time as political relations are normalized. This situation is 
explained by a representative of the German parliament as “taking intercultural 
dialogue as hostage of the sanction”: 
“There is a mood (in German side), if there is trouble with nuclear power 
of Iran, there should be more boycott. And there are more sanctions. And 
there is a broad mood to take intercultural dialogue as hostage of the 
sanction too…  I would not say this is a formula for any conflict in the 
world, but with Iran I don’t see the necessity of interrupt any intercultural 
relations” (Nouripour, personal communication, 2014).  
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That being said, suspending intercultural dialogue activities with Iran was not 
something that all German authorities and cultural actors agreed with. For 
instance, talks with staff of the cultural section (Tier, personal communication, 
2015; Graf, personal communication, 2015) and a former German ambassador in 
Iran (Bernd, personal communication, 2015) revealed that many attempts were 
made to continue cultural relations with Iran, even in difficult times, by applying 
different budgets of the foreign ministry or continuing the activity of the DAAD 
and the Goethe Institute even when they were not officially open in Iran.  
 
To sum up the points relating to Germany’s cautious position towards Iran, it 
should be emphasized that, even if some diplomats, representatives of the German 
parliament, authorities and directors of cultural organizations decided to suspend 
intercultural dialogue with Iran for political reasons, or did not focus on Iran, this 
decision did not practically lead to the dialogue being stopped. Arguments on the 
integrated foreign cultural policy of Germany and the high organizational 
efficiency of German cultural actors, which were discussed above, present reasons 
why German cultural actors appear to be successful in intercultural dialogue with 
Iran.  
 
7.1.3.3 Keeping the Door of Negotiation Open through Intercultural Dialogue  
It is discussed above that some participants of this study refused to talk about 
intercultural dialogue with Iran on the eve of nuclear negotiations (2013). 
Furthermore, intercultural dialogue with Iran has not been a focus for 
organizations like ifa because of some political concerns regarding Iran. 
Nevertheless, despite all these political considerations, some German diplomats 
appreciated the opportunity of “being in contact with Iran”. Some of the 
interviewees of this study, who were directly in charge of organizing the 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue (Kreft, personal communication, 2015; 
Mulack, personal communication, 2016), believe that maintaining cultural 
activities with Iran has been an advantage for Germany over other Western 
countries, because it gives Germany a better opportunity to work with Iran 
internationally on important issues. Germany has had an opportunity to “know 
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Iran” through different actions, including intercultural dialogue activities. This is 
significant comparing it with a country like the USA, which not only officially has 
no diplomatic relationship with Iran, there has also been no substantial cultural or 
academic cooperation between the two countries in the last decades. So in a case 
like the negotiations on the nuclear program with Iran, the USA has limited 
sources for its decisions. It has access to information from its lobbies and think 
tanks, which have “a lot of exile Iranians”, so the information comes from sources 
which are against any relationship with the Iranian state. Germany’s sources of 
information are more up to date. It is already in contact with Iran through several 
cultural organizations that work with Iranian partners. Even the foreign ministers 
of the two countries can exchange views, when necessary, on the sidelines of UN 
meetings.  
Consequently, it can be concluded that intercultural dialogue activities, among 
many others taking place between Iran and Germany, have had a role in keeping 
the door of negotiation with the Iranian state open over important issues like the 
nuclear program between 1998 and 2013. 
 
7.1.2 Different Structures of Iranian and German Foreign Cultural Policy 
Foreign cultural policy generally appeared as a system of principles to guide the 
governments’ decisions regarding their cultural image abroad. For Germany, it 
became important after World War II to have a new cosmopolitan cultural image. 
It worked to make an image that depicts Germany (the German nation) as 
different from the Nazi ideal. Moreover, in the post-9/11 period, Germany cared 
about making a friendly and dialogue-oriented image for itself specifically 
towards Muslim countries. The main aim was to contribute to peace and prevent 
terrorism. For Iran, an Islamic and revolutionary image of Iran/the Iranian nation 
became important after the Islamic Revolution. It attempted to create an image of 
Iran that was different from what the Pahlavi dynasty tried to represent. In the 
post-Iran-Iraq War period, Iran has changed its foreign cultural policy objectives 
and pursued some pragmatic aims in international relationships, specifically with 
Western countries. Hence both Iran and Germany have a common point in their 
foreign cultural policy, which is to represent their countries culturally abroad. 
Nevertheless, there are still some differences between them. 
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This subchapter presents arguments to highlight the differences between the 
Iranian and German foreign cultural policies regarding their relationship firstly 
with their respective government (in 7.1.2.1), secondly with civil society (in 
7.1.2.2), and thirdly with their diplomatic system (in 7.1.2.3).  
 
7.1.2.1 State and Foreign Cultural Policy  
Germany and Iran have different political systems, as was explained in 5.1.1 and 
5.2.1. The structure of the political system in West Germany after World War II 
became that of a federal republic. After the unification of East and West Germany 
in 1990, East Germany adopted the political system of West Germany. Together 
they again constituted the Federal Republic of Germany. The state in this system 
resulted from legitimized democracy, for instance through the election of 
members to the Länder and federal parliaments. In contrast, the Iranian political 
system is not simple. The Iranian state has two legitimated sectors. The first is 
legitimated by democratic process, such as electing members of the parliament 
and the president by the people. The second sector of the Iranian state has a 
religious/authoritarian legitimation. This sector is constructed via the Shi’a 
Islamic theory of Velayat-e Faqih. The head of the religiously legitimated sector 
is the leader. Therefore it is clear that the relationship of the Iranian cultural actors 
to the Iranian state is not similar to that of the German cultural actors to the 
German state. The relationship of Iranian actors to the democratically legitimated 
sector must be differentiated from their relationship to the religiously legitimated 
sector. Figure 12 illustrates a typology of Iranian and German organizations and 
institutes which have implemented foreign cultural activities: 
 
Figure 11. The Iranian and German cultural actors categorized according to their 
relationship to their state, compiled by the researcher 
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Source: by the researcher 
 
Figure 12 shows the German actors on the left in boxes marked A, B, C and D. 
Box A shows the German actors that are more dependent on the German state. It 
contains organizations which are controlled by federal government, for instance 
the foreign ministry. A list of state organizations which directly or indirectly play 
a political guiding role in German foreign cultural policy was presented 
previously in 5.1.2. The foreign ministry has played a key role in German foreign 
cultural policy compared to other state organizations, specifically through its 
department of culture and communication. In some cases it directly implements 
cultural activities, such as holding conferences or inviting international groups to 
discuss specific issues. Basically, however, it works closely with parastatal 
organizations, Mittlerorganisationen, private institutes and groups which assist it 
in implementing cultural activities abroad. In box B are institutes which are 
categorized as parastatal organizations. Organizations of the PAD, which is 
governed by the Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK), are an example of this type, as 
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discussed in detail in 6.2.5.5. Parastatal organizations are not completely under 
the authority of the state. They are initiated by the state to contribute to specific 
issues such as education and mass communication, but they are organized by 
people outside the state. Box C of figure 12 shows Mittlerorganisationen. These 
institutes are quasi non-governmental institutes. They receive part of their funds 
from the German state and part from other sources, for instance from the Länder. 
Their board of trustees and directors are mixed with members of state, authorities 
from the Länder, academics, artists and other individuals. The 
Mittlerorganisationen have attempted to keep decisions about their activities and 
projects independent from the German state. The DAAD is an example of this 
type, which was discussed in 6.2.2. Box D of figure 12 presents a type of cultural 
actor which has the least dependency on the German state compared with other 
actors. Institutes which are governed by the church, such as the EKD, are in this 
category. Although church-based institutes get part of their funding from the 
German state, their directors are loyal to the rules and aims of the Evangelical or 
Catholic churches of Germany. Private groups or volunteer individuals are also 
included in this category. The Grüter family is an example of this type. Its 
activities were discussed in 6.2.5.7. 
Iranian cultural actors are presented in boxes on the right side of figure 12 from E 
to J. Because the Iranian state has two sectors, boxes E and F illustrate those 
organizations which are dependent on the democratically legitimated sector, and 
boxes G and H those which are dependent on the religiously legitimated sector. 
As discussed in 5.2.2, there are a number of organizations which are governed 
fully by the democratically legitimated sector of the Iranian state. Box E shows 
this type of organization. The presidential office and foreign ministry have a key 
role compared with other actors of this type in Iranian foreign cultural policy, as 
the results of this research show. Parastatal organizations that are dependent on 
the democratically legitimated sector, as box F presents, have played a role in 
implementing foreign cultural activities too. For instance, the think tank IPIS can 
be categorized in this type.  
Box G of figure 12 illustrates Iranian state organizations which are dependent on 
the religiously legitimated sector. A list of organizations of this type is presented 
in 5.2.2. The main example of this type is ICRO. ICRO is governed mostly under 
the authority of the leader, although its budget comes from the Iranian parliament. 
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Also, just two members of the higher council of ICRO are ministers, representing 
the democratically legitimated sector. The rest of the members of the council 
represent the religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state. Box H in figure 12 
shows parastatal organizations which are dependent on the religiously legitimated 
sector and play a role in implementing cultural activities abroad. It is hard to 
categorize any Iranian organization as this type. The only example which was 
observed in the field study was the Al-Mustafa international university of Qum. It 
is directly under the authority of the leader, but it is managed by theologian 
academics. However, it is questionable to call a university a parastatal 
organization, because then all universities in Iran and Germany would be 
parastatal since they receive funding from ministries and Länder authorities. The 
Al-Mustafa international university can be classed as a parastatal organization 
here because it is dependent on a specific sector of the Iranian state, the 
religiously legitimated sector, to be involved in religious activities, including 
interreligious activities with other countries. Box I of figure 12 shows those 
Iranian organizations which can be categorized as Mittlerogranisationen. The 
ICDAC roughly fits this type. It received funds from the presidency but 
independently implemented cultural activities with some international partners. 
Box J of figure 12 illustrates civil society or volunteer individuals that implement 
cultural and intercultural dialogue activities. The dialogue NGO of Khatami and 
different projects which Fatemeh Sadr supported in the field of dialogue are the 
examples in this box.  
Comparing the content of figure 12 illustrates that the German actors have a 
relationship to the (single-sector) German state and in this regard their activities 
have been integrated into German foreign cultural policy. Activities of state, 
parastatal and civil society actors have been coordinated by the cultural section of 
the German embassy in Iran, which is the only organization working on behalf of 
the German state thereat. Mittlerorganisationen such as the Goethe Institute, the 
DAAD and ifa, although they have differences in background, organization, 
budget, aims and status of relationship with the foreign ministry, have been 
informed about projects of the foreign ministry, which is the main guiding 
organization of German foreign cultural policy, on equal terms. There has been 
more or less the same opportunity to apply for the budget of European-Islamic 
cultural dialogue for all of them, even volunteer groups such as Grüter. Therefore, 
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none of them had an advantage or disadvantage for being part of a political group 
or section of the German state.  
In contrast to the German (single-sector) state structure, the Iranian dual-state 
structure is significant in figure 12. Iranian foreign cultural policy is set by the 
Iranian state, which consists of a democratically and a religiously legitimated 
sector. The Iranian state and parastatal organizations and civil society actors 
implemented activities under procedures of these two state sectors, but in some 
regards the duality of the system stopped them from functioning properly. That is 
why their activities can be said to have been fragmented in Iranian foreign cultural 
policy. For instance, the foreign ministry and consequently the Iranian embassy in 
Germany have the main authority to guide foreign, including cultural, affairs. But 
it does not have an open hand, because ICRO and consequently Rayzani are in 
charge of setting cultural activities and have a specific budget and the relevant 
means to do so. However, ICRO and Rayzani are not the sole authority for 
implementing cultural activities abroad, including in Germany. To act legally 
abroad, they are also dependent on the permission of the foreign ministry and the 
embassy. Meanwhile, none of these actors, the embassy or Rayzani have efficient 
coordination and cooperation to handle cultural activities in Germany. Each one 
argues that the other should be eliminated. Furthermore, some cultural activities 
of the ICDAC (like cooperating with organizations of Muslim countries) not only 
did not fit in the framework of the Iranian embassy’s cultural work in Germany 
(like preparing travel by Iranian directors to film festivals in Berlin), it also did 
not fit with the activities of Rayzani (like supporting a traditional Iranian music 
festival in Berlin). It worked in a fragmented way to implement general activities 
with some international, including German, partners. The same problem could be 
seen in the work of other Iranian cultural actors. Although IPIS, press media, 
religious institutes such as the Islamic Center of Hamburg, the IID, the dialogue 
NGO of Khatami, and the ministries of education and technology implemented 
cultural, religious and academic activities with German partners, all these 
activities fitted into the foreign cultural policy of Iran in a fragmented way. In 
fact, the dual Iranian state constructed a foreign cultural policy into which Iranian 
cultural actors could fragmentarily fit their activities.  
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In summing up the points regarding the relationship between the state and the 
foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany, it is important to highlight the 
integration of the actors of intercultural dialogue in the political culture. On the 
German side, despite the differences in size, age, budget and aims among the 
actors, those that are involved in foreign cultural activities generally are oriented 
on a single plan and purpose, which is determined and updated by the German 
foreign ministry. These actors are integrated in the political culture of a single-
sector state. In Iran, meanwhile, the actors are fragmented because they are part of 
at least two different political cultures: some of them follow the aims of the 
foreign ministry, and consequently the democratically legitimated sector of the 
Iranian state, and some of them follow the aims of ICRO, and consequently the 
religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state.  
 
 
7.1.2.2 Civil Society and Foreign Cultural Policy 
A greater number of German parastatal organizations, Mittlerorganisationen and 
civil society actors implemented cultural activities for German and Iranian 
participants than their counterparts on the Iranian side. Review of the history of 
Germany in 2.4.1 mentioned that, after World War II, German cultural institutes 
evaluated and changed to gain distance from the authority of the German state and 
become closer to the meaning of non-governmental and civil society. A reason for 
this change was a desire not to repeat what happened during the Nazi regime, 
when cultural instruments were used for racist government policies to represent 
the German nation as a superior nation in the world. An example of the institutes 
which tried to keep their distance from the German state in the post-war period is 
the Goethe Institute. Although some Iranian participants of this research perceived 
the Goethe Institute as part of the foreign ministry, it significantly concluded a 
contract with the foreign ministry in the 1970s governing its independency. 
Furthermore, unlike the DAAD and ifa, the Goethe Institute did not implement a 
specific long-term project relating to European-Islamic cultural dialogue. This 
shows that the Goethe Institute in all cultural matters, including intercultural 
dialogue activities, did not necessarily follow what the foreign ministry expected 
of it.  
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By contrast, the role of civil society in Iran is limited. Parastatal institutions with a 
dependency on the democratically legitimated sector of the Iranian state, like 
IPIS, did not implement cultural activities directly. They used the discourse of 
dialogue among civilizations in their meetings at a particular time. Parastatal 
institutions like the Al-Mustafa international university, which is under the 
authority of the religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state, did not have a 
strong role in implementing cultural activities with German partners. It simply 
accompanied a project which was funded by the DAAD. The ICDAC was the 
only example of a body that works as a Mittleroganisation and implemented some 
cultural activities with German partners. But it had a short life. It was closed down 
after the presidency of Khatami. The cultural activities of the dialogue NGO of 
Khatami and the IID of Abtahi faced problems under Ahmadinejad, and 
specifically in the post-2009 presidential election period. Activities of volunteers 
like Fatemeh Sadr also faced limitations during the presidency of Ahmadinejad. 
The activities of the dialogue center of Imam Musa Sadr, which was established 
with the efforts of Fatemeh Sadr, concentrated on specific groups of society like 
teachers and parents. The members of the center avoided initiating discussions 
between religious and social groups because they did not want to endanger the life 
of the center for political reasons.   
Directors and some members of both Rayzani and the ICDAC were aware of the 
lack of or weak presence of Iranian civil society and its disadvantages for 
developing cultural activities with German partners. The establishment of a new 
NGO of the Islamic Studies Foundation and renewal of the NGO of Amirkabir 
under the name of Hafiz by Rayzani between 2008 and 2013 indicate 
understanding of this gap. The ICDAC also steadily assisted NGOs and university 
communities to implement cultural activities; it has been mentioned that at least 
100 NGO and university communities were in contact with the ICDAC before its 
closure in late 2005. Nevertheless, both Rayzani and the ICDAC did not use the 
full potential of the limited parastatal organizations and civil society that were 
already available. For instance, both had little or no cooperation with the institute 
for the intellectual development of children and youth (Kanun). In the context of 
the organizational structure of figure 12, Kanun could be categorized as a 
parastatal organization in box F. It has appeared as a partner in intercultural 
dialogue activities of the Grüter family, as explained in 6.2.5.7. The possibilities 
that Al-Mustafa international university and the Islamic Center of Hamburg as 
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parastatal organizations have had to establish a Shi’a professorship at Münster 
University, was not used by Rayzani. Perhaps there was no need to establish a 
new NGO to fill the gap of civil society at that point in time.  
To sum up, a clear difference between Iranian and German foreign cultural policy 
is the engagement of civil society. It is much greater in German foreign cultural 
policy than in Iranian foreign cultural policy, and it is significant that even the 
Iranian cultural actors, like Rayzani, are aware of this difference. It has been 
observed that a director of Rayzani even established two NGOs to solve the 
problem of the lack of civil society engagement for a short time.  
 
7.1.2.3 Diplomacy and Foreign Cultural Policy 
Iran and Germany also have different structures to administer their diplomacy in 
the context of foreign cultural and intercultural dialogue activities. On the Iranian 
side, there are at least two types of experts that deal with foreign cultural 
activities. On the one hand there are experts and directors of ICRO and 
consequently Rayzani who are not trained diplomats. For instance, the minister of 
Islamic culture and guidance, who is the head of the higher council of ICRO and 
has a key role in appointing the directors of Rayzani, is not a trained diplomat. 
Some experts in this category may be addressed as “diplomat”, but they are not 
trained as such. As one of the participants in the study explained, having darajeh 
[rank] of a diplomat is different from having the “position” of a diplomat. The 
director of Rayzani has the lowest rank in the diplomatic system but inhabits the 
position of a diplomat (Khatibzadeh, personal communication, 2014). On the 
other hand there are trained diplomats of the foreign ministry who are in charge of 
Iran’s relationship with Western countries, including Germany, but they do not 
have a close relationship with ICRO and Rayzani. Furthermore, both types of 
experts, whether untrained or trained diplomats, have not been fully aware of or in 
contact with available civil society or other state and parastatal organizations to 
implement the foreign cultural activities. These factors construct an inconsistent 
type of diplomacy that has an uneven structure and is administered on both 
domestic and foreign level by experts from both the democratically and 
religiously legitimated sectors of the Iranian state. Some cultural activities, such 
as film festivals, are managed by the cultural section of the Iranian embassy in 
Germany. Others, such as religious activities, are conducted by Rayzani. 
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Depending on the time and characteristics of the directors of Rayzani, some 
cultural activities such as music festivals would be conducted by Rayzani too. The 
Iranian diplomats in charge of analyzing issues on the relationship between Iran 
and Germany are rarely informed about cultural activities between the two 
countries. Both these experts had little contact with (or little information about the 
capacity of) the other cultural actors, such as the IRIB, Islamic Center of 
Hamburg and Kanun. This uneven diplomacy has some similarities with the 
fragmentation model of diplomacy discussed by Rebecca E. Johnson (Johnson 
2011: 666) and in 3.2.5 in this research. A part of Iranian diplomacy that is mostly 
in charge of foreign cultural affairs is trained at domestic level.  
The German side has at least two types of experts that deal with foreign cultural 
activities. The directors of the cultural section of the German embassy in Iran and 
commissioners of the intercultural dialogue section of the foreign ministry’s 
department of culture and communication are trained diplomats. The second types 
of experts are the key members of the German Mittlerorganisationen who are 
professionally trained in their own field, whether it is the DAAD’s academic 
exchange or ifa’s internship exchange. Two of the commissioners and one of the 
ambassadors of the German embassy in Iran who were interviewed in this 
research have had experience of working in Muslim countries; three of them knew 
Arabic and two of them knew Farsi. The ambassador shared a wealth of contact 
information of other ambassadors and Iranian and German cultural actors with the 
researcher. Although the issue of foreign cultural policy is a task of the federal 
republic and specifically in the hands of the foreign ministry, there is close 
cooperation between actors at Länder and federal level relating to intercultural 
dialogue activities. PAD, for instance, is counted as an educational actor at 
Länder level, but it also cooperated in European-Islamic cultural dialogue. ifa is 
managed by some members of and received part of its budget from the Land of 
Baden-Württemberg and the city of Stuttgart. However, it also assisted the foreign 
ministry to implement some cultural projects in the context of European-Islamic 
cultural dialogue. Taking all these points into account, it can be concluded that the 
diplomacy behind Germany’s foreign cultural activities has a coordinated model. 
It has some similarities with Johnson’s concentration model, because it is 
administered by both authorities that have a role at Länder and federal level. The 
diplomacy model also has some similarities with the fusion model (Johnson 2011: 
667), because it allows a large amount of space for the activity of civil society. 
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What is significant in this model, which is closer to “coordinated diplomacy”, is 
that the trained diplomats and professional cultural experts and authorities of the 
Länder cooperate in a harmonious way to implement cultural activities.  
To sum up the points regarding the role of diplomacy in the foreign cultural policy 
of Iran and Germany, the mixed model of Germany and the inconsistent model of 
Iran are significant. The uneven structure of diplomacy in Iran, which at political 
level is directed by the foreign ministry and at cultural level by ICRO, makes it 
practically difficult to achieve the aims of Iranian foreign cultural policy. The 
coordinated diplomacy of Germany uses different actors from the foreign ministry 
and civil society, but decisions are nevertheless made by the foreign ministry. The 
diplomats decide on general cultural projects, but to implement them they use 
assistance from civil society and the Mittlerorganisationen. 
 
7.1.3 Different Organizational Efficiency 
The intercultural dialogue activities have been shaped to a major degree by the 
organizational efficiency of the relevant Iranian and German organizations. An 
organization which tries to reach the aims of foreign cultural policy and 
intercultural dialogue should be able to create proper plans with the assistance of 
experts or have the capacity to promote specific expertise. It also needs to gather 
resources which are necessary to implement its plans; resources such as financial 
aids, labor and technology. Organizational efficiency is also about the ability of an 
organization to implement its plans using contacts, networks and cooperation with 
other organizations to achieve its aims with the minimum possible expenditure of 
resources. However, it is significant that, if the expertise of one cultural 
organization is different from the other, the incompatibility of their structures 
makes cooperation between them inefficient or impossible. Another factor of 
organizational efficiency is a certain and clear order of decision-making for an 
organization’s plans and projects. The long-term projects in such an order are not 
influenced or eliminated by the personal will of a director, but change according 
to a specific bureaucratic trend. Transparency of information on the financial 
sources and organizational structure of an organization has a key influence on the 
quality and quantity of its activities, too. Without regular reporting on the details, 
there would be no chance to assess whether an organization has achieved its aims 
or not. Moreover, without transparency of information, there would be no 
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possibility to compare the achievements of one organization with those of another. 
  
 
7.1.3.1 Different Types of Expertise  
The implementation of cultural and intercultural dialogue activities relies on the 
skills, knowledge, experience and expertise of employees or members of staff of 
Iranian and German cultural organizations. Expert employees are valuable to 
intercultural dialogue because they can help to overcome the challenges of their 
professional work, domestic bureaucratic problems and difficulties of working 
with other country.  
On the Iranian side, the main cultural actors discussed in chapter 6 are not 
concentrated on one specific expertise but on a mixture of skills. The ICDAC, for 
instance, focused under its first president on diverse activities, such as philosophy, 
theater, and music, worked on the target groups of women, youth, small cities, and 
supported publications. At the time of the second president it considered academic 
investigation on issues of political science, art, religion, history, geography, 
environment, and philosophy, and supported NGOs and student associations and 
cooperated with academic institutes and universities. It thus appeared rather as a 
promoter and supporter of diverse cultural and academic activities than an expert 
in specific cultural activity. Rayzani is seen as a religious expert because it is a 
branch office of a religious organization, ICRO. However, as discussed in 6.1.1.3, 
it sometimes clashes with the cultural section of the Iranian embassy, based on the 
argument that it should be the only cultural state agent to contribute to Iranian 
cultural affairs in Germany. The assumption that Rayzani is a religious expert is 
therefore challenged by the organization itself. Nevertheless, based on what has 
been observed in the field study, Rayzani did not play a central role in 
coordinating the activities of the Iranian cultural actors that have the capacity to 
implement cultural activities with different expertise.  
On the German side there are different types of expertise. The cultural section of 
the German embassy is observed in the field study to be a central coordinator of 
activities of different German cultural actors. The cultural section has assisted the 
DAAD with expertise in the field of university exchange, AvH with expertise in 
the field of higher education, the PAD with expertise in teacher training, the ZfA 
with expertise in German schools abroad, the Goethe Institute with expertise in 
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supporting German language, art and music, and ifa with expertise in art 
exhibitions and cultural exchanges with Iranian partners. It also supported the 
Grüter family in its pupil exchange and calligraphy projects and assisted the 
dialogue center of the Imam Musa Institute with preparations for German experts 
to travel to Iran in 2005 and 2010. Hence it can be concluded that the cultural 
section has appeared to be an expert in foreign cultural coordination.  
The expertise of organizations which play a role in the implementation of cultural 
activities is a relevant factor in understanding how the German and Iranian states 
narrate their own culture, and which dimension of culture has priority for them in 
presenting their own nation. German cultural actors have a variety of expertise, 
from educational exchange to art exhibitions. It may suggest that Germany wants 
to show a cosmopolitan dimension of German culture, which also explains why 
the German side has been more active in implementing intercultural dialogue 
activities, given its greater/broader experience in different fields. Review of 
Iranian cultural actors suggests that Iran has a tendency to focus on just a few 
dimensions of its culture, mostly religious. It is no surprise, then, that the Iranian 
actors were the passive side in the intercultural dialogue activities between 1998 
and 2013, since they do not have expertise in several fields. 
 
7.1.3.2 Different Age of Organizations 
How long an organization is active is also important for defining its organizational 
efficiency. The age of Iranian and German actors has differed significantly. Figure 
13 compares the age of Iranian and German cultural actors.  
Figure 12. Life span of Iranian and German cultural actors, according to their founding 
year  
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Source: by the researcher 
As figure 13 shows, the ICDAC officially had seven years to implement cultural 
activities. The period is too short for a cultural institute to build a certain expertise 
for itself and an efficient network with other cultural actors. Rayzani, as indicated 
in figure 13, was established in its specific structure in 1994 and is still working 
today, but in principle it is continuing the cultural work of a cultural section that 
was formerly under the authority of the Iranian ministry of Islamic culture and 
guidance. The predecessor of both is the first office that was in charge of cultural 
affairs in the first Iranian embassy in Berlin, which was opened in 1885. The 
German cultural institutions that have been discussed in this research as the main 
cultural actors, as shown in figure 13, have a much longer lifecycle. The cultural 
section of the German embassy is rooted in the first cultural office, which was 
established in 1885. Clearly, the cultural section has changed structurally in some 
regards since 1945 and following the political change to the German state and 
changes in German foreign cultural policy. The next oldest cultural actor is ifa, 
because it has its roots in the old museum organization of 1917. The Goethe 
Institute, whose origins are in the DA institute, which was established in 1923, 
and the DAAD, which dates back to 1925, are the third and fourth oldest cultural 
actors in Germany. 
The longevity of the German cultural actors can explain how projects such as the 
German-Arabic/Iranian university dialogue of the DAAD and ifa’s CCP project 
were able to continue. It can also explain why the Goethe Institute managed to 
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construct a new structure for working in Iran, despite not having an officially open 
branch office in the country.  
Furthermore, as was discussed in 6.2.5.4, German churches and religious 
institutions have a history of experiencing cultural dialogue with the Muslim 
population, both through interfaith meetings and other events, from the 1970s. 
The German Islam Conference has also been established since 2006 to promote 
dialogue between the German state and Muslim associations. It helps to explain 
why the discourse of “European-Islamic cultural dialogue” was not limited to 
rhetoric and produced some long-term projects by the German cultural actors.  
The age or life span of organizations is relevant to explain the active role of the 
German actors in the intercultural dialogue activities. For instance, an old 
organization which has worked with Iranian and German participants for a long 
time would use the opportunity of a special project like “European-Islamic 
cultural dialogue” more easily and more productively than a young organization 
in Iran that is initiating intercultural dialogue under the discourse of dialogue 
among civilizations. 
 
7.1.3.3 Financial Sources and Budget  
Iranian and German cultural actors have received budgets and financial aid by 
different mechanisms. The cultural section of the German embassy receives its 
total budget from the foreign ministry. It seems that the department of culture and 
communication of the foreign ministry and the ambassador decide on how to 
spend it. Nevertheless, the cultural section and press section of the embassy can 
apply for other budgets from the foreign ministry. For instance, as explained in 
5.1.2, division 600 of the foreign ministry’s department of culture and 
communication promotes a project called Deutschlandbild im Ausland/DA, which 
the press section of the German embassy applied for. A media dialogue was 
organized through this funding source in 2013. German cultural actors such as the 
Goethe Institute, ifa, AvH and the DAAD also receive an annual budget from 
different sources, mainly from the foreign ministry. However, they can also apply 
for a specific budget from the foreign ministry. In the case of European-Islamic 
cultural dialogue, all these Mittlerorganisationen applied to receive funds. The 
amount of this budget and assurance of receiving it differed from one 
Mittleroganisation to the other. For instance, as mentioned in 6.2.33, the general 
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secretary of ifa at the time (2002) was not sure of receiving the budget, but after 
submitting a proposal and seriously promoting the project, was able to increase its 
portion of the budget from this source. A Mittlerorganisation like the DAAD had 
fewer difficulties obtaining this budget. Even some German diplomats 
emphasized in the interviews of this study that the academic exchange is a safe 
investment for German foreign cultural policy. Also, talking to participants of the 
research from the DAAD revealed that they are confident that their German-
Arabic/Iranian university dialogue will not face financial problems in coming 
years. It can therefore be said that all German actors have received two types of 
financial resources: a fixed budget and a project-based budget. The European-
Islamic cultural dialogue project-based budget has had some advantages, 
specifically in the context of intercultural dialogue. Firstly, it theoretically created 
a motivation for some cultural actors to put forward a strong proposal for 
intercultural dialogue to prove their efficiency and obtain part of the budget. It 
therefore also created competition between the actors to acquire the financial 
resources and retain them for the long term. Secondly, it guarantees long-term 
projects by the cultural actors in the field of intercultural dialogue. Continuation 
of intercultural dialogue projects has been mentioned in two projects of the 
DAAD, in 6.2.2.3.1 and 6.2.2.3.2, as a key to advancing participation in dialogue. 
Besides the advantage of the project-based budget for intercultural dialogue, it 
also has some benefits for the organizations themselves. The extra budget creates 
a new labor market for the organization, which can pay its new employees from 
the budget. Also, over a certain time it creates new expertise in an organization. 
For instance, as explained in 6.2.3.3, the CCP, which was established with the 
budget for European-Islamic cultural dialogue, was used structurally for the Cross 
Cultural Praktika Plus project, which is specifically for participants of so-called 
Arab-Spring countries. 
None of the Iranian cultural institutes which have been investigated in this study 
published details of its budget and financial sponsors. When the directors and 
members of staff of the institutes were asked about the budget issue, they reacted 
with surprise or even anger. A common reply was that the budget is “confidential” 
and they have no right to talk about it. A search in different volumes of Iranian 
budget law produced information on the official budgets that ICRO and the 
ICDAC receive from the Iranian parliament. The details are shown in Appendix 1. 
But the organizations have received financial assistance from further state and 
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non-state sources, too. Therefore, with the available collected data, it is difficult to 
evaluate the mechanisms by which they receive financial resources. Two points 
are significant, however. Firstly, discourses of interfaith dialogue and dialogue 
among civilizations have not been promoted as a cultural project by the Iranian 
political guiding actors, ICRO, the foreign ministry or the presidency, for Iranian 
cultural actors. By comparison, it should be recalled that in Germany, European-
Islamic cultural dialogue was promoted as a project by the foreign ministry to 
German cultural actors. What happened in Iran was different. ICRO continued the 
work of the Hekmat Academy and the international office of the ministry of 
Islamic culture and guidance through a specific office, the Center for Interfaith 
Dialogue (CID). It is not clear how the CID received its budget, but it seems that 
it had a fixed annual budget from ICRO. Rayzani, according to observations in the 
field study, has a fixed budget and can apply for some specific budgets from 
different departments of ICRO. The dialogue among civilizations idea never led to 
a budget to which all Iranian cultural actors could apply directly for financial 
resources, but to a specific budget for the ICDAC. Nonetheless, the ICDAC gave 
an opportunity to some Iranian cultural actors to cooperate in projects or 
cooperated itself in their projects. For instance, the ministry of education and 
training participated in the project for a book of dialogue among civilizations, as 
explained in 6.1.2.3. Civil society and other Iranian cultural actors thus had few 
possibilities to compete over cultural activities in the context of interfaith dialogue 
and dialogue among civilizations, because the budget for these specific issues was 
firmly allocated to the ICDAC, CID and Rayzani.  
In summing up the points on financial sources and budget for intercultural 
dialogue activities, the availability of financial bases for cultural actors must be 
considered. An idea for developing dialogue opportunities among different 
cultures is important, but the actors implementing it need financial resources to do 
so. It seems that offering a project-based budget to cultural organizations has been 
an important reason for innovative and advanced intercultural dialogue activities 
being implemented on the German side. On the Iranian side, the contribution of a 
fixed budget to specific cultural actors may be a reason for the passive role of 
Iranian cultural actors in implementing intercultural dialogue activities.  
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 7.1.3.4 Networking  
Besides factors like expertise and the financial resources of an organization, 
networking at national and international level is a key factor in increasing the 
efficiency of an organization regarding implementation of intercultural dialogue. 
Networking in this context means to create a group of friends, contacts and key 
people, and keep the group active through regular communication for mutual 
benefit.  
National networking among the Iranian cultural actors was non-existent or weak. 
Rayzani, as far as investigation in this study shows, was not engaged significantly 
with other Iranian cultural actors in conducting cultural activities. Nevertheless, 
depending on the personality and interests of the directors, some specific cultural 
organizations attracted the attention of Rayzani for cooperation. For instance, 
under Rajabi, Rayzani cooperated with the Institute for Human and Islamic 
Science of Hamburg on the translation of some religious books. When Imanipour 
was in office, the NGO Amirkabir was re-opened under the name of Hafiz, and the 
NGO Islamic Studies Foundation was established to assist Rayzani in its 
cooperation with German non-governmental actors. There was nevertheless only a 
small degree of networking, and it was limited to specific directors and not 
developed in a progressive order. Participation of Rayzani with the Islamic Center 
of Hamburg has also been observed on the level of “participation in some 
seminars”. Although most Iranian cultural institutes in Germany are active in the 
religious field, they did not assist135 when Rayzani needed a non-state institution 
to conclude a contract with a German university to establish a Shi’a professorship. 
Instead it established a new NGO for this purpose. The cooperation between 
Rayzani and the cultural section of the Iranian embassy, as mentioned in 6.1.1, 
was likewise insubstantial.   
The ICDAC did not engage significantly in networking with the Rayzani of 
Germany either. As mentioned in 5.2.2, the ICDAC organized a conference in 
2003 in cooperation with ICRO and its Rayzani offices around the world. But 
Rayzani in Germany and the ICDAC did not cooperate on any project. It has been 
mentioned in the field study that a director of Rayzani at the time of Khatami 
personally requested an initial cooperation with the ICDAC, but he realized that 
Khatami’s administration and the ICDAC were not precise and clear about 
                                                          
135 The reason that they did not assist may be that Rayzani did not ask for their help. There is no way to prove 
this, however, because the interviewees of the field study did not answer the relevant questions.  
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activities under the topic of dialogue among civilizations abroad (Rajabi, personal 
communication, 2016). Even the positive relationship between the ICDAC and the 
foreign ministry in Khatami’s time did not lead to cooperation on any project for 
German and Iranian participants under the discourse of dialogue among 
civilizations.136  
International networking between Iranian and international actors has been 
observed as weak and fragmented. Because the Center for Interreligious Dialogue 
(CID) of ICRO managed to implement different long-term interfaith dialogue 
meetings with international religious actors all over the world, as was reflected in 
in 5.2.3, it is difficult to imagine that networking is an unknown concept in the 
organizational structure of ICRO. But Rayzani cooperated with some German 
cultural institutes and groups in fragmented way; at the time of Rajabi, for 
instance, with the HKW to implement music concerts and an art exhibition in 
Berlin. It also assisted the Grüter family both by connecting them with some 
schools in Iran and by introducing cultural institutes such as Kanun to them. The 
Loccum Academy was one of the perennial German partners of Rayzani to hold 
seminars on religious as well as human rights and later on nuclear issues. In terms 
of networking for the ICDAC, its familiarity with international institutes and 
organizations, including some German actors, was valuable. It is not clear, 
however, whether it would have used networking with them efficiently if it had 
had a longer lifecycle. Nevertheless, the point has been made that the ICDAC did 
not cooperate or express any interest in cooperation with those German cultural 
actors that fitted its cultural expertise. As mentioned in 6.1.2.3, it was interested in 
cooperating with AvH, but the expertise of AvH is in higher education. The 
ICDAC also had contact with the EKD, which became possible during the visit of 
an EKD delegation to Tehran in 2002, but it did not lead to any joint project. 
Because the ICDAC had an interfaith dialogue group, it is thinkable that the 
ICDAC and the EKD might together initiate a joint interfaith dialogue. The 
ICDAC did not use this particular contact, but the same visit resulted in 
networking between the IID of Abtahi and the EKD. Together they held an 
interfaith trialogue between Iran, Germany and Britain.  
                                                          
136 The conference of Turan, which was organized by the office of documentation of the foreign ministry, was 
held in the context of dialogue among civilizations, as explained in 6.1.3.1. But according to information of 
an interviewee (Moujani, personal communication, 2016), it was not supported organizationally or financially 
by the ICDAC  
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Iranian participants in the intercultural dialogue activities between Iran and 
Germany also illustrate different levels of interpersonal networking. For instance, 
Yunes Nourbakhsh, a lecturer at the University of Tehran who participated in the 
DAAD-funded peaceful change project, had great potential to network between 
Iranian and German actors, but he rarely used it to develop activities in the field of 
intercultural university dialogue. Firstly, he was an imam of the Mosque of Imam 
Ali of the Islamic Center of Hamburg when he was doing his PhD. In that position 
he participated in some interfaith dialogues in Germany. He secondly had strong 
ties with ICRO: When he set up the German studies department of the University 
of Tehran, he held a reception dinner in one of the main ICRO buildings in 
Tehran. Thirdly, he was a head of the International Center for Religious Studies of 
the University of Tehran, in which position he held some international interfaith 
seminars in Iran. Fourthly, he initiated the first department of German studies at 
the University of Tehran. It was at that time that he got in touch with Jochen 
Hippler, but at a conference which was held by the dialogue NGO of Khatami. 
After getting to know Hippler, Nourbakhsh invited him to speak at the official 
opening of the department of German Studies and then to participate in the 
peaceful change project. Given the potential of his contacts, it is important to 
understand why he did not play an active role in promoting intercultural university 
dialogue at the time or later. His reply to this question was that the structure of 
Iranian organizations does not support initiatives regarding dialogue. But his 
gradual success in his job (from 2013 to 2016 he was dean of the faculty of social 
science of the University of Tehran) suggests that he benefitted from his 
networking in promoting his position rather than intercultural dialogue in the 
university field.  
As was discussed in 6.1.1.3, Homayoun Hemmati, a former director of Rayzani, 
and Nasr Hami Abu Zaid, were also in dialogue over philosophical issues in some 
sessions in 2005, but this contact did not result in successfully networking 
Rayzani with Muslim intellectual groups. Abu Zaid at that time actively 
participated in ifa’s co-written book on dialogue between Muslim countries and 
the West.137 It was mentioned in 6.2.3.3 that one of the reasons that Iranian 
authors were not invited to take part in this project was a lack of knowledge about 
Iran by the director of that ifa project. The meeting between the director of 
                                                          
137 As mentioned in 6.2.3.3, the book on dialogue between Islam and the West was concluded in 2005, the 
book on terrorism in 2006.  
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Rayzani and Nasr thus clearly had the potential to network Iran in the ifa project, 
but it failed to do so. Unlike the two Iranian participants above, Fatemeh Sadr 
appeared active in networking. As mentioned in 6.1.3.4, she used her knowledge 
of Iranian and German society to promote a network, which in coming years led 
to some intercultural dialogue activities between the two countries. The invitation 
of Jochen Hippler to Iran, which consequently led to the peaceful change project 
of the DAAD, came about through her efforts. She also invited three dialogue 
experts to teach dialogue skills in Iran, and it was through her work that the 
dialogue center of the Imam Musa Institute was established.  
On the German side, the networking of German cultural actors on a national level 
was strong. They also developed organized networking with Iranian cultural 
actors. The cultural section of the German embassy in Iran played a central role in 
communicating with German cultural actors as well as with individuals such as 
the Grüter family. The reception party of the ambassador on reunification day, as 
was explained in 6.2.1.3, indicates that the cultural section intentionally gave 
German cultural actors an opportunity to refresh networking. Divisions of the 
department of culture and communication of the foreign ministry had regular 
networking with the Mittlerorganisationen, parastatal organizations and private 
cultural groups, too. Cooperation among Mittlerorganisationen was also 
significant. The information center of the DAAD has been located since 2014 in 
one of the buildings of the Goethe Institute in Iran, as explained in 6.2.2.3. 
Furthermore, the Goethe Institute and ifa have concluded a deposit agreement 
regarding library exchanges, as explained in 6.2.3.3.  
Regarding international networking, German actors generally cooperated actively 
with actors in Muslim countries; both the DAAD and the Goethe Institute, for 
instance, had fruitful cooperation with relevant authorities in Egypt. But they did 
not successfully develop sustainable networking with Iran. The Goethe Institute is 
still officially closed in Iran today, which makes cooperation with Iranian actors 
difficult for it. Although the DAAD is known by several Iranian universities and 
supported many intercultural dialogue activities of Iranian and German 
universities from 2005 to 2013, up to the end of 2016 it could not successfully 
cooperate with the ministry of higher education and technology to implement a 
common academic program. The level of information about Rayzani and the 
ICDAC among the German cultural actors was also not very high or relevant.  
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Interpersonal networking was important for German cultural actors. Martin 
Affolderbach from the EKD, who traveled to Iran in 2002, could not successfully 
connect with the CID of ICRO and the ICDAC, but did so with the IID of Abtahi. 
That networking led to a triangle interfaith dialogue between Germany, Iran and 
Britain from 2006 to 2008. The next example is that of Jochen Hippler, the 
director of the project for peaceful change, funded by the DAAD. In his co-
written book project (from 2002 to 2006), he did not invite Iranian authors to take 
part in the project on account of his lack of knowledge about them. Having 
developed contacts with Iranian academic actors after visiting Iran in 2007, 
however, he initiated the peaceful change project with the cooperation of Iranian 
partners alongside other universities in Pakistan and Morocco. The final example 
is interpersonal networking in the project of interfaith dialogue of Paderborn 
University, funded by the DAAD. Mohagheghi, an Iranian researcher who worked 
at the German university, used her knowledge and experience of religious actors 
in Iran to add some Iranian universities to the academic exchange taking place 
between Paderborn University and a university in Lebanon. The role played by 
three Iranian PhD students, who were studying at that time at Paderborn 
University, in creating this triangle university interfaith dialogue should not be 
ignored.  
The points discussed above generally suggest that part of the success of Germany 
in actively implementing intercultural dialogue between Iranian and German 
participants was down to the successful national and international networking of 
its cultural organizations and volunteer groups. If the clash between Rayzani and 
the Iranian embassy were not so great, they could likely also cooperate and use 
the cooperation of cultural organizations of both democratically and religiously 
legitimated sectors of the Iranian state to a much greater extent. Again, however, 
the weakness of the ICDAC in networking reflects a deeper problem of 
organizational efficiency among Iranian organizations. Most of the organizations 
investigated in this study failed to take networking seriously. 
 
7.1.3.5 Incompatibility of Iranian and German Cultural Actors  
The next issue in organizational efficiency is the incompatibility of the Iranian 
and German cultural actors. As has been discussed, structurally the Iranian and 
German cultural actors are under the authority of two essentially different states. 
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On the German side is a single, democratically legitimated state, which decides on 
its foreign cultural policy, whereas on the Iranian side is a duality of the 
democratically and religiously legitimated sectors of the Iranian state. A large 
number of German cultural actors that implemented cultural and intercultural 
dialogue activities for German and Iranian participants are from civil society. The 
main Iranian actors, meanwhile, had their basis in the Iranian state. Iranian civil 
society or organizations that were independent from the Iranian state had a limited 
opportunity to work in Iran, or they were short-lived. It is likely that the cultural 
actors on both sides could have overcome difficulties implementing intercultural 
dialogue if their origins had been more similar.  
There are many actors of German civil society which assist in German foreign 
cultural policy. But for intercultural dialogue they need to work with counterparts 
in Iran which are also part of civil society. Because civil society is active in 
Germany and in Iran it is not, this results in an incompatibility of the 
organizational structures of intercultural dialogue actors.  
Furthermore, the expertise of Iranian and German cultural actors is not 
compatible. As explained in 7.1.2.1, German cultural actors, besides the cultural 
section of the German embassy in Iran, have specific expertise in different areas, 
while Iranian cultural actors do not. Officially, Rayzani has expertise in the 
religious field, yet it tends to work in other cultural fields, such as the Farsi 
language, art exhibitions and similar. Those Iranian actors that have expertise in 
issues such as academic exchanges (like Iranian universities) or theater and art 
exhibitions (like Kanun) do not cooperate closely with Rayzani, although they 
would engage in the case of projects offered by the German cultural actors. At the 
same time, there are German actors that have expertise in topics such as academic 
exchange (like the DAAD) and theater (like the Goethe Institute). They work 
closely with the cultural section of the Germany embassy in Iran and cooperate 
even with those Iranian cultural actors that are not in close contact with Rayzani. 
Nevertheless, the interfaith dialogue between Iran and Germany is implemented 
by Iranian cultural actors (like Rayzani) and German cultural actors (like the 
Loccum Academy). Making some allowances, it can be argued that the 
organizational structure of Iranian and German organizations is compatible in 
their area of expertise regarding the issue of interreligious dialogue. Rayzani did 
not use the capacity of its own religious actors (like the CID of ICRO) fully in this 
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regard, however, and the German side clearly was not that focused on the field of 
interreligious dialogue.  
Incompatibility of expertise and organizational origin is important in intercultural 
dialogue between Iran and Germany because it resulted, in some cases, in 
misunderstandings between Iranian and German individuals who played a role in 
implementing intercultural dialogue. For instance, in the case of the Goethe 
Institute, despite being a Mittlerorganisation, it has been understood by some 
Iranian participants to be a state organization. A reason for this misunderstanding 
is that an organizational structure like a Mittlerorganisation rarely exists in Iran. 
Perhaps if the Farsi language center and the Saadi foundation could play a 
stronger role in holding Farsi language courses in other countries, including 
Germany, or if Kanun could institutionalize its role as an implementer of foreign 
cultural activities for youth in other countries, then the role of the Goethe Institute 
and its difference from Rayzani could be understood both by Iranian and German 
key figures.   
The next example is the DAAD. It is an association of (nearly) all universities in 
Germany. The DAAD has been active for about one century in organizing 
academic exchanges between Germany and other countries, including Iran. The 
DAAD is a Mittlerorganisation. Its international academic projects are funded not 
only by the German state, but also by other, private organizations. Additionally, 
the DAAD receives a special fund from the intercultural dialogue section of the 
German foreign ministry to manage intercultural dialogue activities. Since there is 
no comparable university association in Iran, the DAAD had problems 
cooperating with some Iranian academic and university organizations and the 
ministry of higher education. That is because, firstly, the DAAD is not understood 
well by some Iranian authorities which have the ability to fund cooperation (like 
the ministry of higher education), and secondly, some Iranian authorities perceive 
the DAAD to be a state agency and not civil society, because of its state funding. 
Consequently, although the DAAD has undertaken constructive projects with 
Iranian universities, it still could not implement academic projects jointly with 
financial resources of Iranian partners.  
Two of the characteristics of intercultural dialogue, which are discussed in chapter 
6, indicate the active role of Germany and passive role of Iran in implementing 
intercultural dialogue activates. It is likely that if the organizations on both sides 
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were compatible, for instance the structure of the Mittleroganisation also existed 
in Iran, then both sides could cooperate with each other more actively, or the 
Iranian cultural actors could implement some cultural activities more actively. 
The issue of the (in)compatibility of cultural organizations in Iran and Germany is 
mentioned in this study as an interesting result, although it needs to be studied 
more in future. 
 
7.1.3.6 Different Role of the Directors of Cultural Actors  
Generally, an organization implements activities based on the aims it strives to 
achieve and strategies it follows in its decision making. In both Iranian and 
German cultural organizations, besides the rules and regulations which were set 
according to the priorities of the Iranian and German state, their directors also 
played a key role in leading, forming and changing the activities. The role that 
German and Iranian directors played had some similarities and some differences. 
On the German side, ifa had actively engaged in “European-Islamic culture 
dialogue” discourse between 2002 and 2008. According to data collected in this 
research, besides the role that the foreign ministry played in offering the relevant 
budget to ifa, the role of the general secretary in engaging in the project was 
significant too. Ifa’s implementation of cultural activities relating to South 
America in the period that it had a Brazilian-German general secretary is another 
indication of the significance of the director in cultural activities.  
On the Iranian side also, the role of directors of Rayzani, who are appointed by 
the minister of Islamic culture and guidance and consequently by the 
democratically legitimated sector, is noteworthy. Rayzani, which organizationally 
is under the authority of the religious sectors of the Iranian state, therefore 
supported religious activities more than other cultural activities from 1998 to 
2013. But because of the directors it had between 1998 and 2005, who were 
appointed by the Khatami administration, it implemented and cooperated in extra-
cultural activities as well. The role of ICDAC presidents in determining its 
cultural activities has also been discussed in 6.1.2. At the time of the first 
president, activities were to involve different parts of Iranian society, such as 
children, youth, and women, while the main focus under the second president was 
on the academic field, for instance.   
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From 1998 to 2013, many Iranian and German cultural organizations which 
implemented intercultural dialogue activities changed their projects and plans. 
Changes to the plans of the cultural organizations indicate how critical the high-
ranking officials were of their plans, how important the main issue of foreign 
policy and foreign cultural policy were to them, which topic would get better 
financial support, and so on. The personal interests and wills of the high-ranking 
officials also played a role in the changing projects of both Iranian and German 
cultural organizations. Nevertheless, an overall look at their projects and activities 
suggests that the changes in the practices of the German organizations were 
related more to main topics of the foreign ministry. Those of the Iranian 
organizations meanwhile illustrates that the weak intention of new high-ranking 
officials was a reason not to continue the practices of a predecessor, even if those 
projects fitted in with the main topics. 
 
7.1.3.7 Transparency  
Both the Iranian and German cultural actors put mechanisms in place to give 
others (ordinary people or other organizations, for example) opportunities to see 
their background, aims, structure and activities.. Nevertheless, the transparency of 
this information has differed between German actors and Iranian actors. The 
German cultural actors have a high degree of transparency of their information for 
the public, while the Iranian cultural actors have had a low degree of transparency 
or have concentrated on reporting details of their actions clearly to their higher 
authority, but not to people in general or other organizations in a public way.  
To sum up, it can be concluded that the transparency of information has been 
significant in explaining the active or weak role of actors of intercultural dialogue 
in this study. Moreover, it enables German civil society, actors with no or limited 
dependency on the German state, for example, to obtain information about 
relevant projects and budgets and consequently apply for them. It also 
theoretically gives the general public a possibility to monitor and watch what type 
of activities are implemented with their taxes. The transparency of information 
also gives researchers a chance to assess the activities of cultural actors and 
analyze whether or not they have been successful in their tasks. In this research, if 
an Iranian organization was highly engaged in intercultural dialogue activities but 
did not reflect it in a publication, or no member of its staff talked about it, this 
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took the opportunity of monitoring and assessing it away from the researcher. It 
seems that the transparency of information on the German side has been one of 
the main reasons for the German actors being portrayed as the active part of the 
intercultural dialogue, because there has simply been more opportunity to access 
information about them compared with the Iranian side.  
Subchapter 7.1 has analyzed the characteristics of intercultural dialogue between 
Iran and Germany from 1998 to 2013 based on the political reasons, different 
structures of their foreign policy, and their organizational efficiencies. The next 




7.2 Answering the Research Question: The Role of Intercultural 
Dialogue in the Foreign Cultural Policy of Iran and Germany 
towards Each Other 
This subchapter attempts to answer the main question based on the results and 
analysis of the study. The main question is: Which role(s) did intercultural 
dialogue play in the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany towards each 
other, and why? Intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany, based on the 
results of the study which were concluded in 6.3.2 and reflected on at the 
beginning of this chapter, has four characteristics: firstly, German actors play an 
active role in it; secondly, Iranian actors showed a tendency to play an 
accompanying role; thirdly, the activities undertaken in the framework of 
intercultural dialogue have new and advanced forms; and fourthly, most 
intercultural dialogue activities took place in educational and academic fields. 
This subchapter will answer the question of which role intercultural dialogue, with 
these specific characteristics, has played in the foreign cultural policy of Iran and 
Germany. To do this, the main question is divided into two parts. Sections 7.2.1 
and 7.2.2 present these questions and arguments to answer them. 
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7.2.1 Role of Intercultural Dialogue in German Foreign Cultural Policy 
towards Iran 
To understand which role(s) intercultural dialogue played in German foreign 
cultural policy towards Iran, it is necessary to look again at what the aims of 
German foreign cultural policy generally have been, and which cultural actors 
have helped it to achieve its aims. Figure 14 visualizes these aims and presents the 
five characteristics of intercultural dialogue which resulted from this study.   
Chapter 7: Analysis of the Characteristics of Intercultural Dialogue 
422  
Figure 13. Characteristics of intercultural dialogue based on the aims of German foreign 
cultural policy and aims of cultural actors 
 
 
Source: the data comes from a combination of sources of (!!! INVALID CITATION !!! 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2000a: 1-2, Auswärtiges Amt 2003: 5-9, Auswärtiges Amt 2004: 5, 
Auswärtiges Amt 2005: 5-8, Auswärtiges Amt 2006: 5, Auswärtiges Amt 2007: 5, Auswärtiges 
Amt 2008: 2, Auswärtiges Amt 2009: 6, Auswärtiges Amt 2010: 9, Auswärtiges Amt 2011b: 12, 
Auswärtiges Amt 2012a: 10, Auswärtiges Amt 2013a: 7, Auswärtiges Amt 2014: 15)), (!!! 
INVALID CITATION !!! (DAAD 2005: 8, DAAD 2006: 10, DAAD 2008: 10, DAAD 2009: 10, 
DAAD 2010: 12, DAAD 2011c: 15-16, DAAD 2012b: 16-17, DAAD 2013b: 16-17, DAAD 
2014d: 16-17)), (ifa 2015a), (!!! INVALID CITATION !!! (Goethe Institut 2007b: 2, Goethe 
Institut 2008: 7, Goethe Institut 2010a: 2, Goethe Institut 2013a: 4)) 
 
As figure 14 shows, there are some aims of German foreign cultural policy, such 
as “promoting German values” or “considering political aims of the German 
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foreign policy”, which are too abstract to be assessed in a certain period of time or 
through a specific discourse or project of European-Islamic cultural dialogue. 
Nevertheless, this type of aims generally suggests that German foreign cultural 
policy pursues activities which dynamically represent Germany abroad in terms of 
culture. Some aims which are illustrated in figure 14 are clearly achievable and 
can be monitored to show whether cultural actors have attempted to achieve them 
or not. For instance, “potential and networks of Mittlerorganisationen” has been 
used because DAAD, the Goethe Institute and ifa played a practical role in foreign 
cultural activities on the one hand and in the project of European-Islamic cultural 
dialogue on the other.  
The Mittlerorganisationen with their specific expertise could realize aims of 
German foreign cultural policy in different fields. The DAAD, for instance, 
worked to achieve the aim of “paying attention to the educational policy 
interests”. Ifa, among other actors, sets out to achieve the aim of “considering 
media and communication” through its media dialogue projects. The Goethe 
Institute, among other actors, attempts to achieve an aim of “promoting German 
language”.  
As figure 14 shows, some aims of European-Islamic cultural dialogue are also too 
abstract to be monitored in a certain period of time within the study. For instance, 
it is difficult to measure whether the cultural activities which are considered in 
this study succeeded “to improve the mutual understanding between the Western 
and the Islamic world”, and specifically towards Iran, or not. Some of the aims are 
objective. The aim “to use scholarship programs, foreign schools, further 
education” was realized through the activities of the DAAD, among other cultural 
actors, with its academic exchange projects, while ifa, among other cultural 
actors, attempted “to intensify media cooperation” through its media dialogue 
activities.  
In figure 14 the aims of German foreign cultural policy can be connected to the 
characteristics of intercultural dialogue. Three of the characteristics match these 
aims. A general aim of foreign cultural policy has been to actively represent 
Germany culturally abroad. The first characteristic suggests that the German 
actors did play an active role in implementing intercultural dialogue activities 
with Iran. The aim in German foreign cultural policy of “promoting the perception 
of German culture, in modern way” also seems to fit with the characteristic that 
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some new and advanced forms of intercultural dialogue activities were 
implemented. These new activities went beyond the traditional forms, like 
seminars and meetings, for Iranian and German participants. The German cultural 
actors have attempted to present German culture in a modern way. The aim in 
German foreign cultural policy of “paying attention to the educational policy 
interests” fits with the characteristic of the high number of intercultural dialogue 
activities in educational and academic fields.  
Reviewing the aims of foreign cultural policy of Germany and its cultural actors 
reveals that, although some aims were abstract and general, some of them were 
clear and practically achievable. This simultaneously makes the implementation 
of cultural activities easier and assessment of the work of cultural organizations 
possible. It is not difficult to find a way to represent Germany through its 
academic activities worldwide, for example some strong organizations that create 
opportunities for different international pupils, teachers, professors and students to 
research and study. But an abstract aim like “representing German values” is a 
different matter. It is difficult to say what are German values and what are not. 
Equally, it is not easy to assess the work of a cultural organization when its aims 
are abstract. An organization can claim that it did a good job, but the aim is too 
abstract to be easily understood. The existence of such practical aims in German 
foreign cultural policy and German cultural organizations means that they can be 
analyzed in the context of the characteristics of intercultural dialogue activities. It 
seems that intercultural dialogue achieve some of the aims. 
The intercultural dialogue activities which were implemented by German cultural 
actors between 1998 and 2013 did play a significant role in strengthening German 
foreign cultural policy towards Iran. Although German foreign cultural policy is 
not specific, clear and strategic regarding Iran, it still provided a suitable context 
for European-Islamic cultural dialogue discourse towards Iran, because it is 
constructed as a distinct element of German foreign policy. It is decided in an 
integrated way by a single democratically legitimated body of the German federal 
government, as discussed in 7.1.1. It is implemented by cultural actors including 
Mittlerorganisationen in an integrated way. Besides the integrated foreign cultural 
policy, the high organizational efficiency of the German actors worked as a factor 
to support the implementation of German foreign cultural policy through 
intercultural dialogue activities, as argued in 7.1.2. When the Iranian nuclear 
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power issue and statements of President Ahmadinejad against Israel were creating 
tensions between Iran and Germany, some key authorities were not inclined to 
engage in dialogue with Iran. That consequently influenced some dialogue 
projects or their financial sources, as argued in 7.1.3. Nevertheless, because 
intercultural dialogue projects of Mittlerorganisationen had a long timeframe and 
these organizations were convinced that using the opportunity for dialogue could 
strengthen their own issues, the political tensions did not dramatically reduce their 
activities with Iranian and German participants.  
 
 
7.2.2 Role of Intercultural Dialogue in Iranian Foreign Cultural Policy 
towards Germany 
To recognize which role(s) intercultural dialogue played in Iranian foreign 
cultural policy towards Germany, it is essential to look again at what the aims of 
Iranian foreign cultural policy have been generally, and which main cultural 
actors have helped it to achieve those aims. Figure 15 presents these aims and the 




Chapter 7: Analysis of the Characteristics of Intercultural Dialogue 
426  
Figure 14. Characteristics of intercultural dialogue based on the aims of Iranian foreign 
cultural policy and aims of cultural actors 
 
Source: the data comes from a combination of sources of (Rasmi newspaper 05.02.1996), 
(Tavassoli 2010: 89-90), (Geographical Researches 1377 [1999]: 143, ICDAC 2005b) Nejad 
Hosseinian (1999: 2) 
 
Figure 15 illustrates those aims of Iranian foreign cultural policy which the 
organization of Islamic culture and relations is expected to achieve. There are two 
types of the aims of Iranian foreign cultural policy. One is that the democratically 
legitimated sector tries to mediate a multi-cultural image of Iran abroad taking a 
generally pragmatic and diplomatic approach. In some regards it can monitor and 
influence foreign cultural activities, but it does not have access to specific means 
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and financial resources to achieve these aims, nor is it officially in charge of 
foreign cultural policy. The other type of aims of Iranian foreign cultural policy is 
pursued by the religiously legitimated sector, which intends to mediate a religious 
and revolutionary image of Iran abroad, as figure 15 shows. Muslim countries are 
the target group of most of the aims. Therefore they are not relevant as a measure 
of Iranian cultural policy towards Germany, which is not classed internationally as 
a Muslim country. Moreover, some of those aims, such as “revival and 
dissemination of Islamic thoughts with a view to reaching the true message of 
Islam to the people of the world” or “growth, development, and the improvement 
of the cultural, political, economic, and social conditions of the Muslims” are too 
abstract, which makes them difficult to evaluate in a certain period of time or 
through a specific discourse or project of interfaith dialogue or dialogue among 
civilizations. Nevertheless, these types of aims generally suggest that Iranian 
foreign cultural policy pursued activities which dynamically represent Iran abroad 
as a religious (or specifically Islamic or Shi’a) and revolutionary state. 
Nevertheless, some of the aims which are presented in figure 15 as aims of Iranian 
foreign cultural policy are achievable and can be examined whether Iranian 
cultural actors have attempted to achieve them or not. For instance, the aim of 
“expansion of cultural relations with various nations and communities in general” 
or “appropriate presentation of the Iranian culture and civilization as well as its 
cultural, geographical, and historical characteristics” are aims which seem to fit 
well with the aim of “promoting the culture of peace in order to foster peaceful 
coexistence and prevent human rights violations” of the ICDAC. Also, the aim of 
“scholarly debates and confrontations with anti-religion, anti-Islam” could be 
pursued by the CID, which is specifically in charge of Iran’s interfaith dialogue 
and has as one of its aims “introducing the principles of Islamic thought, and 
removing misunderstanding”. The aim of “strengthening spiritual, moral and 
religious culture” illustrates that the ICDAC also had a sympathetic approach to 
achieving the religious aims of Iranian foreign cultural policy. Moreover, the 
ICDAC’s aim of “conducting research on the significance and possible 
interpretations of dialogue among civilizations” and the CID’s aim of “doing 
research on the common views between religions” reveal a desire to realize an 
aim of Iranian foreign cultural policy, which is articulated as “scholarly debate”. 
Returning to figure 15, there remains the question of whether the characteristics of 
intercultural dialogue match the aims of Iranian foreign cultural policy since it 
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generally aimed to actively present Iran as a religious and revolutionary state to 
the world but failed to do so, according to the analysis of its intercultural dialogue 
discourses in this study (the German actors played an active role, not Iran). It is 
nevertheless significant that, because Iranian foreign cultural policy aimed at 
“expansion of cultural relations with various nations and communities in general” 
and “strengthening and regulating the existing cultural relations with other 
countries of the world as well as global cultural organizations”, it made it 
possible, indirectly, for German foreign cultural policy to achieve some of its 
aims. That is because cultural dialogue has two partners; if one does not agree to 
enter into communication, the other partner cannot conduct it successfully. The 
characteristic of the tendency of Iranian actors to accompany intercultural 
dialogue activities which were implemented by German actors therefore fits the 
aims mentioned above. 
The characteristics of implementing new forms of intercultural dialogue activities 
and of the frequency of intercultural dialogue activities in the academic and 
educational field do not fit with the actions of Iranian cultural actors. 
Nevertheless, the existence of highly qualified Iranian applicants in the academic 
projects of the German cultural actors on one hand, and the Iranian state’s history 
of cooperating on academic projects with the German state and German cultural 
actors on the other, make the many instances of academic cooperation possible. In 
other words, without the potential for academic cooperation with Iran, it would 
have been impossible for most of the intercultural dialogue activities between Iran 
and Germany to take place in the academic and educational field. Therefore the 
accompanying help of the Iranian actors should be considered instrumental in 
making intercultural dialogue in the academic field possible in a large number of 
cases. 
As a result, it can be argued that the intercultural dialogue activities which were 
implemented for Iranian and German participants between 1998 and 2013 did 
play a role in supporting those aims of Iranian foreign cultural policy towards 
Germany which were concerned with international cultural cooperation. Iranian 
foreign cultural policy is not specific, clear and strategic regarding Germany. It is 
also mixed up in Islamic propagation and Iranian foreign policy. Moreover, it is 
decided in a fragmented way by the democratically and religiously legitimated 
sectors of the Iranian state, as discussed in 7.1.1. Furthermore the Iranian cultural 
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actors compared with the German ones, in regards such as expertise, lifecycle and 
networking, are less organizationally efficient, as mentioned in 7.1.2. The political 
tensions and control over Iranian students in the intercultural dialogue projects 
created some problems, as mentioned in 7.1.3. But despite all these things, Iranian 
foreign cultural policy still pursued some aims which encouraged cooperation 
with international cultural organizations, including organizations and actors from 
Germany.  
Intercultural dialogue played a supplemental role in strengthening both Iranian 
foreign cultural policy towards Germany and German foreign cultural policy 
towards Iran. Because the structure of foreign cultural policy in these two 
countries, the organizational efficiency of their cultural actors and their political 
considerations are different, intercultural dialogue also had different aspects. The 
discourses of interfaith dialogue, dialogue among civilizations (in the case of 
Iran), and European-Islamic cultural dialogue (in the case of Germany), could not 
make alone a big deal, but they supplement the projects and routines of the 
cultural organizations.  
On one hand, German foreign cultural policy was aimed, besides some abstract 
objectives, at some specific, achievable issues like networking of local and federal 
organizations, Mittlerorganisationen and private actors to implement cultural 
activities abroad, promoting educational policy interests, and sponsoring media 
relations. On the other, practically speaking the German cultural actors that were 
active in European-Islamic cultural dialogue (like the cultural section of the 
German embassy, the DAAD, ifa, and the Goethe Institute) mostly already had 
experience of long-term working with Iranian participants. The combination of 
these two factors made the outcome of the supplemental role of intercultural 
dialogue significant. Hence intercultural dialogue, and consequently its budget, 
was able to play a supplemental role in achieving some aims of German foreign 
cultural policy towards Iran. The result was that the German actors appeared 
active, successful in implementing some advanced forms of intercultural dialogue 
activities and in implementing most of those intercultural dialogue activities in 
academic and educational fields.  
When it comes to Iran, both the aims of foreign cultural policy and the actual 
circumstances of activity by the Iranian cultural actors are important. On one 
hand, Iranian foreign cultural policy is decided by two sectors of the Iranian state, 
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so it is not constructed in an integrated way but a fragmented one. Besides some 
abstract objectives, it also has some achievable aims which encourage cooperation 
and relations with other countries and cultural organizations, as well as supporting 
scholarly debates on religious issues. On the other, practically speaking the 
Iranian cultural actors which were active in the discourse of dialogue among 
civilizations were newly established, with no former experience of working with 
German participants, and shortlived (like the ICDAC). The Iranian cultural actors 
which were active in interfaith dialogue (like the CID) did not have a strong 
connection with the Iranian cultural actors that already had experience of working 
with German participants (like Rayzani) to implement relevant activities. 
Intercultural dialogue discourses and, accordingly, their specific financial sources 
thus only played a supplemental role in achieving a few aims of Iranian foreign 
cultural policy towards Germany. The significant result was that the Iranian 
cultural actors, with their interest in accompanying the German cultural actors, did 





Chapter seven considers two main issues. Firstly, it presents analysis to explain 
specific characteristics of intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany. 
Secondly, it presents arguments to answer the main research question. In three 
main analyses, 7.1 attempts to explain why and how there have been five specific 
characteristics to implementation of intercultural dialogue between Iran and 
Germany. They are: 1) with an active role of German actors, 2) accompanied by 
Iranian actors, 3) in some cases with new and advanced forms, and 4) frequently 
in the academic and educational field. The three analyses and points are 
summarized in table 13.  
Table 13. Analysis of foreign cultural policy structure, organizational efficiency and 
political considerations of Iran and Germany which form characteristics of intercultural 
dialogue between the two countries between 1998 and 2013 






















 Role of 
state 
Fragmented 
The foreign cultural policy of Iran 
is determined by democratically 
and religiously legitimated sectors 
Integrated 
German foreign cultural policy is 
constructed by a single sector of the 
Federal Republic of Germany in an 
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Not engaged significantly with 
civil society 
The presence of civil society to 
implement cultural and intercultural 
dialogue activities is weak, or it 
does not work in close contact with 
the main Iranian actors. 
Joined with civil society  
Civil society, including 
Mittlerorganisationen and NGOs, has a 
high degree of cooperation with the 
German state to implement cultural 





The diplomacy that governs the 
foreign cultural activities of Iran is 
of an uneven type. Those who do 
not have a rank but hold the 
position of diplomat are also in 
charge of administering it (like 
directors of Rayzani).  
Coordinated diplomacy 
The German diplomacy that governs the 
cultural and intercultural dialogue 
activities has a coordinated model. It has 
connections with authorities from both 






















Cultural actors are specialized 
according to specific expertise, like 
the DAAD on educational activities  
Cultural actors are multi-expertise and 




Rarely old Organizations Mostly old Organizations  
Budget Fixed budget from the Iranian 
parliament, other sources are not 
publicly visible 




Low degree of networking at 
national level, some attempts to 
network with German actors, but no 
successful long-term networking 
High degree of networking at national 
level, attempt to network with Iranian 




Cultural actors on both sides sometimes fail to organize organizational 





Directors have decided on cultural 
activities in a significant way based 
on their background and political 
consideration of their time 
Directors have decided on cultural 
activities, but the organizational 
efficiency is formed in such a way that 
they cannot eliminate a project at will 
transpa
rency 
Low degree of transparency of 
information about organizational 
structure, aims, activities and 
budget via publications 
High transparency of information about 
organizational structure, aims, activities 















s Domestic clash 
Clash between two sectors of the Iranian state 
and change of presidency 
Cautious position of Germany  
The nuclear energy policy and view of 
Ahmadinejad about Israel 
Keepings door open for negotiation 
 
Table 13 presents a summary of the discussion in 7.1 of this chapter. Analysis in 
7.1 is divided into three main arguments: firstly political considerations of Iran 
and Germany, secondly the foreign cultural policy structure, and thirdly the 
organizational efficiency of the cultural organizations of the both sides. Each of 
these arguments is explained with more specific arguments and facts.  
As table 13 shows, domestic clashes inside Iran played a role politically. The 
religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state did not have a sympathetic 
relationship with the administration of Khatami (1997-2005) but shared more 
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similar views with Ahmadinejad’s administration (2005-2013). This domestic 
clash influenced the intercultural dialogue with the West, including Germany. The 
change of presidents and the duality of the political system therefore both had a 
negative influence on developing and concentrating on intercultural dialogue. The 
cautious position of Germany towards Iran is also discussed. The nuclear energy 
policy of Iran at the time of Ahmadinejad and Ahmadinejad’s anti-Israeli rhetoric, 
created some concerns for the German side about focusing on intercultural 
dialogue with Iran. Still, as has been discussed, intercultural dialogue, together 
with other cultural activities, created a chance for Iran and Germany to keep the 
door open to talk about controversial international issues like Iran’s nuclear 
project. Such a door has not been open to other Western countries like America.  
The second argument presented in 7.1.2 is on foreign cultural policy structure. It 
argues firstly the role of the state in forming foreign cultural policy. It explains 
that the foreign cultural policy of Iran is not determined by a united body of the 
state but by two democratically and religiously legitimated sectors. They have 
shaped the cultural policy of Iran on a worldwide level, but their duality leads to 
fragmentation in the work of their cultural organizations. For instance ICRO 
(consequently its branch office, Rayzani) as the agent of the religiously 
legitimated sector, and the foreign ministry (consequently the cultural section of 
the Iranian embassy), have cooperated in a fragmented way. In Germany, 
according to the results of this study, there is an integrated German foreign 
cultural policy. It is constructed in an integrated way by a united sector of the 
federal republic.  
Engagement of civil society in foreign cultural activities is another key issue of 
this argument. In Iran, such an engagement has not been observed. But in 
Germany civil society, including Mittlerorganisationen and NGOs, has a high 
degree of cooperation with the German state to implement German cultural 
activities abroad. Thirdly, the type of diplomacy in the foreign cultural policy of 
both countries is analyzed. In Iran there is an uneven kind of diplomacy that deals 
with foreign cultural activities. Those who do not have a rank but hold the 
position of diplomat are in charge of administering it (like directors of Rayzani). 
Decision making about foreign cultural policy is mostly by the authorities that are 
in charge of Iranian domestic and national issues (like the minister of Islamic 
culture and guidance, who is the head of the higher council of ICRO). Finally, 
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Iranian diplomats do not work closely with civil society actors on foreign cultural 
activities. In contrast, on the German side foreign cultural activities are 
administered with coordinated diplomacy. It governs the cultural and intercultural 
dialogue activities with some connections to authorities from the Länder and 
federal offices of Germany, although the foreign ministry diplomats ultimately 
decide on it. Also, trained diplomats and foreign cultural experts mostly play a 
key role in shaping the activities. Finally, they also use the assistance of civil 
society. 
The third argument to analyze the characteristics of the intercultural dialogue is 
presented in 7.1.3. It discusses organizational efficiency in the following seven 
points: 1) The expertise of the cultural actors in both Iran and Germany: in 
Germany, most of the cultural actors of intercultural dialogue have a specific area 
of expertise, like the DAAD on educational activities. Iranian cultural actors have 
had multiple areas of expertise and have not concentrated on a specific area. 2) 
The age of cultural organizations: only one of the discussed Iranian actors of 
intercultural dialogue has worked for a long time, whereas most of the German 
cultural actors are longer term. 3) Budget and financial support: the German 
government has assisted the cultural actors with fixed and project–based budgets; 
the Iranian state has meanwhile mostly offered a fixed budget. It seems that the 
project-based budget has been a good strategy to encourage German cultural 
actors to compete and prove their competence in intercultural dialogue activities. 
4) The ability of cultural actors in networking: Iranian actors have a low degree of 
networking at national level. They made some attempts to network with German 
actors, but they did not successfully network long term. On the German side, a 
high degree of networking at national level has been seen. The cultural actors 
have also attempted to network with Iranian actors. But they have not been 
successful in long-term networking. 5) Incompatibility of cultural organizations: 
cultural organizations on both sides sometimes fail to achieve cooperation simply 
because the structure of their organizations and their expertise are incompatible. 
For instance, the DAAD is not understood by Iranian participants of this study as 
part of civil society because it has a foreign ministry budget. In Iran there are 
rarely organizations like Mittlerorganisationen, nor is there an association of 
universities like the DAAD. 6) The role of directors in the cultural organizations: 
directors in Iranian cultural organizations have decided on cultural activities 
according to their background and political considerations of their time. The 
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German directors have also changed some cultural activities and target countries, 
but the organizational efficiency is such that they could not eliminate a project at 
will. 7) Transparency: there has been little transparency in the Iranian 
organizations about their organizational structure, aims, activities and budget. 
That contrasts with Germany, where there has been a high degree of transparency 
of information about German organizational structure, aims, activities and budget. 
Poor transparency may have been a reason for a lack of awareness of some 
positive dimensions of the Iranian cultural actors.  
But what does this analysis mean for this study? How can it explain the different 
characteristics of intercultural dialogue?  
Intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany have been implemented actively 
by the Germany cultural actors and not the Iranian cultural actors, because the 
integrated structure of German foreign cultural policy was able to mobilize its 
instruments and means better than Iran, the analysis of this study suggests.  
There have been some new and modern forms of intercultural dialogue activities 
implemented by the German side. Analysis of this study suggests that the 
organizational efficiency of the German cultural actors was enough strong to 
create such new forms of activities. The diverse expertise of the old German 
organizations with long-term experience of implementing cultural activities 
enables them to not stick to normal activities like holding a “conference” or 
“meeting” for experts, but to also try other forms of activities which indirectly 
offer ordinary German and Iranian participants the opportunity of dialogue, for 
example through a “student exchange” or “internship” for young graduates.  
Most of the intercultural dialogue activities undertaken from 1998 to 2013 are in 
the field of education, schools and teaching. This characteristic can be explained 
with two reasons. Firstly, the strong potential of Iranian participants and 
educational institutions to be partners of German academic projects, as mentioned 
several times in the field study. Secondly, because of political clashes inside Iran 
on one hand and political considerations of Germany towards Iran on the other, 
“apolitical” issues or projects seem to survive better than others.  
Intercultural dialogue was affected by the presidential change in Iran. This is also 
one of the characteristics of the intercultural dialogue. The analysis of the study 
suggests that Iran’s internal political clashes have been complicated and cannot be 
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explained simply by the duality of the political system. In Iran at the time of 
Khatami there was a chance for reformists to develop international relations with 
the West, including Germany. This chance had a positive influence on 
intercultural dialogue. However, some of the efforts of Iran’s reformists were 
eliminated by the domestic problems created for Khatami and his administration 
by hardliners and the network of the religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian 
system. The change of president to Ahmadinejad was a new era. In this period the 
president shared a similar conservative or radical view to that of the religiously 
legitimated sector towards the relationship with the West. Therefore intercultural 
dialogue generally faced more problems.  
The second subchapter of chapter seven, 7.2, presents arguments to answer the 
main research question. To do so, the aims of Iranian and German foreign cultural 
policy and the main actors that play a role in implementing the cultural activities 
in the framework of specific discourses of intercultural dialogue were reviewed 
again. From examining those aims and achievements of intercultural dialogue and 
the five characteristics of intercultural dialogue, the study concludes that 
intercultural dialogue played a supplemental role in the foreign cultural policy of 
both countries towards each other. Nevertheless, intercultural dialogue was able to 
play a significant role in strengthening the foreign cultural policy of Germany 
towards Iran. The German actors appeared active in this field. In Iran, meanwhile, 
intercultural dialogue was able to play only a minor role in supporting its foreign 
cultural policy Iran towards Germany. The Iranian cultural actors appeared as the 
accompanier in this field.   
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This chapter deals with the concluding discussions. An analysis of the role of 
intercultural dialogue in the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany towards 
each other is the main aim of the study. How can a theoretical discussion be 
constructed to answer this question? This study is conducted based on grounded 
theory. The investigation relies on empirical data from two field studies of Iran 
and Germany. The data were collected over more than five years using theoretical 
sampling. What appears here as the theoretical discussion is the analysis that is 
revised, reviewed and re-conceptualized several times. This theoretical discussion 
is an outcome of exploring the aims, backgrounds and activities of organizations 
which set the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany on the one hand, and 
their cultural actors that implement intercultural dialogue activities on the other. 
Activities which have been specifically implemented under discourses of 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue (on the German side), dialogue among 
civilizations and interfaith dialogue (on the Iranian side) are the focus of this 
study. The relevant activities of the cultural section of the German embassy in 
Iran, the DAAD, ifa, and the Goethe Institute as well as those of the Iranian 
Rayzani in Germany and the International Center for Dialogue among 
Civilizations were explicitly explored in this study. At least 200 texts from the 
Iranian side in Farsi and 150 texts from the German side in German, including 
annual reports, budget bills, bulletins, legal statements, regulations and similar, 
have been studied and analyzed. Moreover, at least 80 interviews have been 
conducted in this research in face-to-face talks with participants, by telephone and 
email. Five groups of politicians, high-ranking officials, members of staff, 
informed individuals and participants of specific dialogue projects are interviewed 
in this study. The main discussion of the study is therefore constructed from 
analyzing different types of data and combining them with the researcher’s 
observation in the field study of Iran and Germany.  
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This chapter consists of five subchapters. The theoretical discussion of the study 
is presented in 8.1. Subchapter 8.2 presents contributions of this study to the 
academic debates. There are some perspectives of the intercultural dialogue 
between Iran and Germany that should be considered in more depth. They are 
presented in 8.3. Because the researcher faced several open questions which are 
interesting and relevant for deeper investigation, in 8.4 some of these questions 
are presented for future studies. 
 
 
8.1 Main Discussion: Supplemental Role of Intercultural Dialogue  
This research began by explaining two examples of cultural events between Iran 
and Germany. One of them was a music concert of the Berlin Staatskapelle 
Orchestra, which was scheduled to be held in Tehran in 2015 but canceled 
because its conductor had an Israeli passport. The second event was an exhibition 
of art pieces collected by the wife of a former Pahlavi king but officially owned 
by a museum in Tehran. It was planned to hold the exhibition in 2016 in Berlin. 
Nevertheless, it too was canceled. These two examples are symbolic of how 
cultural relations between Iran and Germany are constantly affected by political 
tensions. This raised the question of how and why cultural actors on both sides 
have not given up initiating cultural activities, despite all difficulties. By taking a 
deeper look into the cultural activities between the two countries, the study 
showed that they are not limited to those which were picked up on by the media. 
Some have been implemented gradually and quietly between participants of both 
countries for nearly two decades. One type of these cultural activities is 
implemented within the framework of intercultural dialogue. This led to the 
assumption that the stability of the intercultural dialogue activities might have 
encouraged cultural actors to not give up on implementing cultural activities, 
despite all the political difficulties. For that reason, it was supposed that 
intercultural dialogue plays a significant role in their foreign cultural policies. 
Hence the main research question is formed as follows: What role has 
intercultural dialogue played with regard to the foreign cultural policy of Iran and 
Germany towards each other, and why?   
The main discussion of this study is that the intercultural dialogue has played a 
supplemental role in the foreign cultural policy of Germany towards Iran as well 
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as in the foreign cultural policy of Iran towards Germany. This can be ascribed to 
differences firstly, in the structure of foreign cultural policy of the two countries, 
secondly, in the organizational efficiency of their cultural actors, and thirdly, in 
their political considerations. As a result, intercultural dialogue played a different 
supplemental role in the foreign cultural policy of each country. Intercultural 
dialogue did not support Iran and Germany in pursuing their foreign cultural 
policy aims in the same way given the aforementioned differences, but overall it 
helped them to strengthen their connection with the other side.  
On the German side, the (idea and budget of) intercultural dialogue assisted 
German cultural actors to appear more active in the cultural relationship with Iran. 
That does not mean that the “European-Islamic cultural dialogue” has been taken 
up by all German intercultural dialogue actors in a similar way, nor does it mean 
that dialogue with Iran has been a priority for them all. It also does not mean that, 
in all the years from 1998 to 2013, there was no political tension between the two 
countries and the German intercultural dialogue actors could create opportunities 
for cultural dialogue for both Iranian and German participants without difficulty. 
So why, then, did the German cultural actors appear active? The results of the 
study on the characteristics of German foreign cultural policy and on the 
organizational efficiency of the German cultural organizations can help us to 
understand why. For instance, a cultural organization like ifa did not necessarily 
have an expert who is familiar with Iran (among other Muslim countries) in the 
early years when the European-Islamic cultural dialogue was initiated (2001 to 
2005). Dialogue with Iran was also not a priority for ifa because of some political 
concerns of its high-ranking officials. Nevertheless, it still got involved in 
dialogue with Iran, for the following reasons: Firstly, because of the structure of 
German foreign cultural policy, ifa, like other Mittlerorganisationen, was 
informed to apply for European-Islamic cultural dialogue and consequently for the 
corresponding budget. Secondly, because of ifa’s experience in the 
implementation of cultural activities like internships for young graduates and 
“Media Dialogue” with other countries (organizational efficiency), it had the 
capacity to propose motivating projects to obtain the budget. Thus it could 
implement intercultural dialogue with Iran. The DAAD is the next example. The 
DAAD had faced limitations to working in Iran from 2008 to 2012, but it 
managed to involve Iran in the specific project of “European-Islamic cultural 
dialogue”. Firstly, again like ifa, it had an opportunity to apply for the relevant 
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budget (due to structure of German foreign cultural policy). Secondly, it had 
extensive experience of working with participants (academics and students) from 
other countries. Thirdly, even in those years when it could not officially be active 
in Iran, its activities continued with the help of the cultural section of the German 
embassy in Iran (positive points of networking and integrated structure of German 
foreign cultural policy). Thus it simply used these potentials and advantages to 
appear active in the intercultural dialogue with Iran. The DAAD and ifa are the 
examples which show the strength of the German integrated foreign cultural 
policy and its organizational efficiency.  
Sometimes “integrated foreign cultural policy” and “organizational efficiency” 
were not the case. For instance, the Goethe Institute and DAAD count as major 
cultural organizations which assist the foreign ministry to implement cultural 
activities abroad. It was mentioned by some members of staff of other German 
Mittlerorganisationen that they automatically received the budget of the 
“European-Islamic cultural dialogue”, without any requirement to prove their 
competence in intercultural dialogue activities. Such examples were rare, 
however.  
The cooperation among the Mittlerorganisationen, civil society and the German 
foreign ministry has been key to enabling intercultural dialogue activities to be 
implemented continuously. Consequently, intercultural dialogue activities 
strengthen the position of these actors in Iran. In some cases, like that of the 
DAAD, they have a good impact on building trust amongst Iranian universities 
and ministry authorities. Intercultural dialogue has therefore assisted in achieving 
more aims of German foreign cultural policy and has played a supplemental role 
in the foreign cultural policy of Germany towards Iran.    
So what has been the role of intercultural dialogue in the foreign cultural policy of 
Iran towards Germany? With regard to the discourse of “interfaith dialogue”, the 
results of the study suggest that it was neither a unique opportunity for the 
Interfaith Dialogue Center of ICRO to organize regular meetings with German 
partners, nor did it benefit Rayzani in implementing long-term interfaith meetings 
with the help of other Iranian religious organizations located in Germany. Among 
the Iranian diplomats and politicians also there has been no objection politically 
against Germany. There has also been no lack of religious partners in Germany, 
because the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland and Evangelische Akademie 
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Loccum, for instance, have both implemented interfaith dialogue and invited 
Iranian delegations with the help of Rayzani or also ICRO. The analysis of the 
study in chapter 7 on the fragmented foreign cultural policy of Iran and its 
organizational efficiency makes the reason easier to understand. It seems that part 
of the ability of Rayzani to function has been lost because of the clash with the 
cultural section of the Iranian embassy. Consequently, Rayzani did not 
concentrate on the aims and available cultural discourses (like the interfaith 
dialogue which has been organized since 1994 by ICRO) because of time and 
effort spent on dealing with cultural affairs with the embassy. The presidential 
change in Iran also played a role, but only to a limited extent. For instance, at the 
time of Khatami, the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland initiated a triangle 
interfaith dialogue with Iranian partners (including some delegates from ICRO), 
which continued until 2008. At the time of Ahmadinejad, however, such interfaith 
dialogue was not observed.  
With regard to the discourse of “dialogue among civilizations”, results of this 
study suggest that it did not play a significant role in initiating actual programs for 
both Iranian and German participants; nevertheless, as a motivating rhetoric it 
encouraged many German cultural actors and diplomats to consider working with 
Iran culturally. The reason for the failure of the dialogue among civilizations to 
create practical projects for Iranian and German participants, and through that 
create a cultural image for Iran in Germany, is not that there is any grudge against 
Germany politically. Some other reasons are significant. Firstly, the fragmented 
foreign cultural policy of Iran must be considered. Since 1994, ICRO has been 
responsible for foreign cultural policy, but its role was not recognized by 
President Khatami when he wanted to systematically implement his idea of 
dialogue among civilizations. This duality resulted in the creation of the short-
lived International Center for Dialogue among Civilizations. Secondly, the 
ICDAC had organizational restrictions on implementing long-term activities. 
Even when it was officially working, it did not concentrate on a specific activity 
with a specific foreign partner. The young ICDAC experienced different types of 
activities under the three presidents, which again shows that organizational 
efficiency was not one of its strengths.  
Although the two Iranian discourses of the intercultural dialogue were not used by 
the cultural actors systematically or specifically to develop cultural activities with 
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Germany, they still gradually helped the Iranian cultural actors to assist in cultural 
activities implemented by the German cultural actors. In the specific political 
atmosphere of Iran, in which most of the cultural activities with the “West” can 
easily be challenged by hardliners and conservatives, the two discourses work as a 
guideline or a manifest for the Iranian cultural actors. At the time of Khatami, for 
instance, as mentioned in chapter 6, the discourse of dialogue among civilizations 
was used in diplomatic meetings of Iran with the Western partners, including 
Germany.  
The next example is the cooperation of some universities of Qum in the 
European-Islamic cultural dialogue of the DAAD, which took place on the theme 
of “interfaith dialogue”. Firstly, it is important to remember that dialogue has two 
sides: it does not matter if one side is interested in entering into dialogue; if the 
other side is not, dialogue cannot be conducted. Consequently, if one result of the 
study is that German cultural actors played an active role in the implementation of 
intercultural dialogue, it also means that there have been actors on the Iranian side 
who actively made opportunities for dialogue possible. Secondly, from the aims 
of Iranian foreign cultural policy, the aims of ICRO, it is clear that Iran cares 
about accompanying international cultural organizations and engaging in 
international cultural activities. The role of intercultural dialogue in Iranian 
foreign cultural policy should therefore be regarded as supplemental, because it 
helped to achieve a few aims of the Iranian foreign cultural policy.  
The supplemental role of intercultural dialogue in the foreign cultural policy of 
Iran and Germany is clearly not the same. The dialogue based on the potential of 
the foreign cultural policy and abilities of cultural actors in each country has 
played a supplemental role. Because Germany has an integrated foreign cultural 
policy and its cultural actors work with stronger organizational efficiencies, 
intercultural dialogue was able to play a stronger supplemental role in achieving 
its cultural aims in Iran. Because Iran’s foreign cultural policy is fragmented and 
its cultural actors work with some organizational inefficiencies, intercultural 
dialogue did not achieve a great number of Iran’s cultural aims towards Germany, 
although it did achieve a few. It therefore still played a supplemental role, but to a 
lesser degree than in Germany.  
The results of this study must not be generalized as applying to the role of 
intercultural dialogue in any foreign cultural policy, or even to the role of the 
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intercultural dialogue of Iran and Germany in any time period. Intercultural 
dialogue, according to the results of this study, had a supplemental role in the 
foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany in a specific period, between 1998 
and 2013. It is quite possible that a researcher working on the role of intercultural 
dialogue between Germany and Morocco at another time will have quite different 
results. The analysis here shows that intercultural dialogue is able to play a 
supplemental role in a foreign cultural policy which has either a fragmented 
structure (but still aims to cooperate with international cultural organizations) or 
an integrated structure.  
 
 
8.2 Contribution of this Research in the Context of Academic 
Debates 
In addition to analysis in the context of Iran and Germany’s intercultural dialogue, 
the present study also contributes to existing literature. The study not only 
investigates intercultural dialogue in the context of foreign cultural policy but also 
highlights its achievements, such as “opening doors” to Iranian and German 
culture. Moreover, this study contributes to the current research on grounded 
theory. It not only applies this method in the context of political and social science 
but also deals with a large volume of collected data; neither is common in the 
current research. Furthermore, the study contributes to themes like diplomacy and 
science diplomacy in the context of the implementation of intercultural dialogue 
between two countries. These contributions are discussed in detail in this chapter.  
 
8.2.1 Proposing a new Dimension to Intercultural Dialogue Research 
The review in chapter 3 of the academic debates in the realm of intercultural 
dialogue shows that its religious and civilizational dimensions are considered key 
to contributing to conflict resolution and constructing peace between groups of 
people who are divided by different faiths and cultures. It has also been mentioned 
that intercultural dialogue in educational (Graf 2014, Sterkens 2001, Yaron 1993) 
and civil society (ITAD/COWI 2012) fields has attracted attention because of its 
practical relevance in promoting training methods and strengthening human 
cooperation. Some studies also consider intercultural dialogue in the context of 
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political aims (Ferdiou 2003, Näss 2010, Schirch 2010, Wiafe 2010, Wiater 2010, 
Wrogemann 2006, Yeʼor 2002). They focus on the role that dialogue can play to 
decrease security concerns. Nevertheless, there has been a gap in the studies in the 
realm of foreign cultural policy and intercultural dialogue.  
It has been significant to observe that some countries do put effort, time and 
financial resources into extending projects under the discourses of intercultural 
dialogue. But why is that the case? The academic debates so far do not deal with 
what it is that convinces the policy makers, diplomats and high-ranking officials 
of a country to act on the discourses of intercultural dialogue. The main 
assumptions are that either they genuinely believe that they are assisting with 
world conflict generally, or they want to have dialogue with specific countries to 
solve conflicts or strengthen their friendship with them. Another possibility is that 
a country would use the instrument of intercultural dialogue with a country which 
had no or little political relationship with it. The absence of studies dealing with 
these issues made the question of this research relevant. This study attempted to 
follow a specific assumption that states engage in intercultural dialogue not just 
because of their asserted aims (using interfaith dialogue to contribute to world 
peace or European-Islamic cultural dialogue to prevent terrorism), but also 
because intercultural dialogue can achieve some aims of their foreign cultural 
policy abroad. The question of “which role has intercultural dialogue played with 
regard to the foreign cultural policy of Iran and Germany towards each other, and 
why?” has been worth asking and was important to answer for that reason. As a 
result, this study provides a new aspect of intercultural dialogue, which is its 
relevance to and harmony with the foreign cultural policy of countries. 
The role of intercultural dialogue in the foreign cultural policy of a country can be 
“supplemental” if the country is strongly committed to implementing it in its 
cultural activities abroad. Germany’s foreign cultural policy is constructed in an 
integrated way, its organizational efficiency can support long-term cultural 
projects, and its cultural actors have rich experience of implementing cultural 
activities abroad. Thus intercultural dialogue has played a supplemental role in 
achieving many of its foreign cultural policy aims. If, however, a country has a 
dual political system, a fragmented foreign cultural policy, and some deficits in its 
organizational efficiency, intercultural dialogue still plays a “supplemental role” 
but can only achieve a few aims of foreign cultural policy.  
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8.2.2 Re-contextualizing Grounded Theory 
There are a number of reasons why grounded theory is a proper methodology for 
this research. As mentioned in chapter 4, a theory which could efficiently guide 
exploring the role of intercultural dialogue in the foreign cultural policy of Iran 
and Germany has not been found. A method was also needed that can deal with 
various unequal data, different political and cultural contexts and different 
routines of field study in Iran and Germany. But what is the contribution of this 
study with regard to applying grounded theory in the current literature? Charmaz 
argues that researchers should be confident of investigating “small number of 
interviewees” (Charmaz 2014: 25) or “small samples” (p. 41), because grounded 
theory is a method which enables them to analyze case studies deeply. This study 
has dealt with a huge amount of data. There was a large number of interviewees 
(81), for example. Because intercultural dialogue in the context of foreign cultural 
policy of Iran and Germany has a variety of sub-themes, it was important to 
investigate how intercultural dialogue worked in the view of informed individuals, 
members of staff and high-ranking officials or relevant organizations, diplomats 
and participants of specific activities. Therefore, according to experience from this 
study in the case of multi-subject research, a small number of interviewees would 
not be appropriate. Moreover, most studies which apply grounded theory are in 
nursing and similar fields (Mills et al. 2008: 2). In this study, however, grounded 
theory is applied in a social science field. It fits the issue of intercultural dialogue 
specifically and a comparative country-level study generally. It makes discovery 
of different layers of the function of intercultural dialogue in Iran and Germany 
possible. For instance, there is no hypothesis at the beginning of the research that 
the structure of the political system of both countries can influence the role of 
intercultural dialogue. This point is made solely by considering the data and 
observing the field study of Iran and Germany and comparing them through 
grounded theory.  
 
8.2.3 Combining Elements in Diplomacy Theory 
Some new trends of diplomacy (Johnson 2011) were reviewed in 3.2.5. These 
trends are threefold: fragmentation, concentration, and diffusion. In fragmented 
diplomacy, government departments which are traditionally associated with 
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merely domestic issues play a role. The concentration trend is explained by the 
cooperation between cultural actors in national and international levels, but under 
the supervision of authorities who are in charge of foreign policy. In the diffusion 
trend a democracy is governed by professional diplomats who find themselves 
required to engage with an increasing number of nongovernmental and civil 
society actors.  
What is discovered in this study and can be added to the academic debate of 
Johnson is that there are also trends, as observed in the case of Germany, which 
combine some elements of the concentration and diffusion trends. Studying 
intercultural dialogue activities on the German side has revealed that, firstly, it has 
a diplomacy which is administered by authorities in national (Länder) and 
international (federal) levels;138 secondly, there is close contact between its 
diplomats and the cultural actors that form civil society; and thirdly, different 
parts of this system work together in a coordinated way. Hence there is a trend 
which may has to be called coordinated in diplomacy.  
The case study of Iran illustrated that its diplomacy fits both fragmented and 
concentration trends according to Johnson. On one hand, key decisions like 
appointing the director of Rayzani is decided by the heads of those parts of the 
state which decide on domestic policy, for instance by the minister of Islamic 
culture and guidance. On the other, diplomats who are trained by the Iranian 
foreign ministry also deal with some cultural activities. The relationship of 
administrators (domestic and foreign officers/diplomats/members of staff) with 
civil society is not strong. This is a type of uneven (or inconsistent) diplomacy.  
As a result, this study proposes that “coordinated diplomacy” and “uneven 
diplomacy” should be added to Johnson’s theoretical discussion regarding trends 
of diplomacy.  
 
8.2.4 Opening Doors to German and Iranian Cultures through Intercultural 
Dialogue 
The intercultural dialogue activities between Iranian and German participants 
have been implemented under different discourses. As discussed in 5.1.3, 
                                                          
138 However, decisions on foreign cultural policy issues are under the authority of the federal government 
generally and the German foreign ministry specifically.  
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“European-Islamic cultural dialogue” originally aimed to prevent terrorism and 
decrease conflicts between Muslim and Western countries. “Interfaith dialogue” 
was initially implemented in the early post-Iranian Revolution period as a way for 
Iran to communicate with the world through religious institutions, as explained in 
5.2.3. The “dialogue among civilizations” also originally aimed at decreasing 
Islamophobia and was used politically as a cultural instrument to détente, as 
discussed in 5.2.4. It is difficult, however, to measure whether all these aims have 
been achieved by the mentioned intercultural dialogue discourses. One of the 
reasons is that some of these aims are so abstract that one cannot claim with 
confidence that they have been achieved completely or at all. For instance, the 
main reason for declining international tensions under Khatami could lie in his 
other political plans and not merely in his idea of dialogue among civilizations. 
With regard to “European-Islamic cultural dialogue” also, one cannot claim with 
confidence that it was the main reason that Germany had few difficulties with 
terrorism in the post-9/11 period (up to 2013, which is the end of the period of 
analysis of this study). Moreover, Iran has not been among those Muslim 
countries which were the target group of German terrorism prevention. 
Nevertheless, the achievements of participants in the cultural activities under the 
discourses of intercultural dialogue in some cases were no less valuable than the 
stated aims which may or may not have been achieved.  
Through the opportunity of participation in the intercultural dialogue activities the 
participants could understand specific dimensions of Iranian and German culture 
and society. These dimensions are not reflected in books or media programs. In 
the “peaceful change” project of the DAAD, which was conducted by Duisburg-
Essen University, for instance, the German students had a chance to encounter 
new images of political life of Iranian women in Iran. In private meetings they got 
to know an Iranian female political activist and in informal contacts in different 
Iranian cities they realized that the wearing of the hijab is not the same throughout 
the country. In the north of Iran women wear a lose hijab in the streets, while in 
big cities like Tehran there is a combination of modern and traditional hijab. 
These are complex and multidimensional but a self-discovered image of 
contemporary Iranian culture, which the German participants had a chance to 
experience through intercultural dialogue. Iranian students also had an opportunity 
to experience different images of German culture. For instance, in the peaceful 
change project some of them could revise the perfect stereotype image that they 
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had about Germany. One Iranian student revised and updated the image he had of 
the clean streets of Germany after he traveled to some German cities through this 
project. This self-discovered image of contemporary German culture is also a 
result of intercultural dialogue. Intercultural dialogue achieved some aims beyond 
objectives such as “to contribute German values” (Auswärtiges Amt 2000a: 1-2) 
and “introducing the principles of Islamic thoughts” (Rasmi newspaper 
05.02.1996). By opening doors to Iranian and German culture, it enables 
participants to discover different dimensions of each other’s culture. 
As the analysis of chapter 7 showed, the intercultural dialogue between Iran and 
Germany has also been a reason that the door to negotiation with the Iranian state 
over controversial issues like the nuclear program has remained open. This gave 
German diplomats and politicians, compared with other Western countries, the 
advantage of being a partner of dialogue with Iran in international affairs, because 
the two countries have more up-to-date information about each other and “know” 
each other relatively better than other countries.  
This study adds to the academic debates the insight that intercultural dialogue has 
opened doors to and revealed diverse dimensions of Iranian and German culture. 
It has helped participants of two countries to observe things that they could not 
see easily through news and media. Intercultural dialogue has helped them to get 
to know different dimensions of their respective cultures better. 
 
8.2.5 Expanding Copeland’s View regarding Science Diplomacy 
As discussed in 3.2.5, Daryl Copeland argues that there is a specific type of 
diplomacy between countries which is based on their academic and education 
exchanges and on apolitical issues such as natural disasters. This diplomacy is 
called science diplomacy. In his view, science diplomacy uses neutral language to 
connect countries and through this advantage can successfully connect them even 
when they face difficulties in their regular diplomatic relationship.  
This study proposes to add one more aspect to this view: Science diplomacy is a 
relevant instrument for continuing the relationship between countries that are in 
regular diplomatic contact with each other (in the case of Iran and Germany, there 
was no breach in their diplomatic relationship between 1998 and 2013), but 
political tensions indirectly affect their relationship. The result of this study 
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demonstrates that educational and academic exchanges varied little (and in some 
cases even increased) in the relationship between Iran and Germany when 
political issues were indirectly affecting their political relationship. As already 
mentioned in chapter 2, academic exchange has long been part of the relationship 
between the two countries. Iran and Germany have a history of university 
cooperation dating back at least to 1907. Therefore it seems that the academic 
field is rather a “safe ground” to perpetuate the relationship between Iran and 
Germany over time. The academic exchanges have been influenced less than other 
cultural fields by the political tensions between two countries. Hence intercultural 
dialogue between Iran and Germany has created a great opportunity for science 
diplomacy. Academic exchanges have been operated in fields which were difficult 
for traditional German cultural actors to enter. An organization like the DAAD 
was able to support 21 instances of academic cooperation between Iranian and 
German universities from 2005 to 2013 (as clarified in 6.2.2.3) in a variety of 
fields, not just engineering and medicine but also theater and film, under the 
budget of European-Islamic cultural dialogue. It is worth remembering that the 
Goethe Institute has not had any great chance to work officially in Iran and 
successfully develop arts projects since 1986.  
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8.3 Future Perspectives for Intercultural Dialogue between Iran 
and Germany 
 
This subchapter considers some perspectives based on the results of the study.  
 
8.3.1 Concentration and Dispersion of Cultural Actors 
At the end of the research, it is appropriate to look at a general map showing 
where the Iranian and German national and foreign cultural organizations are 
located in Iran and Germany. This map aims to help focus on important points in 
the relationship between Iran and Germany as it has emerged in this study. Figure 
16 contains this map. 
Figure 15. Map of Iranian and German national and foreign cultural organizations in Iran 
and Germany, compiled by the researcher 
 
Source: by the researcher 
The first point which has been significant in the field study and would potentially 
play a role in the intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany in future is the 
concentration and dispersion of cultural organizations in the two countries. 
Although figure 16 does not reflect all cultural organizations discussed in chapter 
6, it generally gives an accurate picture of those which are active or well-known. 
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On the Iranian side, the cultural organizations, whether Iranian-based such as 
IPIS, ICRO and Kanun, or German-based such as the DAAD and the buildings 
and contact office of the Goethe Institute, are concentrated in the capital city 
Tehran. On the German side, the cultural organizations, whether German or 
dependent on Iran, are not located solely in the capital city Berlin, but in other 
cities in Germany too. For instance, in Munich are both the main headquarters of 
the Goethe Institute and an Iranian consulate, which potentially offers a chance 
for cultural activities. In Hamburg there is the Islamic Center of Hamburg and an 
Iranian consulate. In Bonn are the main headquarters of the AvH and DAAD; the 
former Iranian embassy, which is occasionally active, is also located there.139 
One reason for the concentration of cultural organizations in Iran and their 
distribution in Germany may be the political structure of the two countries. Iran is 
governed based on a unitary or concentrated system, whereas Germany has a 
federal system. Nevertheless, according to the results of this study, the Iranian 
government tends to control the cultural image created of Iran abroad. Therefore 
by concentrating them in one place, it has a better chance to monitor activities of 
the cultural actors. What can this concentration mean for Iranian and German 
cultural organizations? It means that in future Iranian cultural organizations, those 
which are more dependent on the democratically legitimated sector would still 
face some restrictions in their activities. The German cultural organizations are 
not located across Iran but concentrated in Tehran, although it seems that they 
have managed with this limitation over the years. They have worked with a great 
degree of coordination with the cultural section of the German embassy and found 
their applicants through this section’s existing networks in Iranian society. 
Therefore, it seems that they can efficiently use the opportunity of working in Iran 
even if they are concentrated in one city.  
Distribution of cultural organizations in Germany can have potential for 
developing cultural activities and specifically intercultural dialogue for Iran in the 
future. For reasons which are discussed in this research, including the fragmented 
structure of Iranian foreign cultural policy and low level of organizational 
efficiency, the Iranian cultural organizations have not used the opportunity of 
being located in different cities in Germany. But there is still a promising 
perspective for their active role in future.  
                                                          
139 For instance, at the time of the Iranian presidential election, the former Iranian embassy in Bonn was a 
voting station, according to observation of the researcher. 
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8.3.2 Continuing Accompanying Role of Iranian Actors 
According to the results of this study, the active role of the German cultural actors 
in implementing intercultural dialogue activities for both Iranian and German 
participants can also be attributed to the accompanying role played by the Iranian 
authorities and cultural actors. But this role may be endangered in future if 
German cultural actors put issues on the platform of intercultural dialogue 
activities that challenge Islamic values and those of the Iranian state. For instance, 
as mentioned in 6.2.5.5, the issue of “separation of religion and state” in a 
pedagogic program of the PAD could be sensitive. Teachers from Muslim 
countries, including Iran, were participants in this project. In Iran, officially, the 
separation of state and religion does not apply. The other sensitive issue was 
reflecting the political crisis of Iran in 2009 which became subject of a conference 
held by DW and ifa; and a specific homepage of DW Farsi, Ru dar Ru. Both 
projects were implemented in 2010, in the post-2009 Iranian presidential election 
period. These projects were to remark on the political remark on the situation of 
journalists and freedom of speech in Iran. 
There are some German cultural actors that have implemented cultural activities 
accompanied by Iranian actors and still discuss political issues. For instance, the 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation has managed to hold the annual Hafiz-Goethe 
Dialog since 2010. Loccum Academy has also appeared effective in holding 
seminars and conferences on political issues. It seems that both of these actors 
built a trusting relationship with Iranian actors. For instance, Loccum Academy is 
in contact with Rayzani and the Iranian embassy; while the organizer of the Hafiz-
Goethe Dialog has built a strong connection with academic partners in Iran and 
the Iranian academic community living in Germany. It is therefore expected that 
in future these two organizations would develop more activities between the two 
countries. As mentioned, the DAAD, ifa and the Goethe Institute are also 
expected to continue their active role in future. 
 
8.3.3 Strengthening the Positive Perception of Iran and Germany 
Both Iranian and German participants who have been interviewed in this study 
have pointed out some points about the other country which indicate their positive 
understanding or perception. With the exception of an Iranian diplomat who 
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thought that Germany is too heavily influenced by America and Israel (“Germany 
is still occupied” [Karimi, personal communication, 2013], which refers to the 
occupation of Germany by the Western powers after World War II, from 1945-
1949), nearly all Iranian participants expressed a positive perception of Germany. 
It is significant that they have some mistrust of the West generally, but when it 
comes to Germany, they stated that it is a country which is “more harmless than 
France and Britain to Iran” (Kharazi, personal communication, 2014) and “Iranian 
people have no negative view towards it” (Zahrani, personal communication, 
2013). Therefore although Iran structurally and organizationally did not have a 
strategy to create cultural activities for a German public, it had no specific 
strategy to reject cooperation with German cultural actors. It even had a positive 
understanding regarding Germany. 
The German participants who were interviewed in this study also expressed a 
positive perception of Iran. They emphasized “good relationship between two 
countries in time of different dynasties (Qajar and Pahlavi)” (Mulack, personal 
communication, 2013), “cultural understanding of two nations” (Erbel, personal 
communication, 2015), “academic capability of Iranian applicants” to participate 
in cultural activities of Germany (Mulack, personal communication, 2013; 
Sodeik-Zecha, personal communication, 2014; and Tier, personal communication, 
2013). Concerns about implementation of cultural projects in Iran due to political 
tensions existed, but high-quality applications from Iran and interest in music 
concerts or art exhibitions (Erbel, personal communication, 2015) were reasons to 
keep the relationship with Iran going. It is worth remembering that reformist 
politicians like Khatami have been mentioned positively by German participants 
of the study as well (Kreft, personal communication, 2014 and Maaß, personal 
communication, 2014). As a result, intercultural dialogue as a form of cultural 
activity has helped to create a positive understanding of Iran and Germany.  
 
8.3.4 Vague Definition of Intercultural Dialogue as an Advantage 
What may also be relevant to understanding the perspective of the intercultural 
dialogue between Iran and Germany are the vaguely defined discourses of 
intercultural dialogue in both countries. The “interfaith dialogue” discourse in Iran 
is not defined by its founder organization Hekmat nor by the latter’s successor, the 
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ICD of ICRO. It aims at “creating forum of understanding between different 
religions”, for instance, although the aims themselves are not precisely defined. 
Which faith is respected as religion is also not defined: Whether Buddhism is a 
religion, or Bahaee accepted as a branch of Islam, is not clarified. “Dialogue 
among civilizations” in Iran is not defined specifically either. It has not been clear 
which “civilizations” are the desired partners of this dialogue. And it is less clear 
what the term “civilization” actually means. Such a vague articulation allows 
everybody to judge and decide for themselves whether Iran belongs to a pre-
Islamic (Persian) or an Islamic civilization, or whether Germany represents a 
“Western” civilization. In Germany, the discourse of “European-Islamic cultural 
dialogue” had some ambiguities too. Terminologically it refers to Europe, while 
nearly all the actors that used its financial resource were German. This might 
imply that Germany is perceived as the representative of Europe in a dialogue 
with the Muslim world. But such a view is not openly stated. It is also not clear 
what the term “Muslim” exactly means. The target group of this discourse are the 
Muslim countries which played a role in the context of the 9/11 terrorism. But in 
this case, why have countries which had nothing to do with 9/11 also been 
included in it? It also raises the question of whether the term “Muslim countries” 
is not ignoring or discriminating against the non-Christian minorities of Lebanon 
or Egypt, for instance. 
One possible reason to explain the vagueness of the discourses is that they work 
exactly because they are unclear and not precisely defined. Perhaps if they were 
direct and precise, intercultural dialogue partners could not easily implement or 
participate in cultural activities. The vagueness of the discourses has been helpful 
to reformist groups (or supporters of dialogue) in Iran in cooperating with German 
actors and convince radical and conservative groups. One of the Iranian 
participants of the study has mentioned a benefit of the vague discourse in the 
context of “critical dialogue” (1992-1996). In his view, the combination of 
terminology of “critical” and “dialogue” was beneficial, as it enabled both the 
Iranian and German authorities to uphold their relationship. The reformist Iranian 
authorities could convince the Iranian conservatives that “critical dialogue” is just 
a “dialogue” and has nothing to do with criticism. The German authorities, 
represented by people like Hans-Dietrich Genscher (former German foreign 
minister), could convince the German federal parliament that “critical dialogue” is 
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to “criticize” the Iranian government (Faridzadeh, personal communication, 
2013). In a corresponding way it has benefitted German intercultural dialogue 
actors as well. If they faced criticism from the media or opponents about engaging 
in a program with Iran, they could respond that it is just a dialogue and an 
opportunity to talk to Iranian people, not with the Iranian state. In 3.1.1 a view of 
Leonard Swidler on the use of “dialog” by people who mean something else is 
verified. In his view, they may use the term incorrectly because they want to be 
“less aggressive” in their communication (Swidler 2007: 7). Results of this study 
suggest that using the terminology of “dialogue”, regardless of its accuracy, had 
helped cultural actors of both countries to implement and continue their cultural 
activities for Iranian and German participants. It has been a non-aggressive term 
to convince radical groups in Iran, and a non-decisive term to satisfy German 
opposition groups.  
 
8.3.5 Necessity to promote Knowledge on Domestic Actors of Iran and 
Germany 
The final point is that the Iranian actors of intercultural dialogue should be 
analyzed and categorized with more knowledge and deeper understanding in 
future. There is a general view that the cultural relationship between Iran and 
Germany is becoming more difficult, almost impossible even, because the Iranian 
state monopolizes all cultural actors and tries to represent Iranian culture 
selectively in the religious or ideological terms of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
The suggestion of people who think like that is to stop cooperating with Iranian 
state organizations and focus on civil society in Iran. However, the results of this 
study contradict such a view, firstly because it is difficult, in the current situation 
in Iran, to find a “real” civil society, fully independent of the state. The 
organizations which are working independently from the Iranian state face 
limitations if they cooperate with Western, including German, organizations. In 
addition, only relatively few of them exist, and the variety of their expertise is 
limited. Therefore, it seems that the suggested solution to focus exclusively on 
civil society in Iran would simply reduce the number and quality of cultural 
partners and consequently Iranian participants of the intercultural dialogue 
projects. Secondly, it is wrong to categorize all Iranian state institutions as 
necessarily conservative or radical. Even inside the Organization of Islamic 
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Culture and Relations, there are liberal and open-minded members of staff or 
high-ranking officials who are ready to cooperate in cultural activities with 
Germany, if they are involved at an early stage. For instance, in the case of the 
cancelation of an art exhibition of the Contemporary Museum of Tehran in Berlin 
in 2016, which was mentioned in chapter one of this study, the Organization of 
Islamic Culture and Relations could possibly have helped, if it had been involved 
as a partner from the beginning. Rayzani got the news of the planned exhibition 
not from the Iranian foreign ministry or the Embassy but from the German media, 
and just a few days before it was due to begin (Abbasi, personal communication, 
2016). If the Iranian foreign ministry and the embassy do not want to take 
Rayzani (and consequently ICRO) seriously as a partner for cultural activities in 
Germany, why should Rayzani, through their powerful political contacts in the 
religiously legitimated sector of the Iranian state, try to help to make the 
exhibition happen?  
What can be learned from this example is that, in many cases, people in these 
organizations are wise enough to realize the benefits of cultural relationships with 
Germany, but they feel isolated and excluded and prevented from playing a role. 
That is why it is necessary not to stop working with cultural organizations which 
are dependent on the Iranian state but to try and understand them and find the 
right people working in them. It is important to be patient, spend time on building 
bridges, and build mutual trust. 
 
8.3.6 Considering Germany as a Key to Future Iran-West Relationship 
The historical relationship between Iran and Germany (which is referred to in 
chapter 2 of this research) and the long-standing intercultural dialogue activities 
between the two countries (which are analyzed in chapter 6 and 7) mean that 
Germany, as a specific European country, has a strong connection with Iran. No 
other Western (or European) country has constructed such a cultural connection 
with Iran. This connection makes Germany the key member of the West to deal 
with Iran on difficult issues like the nuclear deal. The 2015 Iranian nuclear deal is 
a very specific issue which not only the German parties on the left but also those 
on the right (like the AfD) are positive towards and inclined to uphold. Germany 
is therefore in a position to use its advantage and solve the sensitive problems and 
improve the relationship between Iran and the West. 
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8.4 Further Research Recommendations 
Following on from the final answer and related points, it is clear that some 
questions have been raised which are interesting topics to be explored and 
answered in the future and in further research. At least four potential issues are 
recommended for further research: decision making, organizational efficiency, 
forms of learning in intercultural dialogue, and cultural exceptionalism. 
In terms of decision making, it would be useful to spend more time exploring 
which key persons in a state decide on foreign cultural policy and how and why 
this is done. This study has explored, on the surface, what happens in decisions on 
German and Iranian foreign cultural policy. It would be valuable if research were 
to go into this issue in depth and discover what the mechanisms are for deciding 
on issues of foreign cultural policy in the target countries of Iran and Germany 
specifically and in other countries in general. It is also relevant to ask whether 
political base, age, education and gender of members of staff, high-ranking 
officials and politicians are significant to decisions on details of foreign cultural 
policy. However, exploring such issues thoroughly is a particular challenge, 
because foreign cultural policy is part of diplomatic and foreign policy. Therefore 
it is difficult not only to identify the people who play such a role in foreign 
cultural policy, but also to convince them to participate in the research.  
The second issue would be to examine the organizational efficiency of 
organizations which play a role in implementing cultural activities abroad. During 
the stage of analyzing the data it became apparent in this study that a significant 
part of the problem of the intercultural dialogue between Iran and Germany 
resulted from the low organizational efficiency of the Iranian side. It would be 
valuable if a researcher with extensive knowledge of management, organizational 
trends or sociology of organizations were to explore the organizational efficiency 
of organizations which are intercultural dialogue actors. 
Thirdly, it would also be important to conduct research on forms of learning in the 
intercultural dialogue activities which are implemented between international 
participants. For instance, whether gender, education or political orientation of 
participants would shape what they learn from and share with the other 
participants? Why? How?  
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Fourthly, in terms of cultural exceptionalism, it would be useful to study whether 
a country would benefit from the opportunity of intercultural dialogue in a 
specific field as a way of demonstrating its skills and its exceptional position. For 
instance, according to the results of this study, the German cultural actors have 
played an active role in implementing intercultural dialogue with the Iranian side. 
Most of the activities have been implemented in the academic field. There were 
some indications in the field study that German universities, for instance, could 
have a tendency to represent themselves as exceptionally brilliant in specific 
academic fields. This assumption has not been examined in this study, however. 
Therefore it is recommended that this issue be considered as a future research 
subject. Dialogue is a communication between two partners. In a dialogue, both 
sides should be treated equally. If the abilities and strengths of one partner in the 
academic field lead him/her to regard and present him/herself as superior to the 
other partner, the intercultural dialogue is challenged. The result of such research 
















Appendix 1: Informal Conversation Data 
At the beginning of the study some individuals were interviewed to make sense of 
the phenomena of intercultural dialogue in both Iran and Germany. All of them 
are visited personally. Some of them are contacted more than one times. They 
have been contacted from 2012 till 2014. The number of participants is seven and 
they are as follow: 
Iranian participants: 
1. Sadegh Tabatabai. He was an Iranian politician and lecturer in University 
of Aachen. In early years after Iranian Revolution her was special Iranian 
envoy in Germany.  
2. Mohammad Khatami. He was president of Iran from 1997 to 2005. 
3. Mohammad Moghaddam. He is the head of the international department of 
the institute and publication of Imam Khomeini 
4. Mohammadreza Beheshti. He is son of Ayatollah Beheshti, one of the 
godfathers of the Islamic Revolution. He teaches Philosophy in University 
of Teheran.  
5. Mohammadreza Saeedabadi. He is the Secretary General of Iran's National 
Commission for UNESCO. 
German participants: 
1. Jochen Hippler. He teaches in Duisburg-Essen University and organized 
some intercultural dialogue activities for ifa and DAAD. 
2. Andrea Lueg. She is free-lance journalist and author.  
Some other interviewees who are visited personally but for different reasons the 
content of their talk is not recorded, are also categorized in category of informal 
conversation. Their name though is listed in category of interviewees because they 
answered to specific questions of the study. Their name comes in appendixes – 
and -.  
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Appendix 2: Interview Data of the First Round 
Table 14. Iranian participants in first round of interviews 
Group   Number of interviewees: 25 
 
Name and position of interviewee Form and date of 
communication 
Political  1 Sadegh Kharazi, former diplomat  Interview 19.02.2013 
2 Seyed Mohammad Kazem Sajadpour, 
former head of IPIS, diplomat 
Informal conversation in 
Tehran, 14.09.2013 
3 Mohammad Mehdi Imanipour, head of 
Rayzani 
Interview in Berlin, 
26.08.2014 
4 Mohmmadreza Dehshiri, head of 
education department, ICRO 





5 Taj-almoluk Maleki, former staff of 
political group of the ICDAC  
Interview, 29.09.2013 
6 Parvin Daeepour, trainer in Dialogue 
Center of Imam Musa Sadr 
Interview in Tehran, 
10.10.2013 
7 Habibi, head of financial department of 
national center for globalization studies 
Interview in Tehran, 
21.09.2013 
8 Saeid Khatibzadeh, office of education 
of Iranian embassy in Germany 
Interview in Berlin, 
27.08.2014 
9 Abdullah Abbasi, in Rayzani Interview in Berlin, 
26.08.2014 
10 Ali Asghar Mosleh, former head of 
Group Philosophy, ICDAC 
Interview in Tehran, 
09.10.2013 
11 Farzad Farahmand, former staff of 
international department of the ICDAC 
Interview, 16.08.2014 
12 Armities Shafiei, former staff of 
international department of the ICDAC  
Skype interview, 
13.03.2015 




14 Vali Teimouri, head of international 
department of National Center for 
Globalization Studies  
Interview in Tehran, 
21.09.2013 
15 Ali Mohammad Helmi, head of Center 
for Interfaith Dialogue, ICRO 
Interview in Tehran, 
29.09.2013 
16 Seyed Abdulmajid Mirdamadi, former 
head of Center for Interfaith Dialogue, 
ICRO 
Interview in Tehran, 
12.10.2013 
17 Ali Abtahi, head of NGO of dialogue 
among religions 




18 Abdulkarim Soroush,  theology 
researcher  
Interview in Duisburg, 
01.12.2012 
19 Mohammad Masjedjamei, former 
director of cultural office of Iranian 
foreign affairs ministry  
Interview in Tehran, 
17.10.2013 






Table 15.German participants in first round of interviews 
Group   
Number of Interviewees: 24 
Name and position of interviewee 
 
Form and date of interview 
Political  1 Otto Graf, head, director of the Cultural 
Section of German Embassy in Tehran 
Interview in Tehran, 
25.09.2014 
2 Bernd Erbel  
-former Ambassador in Iran 
Interview in Berlin, 
24.06.2015 
3 Heinrich Kreft, Commissioner for 






4 Enzio Wetzel, Head of section of Culture 
and Development, Goethe Institute in 
Munich 
Email, 08.07.2014 and 
15.07.2014 
5 Katrin Schaarschmidt, from Division 
National Contact Point Mobility, 
EURAXESS, Programme Information 
Coordinator of AvH 
Email, 16.06.2014 and 
09.05.2014  
6 Sebastian Kraußer, from Department 
Strategy and External Relations Division 
Press, AvH  
 Email, 16.05.2014,  
7 Niloufar Houssaini, from Cross-Cultural-
Praktika department of ifa 
Informal conversation, 
11.08.2014 
8 Tim Hülquist, from CrossCulture Plus of 
ifa 
Interview, 11.08.2014 
9 Inka Löck, from German-Arab 
Transformation Partnership and Cultural 
Dialogue, DAAD 
Interview, 19.08.2014 
10 Maike Thier, head of press section of the 
embassy 
Interview in Tehran, 
25.09.2014 
11 Klaus Streicher, from dialogue with 
Islamic world section, foreign affairs 
ministry  
Interview in Berlin, 
08.07.2014 
12 Fatima Chahin-Dörflinger, staff of the 
Foreign service at the Tehran German 
Embassy School/ DBST 




13 Bauch, office 602, media and culture 
department of the foreign affairs ministry  
Interview in Berlin, 
26.08.2014 
14 Martin Finkenberger, Email communication,  
21 Mohammad Kazem Anbarlooee, 
journalist of Resalt newspaper 
Interview in Tehran, 
20.09.2013 
22 Sasan Tavassoli, researcher in theology  Skype interview, 
03.03.2015 
23 Fatemeh Sadr, volunteer organizer of 
dialogue, Dialogue Center of Imam 
Musa sadr 
Interview in Düsseldorf, 
21.08.2014 
24 Hadi Khaniki, member of founding 
board of NGO of dialogue among 
civilization  
Interview in Tehran, 
19.09.2013 




Staff of PAD,  2014.11.04 
15 Dennis Schroeder, director of IC of 





Renate Dietrich: head of Arab 
Transformation Partnership and Cultural 
Dialogue; and Alexander Haridi: head of 





18 Mohammad-Javad Faridzadeh, former 
president of the ICDAC 
Interview, 18.10.2013 
19 Rainer Buhtz, head of contact office of 
Goethe Institute in German embassy in 
Tehran 
Interview, 03.10.2014 
20 Kurt-Jürgen Maaß, former general 
secretary of ifa 
Interview in Stuttgart, 
16.06.2015 
21 Eva Sodeik-Zecha, head of program of 
Cross-Cultural Praktika, ifa 
Interview in Stuttgart, 
11.08.2014 
22 Martin Affolderbach, former-Speaker for 




23 Omid Nouripour, member of German 
Parliament  
Interview in Berlin, 
27.08.2014 
24 Udo Steinbach, researcher in political 
science  




Appendix3: Interview Data of the second round 
Table 16. Iranian participants in the second round of interviews 
Group  Number of interviewees:  16 
Name and position of interviewee Form and date of 
communication 
Political  1 Mohammad Rajabi, former director of 
Rayzani in Germany 
Telephone interview, 
28.01.2016 
2 Mostafa Tork Zahrani, former head of 
think tank of IPIS 
Interview in Tehran, 
24.09.2014 
3 Seyed Vahid Karimi, head of 
department of Europe and America, 
diplomat,  
Interview in Tehran, 
24.09.2014 
4 Kamal Kharazi, former Foreign affairs 
minister  
Interview in Tehran, 
24.09.2014 
5 Seyed Hossein Mousavaian, former 
Iranian ambassador in Germany, 
diplomat 
Email contact, 03.11.2015 
Informed 
individual 
6 Mohammad Khatami, former president  Interview in Tehran, 
30.09.2014 
7 Ahmad Naghibzadeh, research in 





8 Attaollah Mohajerani, former President 
of the ICDAC  
Interview in London, 
31.01.2014 
9 Reza Maleki- former head of Education 
department of ICRO  




10 Amir Akrami, former head of center 
for interreligious dialogue, ICRO  
Skype interview, 12.04.2015 
11 Ali Moujani, a head of Rayzani of Iran 
in Berlin 




12 Mehran Movahedifar, head of cultural 
office of Iranian embassy in Germany 
Informal conversation in 
Berlin, 25.06.2015 
13 Alireza Aghaee Telephone Interview, 
29.03.2016 
Participant  14 Seyed Javad Miri, lecturer at institute 




15 Edris Daryoushi, student on DAAD 
exchange  
Interview in Duisburg, 
26.01.2016 
16 Younes Nourbakhsh, lecturer at 





Table 17. German participants in the second round of interviews 
 Number of participant: 15 
 
Name and position of interviewee Form and date of communication  
Political  1 Hans-Günter Gnodtke, former 
Commissioner for Dialogue with 
the Islamic World 
Skype interview, 23.01.2016 
2 Gunter Mulack, former 
Commissioner for Dialogue with 
the Islamic World, diplomat 
Interview in Berlin, 26.06.2015 
Informed 
individual 
3 Matthias Küntzel, researcher in 
political science  
Telephone interview, 22.01.2016 
4 
 
Benjamin Weinthal, journalist from 
the Jerusalem Post  
Skype interview, 07.11.2015 
High ranking 
officials 
5 Ronald Grätz, General Secretary of 
ifa 
Interview in Düsseldorf, 31.12.2015 
6 
 
Odila Triebel, head of department 
of dialogue, ifa 
Interview in Stuttgart, 18.11.2014 
Members of 
staff 
7 Stefanie Notz, team member of 
“Iran-force”, foreign affairs 
ministry  





Petra Drexler: working in dialogue 
with Islamic world section; 
Miriam Tutakhel: member of 
culture and media department of 
foreign affairs ministry 
Group conversation in Berlin, 
13.11.2015 
10 Sussan Riazi, the former head of 
Dialogue Point of Goethe Institute 
in Tehran 
Informal conversation in Cologne, 
05.05.2016 
Participant 11 Jochen Hippler, researcher in 
political science and organizer of 




12 Jan Honrath, organizer of DAAD 
exchange  
Interview in Duisburg, 03.02.2016 
13 Gesila and Manfred Grüter, 
volunteer organizers  
Email contact, 23.01.2016 
14 Anika Mahla, student on DAAD 
exchange  
Interview in Duisburg, 26.01.2016 
15 Hamideh Mohagheghi, researcher 
in Paderborn university, organizer 
in DAAD exchange   
Telephone interview, 23.01.2016 
 
 
Appendix4: Guide questions from interviewees 
Table 18. Guide questions from participants in the first round of the study 
Group  Guide questions 
Politicians Initial open-ended questions: 
 Why do Iran/Germany have an approach to construct intercultural 
dialogue with other countries, in your view? When did it start? Was it 
interrupted? Why? Any specific approach towards Iran/Germany? Why? 
 Can you tell me what have been the reasons that intercultural dialogue 
has attracted attention from the foreign affairs ministry/----/----? What is 
the meaning of intercultural dialogue, to your mind? 
 When would you say was the beginning? When has your experience 
regarding this topic started? 
Intermediate questions: 
 How did it develope? Which actors and institutions did you have in mind 
which play key role? 
 Which institutions and actors do you have in mind which could play a 
key role? 
 Was Iran a partner of ‘dialogue with Muslim countries’ for Germany? 
why? why not? 
 In the case of Germany: I have read in annual reports that institute X and 
Y was mentioned more? Do you know why? 
 In the case of Iran: I did not see any annual report in the foreign affairs 
ministry or archive of the national library regarding intercultural 
dialogue activities of Iran or foreign cultural policy? Do you know how 
can I get information in that regard? What happened to the ICDAC? 
Why did it not continue its work? 
Ending questions:  
 What do you think were the most important results of intercultural 
dialogue activities? What were the main obstacles? Why? 
 After having these experiences, what is your approach for the future? 
Would they continue? Why? Why not? 
 Is there something you might want to add? 
 Is there anybody in this field that you recommend I meet? Can you give 





Initial open-ended questions: 
 What are the main aims your institute tries to reach? Why do you think 









 When did this program start? How did your institute get budget 
resources? 
 When did your experience regarding this topic start? 
Intermediate questions: 
 How has it developed? Which mechanisms have been used in relevant 
dialogue programs? Why? 
 Which programs have been specifically regarding Iran? Why? Why not?  
 In the case of Iran: how can I access any archive, annual report or 
document to inform myself about your relevant projects? 
 In the case of Germany: I did not have access to a few annual reports. 
How can I see them? Is there any other document which can give me 
information? 
 How was the status of your relationship with state/foreign affairs 
ministry/ presidency/parliament? Did they ask your advice because you 
have cultural contact with Iran/Germany? Why? 
 What was the nature of your relationship with other German and Iranian 
institutes? Any cooperation? Why?  
Ending questions: 
 What have been the advantages of these programs? Did you reach your 
aims in the end? 
 Is there something you might want to add? 
 Is there anybody in this field that you recommend I meet? Can you give 




Initial open-ended questions: 
 Why did Iran/Germany have an approach to construct intercultural 
dialogue with other countries, in your view? When did it start? Was it 
interrupted? Why? Any specific approach towards Iran/Germany? Why? 
Intermediate questions: 
 What have been your criticize regarding that? 
 Do you know of some intercultural dialogue projects between Iran and 
Germany? Were they successful? Why? Why not? 
 In the case of Iran: what do you think about the idea of ‘dialogue among 
civilizations’? Could it play a role in foreign cultural policy? Why? Why 
not? 
 In the case of Germany: what do you think about the idea of ‘dialogue 
with Islam’? Could it play a role in the foreign cultural policy of 
Germany? Why? Why not? 
Ending questions: 
 What have been the advantages of these programs? Did you reach your 
aims in the end? 
 Is there something you might want to add? 
 Is there anybody in this field that you recommend I meet? Can you give 
me his contact details? Can I mention your name when I contact this 
person? 
 
Table 19. Guide questions from participants in the second round of interviews 




 What in your view is the main obstacle and problem as well as a strong 









 Why was Iran/Germany not a priority of foreign cultural policy of 
Germany/Iran? Why did the specific discourse of intercultural dialogue 
not reach Iranian/German participants? 
 Why was institutional cooperation between Iran and Germany 
regarding the issue of intercultural dialogue so low?  
Participants  Initial open-ended questions: 
 How did you get to know about this program? What was the 
application procedure? 
 Why did you have an interest in Iran/Germany? 
Intermediate questions: 
 Tell me about your experience compared with other experiences? 
 What have been the strong points and obstacles of this project?  
Ending questions:  




Appendix 5. Budget of ICRO and the ICDAC 
Table 20. Amount of budget dedicated to the ICDAC and ICRO by the Iranian 
Parliament. Table compiled by the researcher from the source of Iranian parliament 
budget law. 
Year  The ICDAC 
Budget Code: 101045 
ICRO, Budget Code: 114028 
 
 RIL Euro RIL Euro 
1376/
1997 
  Total: 75,500,000 
(1000 Rial) 
Spent abroad: 
43,920,000 (Plan and 
Budget Organization 
1376 [1997]: 21) 
1 Euro theoretical rate:  
=2, 197 IRR-Iran  




  Total: 79,500,000 
(1000 Rial) 
Spent broad: 
47,500,000 (Plan and 
Budget Organization 
1377 [1998]: 36) 
1 Euro theoretical rate 
=, 916 IRR-Iran  
 




  Total: 76,500,000 
(1000 Rial) 
Spent abroad: 
44,715,000 (Plan and 
Budget Organization 
1378 [1999]: 42) 
1 Euro theoretical rate 
= 2. 046. IRR-Iran  
 
= 37. 389. 267.73 Euro/€ 
1379/
2000 
  Total: 84,323,000 
(1000 Rial) 
Spent abroad: 
48,240,000 (Plan and 
Budget Organization 
1379 [2000]: 61) 
1 Euro theoretical rate 
=1, 773 IRR-Iran 
= 47, 552, 872.95 Euro/€ 
1380/ 
2001 
  Total: 97,230,000 
(1000 Rial) 
Spent abroad: 
1 Euro theoretical rate 
=1,573 IRR-Iran 
54, 831, 609.85 = Euro/€ 
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54,000,000 (Plan and 
Budget Organization 




















1 Euro rate= 1,531 
IRR-Iran 
 









1 Euro rate= 8 
908 
IRR-Iran 





(Plan and Budget 
Organization 1383 
[2004]-b: 643) 
1 Euro rate= 8, 908 
IRR-Iran 
 











1 Euro rate= 
10384 IRR-Iran 
 








1 Euro rate= 10,384 IRR-
Iran 
 
=21, 493, 001.01 Euro 
1384/
2005 
--- no budget 
can be seen in 
the Budget 
law 




(Plan and Budget 
Organization 1385 
[2006]: 237-238) 
1 Euro rate= 11, 709 
IRR-Iran 
 
= 21, 783, 874.34 Euro/€ 
1385/
2006 
  368,590 (in million 
Rial)  





1 Euro rate= 11, 087 
IRR-Iran 
 
= 33, 245, 581.62 Euro/€ 
1386/
2007 
  No information found  
1387/
2008 
  Total: 584,261 (in 
million Rial) 
 





1 Euro rate= 13, 928 
IRR-Iran  




  747,648 (in million 
Rial) 
 (Plan and Strategic 
Supervision 
Department of 
1 Euro rate= 13, 162 
IRR-Iran 







  955,496 (in million 
Rial) 





1 Euro rate= 13, 377 
IRR-Iran 
 
=71, 429, 407.24 Euro/€ 
1390/
2011 
  1,232,691 (in million 
Rial) 










=84, 821, 049.81 
1391/
2012 
  1,698,827 million 
Rial 











=113, 293, 749.5 
1392/
2013 
  ICRO+ Taqrib+Ahl-
Bayt+ Uni Ahl-Bayt+ 
uni islamic religions  
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Collection budget:  
112, 542, 726.4 Euro/€ 
 
 
ICRO: 70, 339, 046.39 
Euro/€ 
Source: The rate from RIL to Euro is converted with the help of an online tool (currency 







Appendix 6. Iranian cultural Organizations  
 
Table 21. Institutes and organizations which implemented cultural activities under 
discourses of interfaith dialogue and dialogue among civilizations, from 1998 to 2013 
Institutes  Activity  Time 
The Organization of cultural 
Documentation of Islamic 
Revolution of Iran, with help of 
the Ministry of Culture and 
Islamic Guidance, and the 
Institute for Political and  
international Studies of the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry 
organized it.  
(Allahyari 1998, Daneshname-
ye Islami 1999, Ketab-e Mah-e 
Din 1998, Organization of 
cultural Documentation of 
Islamic Revolution 1377 
[1998]) 
Conference of “essence of 
dialogue among civilizations” 
[Chisti-ye goftegoo-ye tamadon 
ha] was hold in Teheran. 
international thinkers-book 47 
selected articles.  
 
on 13.12.1998 (22-23 Azar, 
1377), 
No Information about the actor Conference of dialogue 
between civilizations of Iran 
and Spain 
1998 (Teheran), 1999 
(Madrid) 
No Information about the actors Festival of dialogue among 
civilizations 
1999 (Esfand 1377) 
The International center of 
dialogue among civilizations  
Festival of Dialogue among 
Civilizations , activities such as 
Calligraphy (IRNA 2013) 
2000 (1380 0r 1379) 
Mofid university of Qum 
(Din Pajoohan Journal 2001a, 
Din Pajoohan Journal 2001b) 
Conference of Human Rights 
and Dialogue among 
Civilizations 
 
5th and 6th May 2001, (15th 
and 16th Ordibehesht, 1380 ) 
 
Center for Women's 
Participation- President office 
(Center for Women's 
Participation 2003) 
Conference of Woman in 
dialogue among civilizations  
22, January 2001, 1379, in 
IPIS 
No Information about the actors Conference of Press media, 
serenity and dialogue among 
civilizations 
2001 (1379) 
Students  Second forum of Student 
Dialogue among civilizations 
communities  
September 2001 (Mehr, 
1380) 
University of Tarbiat Modares, 
African Studies Department, 
The international center of 
dialogue among civilizations, 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the 
National Commission of 
UNESCO, the organization of 
Conference of Cultural-
Civilizaitonal relations between 




Islamic culture and relations,  
(Hafeznia 2001) 
University of Sharif and Roshd 
NGO 
Precursors of Dialogue among 
Civilizations 
2001 (1380) 
The International center of 
dialogue among civilizations 
(Habibi 2001) 
Second International 
Conference of Nowruz and 
dialogue among civilizations  
2001 (1380) , in Arg Bam 
The International center of 
dialogue among civilizations, 
and the office for Public 
Relations and International 
Affairs of the Kish Free Zone 
Organization 
(Eskandarfar et al. 2005) 
Seminar of Fiction and 
Dialogue among Civilizations  
2001 (Esfand, 1380), Kish 
The Ministry of Cooperation 
[Vezarat-e Ta-a-von] 
Conference of Public Relations 
and Dialogue among 
Civilizations 
2001 (Esfand 1379) 
University of Medicine, Ahvaz  
(2001) 
Conference of Khozestan and 
Dialogue among Civilizations  
2001 (29-30 Azar 1380) 
Academy of Art, international 
center of dialogue among 
civilizations, 
(Jame Jam Online 06.10.2001) 
Conference of Meaning of Art, 
for six weeks  
Clip-Announce of the 
conference by Alireza 
Eftekhari (Golpaigani 2001) 
Showing movies (Jame Jam 
Online 13.10.2001) 
2001 (Mehr 1380),  
the Cultural attaché of Belgrade, 
part of the organization of 
Islamic culture and relations, 
Ministry of Minority Affairs of 
Yugoslavia, Belgrade 140 
Dialogue among Civilizations 
in Belgrade  
June, 2001 
 
the Cultural attaché Tajikistan, 
The organization of Islamic 
culture and relations 
Dialogue among civilizations, 
participants from Iran, 
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan   
June, 2001 
University of Pretoria and 
Embassy of Iran, South Africa 
(Khatami et al. 2001) 




Imam Sadr Institute in Lebanon  
(Nasser 2001) 
The 6th annual Conference of 
Common Terms focus on 
“dialogue among civilizations” 
in Lebanon, with message of 
November, 2001 
                                                          
140 Another reference is about holding a conference in Organized by the Presidency of the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization in 2003. In this conference Ahmed Jalali, the representative of Iran in UN, 
participated Trajkovski, Boris/Matsuura, Koichiro /Moisiu, Alfred/Covic, Dragan/Parvanov, 
Georgi/Mesic, Stjepan /Drnovsek, Janes/Madl, Ferenc/Marovic, Svetozar/Picco, 
Giandomenico/Schneier, Arthur/Mitreva, Ilinka/Gligorov, Kiro/Zhelev, Zhelyu/Holkeri, Harri/Jalali, 
Ahmed/Bousnina, Mongi/Abramian, Ara 2004: Dialogue among Civilizations: The Regional Forum 
on Dialogue among Civilizations Ohrid, 29 and 30 August 2003: UNESCO.  
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Khatami and Pope 
International center of dialogue 
among civilizations, Center of 
Strategic Center of Damascus 
university  
Conference “how do we 
continue dialogue among 
civilizations?” 
January, 2001 
Organization of Sport and 
Center of Women’s 
Participation  
Conference of Woman, sport 
and dialogue among 
civilizations 
2002, 1380 
No Information about the actors Conference of urbanization and 
dialogue among civilization 
2002 (1381), Shahr-e Rey 
No Information about the actors Conference of urbanization and 
dialogue among civilization 
2002, (khordad, 1381) 
Isfahan 
The Municipal of Mashhad Conference of City and 
dialogue  
2002, (Tir, 1381), Mashahd 
International Center of Dialogue 
Among Civilizations, University 
of Shiraz, Office of Culture and 
Guidance of Province of Fars, 
Organization of Tourism, and 
Foundation of Fars Studies  
Conference on "Iran and the 
West in the mirror of each 
others thoughts" 
 
November, 2002, (Aban 
1381) 
Organization of Beatification of 
city of Teheran [sazman-e ziba 
sazi-ye shahr-e Teheran], which 
is part of Mayoralty of Teheran,  
(Art and Architecture Journal 
2003) 
Monument of Dialogue among 
Civilizations 
The painting is in 10 in 7 m, 
constructed by colorful mosaic. 
Painting was done by Parviz 
Heidarzade and designed by 
Seyed Hamed Mahdavi. 
 
March, 2003 (Esfand, 1381) 
University of  Mohammed bin 
Abdullah from Morocco, 
International Center of Dialogue 
among Civilizations, President 
office, Organization of Islamic 
Culture and Relations, 
Organization of Youth, 
Industrial university of Isfahan, 
Governorship and Municipal of 
Isfahan  
Conference of role of 
Language in Dialogue among 
Civilizations (Aref 2004) 
May 2004 (Ordibehesht, 
1381), in Isfahan university 
Ministry of Higher Education, 
the society of students of the 
universities of Iran 
Three days Forum of Student 
Dialogue among civilizations 
communities (Mehr News 
07.06.2007) 
2007 (1386) 
The Iranian Cultural attaché of 
Tajikistan, The organization of 
Islamic culture and relations 
And  Strategic Research Center, 
President office of Tajikistan 
(ICRO 2008) 
Conference of “Dialogue 
among civilizations, Paste and 
today”, Ayatollah Taskhiri, the 
head of  
World Forum for Proximity of 
Islamic Schools participated   
October 2008 (Mehr, 13879) 
Source: the original sources which are used to make the list are in Farsi, they are 





Appendix 7. German-Iranian university projects under “German-Arabic / 
Iranian university dialogue” 
 
Table 22. list of German and Iranian universities which cooperated with support of 
DAAD from 2006 to 2013 





University of Berlin,  
Iran: Iran University of 
Science and Technology 
[Dānešgāh-e Elm va 
San’at] 
Egypt: Cairo University,  
Turkey: Istanbul 







Study trip, meeting, teaching 
lectures, Summer School, 
workshop, establishing website 
on Participatory Urban 
Regeneration 
 
The project addresses the idea 
of citizen participation in the 
process of urban regeneration 
through case studies in the four 





Institute of the 
University of Frankfurt 
am Main and Institute for 
Religion and Jewish 
Studies of the University 
of Potsdam 





Studies section  
Developing 
Comparative 
Methods in Religious 
Studies 
Project director: Prof. 
Dr. Catherina Wenzel 
Study trip, workshop, excursion, 
Summer School, student and 
professor exchanges, visiting 
religious figures, co-research 
and publication, seminar  
 
The project concentrates on 
using comparative methods to 
discuss topics such as “Religion 
and secularization”. Teachers 
and students of the four 
universities plan to further 
deepen the discourse on 
methods, using relevant 
publications on secularization 






Iran: Isfahan University  
Globalization and 
Health 
in the field of 
Psychotherapy  
Project director: Prof. 
Dr. Carl Eduard 
Scheidt 
Summer school, PhD 
dissertations, post-doc, MA 
thesis, exchange of Iranian 
physicians, curriculum 
 
The project is aimed at 
discussing the issue of handling 
psychological and 
psychosomatic conditions using 
different cultural and 
professional experiences of the 







Essen University,  
Iran: Bushehr University 






the Cairo University  
Indonesia: the Institute 
Teknologi Bandung/ 




Prof. Dr. André 
Niemann 
Study trip, workshop, network 
meeting, online-cooperation on 
project, planning to establish a 
new training program at Master 
and PhD level on water 
management, excursion and 
visits to traditional water 
structure in cities such as Berlin 
and Yazd, networking between 
teachers and young scholars  
 
The project focused on 
historical context, current status 
and the requirements of the 
Water Management Systems in 
Germany and in three Muslim 
countries. Having mixed groups 
on both a national level -Arab, 
Iranian, south Asian and 
German- and religious level- 
Muslim and Christian- was one 
of the characteristics of the 




Essen University  
Iran: University of 
Tehran/Faculty of World 
Studies, Institute for 
Humanities and Cultural 
Studies, Center for 
Strategic Research 
Morocco: Mohammed V 
-Soussi University Rabat, 
University of Al 
Akhawayn Ifrane,  
Pakistan: Quaid-i-Azam 
University, Islamabad, 
Political Studies section 
Peaceful Change and 
Violent Conflict – 
The Transformation 
of the Middle East 
and Western-Muslim 
Relations 
Project director: PD. 
Dr. Jochen Hippler 
Student exchange, network and 
planning meeting, Summer 
School, workshop and seminar, 
excursion, co-writing articles, 
website, visiting religious, 
political and civil society 
figures  
 
The project is on the issue of 
“Arab Spring”, designed to 
bring alive discussion among 
the students, researchers and 
professors of the region about 
social political change in the 





Iran: University of 
Religions and 
Denominations Qom, 
University of Al-Mustafa 
International Qom 
Lebanon:  University of 
Saint Joseph de Beyrouth  
Theological 
University Dialogue 
Paderborn - Qom - 
Beirut 
 
Project director: Prof. 
Dr. Klaus von Stosch  
Study trip, workshop, Summer 
School, seminar, exchange of 
professors and students, co-
writing teaching booklet  
 
The project focused on the issue 
of “interfaith dialogue” and its  
relevance in directing scientific 
discussions in Catholic and Shia 
Studies. Having mixed working-
groups on different levels of 
university, nationality and 
religion was one of the 
characteristics of this 







Iran: University of 
Tehran  
Egypt: University of 
Alexandria, 
Jordan: American 
University Madaba, the 
German Jordanian 
University Amman,  
Turkey: Istanbul Sehir 
University 
Urban Minorities  
In the field of Urban 
? and Geography 
 
Project Director: Dr. 
Frank Eckardt  
Study travel, joint project, 
workshop, conference, final 
publication of the results of the  
project 
 
The project focuses on 
marginalized groups. On the one 
hand, this is done by dealing 
with “outsider” groups, for 
instance in Germany, their 
target region and their specific 
legal, social and urban space; on 
the other hand, the reception, 
communication and 
confrontation between the 
“West” and the “Middle East” 





Iran: Tehran University 
and Hamadan University  
Linguistics as a 
paradigm in cultural 
dialogue 
 





research and teaching 
 
Project director: Prof. 
Dr. Ludwig Paul 
Exchange in research and 
teaching, summer school, 
workshop, experience of new 
tutor and mentor systems in 
teaching 
 
The project aims at bundling 
several years of working 
relations in the field of Iranian 
linguistics with two Iranian 
universities and deepening 
them. It also aims to achieve a 
new quality of exchange 





Institute of Technology 
(KIT)  
Iran: Tehran University 
of Medical Science 














Discussion in working groups, 
"Train the Trainer" seminar, 
workshop, summer schools, 
conference, short courses on the 
project theme, structuring 
Master’s program, construction 
of first Facility Management 
Competence Center in 
Iran,congress on project topic 
 
The dialogue-oriented program 
is directed by the KIT university 
to introduce a specific 
management in Iranian health 
institutions and met with a high 
level of cooperation from the 
students and professors of 
Isfahan and Tehran Universities, 














In the field of Iran 
studies  
Project director: Prof. 
Birgitt Hoffmann 
Possible: Prof. Hoffmann in 
July 2011 had a specialized 
lecture for lecturers of the 
University of Shahid Beheshti 
in the field of Iranian studies 
(DAAD 2011c), workshops in 
Bamberg and Tehran, research 
stays of scholars and students 
 
The main issue was 
“Reiseberichte” [travelogues] 
and translation. In the seminar, 
some reports which were 
written in German about Iran 
were translated to Farsi, and 
vice versa. This project was to 
maintain that the text represents 
reality, therefore questions such 
as “what was the motivation of 
the writer?” and “what was the 
focused interest of the writer?” 
must be considered in the 
process of translation.  
2010-
2012 




Iran: University of 
Tehran/School of 
Electrical and Computer 
Engineering 
IT, Culture and 
Gender: Research 
Exchanges in German 





Project directors: in 
2012, Prof. Dr. Lars 
Schwabe; in 
2010/2011, Prof. Dr. 
Djamshid 
Tavangarian 
Common projects, workshop, 
Communication Seminar, 
participation in cultural events 
and excursion, writing and 
publishing results of the three-
year project in a study, study 
stay for MA students at the 
University of Rostock under 
supervision of Tehran and 
Rostock University professors, 
 
The aim of the project is to 
allow Iranian female students 
from engineering sciences to 
collaborate with German 
students and scientists on 
handling shared current 
technical issues and reflecting 
the intercultural processes 




Iran: Tehran University 









In the field of 
geography  
 
Project director: Prof. 
Dr. Achim Bräuning 
 
Study travel, scientific lectures 
especially via internet portal, 
directing discussions in 
intercultural groups 
 
The project was on the topic of 
"Forestry and Wood Science" 
and "Agriculture and Natural 
Resources". It aims at 
sustainable networking between 
the participating institutions and 
universities in Iran and 
modernization and networking 
of teaching content and teaching 
methods in Iran, and promoting 
intercultural dialogue though 
jointworks and conceptualizing 
the administrative  regulations 
which are needed in natural risk 
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University of Berlin 
Iran: Shahid Beheshti 
University, Hamyaran 
Iran NGO Resource 
Centre, Building and 





 and several other 
universities and 
institutions from Algeria, 









In the field of 
Applied Geosciences  
 
Project director: Prof. 
Dr. Rudolf Schäfer, 
TU Berlin  
Common projects, teaching 
program, research and planning  
   
The project is to implement 
concrete measures to promote 
the sustainable design of living 
spaces in the target region and 
build a stable management 
structure. Before the project 
ended, MENASHDA formed an 
international association to 





Germany: University of 
Wuppertal 
Iran: Isfahan University 
of Technology  
+University of Shiraz  
Earthquake-Proof 
Housing in Iran: Joint 
master and joint PhD 




Director of project: 
Prof. Dr. Georg 
Pegels  
  
Summer school, common 
project to build a Fachwerkhaus 
[a model house], establishing 
joint Master and PhD course of 
studies  
 
The project was to create a 
network between German and 
Iranian engineers to share and 
develop experience of 
earthquake-proof housing. 
Given that Iran is located in a 
high-risk earthquake region and 
German firms are looking for 
experts, networking makes more 





Iran: University of 
Tehran 
Lebanon: American 
University of Beirut  
Jordan: University of 
Jordan/ UoJ, University 
of Yrmouk Marine 
Science Station  
Yemen: University of 
Sanaa  






In the field of Marine 
Zoology 





Networking, teaching programs, 
field study research, excursion 
inside Yemen and Iran, partly 
participation in field of PhD 
dissertations and regional 
curriculum, congress and 
presentation of project results  
 
The project aimed firstly to 
establish scientific exchange 
and was founded to aid 
understanding of biodiversity 
and biodiversity informatics 
practices in the specific local 
context; secondly to establish a 
new biodiversity informatics 
subject at the partner 
universities and to include it in 
the teaching system; and thirdly 
to contribute to the development 
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of a knowledge-based society, 
extending the results of the 




University, Faculty of 
Forest Sciences/Forest 







University and Research 
Institute of Forests and 
Rangelands of Iran 
Sustainable Forestry 
Management 
Concepts to ensure 
Domestic Wood 
Supply in Iran 




Prof. Dr. Alireza 
Kharazipour 
Study trip, developing some 
parts of the botanic gardens of 
Iran and Germany, common 
research project, co-writing and 
publishing relevant articles  
 
The aim of the project was to 
create a German-Iranian 
network and develop the 
sustainable forest management 
concepts to secure domestic raw 
wood supply and to support 
reforestation of earthquake-hit 








University of Babelsberg 
Konrad Wolf  





First: Talking Youth- 
2015-2017  
Project director: Prof. 
Martin Steyer 
 




Project director: Prof. 
Michael Hammon, 
2007-2009 
Study trip, developing and 
directing short films together, 
showing the product at the 
foreign office in Berlin, 
publishing DVD and BluRay 
version of the production  
 
The project was to encourage 
young film-makers of both 
countries to develop and direct 
movies together, each film 
about the guest country, subjects 
such as “worker”, “football 
fans” and “fan culture”. The 
project was done in two period 




Osnabrück, Institute of 
Theaterpädagogik 
Iran: University of 
Tarbiat Modares, 
department of Theater  
+ Tehran University, 
University of Theater 
and Film, Islamic Azad 






Study travel, joint play, 
presentation of theater plays, 
active discussion of each other's 
artistic and didactic procedures 
in teaching and study of theater, 
playing a joint theater at 
international theater festivals in 
Osnabrück and Tehran, 
teaching in theater education 
courses by Osnabrück 
 
The project aimed at extending 
scientific, cultural and artistic 
dialogue between young Iranian 
and German teacher training 
students, to consolidate and 
expand their experiences 















Local Actions in 
Regional 
Development  
In the field of 
Geography and 
Conference between scholars of 
the universities, initial 
conference to focus on 
Geography and Geosciences in 
Northern Iran (ZEU 2008: 35) 
 
It seems that it was an 
orientation visit and seminar 
that took place in Iran, but it did 
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Azad University  Geology 
Project director: Prof. 
Dr. Andreas 
Dittmann 
not continue as a project in the 
subsequent years. 
2006 Germany: Technical 
University of Munich 
Iran: University of 




Processes to assist 
with diagnosis and 
surgery 




Project director: Prof. 
Nassir Navab 
Workshop held for students and 
professor exchanges.  






Appendix 8: Iranian scholarship holders of ifa’s CCP program  
 
Table 23. List of Iranian scholarshipholders of the CCP program, from 2005 to 2013 
Time  Sending Organization Host Organization  
2013 Fatemeh Ahmadi Kamali from Center for 
Sustainable Development and 
Environment 
Michael-Succow-Stiftung, Greifswald 
2013 Heiko Hanke from the Deutsch-Iranische 
Krebshilfe e.V., Friedberg 
Gesundheitskampagne "5 am Tag Iran-
Deutschland", Deutsche Botschaftsschule 
Iran, Tehran 
2012 Niloofar Shahrasebi from an Iranian 
NGO, Qazvin 
Medica Mondiale, Köln 
2012 Fezzeh Gholamreza Kashi from Tarh O 
Manzar Institute, Tehran 
Arnold Bergsträsser Institut in Freiburg 
2012 Mehran Aliasghazadeh from 
Construction Company Jahanfaraz, 
Gorgan 
Umwelt-Campus Birkenfeld in Trier 
2011 Fatemeh Ziaeyan Bahri from 
Conservation and Watershed 
Management Research 
Institute/Department of Coastal 
Protection, Tehran,  
Integrated School of Ocean Sciences/ISOS, 
Cluster of Excellence "The Future Ocean", 
Kiel 
2010 Hoda Shakib Manesh from Institute for 
Trade Studies and Research, Tehran 
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht, Hamburg 
2009 Tirazheh Zare Garizy from Iranian 
Resources& Engineering 
Management/IREM Co, Tehran 
p2m berlin GmbH, Berlin 
 
2008 Neda Nazmi from International Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 
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2007 Hannah Kaviani from Atieh Bahar 
Consulting, city of Tehran 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 
Berlin 
2007 Marjam Ghaffari from Dr. Shirin Ebady 
Advocacy Office, Tehran  
IGFM, Frankfurt 
2006 Seyed Emadeddin Tabatabaei from 
Imam Mussa Sadr Stiftung, and Institute 
of Culture and Art "Nogteh Atf", Tehran  
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht, Freiburg 
2006 Firouz Mahmoudi from faculty of Law 
and Political Science – Tehran 
University, Tehran 
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht, Freiburg 
2005 Leila Alikarimi from Centre for 
Defenders of Human Rights/ CDHR, 
Tehran 
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht, Hamburg 
Source: ifa (2016); worked out by the researcher 
 
 
Appendix 9: Intercultural dialogue projects with central role of the Grüter 
family 
 
Table 24. List of intercultural activities that Grüter family organnzed from 2003 to 2013 
Time  Program  Projects  
 
2003 School Exchange  
KLS and Shohadaye 
Kargar School 
Study travel to Tehran  







School Exchange  
SKL and Shohadaye 
Kargar School 
Study travel to Berlin  
Six pupils, boy and girls, four teachers (Lohse 14.03.2004) 
from Shohadaye Kargar School 
Participation in school-
network conference of 
the Iranian Science and 
Art Foundation 
Study travel to Tehran and Isfahan by two German teachers 
and three pupils to participate in the conference which was 
organized by Iranian school network of the Science and Art 







school and KLS 
Study travel to Berlin by Iranian pupils to present projects 
on the issues of earthquakes, training seminar by a professor 
from Potsdam University, Geological Research Institute, 
traveling to different cities  
Participation in school-
network conference of 
the Iranian Science and 
Art Foundation 
Travel by one teacher and one female pupil from KLS to 
town of Neishabour to present a PowerPoint on “dialogue 




Youth in Dialog -  
Cooperation in three 
projects: Biography 
research, practice 
period and internet 
portal 
 
Two to three visits to Tehran and Berlin by pupils of KLS 
and Kherad High School (later the pupils of Mahdavi 
Educational Complex joined), together writing a biography 
of German figures in Iran and Iranian figures in Germany; 
(e.g. Gerhard Bachmann and Dr. Beheshti), internships in 
e.g. German company MAN and UNESCO, exchanging 
thoughts and experiences in internet portal www.Shula21.de, 
presenting result of earthquake and biography projects in 
some exhibitions in Tehran and Berlin, traveling to different 










Ten German pupils, boys and girls, participated together 
with a group of Iranian pupils, also boys and girls, in a 
fairytale puppet workshop which was held by the Iranian 
cultural organization, Kanon, and performed together a 

















Ten Iranian and eight German pupils presented a puppet 
performance: Goldapfelsins Tochter/Doxtar-e Nārenj va 
Toranj [Daughter of sour Orange], in the foreign affairs 




About 70 German and Iranian teachers, social and science 
researchers participated in a seminar in Berlin on issues such 
as cultural projects between the two countries, theoretical 
and practical aspects and vocational education system 
(Grüter 2009) 
Besides German universities and academic institutes, 
researchers of a project called “Young Cities” also 
participated. Young Cities was a “Developing Energy 
Efficient Urban Fabric” project supported by the German 
federal government from 2008 to 2013; it concentrated on 







German and Iranian teachers participated in a seminar in 
Tehran; the main issue was “Environmental Energy” and 
“not fossil energy” as well as the “Young Cities” project; 
visiting the main office of Kanoon in Tehran and excursion 
to Isfahan, visiting the participants of the last exchange and 





Photo workshop“I see 
something that you 
can’t see” 
 
Preparing photo workshops with Iranian and German pupils, 
taking photos together, printing the results as postalcards, 
photo exhibition; main org-partner: UNESCO Weltnaturerbe 
Wattenmeer (German-IRIB 2013) 
2011 “Kunst baut Brücken – 
Morgenland trifft 
Abendland” 
Holding Iranian calligraphy workshop and exhibition by 
Iranian artist: Sedaghat Jabbari, in Richard Haizmann 
Museum, Niebüll, which is located in Nordfriesland, a 
German-Danish region 
Org-partner: Hafis-Gesellschaft Hamburg 





A joined exhibition of calligraphy art of a German artist, 
Antje Glashagen-Stuck, and the Iranian artist Sedaghat 
Jabbari in Tehran, in National Library and Khane-ye 
Honarmandān  [Iran Art Forum]  
The org-partner: Evangelischen Kirche deutscher Sprachen 
eine Gemeinschaftsausstellung [the German Church]  
2013 “Kunst baut Brücken – 
Morgenland trifft 
Abendland”  
Holding exhibition and calligraphy workshop by a German 
artist group, lettera', in Iran Artists’ Forum and Iranian 
National Library, publishing book on activities of the project  
Org-partner: Hafis-Gesellschaft Hamburg 
Source: made by the researcher based on information of the Grüter family and some 
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